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Recent Decisions
The Maryland Court of Appeals
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Balancing Media Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings and the First
Amendment Freedom of the Press
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that a
court may restrict the media's publication of information obtained
from confidential juvenile hearings but may not prohibit publication
of information obtained from extra-judicial sources.' Further, the
court held that a juvenile court cannot require the media to publish
specific information as a prerequisite to access to juvenile proceed-
ings.3 In its decision, the Court of Appeals followed the trend set by
other state courts4 to permit media access to juvenile hearings but to
restrict publication.5 The result is a prior restraint on publication
which compromises the integrity of a free press.
1. The Case.-On January 17, 1995, the Baltimore City Circuit
Court (Division of Juvenile Causes) entered an order granting media
access to a previously closed juvenile court proceeding.6 The proceed-
1. 340 Md. 437, 667 A.2d 166 (1995).
2. Id. at 442-43, 667 A.2d at 169.
3. Id. at 443, 667 A.2d at 169.
4. See, e.g., In reMinor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1053-55 (Ill. 1992) (upholding the juvenile
court's order admitting the media to closedjuvenile proceedings on the condition that the
minor's identity not be revealed); Austin Daily Herald v. Mork, 507 N.W.2d 854, 857
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that media restrictions on publication of information
obtained during testimony ofjuvenile victims is permissible); In re H.N., 632 A.2d 537, 539
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (vacating order prohibiting media coverage of juvenile
proceedings only because it prohibited the media from publishing information that they
had lawfully obtained from extra-judicial sources); Edward A. Sherman Publ'g Co. v.
Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1259 (R.I. 1982) (allowing the juvenile court to prohibit the
media from publishing information obtained from the proceedings, but not permitting
the prohibition of information gleaned from nonjudicial sources).
5. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 449, 667 A.2d at 172.
6. Id. at 444, 667 A.2d at 169. The proceeding had been closed pursuant to section 3-
812(e) of the Maryland Code, which states: "The court shall conduct all hearings in an
informal manner. It may exclude the general public from a hearing, and admit only those
persons having a direct interest in the proceeding and their representatives." MD. CoDE
ANN., Crs. &JUD. PROC. § 3-812(e) (1995); see also MD. R. 910(b) ("The Uuvenile] hearing
... may be conducted out of the presence of all persons except those whose presence is
necessary or desirable."); MD. R. 921(a) ("Files and records of the court in juvenile pro-
656
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
ing concerned the location of Maurice M., a missing child whom the
Baltimore City Department of Social Services (DSS) had placed under
protective services.7 The order granting media access to the hearings
stipulated that "[a] ny reference to the respondent shall not be to his
full legal name; reference will be to 'Maurice' or 'Maurice M.'"" Nev-
ertheless, after gaining access, The Baltimore Sun (The Sun) published a
computer-enhanced image of the child and identified him as "Mau-
rice Bouknight."9 The newspaper had obtained the picture of Mau-
rice from the Baltimore City Police Department, not from the juvenile
court proceedings.1 °
Following this publication, the juvenile court conducted a hear-
ing to determine if the newspaper had violated the court's order
granting media access to the proceedings. The Sun argued that it
had inadvertently used the name "Bouknight" in the caption under
ceedings, including the docket entries and indices, are confidential and shall not be open
to inspection except by order of the court.").
Subsequent to this case, Maryland's legislature amended section 3-812 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article to allow juvenile court proceedings to be closed. See Act
of May 8, 1997, ch. 314, 1997 Md. Laws 759 (to be codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &Jun.
PROC. § 3-812). The amended statute takes effect on October 1, 1997, and requires open
court proceedings when a juvenile is charged with an offense that would be a felony if
committed by an adult, unless there is a showing of good cause that the proceedings be
closed. See id. (to be codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-
812(e) (3)). The legislature rejected changes that would require open proceedings absent
a showing of good cause when the proceedings concern a child in need of assistance or a
child charged with "an act that would be a misdemeanor if committed by an adult." Id.
7. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 443-44, 667 A.2d at 169. On January 23, 1987, DSS be-
came aware that the then three-month-old Maurice required the Department's assistance
when a local hospital admitted him with a broken leg. Id. at 443, 667 A.2d at 169. The
hospital also found evidence of other partially healed fractures. Id. On August 18, 1987,
the court placed Maurice under an order of protective services by DSS. Id. By April 7,
1988, however, Maurice's mother, Jacqueline Bouknight, refused to reveal her son's where-
abouts to DSS. Id. At one point, Ms. Bouknight claimed that Maurice's aunt in Texas had
the child, but a police investigation proved the story false. In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391,
395 n.5, 550 A.2d 1135, 1137 n.5 (1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 549 (1990). DSS expressed fear
that Ms. Bouknight's refusal to divulge her son's location indicated that he might be dead.
Id. When Ms. Bouknight refused to cooperate with DSS, the court ordered her jailed until
such time as she disclosed Maurice's whereabouts or produced him in court. Id. at 396,
550 A.2d at 1137. Ms. Bouknight remained in jail until 1995 when the court released her
under certain conditions pursuant to its continuing jurisdiction over the case. Baltimore
Sun, 340 Md. at 444, 667 A.2d at 169.
8. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 444, 667 A.2d at 169 (alteration in original).
9. Id Maurice's last name was not "Bouknight," but "Bouknight" was Maurice's
mother's last name. Id. at 459, 667 A.2d at 177.
10. Id. at 444, 667 A.2d at 169. The State argued that The Sun would not have known of
the picture's existence if the newspaper's representatives had not attended the hearing
when the State introduced the picture into evidence. Brief of Appellee at 11, Baltimore
Sun Co. v. State, 340 Md. 437, 667 A.2d 166 (1995) (No. 35).
11. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 444, 667 A.2d at 170.
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the picture, but the court suspected that the newspaper had acted in
bad faith-attempting to circumvent the court order by using a name
to identify the child, even if it was not the child's legal name.1 2 Conse-
quently, on January 26, 1995, the court proposed an amended version
of the court order granting access to the media.1 3 The proposed or-
der stipulated:
[T] he child ... shall only be referred to as Maurice M. or
Maurice. The last name of the child shall not be used in any
way in publication, either in print or broadcast. No likeness,
photograph or visual representation of any kind of the child
shall be used or displayed in any news media publications. 4
Although the proposed order granted access to the media, the juve-
nile court stated that it would issue the order only on the condition
that The Sun agree to publish it.'5 When The Sun refused publication,
the court withdrew the proposed order and denied media access to
the proceedings.' 6 After the media petitioned the court for reconsid-
eration, the court, in an order dated February 6, opened the proceed-
ings to all media representatives, except The Sun. 7 The court's order
required that "the media shall not print the full legal name of the
Respondent, but may refer to him as 'Maurice' or 'Maurice M.'"' 8 and
that "[n]o likeness, photograph, or visual representation of any kind
of the child as presented in court or made an exhibit shall be used or
displayed in any news media publication."" 9 The Sun appealed the
constitutionality of this order to the Court of Special Appeals.2" The
Sun did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute or rules per-
mitting a court to close juvenile proceedings, 21 nor did it assert a con-
12. Id. at 444-45, 667 A.2d at 170. Because the court intended the order to protect the
identity of the child, The Sun arguably defeated the purpose of the order without violating
its terms by publishing a name that would identify Maurice. See id. The record did not,
however, support the juvenile court's suspicion that The Sun had willfully defied the spirit
of the order. Id. at 459, 667 A.2d at 177.
13. Id. at 445, 667 A.2d at 170.
14. Id. (alteration in original).
15. Id. The juvenile court claimed that it could not publicize the order to the extent
that it would have liked; therefore, the court stated it needed The Sun to publish the order
so that all members of the media would be aware of the restrictions upon access. Id. at 457,
667 A.2d at 176. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that the juvenile court had other
means by which to disseminate the order to the members of the media attending the pro-
ceeding. Id.
16. Id. at 457, 667 A.2d at 176.
17. Id. at 445, 667 A.2d at 170.
18. Id. at 446, 667 A.2d at 170 (alteration in original).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 447, 667 A.2d at 171.
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stitutional right to attend juvenile proceedings.2 Before the Court of
Special Appeals could render a decision, the Court of Appeals issued a
writ of certiorari to consider whether the juvenile court had abused its
discretion in granting access to the media with limitations on
publication.2"
2. Legal Background.-
a. The History of Juvenile Courts.-The juvenile court system
developed because of public disapproval of incarcerating juveniles in
adult prisons.24 The nation's first statewide juvenile justice system be-
gan in Illinois in 1889,25 and it handled the state's neglect, depen-
dency, and juvenile delinquency cases.2 6 From the beginning, the
underpinnings of the juvenile court system rested on rehabilitation
and informal court proceedings.27 Since its inception, however, the
system has come under attack.2" Critics note that the secrecy sur-
rounding juvenile proceedings fosters suspicion among the public
that juvenile courts coddle young offenders. 9 Arguing against confi-
dentiality, critics contend that less secrecy surrounding the proceed-
22. Id. The United States Supreme Court has held that the press has a right of access
to adult criminal trials under the First Amendment. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). The Supreme Court, however, has never addressed the
public's fight of access to juvenile court proceedings. See Susan S. Greenebaum, Condi-
tional Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Prior Restraint or a Viable Solution , 44 WASH. U.J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135, 136 (1993); Stephen Jonas, Comment, Press Access to the Juvenile
Courtroom: Juvenile Anonymity and the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 287,
343-44 (1982).
23. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 446-47, 667 A.2d at 170-71.
24. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
25. SeeJonas, supra note 22, at 290.
26. See id. at 291.
27. See id. at 295.
28. See generally In re Gault 387 U.S. at 17-18 (1967) (noting that the results of the
juvenile court system, "in practice ... have not been entirely satisfactory"); Hon. Gordon A.
Martin, Jr., Open the Doors: A Judicial Call to End Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings, 21
NEw ENG. J. ON CRlM. & CrV. CONFINEMENT 393, 394-95 (1995) (arguing that removing the
secrecy surrounding juvenile proceedings is critical to "rebuilding trust and dissipating the
fear that the closed juvenile system fosters").
29. See Jonas, supra note 22, at 305-06 (stating that the public and the government
criticize the juvenile justice system because they feel it is too lenient on young offenders);
see also Gilbert Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 RocKy MTN. L. REv. 101, 102
(1957) (stating that the secrecy surrounding the juvenile court system has come under
attack); Martin, supra note 28, at 393-94 (noting that the theme for the 1995 National
Conference on Juvenile Justice was "Strengthening Public Confidence in Juvenile Justice").
The declining confidence in the juvenile justice system may be a result of the public's
perception that crimes committed byjuveniles have increased. See Martin, supra note 28, at
393. This perception is based in reality, as juvenile arrests for violent crime increased by
47% between 1988 and 1992. See id at 393-94.
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ings will protect the rights ofjuvenile offenders, provide better public
understanding of the juvenile system, deter would-be juvenile offend-
ers, and garner more support and resources for the juvenile court sys-
tem in general.3 0
Advocates of closed proceedings cite rehabilitation and confiden-
tiality as cornerstones of the juvenile court system.31 Publication of
thejuvenile's name may stigmatize the juvenile and impede rehabilita-
tion. 2 Furthermore, confidentiality deters juvenile crime committed
for the sake of attracting publicity and shields the child's family from
unwanted media attention accompanying the child's wrongdoing.33
Although the Supreme Court has held that the public has a right
of access to adult criminal trials, the Court has not yet addressed
whether the public has a right to attend juvenile proceedings.3 4 Mary-
land allows courts to exclude the public from juvenile proceedings by
statute, but there have been no reported cases that directly address
this issue.33
b. Prior Restraints.-The Supreme Court first established a
presumption that prior restraints on publication are unconstitutional
in Near v. Minnesota,36 a case in which the Court struck down a state
statute enjoining "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory" publica-
tions.3 7 In dicta, the Court acknowledged that freedom of the press is
not an absolute right.38 Rather, prior restraints may be permissible
during wartime, to bar obscene expression, or to prevent a forceful
overthrow of the government.3 9
30. See Jonas, supra note 22, at 297 (enumerating arguments in favor of access and
publicity). The Maryland legislature has accepted this reasoning as evidenced by its recent
enactment of Senate Bill 560, which requires open juvenile court proceedings absent a
showing of good cause to close the proceedings when the juvenile is charged with an of-
fense that would be a felony if committed by an adult. SeeAct of May 8, 1997, ch. 314, 1997
Md. Laws 759 (to be codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-
812(e) (3), (4)).
31. See Jonas, supra note 22, at 294.
32. See id. at 296.
33. See id. at 296-97.
34. See supra note 22.
35. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
36. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). In Near, the State of Minnesota repeatedly enjoined produc-
tion of a magazine known as The Saturday Press under the State's nuisance law. Id. at.702.
Although the periodical had published malicious and scandalous articles about public offi-
cials on a regular basis, the Supreme Court ruled that injunctions before publication seri-
ously infringe on the freedom of the press. Id. at 706, 722-23.
37. Id. at 702.
38. Id. at 716.
39. Id.
[VOL. 56:656
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The Supreme Court further explained what may constitute a
prior restraint in Pell v. Procunier.40 In Pell, the Court held that a Cali-
fornia statute limiting press interviews with prisoners did not consti-
tute a prior restraint on publication in violation of the First
Amendment.41 The Court reasoned: "The Constitution does not...
require government to accord the press special access to information
not shared by members of the public generally."42 Because the state
statute did not deny the media access to publicly available informa-
tion, the state statute at issue did not violate the media's First Amend-
ment rights.43 In dissent, Justice Powell argued that the California
statute violated the media's constitutional right to inform the public
about its government.44 Similarly, Justice Douglas, also dissenting, ex-
pressed concern that the Court relied too heavily on the fact that the
press had as much access to information as the general public,45 noting
that "'[t] he Constitution specifically selected... [the press] to play an
important role in the discussion of public affairs."'" Consequently,
Justice Douglas found the statute too broad to achieve the govern-
ment's interest in maintaining prison security and, as such, in viola-
tion of the public's right to know as guaranteed by the First
Amendment.47
In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,4 8 the Supreme Court struck down
a court order for imposing a prior restraint.49 That order prohibited
the media from reporting the names of victims and incriminating
statements made by the accused until the court impaneled a jury.5"
Because the case received national exposure, 1 the Court found itself
torn between two competing rights-the right to trial by an impartial
jury under the Sixth Amendment and the freedom of the press under
the First Amendment. 2 The Court declined to rank one fundamental
40. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
41. Id. at 835. The California statute prohibited press interviews with particular in-
mates. Id. at 819. The media still had access to interviews with prison inmates selected at
random, but could no longer request to interview particular individuals. Id, at 821. The
Court reasoned that the interest of security justified the restrictions on the media. Id. at
827.
42. Id. at 834.
43. Id. at 835.
44. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966)).
47. Id.
48. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
49. Id. at 570.
50. Id. at 543.
51. Id. at 542.
52. Id. at 547.
1997]
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right above the other,53 but acknowledged the heavy presumption
against prior restraints.54 In striking down the order as unconstitu-
tional, however, the Court noted the availability of other means of
controlling pretrial publicity surrounding an open court proceeding
short of imposing a prior restraint.55
c. Media Publication. -In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,56 the
Supreme Court held that states may not prohibit publication of a rape
victim's name when that name is part of publicly available judicial
records. 7 Although the Court concluded that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments shield the press from liability for truthful publi-
cation of material obtained from court records,58 the Court declined
to consider the constitutionality of a state policy prohibiting access to
records of juvenile court proceedings.59
The Supreme Court addressed the restrictions a trial court may
place on media coverage of open juvenile proceedings in Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. District Court.6° In Oklahoma Publishing, the trial court
issued a pretrial order prohibiting the media from publishing the
name or photograph of an eleven-year-old boy charged with second
degree murder.6' Because the trial court had opened the juvenile's
trial to the public,62 the Supreme Court relied on Cox and Nebraska
Press to conclude that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohib-
53. See id. at 561 ("But if the authors of these guarantees, fully aware of the potential
conflicts between them, were unwilling or unable to resolve the issue by assigning to one
priority over the other, it is not for us to rewrite the Constitution by undertaking what they
declined to do.").
54. Id.
55. Id. at 563-64. Instead of imposing a prior restraint, the Court suggested that pre-
trial publicity could be controlled by a change of venue, postponing the trial, thoroughly
questioning jurors to eliminate those who had formed opinions as to innocence or guilt
before trial, instructing the jury to decide the case based on evidence presented in trial,
sequestering jurors, and imposing gag orders on the parties, lawyers, and police. Id.
56. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
57. Id. at 496.
58. The First Amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth
Amendment states in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV.
59. Cox, 420 U.S. at 496 n.26.
60. 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 308-09.
62. Although there is some question as to whether the trial judge opened the juvenile
proceedings to the public, the Court noted that the judge, prosecutor, and defense coun-
sel knew that the media were present at the hearing even if the judge never expressly
opened the proceedings to the public. Id. at 311. Furthermore, the Court found no evi-
dence that the press acquired the information without "the State's implicit approval." Id.
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ited the court from preventing the publication of information made
publicly available.6"
The Supreme Court considered the tension between juvenile pro-
ceedings and the freedom of the press more closely in Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co. 6' In Smith, the Supreme Court held that states can-
not punish the media for truthfully publishing the name of ajuvenile
delinquent that they had obtained legally.65 Smith differed from Cox
and Oklahoma Publishing because the newspaper in Smith had obtained
the juvenile's name by interviewing police and witnesses at the scene
of the crime,6 6 whereas the media representatives in the other cases
had obtained the names from the court.67 The Smith Court con-
cluded that the source of the information does not matter, so long as
the media had obtained the information legally.' In balancing the
juvenile's right to anonymity against the freedom of the press, the
Court determined that the First Amendment prevails over the state's
interest in maintaining anonymity for juveniles when the media legally
obtain their information. 69
Although the Supreme Court has not considered whether a state
may restrict publication of information that the media obtain from
juvenile proceedings that are conditionally open to the media,7" state
courts have examined the issue. 7 ' In Edward A. Sherman Publishing Co.
v. Goldberg,72 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that a juvenile
court may prohibit the media from publishing the identity of a juve-
63. Id. at 310.
64. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
65. Id. at 105.
66. Id. at 99.
67. See Oklahoma Publ'g, 430 U.S. at 309 (stating that the reporter learned thejuvenile's
name during open court proceedings); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 472
(1975) (noting that the reporter learned the rape victim's name from examining court
documents made available to him in the courtroom).
68. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103-04.
69. Id. at 104.
70. See supra note 22.
71. See, e.g., San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Superior Ct., 283 Cal.
Rptr. 332, 334 (Ct. App. 1991) (determining whether the juvenile court abused its discre-
tion by allowing the media to attend juvenile proceedings on condition that the media
abide by certain limitations on publication); In re Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052 (Ill. 1992) (con-
sidering whether a juvenile court can grant access to juvenile proceedings on condition
that the media not disclose the juvenile's identity); In re H.N., 632 A.2d 537, 539 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (holding that an order restricting publication of information
obtained from juvenile court proceedings was overly broad); Edward A. Sherman Publ'g
Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1254 (R.I. 1982) (determining whether a juvenile court
can allow media access to a juvenile proceeding on condition that the media agree not to
publish the name of the minor child).
72. 443 A.2d 1252 (R.I. 1982).
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nile if the media received that information through attendance at a
juvenile proceeding.7" The court also held that a juvenile court may
not prohibit the media from publishing information obtained from
nonjudicial sources.74
Similarly, in In re Minor,75 the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld
the right of a trial court to prohibit the media from publishing the
names ofjuvenile victims of abuse if the media obtained the names of
the victims through attendance at the juvenile proceedings.7 6 In so
ruling, the court emphasized the importance of anonymity for juve-
nile victims of abuse as opposed to juvenile delinquents.77
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has also focused on the juvenile
victim's need for anonymity. In Austin Daily Herald v. Mork,7" the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals upheld the decision of a trial court that
granted media access to the testimony of juvenile victims of sexual
abuse, provided that the media not publish the names or juvenile
records of the victims and witnesses.79 The Austin court made clear
that its decision did not prohibit the media from disseminating infor-
mation they obtained from other sources8" and emphasized that the
restrictions on the media did not constitute a prior restraint.81
In re Hughes County Action NO. JUV 90- 2 represents the minority
view with respect to the publication of information and juvenile pro-
ceedings by the media.83 In In reHughes County, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota allowed a trial judge to condition media access to juve-
nile proceedings on the media's agreement not to publish the
73. Id. at 1259.
74. Id. The court indicated that "nonjudicial" sources referred to information ob-
tained by the media's own investigations or "under similar circumstances." Id.
75. 595 N.E.2d 1052 (Ill. 1992).
76. Id. at 1054.
77. Id. at 1053. The court noted a distinction between the privacy needs of juvenile
delinquents and juvenile victims of abuse. Id, at 1056. The court acknowledged that the
confidentiality traditionally associated with the juvenile court system had come under at-
tack, but the re-evaluation of the system's confidentiality resulted from the rise in major
crimes by juvenile offenders. Id. at 1053. Some believe that publication of the names of
juvenile offenders will deter juvenile crime. See id The court stressed, however, that the
juveniles in the instant case were not delinquents, but rather, victims. Id at 1056. As the
Illinois court opined, the juveniles "were thrust into the juvenile system by actions of third
parties, not by their own actions." Id Consequently, the court emphasized a greater need
for anonymity when the minor was a victim. Id
78. 507 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
79. Id. at 858. Austin was an adult criminal trial, but the trial court closed the court-
room to the public during the juvenile victims' testimony. Id at 856.
80. Id. at 858.
81. Id. at 856.
82. 452 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1990).
83. See Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 451, 667 A.2d at 172.
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"names, pictures, place of residence or identity of any parties in-
volved. '8 4 When the media refused to agree to the limitations, the
trial judge closed the proceedings.8 " Notably, the trial court's offer
not to close the proceedings prohibited the media from publishing
information obtained outside of the court proceedings.8 6 The
Supreme Court of South Dakota did not view the trial court's decision
to close the proceedings as a punishment for the media's refusal to
abide by the limitations of the court's offer.8 7 Rather, it considered
the demands of the trial court an alternative to closing the proceed-
ings entirely.8 8
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Baltimore Sun Co. v. State, the Court
of Appeals held that an order granting media access to juvenile pro-
ceedings was unconstitutional to the extent that the order prohibited
publication of information obtained from sources outside of such pro-
ceedings.8 9 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered whether
the juvenile court abused its discretion when it barred The Sun from
the courtroom after the newspaper published a picture of the juvenile
at issue, along with the name "Maurice Bouknight," in violation of the
January 17 order.9" Writing for the court, Chief Judge Murphy noted
that the Supreme Court has not decided what conditions are appro-
priate when granting media access to juvenile proceedings that are
otherwise closed.9' Consequently, the court's opinion focused on de-
cisions from other states regarding the publication of information ob-
tained from sources outside of open juvenile proceedings. 92 Because
the judiciary has the discretion to prohibit the media from attending
juvenile court proceedings, the court reasoned that courts are permit-
ted to restrict the press when granting access to juvenile proceed-
ings," but the court further held that the juvenile court may not bar
publication of information obtained outside of the proceedings.94
84. In re Hughes County, 452 N.W.2d. at 130.
85. Id.
86. Id at 132.
87. Id. at 134.
88. Id. at 133.
89. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 460, 667 A.2d at 177.
90. Id. at 447, 667 A.2d at 171.
91. Id. at 449, 667 A.2d at 172. The court did not consider whether the juvenile court
had the authority to close the proceedings because neither party challenged the closure.
Id. at 447, 667 A.2d at 171.
92. Id. See supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the other
states' treatment of the publication of information concerning juvenile proceedings.
93. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 447, 667 A.2d at 171.
94. Id. at 460, 667 A.2d at 177.
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The Court of Appeals examined the juvenile court's January 17
order and theJanuary 26 proposed order to determine if they justified
the February 6 order barring The Sun from the proceedings.95 In re-
viewing the January 17 order, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
the order never specified that the media could not publish Maurice's
picture. 6 Therefore, the juvenile court wrongfully treated The Sun's
publication of Maurice's picture as a violation of the January 17
order.97
The juvenile court's restriction that the media refer to the child
as "Maurice" or "Maurice M." also exceeded the permissible restric-
tions that a court may set.98 The court proclaimed that the judiciary
may not force the media to print specific material as a condition of
access to court proceedings unless it is necessary to protect the ano-
nymity of ajuvenile and the interest in anonymity outweighs the com-
peting interests of the free flow of information and the media's
unfettered editorial control.99 In so concluding, the court relied on
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,t'° which held a state statute
unconstitutional because it forced newspapers to print replies from
political candidates who responded to editorials published by the
newspaper. ' ° ' As in Tornillo, the Baltimore Sun court determined that
the State's interest in protecting Maurice's identity did not justify in-
terference with the newspaper's editorial process by forcing the news-
paper to use a specific name to identify the child. °2 According to the
court, both prior restraints and government-mandated publication of
specific information violate editorial autonomy, and the Supreme
Court has never distinguished between the two.'
Furthermore, because Maurice Bouknight was not the child's
legal name, The Sun did not violate that aspect of the order prohibit-
ing the use of his legal name.' 4 The Court of Appeals acknowledged,
however, that The Sun technically violated the January 17 order when
95. Id. at 454, 667 A.2d at 174-75.
96. Id. at 455, 667 A.2d at 175.
97. Id. The State argued that publication of the photograph violated the "spirit" of the
court order, but the Court of Appeals confirmed that the media is entitled to rely on the
actual wording of the order. Id. Furthermore, if the juvenile court intended to prohibit
the publication of pictures, it should have explicitly addressed this condition. Id.
98. Id.; see Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (holding that
the government may not compel the media to publish information).
99. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 453, 667 A.2d at 174.
100. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
101. Id. at 243.
102. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 455, 667 A.2d at 177.
103. Id. at 453, 667 A.2d at 174.
104. Id. at 455, 667 A.2d at 175.
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it captioned Maurice's photograph "Maurice Bouknight" instead of
"Maurice" or "Maurice M." as the order required.105 Even though that
provision of the January 17 order was unconstitutional, The Sun
should have sought judicial review of the order instead of violating
it.1 06 Consequently, the Court of Appeals approved of the juvenile
court's consideration of the technical violation of the January 17 or-
der in later deliberations over The Sun's continued access to the
proceedings. 10 7
The Court of Appeals next considered the juvenile court's Janu-
ary 26 proposed order.108 It would have been unconstitutional for the
juvenile court to condition access on publication of the proposed or-
der if The Sun had not violated the January 17 order.10 9 Because The
Sun technically violated the January 17 order, however, the juvenile
court could have required The Sun to publish a subsequent court or-
der if publication would protect the juvenile's anonymity and the
State's interest in anonymity outweighed the competing interests of
the free flow of information and the media's editorial freedom." 0
The Court of Appeals could not envision how the publication of the
proposed order would have helped to protect Maurice's anonymity,
and, therefore, the juvenile court could not condition further access
to the proceedings based on The Sun's publication of the proposed
order. 1 I
After careful review of the preceding order and proposed order,
the Court of Appeals determined that the newspaper's violation of the
January 17 order did not justify the juvenile court's February 6 order
barring The Sun from the proceedings. 1 2 Consequently, the court va-
105. Id.
106. Id. at 456, 667 A.2d at 175.
107. Id.




112. Id. at 456, 667 A2d at 175. The court declared that although referring to the child
as "Maurice Bouknight" constituted a technical violation of the order, it did not justify
banning The Sun from all future proceedings. Id at 459, 667 A.2d at 177. The court rea-
soned that The Sun's reference to Maurice as "Maurice Bouknight" was "relatively insignifi-
cant" and did not "impair Maurice M.'s anonymity." I& It was public knowledge that
Jacqueline Bouknight was Maurice's mother, and anyone could have reached the logical
assumption that Maurice's last name was also Bouknight. I The court noted that "to the
extent that The Sun's caption convinced anyone that Maurice M. was named Maurice
Bouknight, that person would be even farther from knowing Maurice M.'s true name than
before the publication of the article." Id Finally, both the Baltimore City Police Depart-
ment and the attorney representing Maurice stressed that publicity was in the child's best
interest because it could help to find him. Ie
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cated the February 6 order and required the juvenile court to treat
The Sun the same as all other media representatives when granting
access to the proceedings.'"
4. Analysis.-The Supreme Court's decisions in Oklahoma Pub-
lishing and Smith required the Court of Appeals to find the juvenile
court's orders unconstitutional insofar as the orders prohibited publi-
cation of information obtained from nonjudicial sources." 4 The criti-
cal issue in this case, therefore, was whether the court may prohibit
the media from publishing material revealed during a juvenile pro-
ceeding that was open to the media but lawfully could have been
closed.' 1
5
The court's decision in Baltimore Sun allows the media to attend
juvenile court proceedings, but still gives judges control over the me-
dia by permitting judges to restrict what the media publish, so long as
the information is taken from court proceedings." 6 At first glance,
the court's ruling appears to be a good compromise to the problem of
media access to juvenile courts because it allows dissemination of in-
formation to the public withoutjeopardizing thejuvenile's privacy. 117
The holding in Baltimore Sun, however, blurs the line between a free
press and government-controlled access to information. Media re-
strictions encourage "timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead
to the suppression of many items that would otherwise be published
and that should be made available to the public."" 8 Allowing partial
disclosure of information revealed at juvenile proceedings risks dis-
torting the truth because missing facts may warp the public's percep-
tion of the case. 119
Moreover, the court's decision to allow ajuvenile court to restrict
media publication imposes a prior restraint because the media receive
information from the proceedings and then are forbidden to publish
it. 2 ' The First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow a state to
113. Id. at 458, 667 A.2d at 176.
114. Id. at 448-49, 667 A.2d at 171-72.
115. Id
116. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
117. See Note, The Public Right of Access to juvenile Delinquency Hearings, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1540, 1563-64 (1983) ("[Clonditional access [to juvenile courts] maximizes the flow of in-
formation to the public.").
118. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
119. See Austin Daily Herald v. Mork, 507 N.W.2d 854, 857 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (not-
ing that the trial court "parcels out news to the press and the public" when it places restric-
tions on media access to court proceedings).
120. See In re Minor, 595 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (Ill. 1989) (Miller, J., dissenting) (stating
that a circuit court order prohibiting the press from publishing the name of a minor of-
668 [VOL. 56:656
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
restrict the publication of information obtained through attendance
at open court proceedings because to do so would constitute a prior
restraint. 121 Even though a juvenile proceeding could have been
closed, once the media gain access, the proceeding should be consid-
ered open. 2 2 The Supreme Court has recognized that the judiciary
has no special privilege to "suppress, edit, or censor events which tran-
spire in proceedings before it." 2 ' Consequently, courts may not im-
pose a prior restraint upon the media under the justification that the
judiciary holds a privileged place in government. If the media acquire
information as a result of lawful access to court proceedings, the judi-
ciary should not censor that information.124
Yet a court order imposing a prior restraint can overcome the
heavy presumption against prior restraints if the "evil" associated with
publication justifies such a serious measure and restricting publication
is necessary to avoid the danger.1" Nevertheless, the possibility still
exists that the media will publish information concerning a juvenile,
despite a prior restraint, because the media may have obtained the
information from nonjudicial sources.1 26 The prior restraint will not
pass constitutional scrutiny if it will not avert the harm it seeks to
prevent.1 2 7
fender which they learned from attendance at a juvenile proceeding violated the First
Amendment). In Baltimore Sun, the State argued that conditional access did not impose a
prior restraint because a court order prohibited The Sun from publishing information it
obtained from the juvenile proceeding. Brief of Appellee at 11, Baltimore Sun (No. 35)
(citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984)).
In Seattle Times, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), the Supreme Court held that it is not a prior
restraint to prohibit publication of facts obtained during pre-trial discovery. Id. at 33. Seat-
tie Times differs from Baltimore Sun, however, in one important aspect: in Seattle Times the
newspaper was defending itself against an action for defamation. Id, As a party to the case,
the Seattle Times was entitled to the information it received in order to defend itself in a suit
brought against it. See i. at 32. Conversely, in Baltimore Sun, The Sun was not a party to a
case and, thus, had no fundamental right to the information. The juvenile court could
have closed the proceedings entirely, thereby avoiding the prior restraint dilemma.
121. See Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Ct., 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977).
122. See In reMinor, 595 N.E.2d at 1059 (Miller, J., dissenting) (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (1976), for the proposition that once a proceeding is open to
the media, the information presented there is publicly revealed); In re Minor, 563 N.E.2d
1069, 1079 (Ill. App. CL 1990) (Steigmann, J., dissenting) (stating that because the court
allowed the media to be present at a juvenile hearing, any information disclosed at that
hearing was obtained by lawful means), affd, 595 N.E.2d 1052 (Ill. 1992).
123. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
124. See In re Minor, 595 N.E.2d at 1059 (Miller, J., dissenting).
125. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
126. See supra notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
127. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976) ("Nor can we conclude
that the restraining order actually entered would serve its intended purpose.").
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A prior restraint cannot be justified in juvenile court proceedings
simply because the juvenile court system has historically rested on
principles of confidentiality.' Commentators expound at length on
the necessity for confidentiality in the juvenile court system.' 2 9 The
juvenile proceeding at issue in Baltimore Sun concerned the abuse of a
minor."' 0 Arguably, of all the youths involved in the juvenile court
system, minor victims of abuse need the most protection from public-
ity because they find themselves in court through no fault of their
own."' The Supreme Court, however, has not recognized a prevail-
ing privacy interest for victims.'3 2 The Supreme Court ruled in Cox
that an adult rape victim's interest in anonymity does not outweigh
the constitutional interest in preserving a free press.13 3 Moreover, in
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,13 4 the Supreme Court held that
despite the state's interest in protecting juvenile rape victims from em-
barrassment and the harm attendant to media publication, that inter-
est does not weigh heavily enough to justify a mandatory closure rule
of adult criminal trials during testimony ofjuvenile victims.' 3 5 Conse-
quently, while shielding victims from public scrutiny is desirable, the
128. See Kathleen M. Laubenstein, Comment, Media Access to juvenile justice: Should Free-
dom of the Press Be Limited to Promote Rehabilitation of Youthful Offenders , 68 TEMP. L. REv.
1897, 1901 (1995) ("Confidentiality has been a hallmark of our juvenile justice system.").
129. See Greenebaum, supra note 22, at 142-43 (listing justifications for confidentiality
within the juvenile court system); Jonas, supra note 22, at 296-97 (exploring arguments in
favor of confidentiality for juvenile delinquents); Laubenstein, supra note 128. (identifying
the beneficial effects confidentiality has on juvenile delinquents).
The Maryland legislature recently has rejected the arguments for confidentiality when
it comes to juvenile offenders charged with serious crimes. See supra note 6.
130. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 443-44, 667 A.2d at 169. Specifically, the proceeding
sought to determine the whereabouts of a minor placed under protective services by DSS.
131. Whilejuvenile delinquents enter the court system because of their wrongful deeds,
minor victims have done nothing wrong. Juvenile victims come to the system as a result of
the wrongful deeds of others.
132. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1982) (holding
that a state statute that required a closed courtroom in every proceeding while minor vic-
tims testify in sex-offense trials violated the First Amendment); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (holding that a rape victim's name can lawfully be reported when
the news outlet obtained the information from the public record).
133. Cox, 420 U.S. at 494-95 ("Thus even the prevailing law of invasion of privacy gener-
ally recognizes that the interests in privacy fade when the information involved already
appears on the public record.").
134. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
135. Id. at 607-08. Although the Court recognized that protecting the juvenile victim is
a compelling interest, the Court stated that closing the courtroom must be handled on a
case-by-case basis because the interest is not great enough to warrant a closure in every
case. Id.
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Cox Court clearly indicated that that laudable goal is not to be at-
tained at the expense of the First Amendment.13 6
Furthermore, even though anonymity for juvenile victims may
constitute a compelling state interest, the extent to which modern ju-
venile courts can preserve anonymity is questionable, even when the
court excludes the press from the hearings.' 3 7 Conditional media ac-
cess to juvenile courtrooms is a method some believe will help keep
juvenile names confidential, 13  but after Oklahoma Publishing and
Smith, the press can lawfully print any information obtained through
"routine reportorial techniques."'3 9 In Baltimore Sun, the newspaper
could have lawfully reported Maurice's name and the circumstances
surrounding the case if it had obtained the information from wit-
nesses, hospital personnel, DSS employees, the police, or anyone else
having information. The Sun likely knew about the history and sur-
rounding circumstances of the case from the related decisions ren-
dered in the Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court. 4 ' It is doubtful that The Sun's reporters needed to be at the
proceedings to acquire basic information surrounding the case. In-
deed, The Sun obtained the photograph of Maurice from the police
department, not the juvenile proceedings. 4 Restricting the media's
ability to publish information obtained from attending juvenile pro-
136. Cox, 420 U.S. at 494-95.
137. In San Bernardino Department of Public Social Services v. Superior Cour, 283 Cal. Rptr.
332 (Ct. App. 1991), the trial judge admitted that even if he prevented the press from
attending ajuvenile proceeding, the publicity surrounding the case would continue. Id. at
344. He further stated that "[t]he only control I can gain is by allowing the press in." Id
(internal quotations omitted).
Even if the media maintain a minor's anonymity, the details of ajuvenile's record may
be disclosed in other ways. Police departments sometimes have the discretion to disclose a
minor's record and often disclose the information to the FBI, the armed services, and
social services agencies upon request. See In reGault, 387 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967). In addition,
many employers design their employment application forms with the intent to elicit infor-
mation regarding past juvenile arrests. See id.
138. SeeJonas, supra note 22, at 329; Laubenstein, supra note 128, at 1898.
139. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). In Smith, the Supreme Court
considered whether a state can prohibit the publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's
name if the newspaper learned the minor's identity through "routine reportorial tech-
niques." Id. at 103-05. Although the Court did not define "routine reportorial tech-
niques," it sided with the newspaper in Smith, which learned the youth's name by
monitoring police radio frequencies, sending reporters to the crime scene, and interview-
ing witnesses, police, and the assistant prosecuting attorney. Id. at 99.
140. See In re Maurice M., 314 Md. 391, 393, 550 A.2d 1135, 1136 (1988) (considering
whether a mother may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
when ordered by the juvenile court to disclose the whereabouts of a minor child under the
protective services of the state), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
141. Baltimore Sun, 340 Md. at 460, 667 A.2d at 177.
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ceedings has a minimal effect on shielding the juvenile from public
scrutiny because the most basic aspects concerning the juvenile and
the nature of the proceeding are often matters that can be learned
from extra-judicial sources. Because the interest in anonymity cannot
be preserved by conditional media access, the interest in protecting
the media's First Amendment rights should weigh heavier in the
analysis.
Furthermore, unfettered press access tojuvenile proceedings may
foster positive outcomes. The press can help the public understand
the methods and deficiencies of the system. 142 In the past, the system
has been reticent to ensure that juvenile delinquents receive the pro-
cedural safeguards that adults receive. 4 The sometimes harsh reality
of the juvenile justice system has caused concern that the original in-
tentions of the system have been defeated.1 Even though, histori-
cally,juvenile proceedings have been informal attempts to rehabilitate
young offenders, 4 5 the modern juvenile court system does not com-
port with the original plan because the proceedings have become
more formalized and confidentiality is no longer assured. 146
142. See San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 336 ("We believe the press can assist juvenile
courts in becoming more effective instruments of social rehabilitation by providing the
public with greater knowledge ofjuvenile court processes, procedures, and unmet needs."
(internal quotations omitted)).
143. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35-57 (1967) (extending due process requirements to
juvenile court proceedings-specifically, written notice of charges, the right to counsel, the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, and the right of confrontation and
sworn testimony of witnesses available for cross-examination).
144. The Supreme Court has noted that the juvenile court system has not always pro-
vided children with "careful, compassionate, individualized treatment" and that "[tihe ab-
sence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principle has not always produced
fair, efficient, and effective procedures." Id. at 18.
145. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
146. The juvenile court system began as an informal system with few characteristics of
the adult court system. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16. In that case, the Court observed
that under the juvenile justice system "[t]he rules of criminal procedure were . . . alto-
gether inapplicable. The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and harshness... were there-
fore to be discarded." Id. Since its inception, however, the system has accepted more
procedural safeguards that bring it more in line with adult courts, as evidenced by the
Court's holding that Arizona's Juvenile Code violated due process requirements. See i&t at
3. Likewise, the Supreme Court compromised the confidentiality traditionally associated
with the system when it affirmed the media's right to publish information concerning mi-
nors involved in cases before the juvenile court if the press obtained the information law-
fully. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979) (holding that the state
may not prohibit a newspaper from publishing the name of a juvenile delinquent if the
name was lawfully obtained); Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Ct., 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977)
(per curiam) (holding that the court cannot prohibit publication of information obtained
at an open juvenile court proceeding).
The confidentiality traditionally associated with the juvenile court system has further
eroded in Maryland with the passage of Senate Bill 560, which requires open court pro-
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Of course, if courts cannot compromise between juvenile ano-
nymity and the free flow of information, the danger exists that juve-
nile courts will deny media access to proceedings like the South
Dakota court did in In re Hughes County Action No. JUV 90-3.147
Although this appears to be a possible result, denying media access to
juvenile proceedings will not prevent all publicity surrounding juve-
nile proceedings because the media can lawfully publish any informa-
tion obtained from extra-judicial sources.148 By allowing the media to
attend juvenile proceedings, at least the courts can be assured that the
information obtained in court is accurate and reliable. Unfortunately,
the same cannot always be said for information obtained elsewhere.
The accuracy of the information the media publish should be a strong
incentive for juvenile courts to allow media attendance at juvenile pro-
ceedings instead of denying access.
5. Conclusion.-The court held in Baltimore Sun that juvenile
courts may prevent the media from publishing information obtained
solely from attending juvenile proceedings. At first glance, this ap-
pears to be a good compromise to the alternative of closing juvenile
proceedings to the media, but closer inspection of this alternative
reveals significant shortcomings. If a trial judge opens juvenile pro-
ceedings to the media, no restrictions should be placed upon what the
press may publish. Allowing the media to attend juvenile proceedings
but restricting publication amounts to a prior restraint, even if the
proceedings could have lawfully been closed to the media. Although
protecting the identity of a juvenile victim is a compelling state inter-
est, it cannot justify the imposition of a prior restraint. Consequently,
the Baltimore Sun court's compromise between the interests of ano-
nymity and the free flow of information results in more problems than
solutions.
HEATHER A. DOHERTY
ceedings for juveniles charged with offenses that would be felonies if committed by adults.
SeeAct of May 8, 1997, ch. 314, 1997 Md. Laws 759 (to be codified as amended at MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-812(e)(3), (4)).
147. 452 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1990); see supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
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B. Extending to White Potential Jurors the Equal Protection Right to a
Racially Neutral Jury Selection Process
In Gilchrist v. State,1 the Court of Appeals held that the reasons
proffered for a criminal defendant's peremptory strikes of white
venirepersons constituted a pretext for racial discrimination and,
thus, violated both Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.2 In so holding, the court extended to
white potential jurors the constitutional right to a racially neutral jury
selection process.'
This Note will analyze two aspects of the court's holding: (1) the
extension of equal protection precedent to cover white venirepersons
as constituents of a "cognizable racial group" and (2) the application
of the relevant equal protection test. Given the current state of consti-
tutional jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals correctly extended the
right to a racially neutral jury selection process to white venirepersons.
Because the court misapplied the applicable constitutional test, how-
ever, future courts may treat this case as an exception rather than the
rule.
1. The Case.-The State charged Gary Gilchrist on two counts:
the distribution of cocaine and the possession of cocaine with the in-
tent to distribute.4 Duringjury selection in the Circuit Court for Balti-
more City, the State raised an objection to alleged attempts by the
defense to strike peremptorily all white venirepersons from the jury
pool.5 The trial court found that the defense had exercised seven per-
emptory strikes and that all of the stricken venirepersons had been
1. 340 Md. 606, 667 A.2d 876 (1995).
2. Id. at 623-25, 667 A.2d at 884-85. Article 24 states: "That no man ought to be taken
or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or,
in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment
of his peers, or by the Law of the land." MD. CONSr. DECL OF RTS. art. 24. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "[N]or shall any State... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. For an explanation of the interpretative relationship between Article 24 and the
Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 81-82, 109 and accompanying text.
3. Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 624-25, 667 A.2d at 885.
4. 1& at 611, 667 A.2d at 878.
5. Id. at 612, 667 A.2d at 878-79.
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white.6 Upon this finding, the trial judge ordered the defense to ex-
plain its reasons for striking each of the seven potential jurors.7
The defense explained that it struck two of the venirepersons be-
cause they had been victims of crime8 and another because he had
stared at the defendant, making the defendant uncomfortable.9 The
trial judge found these reasons acceptable,10 but she found the rea-
sons for striking the four other jurors unsatisfactory." The defense
could not remember the basis for striking one of the venirepersons,
12
but struck a second venireperson because she reminded the defense
counsel of her Catholic school teacher." The defense struck a third
venireperson because of his youth, his apparent inability to fit in with
the others on the panel, and because he did not seem to "[relate] to
anything in the room." 4 Finally, the defense struck a fourth potential
juror on the grounds that his apparel, education, and manner sug-
gested that he would be unable to relate to the defendant.15
One by one, the trial judge rejected each of these explanations.1 6
Concluding that the defense had not rebutted the presumption of ra-
cial motivation by offering satisfactory explanations for four of the
seven peremptory strikes, 17 the trial court dismissed the entire jury
pool and began a second jury selection with a different venire.18 After
finally impaneling ajury, the court asked the defense whether the new
6. IM, 667 A.2d at 879.
7. Id., 667 A.2d at 878-79. Referring to the stricken jurors, the judge stated, "Let's go
through them one by one and give me the reasons you struck them." Id., 667 A.2d at 879
(internal quotations omitted).
8. Id. at 612 n.1, 667 A.2d at 879 n.1.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 612, 667 A.2d at 879.
11. Id. at 613-16, 667 A.2d at 879-80.
12. Id. at 615-16, 667 A.2d at 880.
13. Id at 612-13, 667 A.2d at 879.
14. Id. at 613, 667 A.2d at 879 (internal quotations omitted). The defense stated that
this potential juror did not look at the defendant and acted like he did not want to be in
court. Id.
15. Id. at 613-15, 667 A.2d at 879-80. This potential juror wore a navy blazer and khaki
slacks, had apparently finished college, and seemed rather "studious." Id.
16. Id. at 612-16, 667 A.2d at 879-80.
17. Id. at 615-16, 667 A.2d at 880. Explaining this presumption, the trial judge stated,
"The Court is saying you have to, when you have struck seven jurors, potential jurors,....
and they are all white and they all have different profiles, you're going to have to come up
with a satisfactory explanation that persuades me that your reason for striking [them] was
not racial." Id. at 615, 667 A.2d at 880 (internal quotations omitted).
18. Id at 616, 667 A.2d at 880.
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jury was acceptable, and the defense affirmed.' 9 Trial commenced,
and the jury convicted Gilchrist of both charges.20
On appeal, the defense made two arguments. First, the defense
contended that it could use peremptory strikes in a racially discrimina-
tory fashion so long as the venirepersons were white. Alternatively,
the defense argued that the State had failed to make a prima facie
showing of racially discriminatory peremptory strikes.2 ' The State ar-
gued that the defense's affirmance of the jury as acceptable precluded
appellate review of the dismissal of the first venire.22
The Court of Special Appeals rejected the State's assertion that
the defense had essentially waived its right to allege error in the dis-
missal of the initial venire .2  Reaching the merits of the case, the
court dismissed both of the defendant's arguments, holding that the
State had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination 24 and
that the Equal Protection Clause "applie[d] with equal force to the
exercise of peremptory challenges in a manner discriminatory to
blacks or whites." 25 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari on cross-
petitions from both parties.2 6
2. Legal Background.-By definition, a peremptory challenge re-
quires no explanation. 27 Thus, requiring a party to produce an expla-
nation for its use of the challenge is fundamentally at odds with policy
implications favoring the strike. As the Supreme Court duly noted:
The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate
extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties
that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on
the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not other-
wise. In this way the peremptory satisfies the rule that "to
perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Gilchrist v. State, 97 Md. App. 55, 70, 667 A.2d 44, 51 (1993), afd, 340 Md. 606,
667 A.2d 876 (1995); see infra notes 103-111, 126 and accompanying text.
22. Gilchrist, 97 Md. App. at 70-71, 627 A-2d at 51.
23. Id., 627 A.2d at 51-52.
24. Id. at 76, 627 A.2d at 54.
25. Id. at 75-76, 627 A.2d at 54. The Court of Special Appeals noted that even if the
defendant prevailed on appeal, "the relief available would be a new trial ... which was
essentially what [the defense] received when the court dismissed the first panel and began
jury selection anew." Id. at 77, 627 A.2d at 55.
26. 332 Md. 741, 663 A.2d 102 (1993).
27. Black's Law Dictionay defines peremptory challenge as "[t]he right to challenge a
juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the challenge." BLACK'S
LAw DICrIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
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The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that
it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry
and without being subject to the court's control."8
Nonetheless, courts have come to control the use of peremptory chal-
lenges, at least when opposing parties allege racially discriminatory
abuses of the strike.
a. The Question of Right.-
(i) Racially Neutral Peremptory Strikes as Required by the Supreme
Court of the United States.-
(1) The Defendant's Right to a Racially Neutral Jury Selection Pro-
cess.-In 1879, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the
issue of whether, in light of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution, a criminal defendant had a right to a trial by ajury impaneled
from a venire whose members were selected in a racially nondiscrimi-
natory manner. In Strauder v. West Virginia,29 an African-American de-
fendant challenged a state statute that allowed only white males to
serve as jurors.30 Expounding upon the history and policy behind the
Fourteenth Amendment 3' and the significance of a jury of one's
"peers or equals,"3 2 the Court struck down the statute as violative of
the Constitution.33 In so ruling, the Court began to sow the seeds for
the recognition of a defendant's right to a racially neutral jury selec-
tion process.
28. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1965) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955)). For a brief discussion of the current peremptory-strike debate, see infra
note 125.
29. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
30. Id. at 305. The Court did not address the issue of gender. However, in J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), the Court held that civil litigants may not discrim-
inate on the basis of gender when exercising peremptory strikes. See id. at 143-46. The
states did not ratify the Nineteenth Amendment, which gave women the right to vote, until
1920. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
31. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-07. The Court emphasized the central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment: "'No one can fiail to be impressed with the one pervading pur-
pose found in all the [post-Civil War] amendments, lying at the foundation of each, and
without which none of them would have been suggested,-we mean the freedom of the
slave race .... '" Id. at 307 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1872)).
32. Id. at 308-09. The Court insisted that "the constitution of juries is a very essential
part of the protection such a mode of trial is intended to secure." Id. at 308.
33. Id. at 309-10. The Court noted that "[iut is not easy to comprehend how it can be
said that while every white man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from persons of his
own race or color, or, rather, selected without discrimination against his color, and a negro
is not, the latter is equally protected by the law with the former." Id. at 309.
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In 1965, however, the Court temporarily delayed the germination
of this right. In Swain v. Alabama,4 the Supreme Court considered
whether the State's purposeful use of peremptory challenges to strike
African Americans from a criminal case against an African-American
defendant constituted a denial of that defendant's right to the equal
protection of the laws.35 While acknowledging that "a State's pur-
poseful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of partici-
pation as jurors . . .violates the Equal Protection Clause,"36 the
Supreme Court nevertheless extolled the virtues of the peremptory
system37 and refused to hold that "the striking of Negroes in a particu-
tar case is a denial of equal protection of the laws."38
Twenty-one years later, in Batson v. Kentucky,39 the Court proved
to be more fertile ground for cultivating a defendant's right to a ra-
cially neutral jury selection process. In Batson, the Court reconsidered
whether the purposeful use of peremptory challenges to strike African
Americans on the venire from a criminal case involving an African-
American defendant constituted a violation of that defendant's right
to equal protection of the laws.40 The Court carefully maneuvered
around its holding in Swain and held that "[p]urposeful racial dis-
34. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
35. See id. at 204-05. The State contended that the peremptory system provided "justifi-
cation for striking any group of otherwise qualified jurors ... whether they be Negroes,
Catholics, accountants or those with blue eyes." Id. at 212.
36. Id. at 203-04.
37. Id. at 219. The Court asserted that "[t]he persistence of peremptories and their
extensive use demonstrate ... that [the] peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial
by jury." Id.
38. Id. at 221 (emphasis added). The Court added:
In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it
serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we
cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's
reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case. The presumption in
any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to
obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The presumption
is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected to examination by allega-
tions that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they
were removed because they were Negroes. Any other result, we think, would establish a
rule wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge system as we know it.
Id. at 222 (emphasis added). Note the Court's deference to the policy implications favor-
ing the unencumbered use of the peremptory strike. See also supra note 28 and accompany-
ing text. It is also interesting that the Court referred to a "presumption" of fair use of
racially motivated peremptory challenges without explaining how and whether the pre-
sumption was rebuttable. Note too that the State had argued that it could strike any group
of potential jurors without explaining why. See supra note 35. With its holding in Swain,
the Supreme Court essentially accepted the State's argument.
39. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
40. Id. at 82.
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crimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to
equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is
intended to secure."41 From ajudicial policy perspective, the Court was
also concerned that race-based exclusion of potential jurors denied
those jurors equal protection and that the harm of such action under-
mined the community's confidence in the judicial system.42
The Court developed a three-step process for determining
whether the equal protection right of a criminal defendant to a ra-
cially neutral jury selection process had been violated. First, Batson
required the opponent of a peremptory challenge to make out a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.4" Second, once the op-
ponent made out a prima facie case, the burden would shift to the
State to demonstrate that "'permissible racially neutral selection crite-
ria and procedures . . .produced the monochromatic result.'"' Fi-
nally, the trial court had to make the ultimate determination of
whether the defense established purposeful discrimination.4"
In Purkett v. Elem,46 the Supreme Court revisited the judicial anal-
ysis under this three-step process. 47 In Purkett, the prosecution exer-
cised its peremptory challenges to strike two African Americans.4'
The defense objected, but the prosecution was adamant that it did not
care for jurors with facial hair and that the stricken African Americans
were the only two individuals on the venire with any type of whisk-
41. Id. at 86 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the Court stated, "To the extent that
anything in Swain ... is contrary to the principles we articulate today, that decision is
overruled." Id. at 100 n.25 (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 79, 87-88.
43. Id at 93-97. The Court further subdivided this first step:
[First,] the defendant... must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group .... and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to re-
move from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is
entitled to rely on the fact... that peremptory challenges constitute ajury selec-
tion practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate." . . . Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice
to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.
Id. at 96 (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 94 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)). In this step,
the state "must articulate a [racially] neutral explanation related to the particular case to
be tried" and "must give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of [its] 'legitimate
reasons.'" Id. at 98 n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 258 (1981)). Further, the state cannot "rebut the defendant's case merely by denying
that [it] had a discriminatory motive." Id at 98.
45. Id. at 98.
46. 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (per curiam).
47. Id. at 1770-71.
48. Id. at 1770.
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ers.4 9 Without explanation, the state trial court overruled the objec-
tion. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the explanations proffered by the prosecu-
tion were "'pretextual,' and that the state trial court had 'clearly
erred' in finding that... [there] had not been intentional discrimina-
tion. " " The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's holding on
the grounds that it "erred by combining Batson's second and third
steps into one."5" Specifically, the Supreme Court criticized the
Eighth Circuit's requirement "that the justification tendered at the
second step be not just neutral but also . . . a 'plausible' basis for
believing that 'the person's ability to perform his or her duties as a
juror' will be affected."5" The Supreme Court explained that the
Eighth Circuit, by making such a requirement, misconstrued the lan-
guage in Batson that "the proponent of a strike 'must give a "clear and
reasonably specific" explanation of his "legitimate reasons for exercis-
ing the challenges.""' 53 This language, the Court stated, was merely a
"warning... meant to refute the notion that a prosecutor could satisfy
his burden of production by merely denying that he had a discrimina-
tory motive or by merely affirming his good faith."54 The Court con-
cluded that as the prosecutor had offered racially neutral
explanations at step two of the Batson inquiry, the trial court had not
erred in accepting these explanations at this step.5 Accordingly, the
Court reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit and remanded the
case for a final determination.56
(2) From the Undergrowth: The Burgeoning Right of the Potential
Juror.-From Batson, a parallel equal protection right developed. Not
only did Batson hold that racially motivated peremptory strikes denied
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.2d 679, 684 (8th Cir. 1994)).
51. Id. at 1771.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.20 (1986) (quoting Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981))); see also supra note 44.
54. Purkett 115 S. Ct. at 1771; see also supra note 44. Prior to Purkett, the Maryland
Court of Appeals had required satisfactory nondiscriminatory reasons at this step of the
Batson test. See infra note 142.
55. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771.
56. Id. at 1771-72. The Court further criticized the Eighth Circuit for failing to review
the state trial court's ultimate determination, rendered at the third step of the Batson pro-
cess, that the prosecution was not racially motivated in its use of the peremptory strikes in
issue. Id at 1771. As this case was a habeas proceeding in a federal court, the Eighth
Circuit should have reviewed the trial court's determination in light of whether or not it
was "fairly supported by the record." Id For a discussion of the standard of review regard-
ing the third step of the Batson inquiry, see infra notes 114, 149 and accompanying text.
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defendants their equal protection rights, it also held that such chal-
lenges affected the rights of excluded jurors and harmed the commu-
nity at large as well.5 7 In 1991, the right of the potential juror to a
racially neutral jury selection process took root in two significant
Supreme Court decisions.
In Powers v. Ohio,5" the prosecution used its peremptory strikes to
remove six African Americans from the venire in a criminal trial.5 9
The defendant, a white male, objected to these strikes, but the trial
court overruled the objection.6" Reversing the lower court's ruling,
the Supreme Court noted that "'Batson was designed "to serve multi-
ple ends[ ]"'6" and held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited
the State from exercising race-based peremptory challenges.6" The
Court further held that a defendant had standing to raise an equal
protection challenge on behalf of excluded jurors.6" Thus, while the
defendant prevailed in Powers, the Court's reasoning focused entirely
on the venireperson's, rather than the defendant's, equal protection
rights.
Seizing upon its holding in Powers, the Supreme Court next ex-
tended the right of the potential juror in the civil context. In Edmon-
son v. Leesville Concrete Co.,' the Court easily concluded that private
litigants in a civil trial essentially fulfilled a governmental function in
impaneling ajury;65 therefore, the peremptory challenge, as an essen-
tial part of this process, also constituted state action.66 Following this
line of reasoning, the Court held that the use of peremptories had to
57. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
58. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
59. Id at 402-03.
60. Id.
61. Id at 406 (quoting Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986) (per curiam) (quoting
Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 329 (1980))).
62. Id. at 409. In so holding, the Court also relied on the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Id. at
402, 408-09. This Act provides, in pertinent part:
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by
law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude; and whoever, being an officer or other person charged with any duty in
the selection or summoning ofjurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen for
such cause, shall be fined not more than $5,000.
18 U.S.C. § 243 (1994).
63. Powers, 499 U.S. at 415. In its analysis, the Court adopted the theory of third-party
standing. See id. at 410-15.
64. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
65. See id. at 621-28.
66. See id at 621-22. The Court made three specific inquiries in reaching its conclu-
sion: "the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits[,]
. . . whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function[,] . . . and
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conform with the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause in that
they could only be exercised in a racially nondiscriminatory manner.67
Thus far, the Court had foreclosed the exercise of racially moti-
vated peremptory strikes in both the civil context and on the part of
the state in a criminal trial. In Georgia v. McCollum,6" the Court consid-
ered the inevitable question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment
also precluded a criminal defendant from using racially motivated
peremptory challenges.69 In McCoUum, the trial court denied the
State's pre-jury-selection motion to prohibit the white defendants
from peremptorily striking African-American venirepersons on the ba-
sis of race.7 ° In considering the difficult issue at bar, the Supreme
Court addressed four questions in its analysis: (1) "whether a criminal
defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially discrimina-
tory manner inflicts the harms addressed by Batson";71 (2) "whether
the exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant consti-
tutes state action";72 (3) "whether prosecutors have standing to raise
this constitutional challenge";73 and (4) "whether the constitutional
rights of a criminal defendant nonetheless preclude the extension of
[the Court's] precedents to this case."7 4 The Court answered the first
three in the affirmative and the last in the negative, holding that "the
Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in pur-
poseful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of per-
emptory challenges."7 5
With respect to the last question, the Court addressed head-on
the competing rights of the defendant and those of the potential ju-
ror. The Court first reiterated the notion that the Constitution guar-
anteed no right to peremptory challenges and added that "'if race
stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair,' we
reaffirm today that such a 'price is too high to meet the standard of
whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental
authority." Id. (citations omitted).
67. Id at 628. The Court concluded that either side of a civil dispute would have stand-
ing to raise equal protection claims on the behalf of excluded venirepersons. Id.
68. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
69. Id. at 44.
70. Id. at 44-45.
71. Id at 48; see also supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
72. McColum, 505 U.S. at 48; see also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
73. McCoUur, 505 U.S. at 48; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
74. McColum, 505 U.S. at 48.
75. Id. at 59. The Court concluded that the defense harmed the excluded jurors and
the community at large, that the defendant's use of peremptories constituted state action,
and that the State had standing to raise the equal protection rights of the excluded jurors.
Id.
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the Constitution. '' 76 It is important to note that the competing rights
at issue in McCollum were not identical, for the defendant had no
equal protection claim against the State. Rather, the potential jurors'
rights to a racially neutral jury selection process came to parallel that
same right of the criminal defendant.
(ii) Racially Neutral Peremptories as Required by the Maryland
Court of Appeals.-In order to circumvent Swain,77 many state courts
sought relief for criminal defendants via their own state constitu-
tions. 7' Although the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to go this
far, it did entertain the idea. In Lawrence v. State,79 an African-Ameri-
can defendant challenged the prosecution's striking of the only three
African Americans on the venire.80 The Court of Appeals discussed
the relationship between the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights81 and explained that, although the two were jurisprudentially
related, "'a violation of one [was] not necessarily a violation of the
other."8 2 The court stated that it agreed that "peremptory challeges
[sic] may not be exercised to exclude individuals from the jury solely
on the basis of race," but the court refused to abandon Swain and held
that the defendant failed to prove purposeful racial discrimination.8"
On the eve of Batson, the Court of Appeals once again considered
the issue. In Evans v. State,' the prosecution used eight of its ten
peremptories to strike African Americans from the venire for a trial of
an African-American defendant.8 5 The court assumed, arguendo, that
the defendant had made out a prima facie case of a constitutional
violation. In the final analysis, however, the court concluded that
other evidence rebutted the inference of racial discrimination.
86
76. I& at 57 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991)).
77. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 56, 542 A.2d 1267, 1270 (1988) (discussing
cases in which "courts began sidestepping Swain to find protection for defendants").
79. 295 Md. 557, 457 A.2d 1127 (1983).
80. I& at 558, 457 A.2d at 1127.
81. Id. at 561-62, 457 A.2d at 1129; see supra note 2.
82. Lawrence, 295 Md. at 561, 457 A-2d at 1129 (quoting Attorney General v. Waldron,
289 Md. 683, 704-05, 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981)); see also infra note 109 and accompany-
ing text.
83. Lawrenc 295 Md. at 565, 571, 457 A.2d at 1131, 1134.
84. 304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985).
85. I. at 528, 499 A.2d at 1282.
86. Id, 499 A.2d at 1280. The court based its conclusion on two facts: (1) the prosecu-
tion had not stricken two African-American venirepersons who were subsequently impan-
eled on the jury, i&. at 528, 499 A.2d at 1282, and (2) neither the defense nor the court
questioned the prosecution's explanations of the strikes in issue, i&, namely that the State
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Hence, the court effectively declined the invitation to go beyond the
standards enunciated in Swain.
In the wake of Batson, however, the Court of Appeals more ag-
gressively disregarded Swain. In Stanley v. State,87 the State used its
peremptory challenges to strike all or most of the African-American
venirepersons from jury service in two criminal trials involving Afri-
can-American defendants."8 Eager "to tell the trial court 'how to do
it, '  the Court of Appeals fully expounded upon the Supreme
Court's holding in Batson,9" adopted the three-step process an-
nounced in that case,9" and remanded the cases at bar for a final de-
termination.9" Thus, the right of a defendant to a racially neutral jury
selection process took root in Maryland. The state would have to wait,
however, for a final determination of the right of the potential juror.
b. The Question of Race.-
(i) "Cognizable Racial Groups" in the United States Supreme
Court. -As discussed, Batson articulated a three-step process for deter-
mining the merits of a Batson challenge.9 3 Batson further subdivided
the first step of this process-making out a prima facie case of racial
discrimination-to require a defendant to show that she was a mem-
ber of a "racial group capable of being singled out for differential
treatment."94 Given the Supreme Court's holding in McCollum95 and
the burgeoning right of the excluded juror, the defendant's race
would not necessarily be determinative. At a minimum, however, the
race of the venireperson would be.
In Batson, as in most of the cases discussed above, African Ameri-
cans raised the equal protection claims. In Hernandez v. New Yor*,9 6
however, the Supreme Court implied that the Batson analysis should
not be limited to this group alone.97 Although the Hernandez Court
ultimately rejected the Batson challenge at bar, it acknowledged that
was striking persons on the grounds of "background, age, occupation, [and] what was
learned during the voir dire at the bench and in open court." Id. at 524, 499 A.2d at 1280.
87. 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988).
88. Id. at 54-55, 542 A.2d at 1269.
89. Id. at 68, 542 A.2d at 1276.
90. See id. at 55-63, 542 A.2d at 1269-73.
91. See id. at 64-76, 80-88, 542 A.2d at 1273-79, 1282-85; see supra notes 43-45 and accom-
panying text.
92. Stanley, 313 Md. at 76, 88, 542 A.2d at 1279, 1285.
93. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
94. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986); see supra note 43.
95. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
96. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
97. Id at 371.
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proficiency in the Spanish language would be an acceptable character-
istic for establishing one as a member of the Latino racial group.98
(ii) "Cognizable Racial Groups" in the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land. -In Mejia v. State,99 the Court of Appeals, following the Supreme
Court's lead in Hernandez, concluded that "[b] lacks are not the only
cognizable group to which the Batson rule applies.""°° Applying Bat-
son's criteria, the court held that the prosecution's strike of the only
Hispanic on the venire made out a prima facie case of racially discrim-
inatory peremptory challenges.1 01
Although other courts have recognized additional cognizable
groups,'0 2 neither the Supreme Court nor the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals has established any bright-line rules identifying such groups.
Hence, courts have addressed the issue in a case-by-case fashion.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Gilchrist v. State, the defense main-
tained that white persons did not constitute a cognizable racial group
for the purposes of Batson, and, in the alternative, that the State failed
to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 03 The court
rejected both of these assertions. With respect to the first contention,
the defense argued that the Supreme Court intended Batson to func-
tion as a remedial measure "to address historical discrimination in
jury selection."10 4 Because whites traditionally had not been the tar-
get of race discrimination injury selection, the defense argued, whites
98. Id. at 355, 363-64. The Court did not distinguish "Latino" and "Hispanic." See id. at
355.
99. 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992).
100. Id. at 530, 616 A.2d at 358.
101. Id, at 539, 616 A.2d at 364.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 1988) (asserting that Ital-
ian Americans are a cognizable racial group); Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 227-28 (2d
Cir. 1987) (conceding that white venirepersons constitute a cognizable racial group);
United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1312-14 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding Native Ameri-
cans to be a cognizable racial group); State v. Jordan, 828 P.2d 786, 790 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992) (holding Asian Americans to be a cognizable racial group). But see United States v.
Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 833 (1st Cir. 1988) (refusing to deem Italian Americans a cognizable
racial group on the ground that the prosecution failed to show that this group historically
suffered from racial discrimination).
103. Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 619, 625-27, 667 A.2d at 882, 885-86. The State contended that
the defendant waived his right to allege error in the jury selection process because he
affirmed that the ultimate jury and trier of fact was "acceptable." Id. at 617, 667 A.2d at
881. The Court of Appeals noted that by affirming the acceptability of a particular jury, a
party usually waives its right to allege error on appeal. Id. at 618, 667 A.2d at 881-82.
Because the defendant in this case affirmed the acceptability of a jury which ultimately
came from the second venire, however, the court held that the defense had not waived its
right to allege error regarding the dismissal of the first venire. Id.
104. Id. at 619, 667 A.2d at 882.
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could not avail themselves of the holding in Batson.' In rejecting
this argument, the court invoked McCollum,"° 6 detailed the policy con-
siderations of Batson,'0 7 and noted that "[t] he Supreme Court's recent
cases considering Batson's reach indicate the great importance that
the Court places on the equal protection rights of the excluded ju-
rors."1" 8 The Court of Appeals looked to the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights and held that the protections they guarantee "'cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else
when applied to a person of another color.""0 9 The Court of Appeals
also reiterated its finding in Mejia that "'blacks are not the only cogni-
zable [racial] group to which Batson applies"'110 and held that Batson
applied "equally to white persons and black persons.""' Thus, the
court affirmed the right of the potential juror to a racially neutral jury
selection process and added whites to the list of "cognizable racial
groups" in Maryland.
As mentioned earlier, the defense also contended that even if Bat-
son did apply to peremptory strikes against white venirepersons, the
State failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination."12
The Court of Appeals detailed the steps of the Batson process 1 3 and
explained that the trial court's ultimate determination of racial dis-
crimination could not be overturned unless it was clearly errone-
ous." 4 The court further noted that "the issue of whether a primafacie
case was properly made before the trial court has been treated as
moot once the party making the peremptory challenges has offered
explanations for the discriminatory challenges, and 'the trial court has
105. Id.; see supra note 21 and infra note 126 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
108. Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 622, 667 A.2d at 884.
109. Id. at 623, 667 A.2d at 884 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 289-90 (1978)). The court explained that "'[a]lthough the Maryland Constitution
does not contain an express guarantee of equal protection, it is well established that Article
24 embodies the same equal protection concepts found in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.'" Id. at 623 n.3, 667 A.2d at 884 n.3 (quoting Verzi v. Baltimore
County, 333 Md. 411, 417, 635 A.2d 967, 969-70 (1994)); see also supra notes 81-82 and
accompanying text.
110. Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 624, 667 A.2d at 885 (alteration in original) (quoting Mejia v.
State, 328 Md. 522, 530, 616 A.2d 356, 359 (1992)).
111. Id. The court also concluded that Batson "is not limited to the exclusion fromjuries
of historically oppressed minorities." Id., 667 A.2d at 884 (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994)).
112. Id. at 625, 667 A.2d at 885.
113. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
114. Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 627, 667 A.2d at 886.
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ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination."'" 5 As
the trial court in Gilchrist had ruled on the ultimate question, the
Court of Appeals rendered moot the defense's contention that the
State failed to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination and
that the trial court thereby improperly shifted the burden to the de-
fense.116 The Court of Appeals further evaluated the trial court's ulti-
mate determination and held that it was not clearly erroneous.' 1 7 The
defense argued that "the trial court erred in finding a Batson violation
because the court merely disagreed with defense counsel's rea-
sons."' 1 8 Dismissing this assertion, the Court of Appeals explained
that the second step of the Batson process required the alleged viola-
tor to put forth an explanation that is "'neutral, related to the case to
be tried, clear and reasonably specific, and legitimate.""' 9 Further,
the court held, during the third step, "[w] hile the complaining party
has the ultimate burden of proving unlawful discrimination ... the
court may find that the reasons offered were pretexts for discrimina-
tion without such demonstration from the complainant."' 2 ° There-
fore, the court found that the trial judge correctly applied the three-
step process and declined to find reversible error.' 2 '
4. Analysis.-The Gilchrist court took McCollum22 to its logical
conclusion.' 23 In the context ofjury selection, there is no support for
the proposition that only certain races should be able to avail them-
selves of equal protection, while others should not.'24 Given McCollum
115. Id. at 628, 667 A.2d at 886 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359
(1991)).
116. Id. at 627-28, 667 A.2d at 886. The Court of Appeals was also satisfied that the trial
court had properly concluded that the State had made out a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. Id. Specifically, the Court of Appeals evaluated the findings of the trial
court along with the dialogue between the trial judge and the defense counsel. Id.; see
supra notes 6-7, 17 and accompanying text. Being satisfied that the State had properly
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the Court of Appeals retorted that
the trial "court was neither required to make more detailed findings nor to use the precise
words 'prima faae.'" Gilchris4 340 Md. at 628, 667 A.2d at 886.
117. Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 628, 667 A.2d at 887.
118. Id. at 625, 667 A.2d at 885.
119. Id. at 626, 667 A.2d at 885 (quoting Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 78, 542 A.2d 1267,
1280 (1988)).
120. Id. at 626-27, 667 A.2d at 886 (citation omitted).
121. Id. at 627-28, 667 A.2d at 886-87.
122. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
123. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas predicted that "[elventually, we will
have to decide whether black defendants may strike white veniremen." Georgia v. McCol-
lum, 505 U.S. 42, 62 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
124. Cf Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (asserting that if a state were
to enact a law excluding whites from jury service, "no one would be heard to claim that it
would not be a denial . . . of equal protection").
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and the current state of constitutional jurisprudence, 12 5 the court cor-
rectly recognized white prospective jurors as constituents of a "cogni-
zable racial group." Nevertheless, because the Court of Appeals
misapplied the Batson test, this case lends itself to being an exception
rather than the rule.
a. The Court Correctly Recognized Whites as a Cognizable Racial
Group.-The defense in Gilchrist asserted that Batson constituted a re-
medial measure and, as such, should not apply to whites, who histori-
cally, as a group, have not been subject to racial discrimination.'26
125. Note that with McCollum and the other cases discussed, there are strong currents
and undercurrents regarding the utility of peremptory challenges. Compare Gilchrist v.
State, 97 Md. App. 55, 78, 627 A.2d 44, 55 (1993) (Wilner, CJ., concurring) (proposing
that, because courts are finding it difficult to reconcile the peremptory strike with Batson
and its progeny, they should reevaluate the "continued viability of peremptory chal-
lenges"), affd, 340 Md. 606, 667 A.2d 876 (1995), and Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme
Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review ofJuy Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 153, 209 (1989) ("[Peremptory] challenges are not worth saving.... The gains would
include substantial economic savings, the effective control of racial and other widely con-
demned forms of group discrimination, and the control of countless other, less frequently
employed, less generalized classifications that insult and diminish human beings." (foot-
note omitted)), with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 118-31 (1986) (Burger, CJ., and
Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (extolling the virtues of the peremptory strike and discussing its
legal history and policy implications), and McCollum, 505 U.S. at 60 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) ("I am certain that black criminal defendants will rue the day that
this Court ventured down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of peremp-
tory strikes.").
There are also contentions regarding the rights of potential jurors versus those of
criminal defendants. Compare Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (discussing juror
competence and insisting that the Court cannot "accept as a defense to racial discrimina-
tion the very stereotype the law condemns"), and Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Dis-
crimination injury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway ?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 727-50 (1992)
(arguing that two factors support the proposition that the juror's right to a racially neutral
jury selection process, as opposed to that of the defendant, better explains the unconstitu-
tionality of race-based jury selection: (1) the victim of the discrimination is the excluded
juror and (2) the theories supporting the defendant's right fail to provide satisfactory, non-
racist answers as to the discrimination suffered by the defendant), with McCollum, 505 U.S.
at 63-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (maintaining that in a criminal trial a defendant's tac-
tics are not state actions, and that as such, potential jurors have no discrimination claims
against the state for a criminal defendant's use of race-based peremptory strikes), and
Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind, but Is She a Soul Sister? Race-Neutrality and the
Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 327, 343-48, 351-56 (1994) (arguing that pro-
tection of the juror's right to a racially neutral jury selection process actually leads to fewer
minorities being able to sit on petit juries and asserting that social scientific research and
opinion polls indicate that race is a factor injury deliberations and verdicts, and thus poses
a threat to a criminal defendant's right to an impartial trial).
126. See supra notes 21, 103-111 and accompanying text. The defense argued:
[C]ourts have declined to extend Batson to groups which may be arguably identi-
fiable but have not made the showing required to entitle them to protection from
discrimination injury selection.... [W]hite persons are not entitled to the appli-
cation of Batson since they are clearly not a group that has been "subjected to
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The court properly dismissed this assertion, because there exists a fun-
damental difference between receiving a preference, as a remedial
measure, with respect to the distribution of a state benefit and the
equal protection right not to be denied a state benefit. The right to a
racially neutral jury selection process is best characterized as a right to
serve as a juror irrespective of race, rather than a racial preference as
a remedial measure in the distribution of jury seats. 12 7
Several authorities support this characterization. First, a plain
reading of the Equal Protection Clause reveals that it forbids state ac-
tion that denies individuals equal protection of the law.12 1 It does not,
however, mandate that state action must make preferences for certain
racial groups.129 It is one thing to refrain from discriminating against
a person on the basis of race, but quite another to favor a person on
that same basis. The former levels the playing field by disallowing
both race-based favoritism and racially motivated prejudice, while the
latter ultimately results in the denial of equal protection. Hence, state
action, which includes a criminal defendant's exercise of a peremp-
tory challenge, 3 ° should not deny any individual the opportunity to
fulfill her civic duty on the basis of race.
Second, although courts have made exceptions to this plain read-
ing of the Equal Protection Clause and allowed racial preferences in
certain circumstances, the current jurisprudential trend limits such
discriminatory treatment." ... The courts which have extended the equal protec-
tion principles in Batson to the discriminatory use of peremptories against white
jurors have either ignored the requirement that the juror be a member of a cog-
nizable group or have found that Powers eliminated that requirement altogether.
Petitioner's Brief at 20-21, Gilchrist v. State, 340 Md. 606, 667 A.2d 876 (1995) (No. 111)
(citations omitted).
127. Cf Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) ("An individual juror does not have a
right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be
excluded from one on account of race.").
128. See supra note 2; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112
(1995) (observing that the "Fourteenth Amendment[ ] to the Constitution protect[s] per-
sons, not groups"); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (the Equal Protection Clause
"prevent[s] the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of
race" (emphasis added)); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978)
("The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individ-
ual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not ac-
corded the same protection, then it is not equal." (emphasis added)); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("[R] ights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment
are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual The rights established are personal rights."
(emphasis added)).
129. See supra note 128.
130. See supra notes 66, 72 and accompanying text.
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preferences to remedial settings."' The urgencies undergirding the
application of a remedial program are absent, however, from the jury-
selection context. Courts uphold remedial programs favoring racial
groups only if the programs are necessary to dismantle racially dis-
criminatory systems in which there are lingering effects of past dejure
discrimination. 3 In the context ofjury selection, Batson and its prog-
eny have already dismantled the historically racially discriminatory sys-
tem; by enforcing the parallel equal protection rights of criminal
defendants and prospective jurors, courts have quickly remedied the
past wrongs of racial discrimination in the courtroom. The appeals
process ensures that these remedies will not be abridged in the future
and that the general underrepresentation of minorities on jury panels
will not recur.
Third, although there is no doubt that individuals have histori-
cally suffered racial discrimination during jury selection processes,
righting this wrong with a remedial application of Batson would only
frustrate another important policy goal, namely "public confidence in
the fairness of our system ofjustice. " s3 Should the courts accord spe-
cial protection to certain racial groups in the process ofjury selection,
individual members of excluded groups would undoubtedly cry foul.
This is all the more true for criminal trials.' 4
131. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. CL at 2108-14 (explaining that remedial programs are
necessary but not sufficient to pass the constitutional mandates required for governmental
race-based favoritism); Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion) ("Unless [racial classifications] are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they
may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.");
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 941-48 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding unconstitutional a law
school's affirmative-action admissions policy on the ground that the school failed to justify
the policy on remedial grounds), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
132. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. CL at 2108-14 (requiring a showing of past discrimination
before a federal program favoring minorities could be sustained and holding that the pro-
gram had to pass strict scrutiny); Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 ("[Ilf [a governmental unit can]
show that it ha[s] essentially become a 'passive participant' in a system of racial exclusion
practiced by elements of the [private sector], we think it clear that the [governmental unit]
could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system."); cf. Missouri v.Jenkins, 115 S. Ct.
2038, 2055 (1995) ("The basic task of the District Court is to decide whether the [effects]
attributable to prior de jure segregation ha [ve] been remedied to the extent practicable.").
133. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); see also supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
134. See, e.g., Respondent's and Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 4 n.1, Gilchrist v. State, 340
Md. 606, 667 A.2d 876 (1995) (No. 111) (arguing that "there can be no dispute that the
issue of race often has been an issue in criminal trials"). Indicators of this include the
great disparities between white and African-American perceptions regarding the O.J. Simp-
son trial. Between two-thirds and three-fourths of whites believed Mr. Simpson to be guilty,
while the same proportion of African Americans believed him to be innocent. Simpson
Trial Reopens Old Racial Disput in America (CBS Evening News television broadcast, Sept.
30, 1995), available in 1995 WL 3029589; Poll O.J. Simpson Murder Trial Opinion in America
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Finally, as jury service is a fundamental tenet of American democ-
racy,' 35 it would be undemocratic to afford racial preferences in jury
selection. Juror competence ultimately hinges on one's ability to con-
sider impartially the evidence presented at trial; simply put, one's race
"'is unrelated to his fitness as ajuror."' 1 6 Given this, race-based juror
preferences would result in unjustifiable denials of opportunities to
serve in the democratic process. In light of all these reasons, it is clear
that the right to a racially neutral jury selection process should cut
across all races and extend to all individuals, irrespective of their skin
color.
b. The Court Improperly Applied the Batson Test.-In elaborat-
ing upon the Batson test, the Gilchrist court gave cursory treatment to
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Purkett,'3 7 but it eluded the
holding in that case. The Purkett Court was unequivocal:
The second step of [the Batson] process does not demand an
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. "At this
[second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of
the... explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inher-
ent in the. . ,,explanation, the reason offered will be deemed
race neutral. 1
38
Nevertheless, the Gilchrist court, relying on language in Batson, con-
cluded that the "'explanation must be [racially] neutral, related to the
case to be tried, clear and reasonably specific, and legitimate. '"139
Although this language is not necessarily irreconcilable with that em-
ployed in Purkett above, the Purkett Court assailed the Eighth Circuit
Reflects Racial Divisions (CBS Evening News television broadcast, Oct. 1, 1995), available in
1995 WL 3029601.
135. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) ("Jury service preserves the demo-
cratic element of the law.... Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens the
honor and privilege ofjury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the
democratic process." (citation omitted)). As Alexander Hamilton observed:
The friends and adversaries of the ... [Constitution], if they agree in nothing
else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any
difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable
safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free
government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
136. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
137. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. The Gilchrist court cited and quoted
Purkett, but it never discussed the case. See Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 625-27, 667 A.2d at 885-86.
138. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995) (per curiam) (alteration in original)
(quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
139. Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 626, 667 A.2d at 885 (quoting Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 78,
542 A.2d 1267, 1280 (1988)). This language comes from Batson. See supro note 44.
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for its strict reading of this very language.14 ° Judge Chasanow in his
concurrence in Gilchrist was quick to chide the majority for making
this same mistake.141 The Purkett Court explained that this language
was a "warning," in that proponents of peremptory strikes could not
merely deny "discriminatory motive[s]" or assert their "good faith" in
order to satisfy the requirements of the second step.
4 2
The purpose of the second step of the Batson test is to force the
proponent of a peremptory strike to produce a reason that is racially
neutral on its face.'4 3 Thus, it is a burden of production, not of per-
suasion." 4 The production-persuasion distinction is key. In the first
step, both the burden of persuasion and the burden of production
rest upon the opponent of a peremptory challenge, requiring her to
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.' 45 In the second
step, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the propo-
nent of the challenge to rebut the prima facie case with a racially neu-
140. Purket 115 S. Ct. at 1771. The Court observed:
The Court of Appeals appears to have seized on our admonition in Batson that to
rebut a prima facie case, the proponent of a strike "must give a 'clear and reason-
ably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the chal-
lenges," and that the reason must be "related to the particular case to be tried."
Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) and
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (citations omitted); see also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
141. See Gilchris 340 Md. at 630, 667 A.2d at 888 (Chasanow, J., concurring) ("The
majority may be perpetuating errors based on too literal a reading of Batson v. Kentucky.").
Judge Chasanow's concurrence explains the Batson process in. detail; providing guidelines
for each step. See id. at 633-45, 667 A.2d at 889-95. Indeed, Maryland courts are already
relying on his opinion as an authoritative statement of the law. See infra note 156 and
accompanying text.
142. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. Judge Chasanow, in his concurring opinion in Gilchris
contrasts this rule in Purkett with a line of Maryland cases that require satisfactory nondis-
criminatory reasons at step two of the Batson test. See Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 640-43, 667 A.2d
at 892-94 (Chasanow, J., concurring) (citing Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267
(1988), Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 553 A.2d 228 (1989), Chew v. State, 317 Md. 233, 562
A.2d 1270 (1989)). Judge Chasanow condemns the majority for following this line of
cases: "The majority's second step analysis is taken from several of our prior cases includ-
ing Chew ... Tolbert, ... [and] Stanley .... This analysis is similar to what the Supreme
Court condemned in Purkett...." Id. at 640-41, 667 A.2d at 892-93.
143. See Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1770-71 ("[T]he burden of production shifts to the propo-
nent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation .... '[T] he issue is the
facial validity of the [proponent's] explanation.'" (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352, 360 (1991))); Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 ("[T]he burden shifts to the [proponent] to
explain adequately the racial exclusion.").
144. SeePurkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1770 ("[O]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has
made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step 1), the burden of production
shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step
2).").
145. See id.; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59; Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98; Mejia v. State, 328
Md. 522, 533, 616 A.2d 356, 361 (1992); Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 59-63, 542 A.2d 1271-
73 (1987); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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tral, though possibly "silly" or "superstitious," explanation. 146 In the
final step, the ultimate burden of persuasion, which never shifts from
the opponent of the strike, is dispositive-the trial court assesses the
evidence proffered by both parties and makes a final determina-
tion. 14 7 It is during this last step-and not during the second step-
that "implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be
found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination." 48
There are at least three reasons that make the distinction be-
tween the second and third steps significant. First, because courts
cannot overturn third-step findings unless there is "clear error,"1 49
there is effectively no appellate review of these determinations.15
Second, if a trial court takes Batson's "warning" too literally and fo-
cuses on whether the proponent's prima facie rebuttal is "related to
the case to be tried," "clear and reasonably specific," and "legitimate,"
then it mistakenly shifts the burden of persuasion, which should al-
ways lie with the opponent of the strike."' Finally, if the case is in
equipoise, the complainant's ultimate burden of persuasion requires
146. See supra note 138 and infra note 154 and accompanying text.
147. See Stanley, 313 Md. at 61, 542 A.2d at 1272 (asserting that the proponent "has the
ultimate burden of persuading the court [that] there has been intentional racial discrimi-
nation"); cf. Purett, 115 S. CL at 1771 ("It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness
of the justification becomes relevant-the step in which the trial court determines whether
the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.");
Hernand7, 500 U.S. at 359 (stating that in the third step, "the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination"); Bat-
son, 476 U.S. at 98 (explaining that after the proponent of the strike comes forward with a
racially neutral explanation, "[t]he trial court then will have the duty to determine if the
defendant has established purposeful discrimination"); Mejia, 328 Md. at 533, 616 A.2d at
361 (explaining that after the second step of the analysis, "[t]he ultimate burden of proof
is always on the moving party and it is to persuade the court that there has been intentional
racial discrimination").
148. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771.
149. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369 (declining to overturn the trial court's finding on the
issue of discriminatory intent unless its determination was clearly erroneous); Stanley, 313
Md. at 83-84, 542 A.2d at 1283 (same); Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 627, 667 A.2d at 886 (same); see
also supra note 114 and accompanying text. Judge Chasanow, in his concurring opinion in
Gilchrist, noted that the majority opinion in that case implicitly overruled prior Maryland
holdings in which the Court of Appeals required "'independent constitutional appraisal [s]
concerning the existence of neutral, non-racial reasons for the striking of a juror.'" Id. at
647 n.3, 667 A.2d at 896 n.3 (Chasanow, J., concurring) (quoting Chew v. State, 317 Md.
233, 245, 562 A.2d 1270, 1276 (1989)).
150. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369; Gilchris 340 Md. at 641, 667 A.2d at 893 (Chasanow,J.,
concurring).
151. Cf Gilchrist, 340 Md. at 643, 667 A.2d at 894 (Chasanow, J., concurring)
("[A] Ithough the step one prima facie finding still remains in step three as a permissible
inference, it does not shift the burden of proof to the striking party by creating a presump-
tion that must be rebutted.").
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the trial court to overrule any allegation of racially discriminatory per-
emptory strikes. 152
In Gilchrist, the facts are at odds with the requirements of the sec-
ond step. The trial court immediately and repeatedly rejected the ex-
planations proffered by the defense, even though each explanation
was racially neutral on its face.' 53 Thus, the court deemed these ra-
cially neutral explanations unacceptable at the second step of the Bat-
son process, rather than the third step. This flies in the face of the
Purkett decision. Instead of shooting down the explanations as imme-
diately as the defense proffered them, it would have been more appro-
priate for the trial court to consider all of the explanations together in
light of all of the evidence. 54 As Judge Chasanow's concurrence im-
plies, however, because the jury selection in Gilchrist occurred prior to
the decision in Purkett, the Court of Appeals properly upheld the trial
court's findings.155 The Gilchrist court should have limited its holding
to the case at hand. Instead, by upholding the trial court's findings
and, more particularly, by giving the Batson "warning" too literal a
reading, the Court of Appeals is perpetuating the same Batson error
made by the Eighth Circuit in Purkett. Indeed, the Court of Special
Appeals is already side-stepping the majority opinion in Gilchrist and
adopting its concurring opinion in order to avoid this error.1 5 6
152. Id. at 643, 667 A.2d at 894 ("[I]f the judge is in equipoise, the objection to the
strike must be overruled.").
153. See id. at 645, 667 A.2d at 895 ("After finding a prima facie case of discrimination,
[the trial judge] seemed to focus on the legal sufficiency of defense counsel's explanations,
rather than their truthfulness."); see also supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. Note,
however, that the defense may have failed to satisfy its burden of production with at least
one of its proffered explanations. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
154. Cf Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. The Putt Court stated:
[T]o say that a trial judge may choose to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at
step 3 is quite different from saying that a trial judge must terminate the inquiry at
step 2 when the race-neutral reason is silly or superstitious. The latter violates the
principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests
with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.
Id.
155. See Gilchrist 340 Md. at 645-47, 667 A.2d at 895-96 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
156. See, e.g., Ball v. Martin, 108 Md. App. 435, 450-52, 672 A.2d 143, 150-51 (consider-
ing a Batson challenge in the context of a civil trial), cert. denied, 342 Md. 472, 677 A.2d 565
(1996). The Ball court stated:
Purkett is discussed in the concurrence ... wherein it is suggested that the major-
ity failed to afford Purkett the full range of its holding relating to the second step
of the Batson inquiry. As we perceive it, that reluctance (if it existed) may have
been occasioned by reason of the Gilchrist majority's review of the grant of a Bat-
son challenge, not a denial. Purkett... appear[s] to ... limit seriously the power
of appellate courts to address the findings of trial courts in respect to the second
step when that court is confronted with, and accepts, facially neutral reasons for
the strikes .... [W]e shall borrow liberally from the [concurrence].
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5. Conclusion.--On the one hand, Gilchrist is a landmark case for
the right of a potential juror to a racially neutral jury selection pro-
cess; so too is it a milestone for according white venirepersons this
equal protection right. Voir dire in Maryland now rests upon a firm
equal protection foundation, which is supported by the parallel rights
of the prospective juror and the criminal defendant. On the other
hand, Gilchrist provides faulty judicial guidance by misapplying the
Batson process. The policy interests served by Gilchrist may compen-
sate for its shortcomings, but its shortcomings-analytically funda-
mental as they are-pose serious threats to the interests served.
ROBERT D. FRIZELL
C. Prison Checkpoints and the Fourth Amendment: Balancing Compelling
State Interests with the Individual's Reasonable Expectation to
Privacy
In Gadson v. State,1 the Court of Appeals held that, absent an ar-
ticulable suspicion of criminal activity, it is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution2 and Article 26
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights' to detain a prison visitor, who,
prior to entering a prison, indicates a preference to leave rather than
Id. at 450-52, 672 A.2d at 150-51 (citations omitted); cf. Dennis O'Brien, Race Can't Keep
Whites Off Junes, Md. Court Rules, BALT. SUN, Nov. 29, 1995, at 2B, available in 1995 WL
2476212 (quoting Nancy M. Cohen, Gary Gilchrist's counsel on appeal, as saying that
Judge Chasanow's concurring opinion would be an important guide to trial judges).
1. 341 Md. 1, 668 A.2d 22 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1704 (1996).
2. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
3. Article 26 provides:
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or
to seize any person or property, are [grievous] and oppressive; and all general
warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without
naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought
not be granted.
MD. CONST. DECr.. OF Rrs. art. 26.
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submit to detention.4 The court's holding is consistent with search
and seizure jurisprudence.'
Using a balancing test,6 the Court of Appeals weighed the state's
interest in preventing drugs from entering the prison against the pri-
vacy interest of the individual in being free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.7 This Note argues that the court's holding is
justified because the state achieved its goal of keeping drugs out of the
prison when the visitor chose to leave the prison property." Accord-
ingly, the continued detention of the visitor was unreasonable, as it
did not further the state's articulated interest.9
1. The Case.-At the governor's request, the Maryland State Po-
lice established a drug detection checkpoint outside the House of
Correction in Jessup, Maryland.' ° Three signs along an access road
leading to the House of Correction advised visitors that they may be
subject to a search by drug detection dogs before entering the prison
4. Gadson, 341 Md. at 5-6, 668 A.2d at 25. Gadson implicates not only protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but also Article
26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated that
decisions by "the Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment are entitled to great
respect in construing Article 26" of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at 8 n.3, 668
A.2d at 26 n.3; see also Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 493 n.3, 479 A.2d 903, 907 n.3 (1984)
(stating that "[Article] 26 is in par materia with its federal counterpart and that decisions of
the Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment are entitled to great respect").
Throughout this Note, any reference to the Fourth Amendment also encompasses
Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
5. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (stating that "[a person] may not be
detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so"); Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (stating that in order tojustify detention of an individual,
officers must have "a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is
involved in criminal activity"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (stating that even lim-
ited seizures must be justified by "specific and articulable facts"); United States v. Moore,
817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir. 1987) (an investigatory detention must be justified by a
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is about to be committed); Little, 300 Md. at
494 n.4, 479 A.2d at 907 n.4 (noting the need for an articulable suspicion of criminal
activity in order to temporarily detain an individual); see also United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) (explaining that reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause).
6. A balancing test "gives full recognition to the competing public and private inter-
ests ... at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind the constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy." Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967); see also infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
7. Gadson, 341 Md. at 11, 668 A.2d at 27.
8. Id. at 12, 668 A.2d at 28.
9. Id. at 11, 668 A.2d at 27.
10. Gadson v. State, 102 Md. App. 554, 570, 650 A.2d 1354, 1362 (1994), rev'd, 341 Md.
1, 668 A.2d 22 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1704 (1996). Because 70% of the House of
Correction's prison inmates tested positive for drugs, the state established drug detection
checkpoints to stop the transportation of illegal narcotics into the prison by visitors. Id.
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facility.'1 On September 13, 1992, Tyrone Gadson (Gadson) and a
friend drove along this access road and stopped at the guard booth
outside the prison facility.12 As Gadson spoke to the guard on duty,
who screened all potential visitors as to the nature of their visit,1"
Trooper Charles Prince of the Maryland State Police approached and
ordered Gadson to turn off the vehicle and remove the keys from the
ignition to allow for a canine sniff of the truck to check for narcot-
ics. 4 Gadson immediately expressed his opposition to the canine
sniff1 5 and requested to leave the prison's property. 16 Trooper Prince
denied Gadson's request to leave and again ordered Gadson to turn
off the truck while the officer retrieved the drug detection dog.17
Gadson followed Trooper Prince's orders."i During the canine sniff
of Gadson's truck, the dog indicated the presence of drugs.19 Gadson
then admitted to Trooper Prince that he possessed marijuana.2" A
search of Gadson's truck resulted in the seizure of illegal drugs.21
At a suppression hearing, Gadson moved to suppress the evi-
dence as the fruit of an illegal seizure.22 The circuit court denied
Gadson's motion,2 3 and Gadson was convicted.24 The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals affirmed the conviction,2 5 and the Court of Appeals
11. Gadson, 341 Md. at 6, 668 A.2d at 25. The first sign, located approximately 150
yards from the point where the road turned away from Maryland Route 175, read: "WARN-
ING. ALL VISITORS INCLUDING ALL VEHICLES AND OCCUPANTS ARE SUBJECT
TO BEING SEARCHED UPON ENTERING OR EXITING THE PREMISES." Id. at 6 n. 1,
668 A.2d at 25 n.1. The second sign read: "WARNING: DRUG DETECTION DOGS BE-
ING UTILIZED ON INSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY." Id. A final sign read: "STOP. ALL
VEHICLES SUBJECT TO INSPECTION." Id.
12. Id. at 6, 668 A.2d at 25.
13. Id. at 7, 668 A.2d at 25.
14. Id. at 6-7, 668 A.2d at 25.






21. Id. Trooper Prince found three bags of crack cocaine, two bags of marijuana, ciga-
rette rolling papers, and an electronic scale. Gadson v. State, 102 Md. App. 554, 555-56,
650 A-2d 1354, 1354 (1994), rev'd, 341 Md. 1, 668 A.2d 22 (1995), cet. denied, 116 S. CL
1704 (1996).
22. Gadson, 341 Md. at 6, 663 A.2d at 25.
23. Id. at 7, 668 A.2d at 25.
24. Id. at 6, 668 A.2d at 25.
25. Gadson, 102 Md. App. at 571, 650 A.2d at 1362. The Court of Special Appeals
reasoned that the state's interest in reducing the "scourge of narcotics in the State's prison
system is a compelling one." Id. at 569, 650 A.2d at 1361. The court opined that because
dogs were not always on duty, a motorist who transported drugs should not be allowed to




granted certiorari 26 to determine whether a state trooper can constitu-
tionally detain a visitor to a prison after the visitor tells the state
trooper that he wishes to leave rather than submit to a canine
search.27
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Reasonableness Standard.-The Fourth Amendment
guarantees individuals the right "to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. "28 In
Mapp v. Ohio,29 the United States Supreme Court held that the dic-
tates of the Fourth Amendment are enforceable against the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."0
A seminal search-and-seizure case is Katz v. United States."' In
Katz, federal law enforcement officers arrested Katz for transmitting
betting information after the officers placed an electronic listening
device on a public telephone booth and recorded Katz's conversa-
tions. The Court held that the officers' actions "violated the privacy
upon which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth." 3 The Court proclaimed that "the Fourth Amendment pro-
26. Gadson v. State, 338 Md. 252, 657 A.2d 1182 (1995).
27. Gadson, 341 Md. at 7, 668 A.2d at 26.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Beginning with Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886),
the Supreme Court sought to define the meaning of unreasonable searches and seizures.
See id. at 622. Boyd involved a court that mandated production of an invoice to be used as
evidence to prove alleged revenue fraud involving illegal imported glass. Id. at 617-18.
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not allow the government to compel a
person to produce evidence against himself because it constituted an unreasonable intru-
sion and was an "invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property." Id. at 630 (citing Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King's Messen-
gers, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765)).
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. Id. at 655. The Due Process clause states, "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONSTr. amend. XIV, § 1. Specif-
ically, the Mapp Court held that the exclusionary rule was applicable to state actions in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
32. Id. at 348.
33. Id. at 353. The Government argued that Katz could not have expected any degree
of privacy while in the telephone booth because the booth was made of glass, and Katz
remained completely visible for anyone to see inside. Id. at 352. The Court rejected the
Government's argument and stated: "[What [Katz] sought to exclude . .. was not the
intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear." Id.
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tects people, not places." 4 Hence, the underlying command of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.3 5
In Camara v. Municipal Court,6 the Court developed a balancing
test to determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness to apply
to a particular search. Under this test, a court weighs society's need
for the police activity at issue against the intrusion on the individual's
protected interests.3 8
The Supreme Court applied this balancing test to the police prac-
tice of investigative detentions of persons on the street in Terry v.
Ohio.39 The Terry Court held that a police officer need not have prob-
able cause to perform a limited search of a person's outer clothing if
that police officer "reasonably" believes that criminal activity may be
imminent.4 ° The Court reasoned that the government's need to pro-
mote crime control and to ensure the officer's safety outweighed the
slight and minimal intrusion of Terry's brief detention.4 1
34. Id. at 351. Both Katz's and the Government's respective arguments focused on
whether the phone booth was a "constitutionally protected area." Id. The Court, empha-
sizing the parties' mischaracterization of the issue, stated: "What a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
35. See NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (stating that the Fourth Amend-
ment is about reasonableness, and "what is reasonable depends on the context within
which a search takes place").
36. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
37. Id. at 536-37.
38. Id. The Court stated that "there can be no ready test for determining reasonable-
ness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails." Id. Moreover, the Court identified that "[iln determining whether a particular
inspection is reasonable-and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to is-
sue a warrant for that inspection-the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of
these reasonable goals of code enforcement." Id. at 535.
39. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
40. Id. at 30. Under the Supreme Court's definition of "reasonable," the stop must be
based on specific inferences of criminal activity and not merely on unparticularized suspi-
cion. Id. at 27; see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) ("The police officer is
not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the street .... [H]e must
be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual
was armed and dangerous."); cf Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (recognizing
that the officer's reasonable inferences may be drawn from an informant that is considered
reliable).
41. Tery, 392 U.S. at 27. According to Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in
Tery, the decisions in Tery and Camara lead ineluctably to the conclusion that application
of the reasonableness clause is less stringent, more flexible, and allows intrusions on a
standard of proof less than that required by application of the warrant clause with its con-
comitant probable cause. See id. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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b. The Reasonableness Standard Applied in Mayland.--Against
the backdrop of the previous Supreme Court decisions, in Little v.
State,42 the Court of Appeals held that sobriety checkpoints do not
violate the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard."a In so
concluding, the court weighed the intrusions of privacy imposed by
the checkpoints against the interests of the state in keeping drunk
drivers off the road.' Espousing the views articulated in Delaware v.
Prouse,4 5 the Court of Appeals emphasized the comprehensive regula-
tions that govern the operation of the sobriety checkpoint program
and determined that the manner in which police officers perform the
stop is minimally intrusive compared to the state's compelling interest
in deterring drunk motorists from driving.46
Maryland courts have made clear, however, that unless a police
officer has some reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity,
limited seizures of motorists may not extend beyond their articulated
purpose. In Snow v. State,47 the Court of Special Appeals held that
once a police officer issues a traffic citation, the officer must have a
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity to further de-
tain the vehicle's occupants.' Absent such suspicion, the continued
detention of the driver and passengers constitutes an unreasonable
seizure.49
Similarly, in Munafo v. State,"° the Court of Special Appeals stated
that the dictates of Snow may not be averted by waiting to issue a traffic
citation until after a search of the vehicle is conducted.5" In Munafo, a
42. 300 Md. 485, 470 A.2d 903 (1984).
43. Id. at 504, 479 A.2d at 912.
44. Id. at 503-06, 479 A.2d at 912-14.
45. 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (stating that reasonableness is determined "by balancing
[the] intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against promotion of legit-
imate government interests").
46. Little, 300 Md. at 490, 479 A.2d at 905.
47. 84 Md. App. 243, 578 A.2d 816 (1990).
48. Id. at 246, 578 A.2d at 817.
49. Id. at 267, 578 A.2d at 827. In Snow, a state trooper stopped Snow for speeding. Id.
at 246, 578 A.2d at 817. Snow appeared "nervous" to the trooper and did not make any eye
contact. Id. at 247, 578 A.2d at 818. After issuing Snow a citation for speeding, the state
trooper ordered both Snow and his passenger out of the vehicle and conducted a scan of
the vehicle's exterior using a trained drug detection dog. Id. The trooper subsequently
discovered heroin. Id. at 248, 578 A.2d at 818. The court held that the circumstances did
not amount to reasonable and articulable suspicion that Snow and his passenger were in-
volved in criminal activity, and thus Snow's continued detention during the dog scan con-
stituted an unreasonable seizure. Id. at 267, 578 A.2d at 828.
50. 105 Md. App. 662, 660 A.2d 1068 (1995).
51. Id. at 672, 660 A.2d at 1072-73, "We find it more than slightly illogical to allow
officers to circumvent Snow merely by waiting to issue a citation until after conducting a
search of the detained vehicle." Id.
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police officer stopped the appellant for a traffic violation.5" The of-
ficer recognized the appellant as someone who previously had been
involved with illegal drugs.53 Rather than issue a traffic citation after
learning that the appellant's driver's license and vehicle registration
were in order, the police officer waited for back-up to arrive.54 The
back-up officer shined his flashlight into the appellant's vehicle and
noticed marijuana and crack cocaine in the vehicle.55 The Munafo
court averred that once the officer learned that the appellant's infor-
mation was in order, the purpose of the initial stop was achieved, and
the officer either had to issue a citation or release the appellant.56
Consequently, the continued detention of the appellant was a
second seizure that was not independently justified by reasonable sus-
picion of criminal activity.57 The officer only had a "hunch" that crim-
inal activity was afoot, but a "hunch, without more, does not rise to the
level of reasonable suspicion."58
c. Regulatory Searches and Seizures.-The "reasonableness"
framework of balancing interests has been applied in numerous cases
involving regulatory searches and seizures.59
52. Id. at 666, 660 A-2d at 1070.
53. Id. at 667, 660 A.2d at 1070.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 673, 660 A.2d at 1073.
57. Id. at 676, 660 A.2d at 1074-75.
58. Id., 660 A.2d at 1075.
59. Regulatory searches are directed toward problems unlike those ordinarily con-
fronted by police during their routine law enforcement activities. See United States v. Bis-
well, 406 U.S. 311, 311-12, 317 (1972) (allowing search of firearms dealer's storeroom as
part of inspection procedures authorized by the Gun Control Act of 1968); Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971) (upholding the conditioning of receipt of future welfare
benefits on the recipient's consent to periodic home visits by caseworkers in accord with
New York statutes and regulations); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967)
(holding that unconsented safety inspections of housing could be conducted pursuant to a
warrant issued upon less than the usual quantum of probable cause); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967) (applying the holding of Camara to a regulatory search of a
business and holding that such a search may be made only when a warrant has been is-
sued); United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 1972) (allowing search of all
baggage and personal effects without a warrant as part of a screening inspection of aircraft
passengers leaving Hawaii to prevent exportation of plant pests and diseases); see also
Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1972) (upholding the search of a brief-
case for weapons and explosives pursuant to a rule conditioning entry into a federal build-
ing upon submission to such a search). See general!y WAYNE R. IAFAvE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.9(a) (2d ed. 1992) (describing routine regulatory and administra-
tive practices).
Regulatory search practices entail the use of warrandess administrative searches that
are designed to effectuate a vital state interest. See, e.g., Klarfeld v. United States, 944 F.2d
583, 586 (9th Cir. 1991) (allowing courthouse security procedures to ensure safety as a
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In United States v. Biswell,6° a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms agent discovered two sawed-off rifles in the defendant pawn-
broker's storeroom during a regulatory inspection. 61 The govern-
ment charged the defendant with violations of the firearms laws.6 2
The Supreme Court held that the evidence seized was admissible, de-
spite the absence of a warrant, because the regulatory search was a
credible deterrent that furthered urgent federal interests and was au-
thorized by statute.6"
Similarly, in Wyman v. James,64 a woman who refused to allow
home visits by New York City Department of Social Services
caseworkers sued the Department over termination of her federal
benefits.65 The Court held that the home visits were not searches for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment,6 6 and as such, a Fourth Amend-
ment analysis was unnecessary.67 Thus, if a regulatory state action
does not constitute a search, then no Fourth Amendment protections
are implicated.6 8
In Camara v. Municipal Court,6 9 however, the Supreme Court held
that an individual may refuse entry into his apartment by a city hous-
ing inspector who desires to conduct a routine and statutorily re-
result of the threats of violence directed at courthouses); McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897,
899 (9th Cir. 1978) (allowing limited searches of persons seeking to enter sensitive
facilities).
Other types of regulatory practices include sobriety checkpoints to prevent drunk driv-
ing, such as those performed in Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 494, 479 A.2d 903, 907 (1984),
and canine searches at prisons to stop the flow of drugs from entering the prisons. See
Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1, 10, 668 A.2d 22, 27 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1704 (1996).
60. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
61. Id. at 311-12.
62. Id. at 312.
63. Id. at 317.
64. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
65. Id. at 314-15. Specifically, the government sought to terminate the woman's Aid to
Families with Dependent Children benefits. Id. at 314.
66. Id. at 326. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court stated that the visits did not
"descend to the level of unreasonableness." Id. at 318. The Court then listed a number of
reasons why Social Service home visits did not fall within Fourth Amendment protections.
Id. at 318-24. The Court stated: "The public's interest... is protection and aid for the
dependent child" and that because the "dependent child's needs are paramount... only
with hesitancy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a posi-
tion secondary to what the mother claims as her rights." Id. at 318. The Court opined
further that "the [home] visit is 'the heart of welfare administration'; that it affords 'a
personal, rehabilitative orientation, unlike that of most federal programs.'" Id. at 319-20
(quoting Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Welfare Home Vuit, 79 YALE L.J. 746, 748
(1970)).
67. Id. at 317.
68. Id. at 326.
69. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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quired housing code inspection.7° The Court held that such an
intrusion is a search and requires a search warrant, regardless of its
administrative character. 7' The Camara Court concluded that the in-
vasion of privacy from regulatory inspections was limited because such
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery
of evidence of crime.7 2
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 73 the Supreme Court
upheld an administrative seizure that involved a sobriety checkpoint.74
The Court held that the state's interest in preventing drunk driving
outweighed the minimal intrusion upon motorists to such an extent
that the absence of individualized suspicion of criminal activity would
not prevent police from detaining motorists at checkpoints.75
The primary focus of decisions involving regulatory searches and
seizures is that searches conducted as part of a general regulatory
scheme to further some specific administrative purpose, rather than
as part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime, are
permissive under the Fourth Amendment. Yet for an administrative
search to pass constitutional muster, it still must meet the Fourth
Amendment's standard of reasonableness.76
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Gadson v. State, the Court of Ap-
peals held that it is unconstitutional for a police officer to detain an
individual, absent some "articulable reason" that the person so de-
tained is or has been engaged in criminal activity. 7 7 According to the
court, Gadson's detention was indisputably a "seizure" under the
70. Id. at 540.
71. Id. at 534. The Court noted, however, that "[u]nfortunately, there can be no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails." Id. at 536-37.
72. Id. at 537; see also Wyman, 400 U.S. at 323 ("The home visit is not a criminal investi-
gation, does not equate with a criminal investigation, and.., is not in aid of any criminal
proceeding."); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230 (1960) (emphasizing that if admin-
istrative warrants were employed as an instrument of criminal law enforcement, rather
than as a bona fide preliminary step in a deportation proceeding, evidence seized would be
inadmissible); United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1989)
("To the extent that administrative searches are used for purposes other than those con-
templated by the regulatory scheme, they may fall outside the rationale by virtue of which
we have approved them.").
73. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
74. Id. at 455.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
77. Gadson, 341 Md. at 9, 668 A.2d at 26.
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Fourth Amendment.7" Thus, the only issue before the court was the
reasonableness of that seizure.79
Pursuant to the balancing test set forth in Camara, the court
judged the reasonableness of Gadson's detention by balancing the in-
trusion on Gadson's Fourth Amendment privacy interests against the
societal need served by the seizure.80 The court reasoned that "the
State has a strong interest in keeping drugs out of its correctional fa-
cilities,"'" and a canine sniff effectuates this interest.82 The court con-
cluded, however, that once Gadson asked permission to leave the
premises, thereby opting to forego the visit, the state achieved its
goal."3 The court further reasoned that because Trooper Prince con-
tinued to detain Gadson, rather than allow him to leave, the state's
true interest appeared to be the detection and seizure of illegal nar-
cotics generally, rather than its articulated interest of keeping drugs
out of the prison. 4 Although the general detection and seizure of
narcotics is clearly an appropriate governmental interest, the court
concluded that this interest is "beyond the scope of the articulated
purpose of the prison checkpoint."83 Consequently, because the pur-
pose behind Gadson's seizure exceeded the scope of the state's articu-
lated interest, the seizure was unreasonable.86
In essence, the state sought to expand its authority by allowing
state troopers to detain motorists beyond the articulated goal of the
checkpoint detention. 7 The court declined to expand the state's au-
thority in this way."8 Instead, the court concluded that the facts in
Gadson were more analogous to cases such as Munafo and Snow."° The
Gadson court concluded that unless a reasonable, articulable suspicion
of criminal activity is established, detentions of the kind at issue may
not be extended beyond the point of their original purpose.9"
Chief Judge Murphy, joined by Judge Rodowsky, dissented and
argued that the facts in Gadson were more analogous to cases such as
Sitz and Little, in which no particularized suspicion of wrongdoing is
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 11, 668 A.2d at 27.
81. Id., 668 A.2d at 26.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 12, 668 A.2d at 28.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 11, 668 A.2d at 27.
87. Id. at 13, 668 A.2d at 28.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 13-16, 668 A.2d at 28-30; see also supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
90. Gadson, 341 Md. at 13-14, 668 A.2d at 28.
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required when the state has a compelling interest that outweighs a
motorist's privacy interest.9" Judge Murphy predicated his reasoning
on the fact that the danger of drugs does not end once drugs are
prevented or diverted from entering the prison system, and thus, the
state's interest should outweigh the minimal intrusion experienced by
motorists.
9 2
4. Analysis.-In Gadson v. State, the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded that, prior to entering a prison, once an individual ex-
presses his opposition to a canine sniff of his vehicle and states that he
prefers to leave rather than submit to detention, the goal of prevent-
ing drugs from entering the prison is accomplished.9" Thus, further
detention of the individual is justified only if a reasonable, articulable
suspicion exists that the individual is engaged in criminal activity.9"
a. The State's Interest.-The public concern served by the
prison checkpoint is the prevention of narcotics-smuggling into the
prison.95 As such, the initial stop of Gadson's truck was reasonable
because it furthered the purpose of the checkpoint.96 The institu-
tional security of a prison is unquestionably a matter of significant
public concern.97 The Court of Appeals did not dispute the weight or
strength of the state's interest in keeping drugs out of the correctional
facilities and thus found the initial stop and seizure reasonable.98
b. The Second Seizure. -Arguably, however, a second seizure
occurred that was not reasonable. In United States v. Mendenhall,99 the
Supreme Court held that "a person has been 'seized' within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave."1"' In Mendenhall, the Supreme
91. Id. at 21, 668 A.2d at 32 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting); see also supra notes 42-46 and 73-
75 and accompanying text.
92. Gadsmon, 341 Md. at 22, 668 A.2d at 32-33.
93. Id. at 20-21, 668 A.2d at 32.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 11, 668 A.2d at 27.
96. Id.
97. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (stating that "maintaining institutional
security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals" of prison adminis-
tration); see also Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013, 1016 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding a signifi-
cant public interest in the state's conducting a stop and canine drug sniff of prison
visitors).
98. Gadson, 341 Md. at 11, 668 A.2d at 27.
99. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
100. Id. at 554 (Op. of Stewart, J.).
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Court stated that there was no seizure until the police officer in some
way demonstrably curtailed the defendant's liberty.101
Trooper Prince impeded Gadson's liberty by both refusing to let
Gadson leave as requested and ordering Gadson to turn off his vehi-
cle.' 012 It is this restraint on Gadson's movement that constituted a
second seizure and provided the foundation for invoking Fourth
Amendment protections. 03
c. The Expectation of Privacy.-The question which then
emerges is whether Gadson's detention violated his subjective expec-
tation of privacy.'0 4 Clearly, the purpose of Gadson's detention was
no longer the prevention of drugs from entering the prison. 0 5 Thus,
the continued detention and seizure of Gadson no longer amounted
to a seizure that was administrative in nature. 0 6 Gadson's detention
was a criminal investigatory stop that was outside the scope of the ar-
ticulated governmental interest. 7
A compelled search of a person who has decided not to visit a
prison would do nothing to contribute to the prevention of drugs
from entering that prison.' 08 Such a search would constitute a crimi-
nal investigation, which is subject to warrant and probable cause re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment.'0 9 Courts have consistently
emphasized the requirement that administrative searches may not be
used for purely criminal investigatory motives.1 In order to pass the
reasonableness test, "an administrative screening must be as limited in
its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative
101. Id. at 553 ("We adhere to the view that a person is 'seized' only when, by means of
physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.").
102. Gadson, 341 Md. at 6-7, 668 A.2d at 25.
103. Id. at 16, 668 A.2d at 40.
104. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating
a two-pronged test for expectations of privacy); see supra notes 31-35 and accompanying
text.




109. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908-12 (9th Cir. 1973). The Davis court
considered the constitutionality of screening passengers and luggage at airports. Id. at 904.
The court cautioned that such screening, without probable cause, might be subverted into
a general search for evidence of crime, and thereby become unreasonable. See id. at 909.
The court stated that "airport screening searches are valid only if they recognize the right
of a person to avoid search by electing not to board the aircraft." Id. at 910-11.
110. See, e.g., United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating criminal investigations are outside the scope of the regulatory scheme of
administrative searches).
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need that justifies it.""' Stated differently: "The scope of the search
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which ren-
dered [the search's] initiation permissible."" 2
Investigatory detentions must be justified by a reasonable suspi-
cion that a crime has been or is about to be committed.' As Chief
Justice Burger explained in Brown v. Texas," 4 when even a limited
seizure "is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and
abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits.""15 In Gadson, it is
difficult to see how the need to prevent drugs from being smuggled
into the prison could justify searching a person who elected not to
enter the prison. It follows that there is no reasonable relationship
between the continued detention of Gadson and the state's interest in
preventing drugs from entering the prison. Trooper Prince admitted
that when Gadson indicated he did not want the canine sniff to pro-
ceed, the officer's suspicion that drugs were in the vehicle was height-
ened." 6 Nevertheless, suspicion raised by an individual's refusal to
consent to a search may not be considered in determining whether
the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity
to justify continued detention." 7
The State argued that Gadson's situation fell within an exception
to the articulable suspicion requirement and was analogous to other
cases in which no articulable suspicion of criminal activity existed." 8
111. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
112. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310
(1967) (FortasJ., concurring)).
113. See, e.g., United States v, Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
continued detention after a traffic stop for a seatbelt violation was unreasonable after the
occupants produced valid drivers licenses, and there was no objective reason to raise suspi-
cion of criminal activity); United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 816 (10th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that once a police officer has fully investigated the basis for a traffic stop, it is
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to extend the duration of the stop without
reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity); Munafo v. State, 105 Md. App. 662, 673,
660 A.2d 1068, 1073 (1995) (holding that once the purpose of an initial traffic stop for
speeding and reckless driving had been fulfilled, continued detention of the driver was
unreasonable without articulable suspicion of criminal activity).
114. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
115. Id. at 52.
116. Gadson, 341 Md. at 16 n.7, 668 A.2d at 30 n.7.
117. United States v. Torres, 65 F.3d 1241, 1247 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that refusal to
consent to a search of duffle bag did not give rise to reasonable suspicion); Snow v. State,
84 Md. App. 243, 262, 578 A.2d 816, 825 (1990) ("A citizen's exercise of the Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unwarranted searches does not trigger a reasonable
suspicion that he or she is carrying narcotics.").
118. Gadson, 341 Md. at 10, 668 A.2d at 27; see Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (allowing temporary detentions at sobriety checkpoints); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (upholding a required stop at a check-
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The cases to which the State referred, however, are distinguishable
from Gadson. For instance, cases that involve the use of sobriety
checkpoints differ in that the state's interest is to get drunk drivers off
the road, and a sobriety checkpoint furthers this interest.'1 9 If a
drunk driver were permitted to turn around and escape a sobriety
check, the state's interest would not be achieved because the drunk
driver would continue to present a danger.12 ° Conversely, allowing a
prospective visitor to a prison to forego entry into the prison does
accomplish the state's articulated goal of preventing drugs from enter-
ing the prison.
12 1
Dissenting from the majority's opinion, Chief Judge Murphy ar-
gued that the state's interest in keeping drugs out of the prison out-
weighed the minimal intrusion that Gadson endured during his brief
detention and thereby satisfied the Fourth Amendment's reasonable-
ness standard. 122 In support of his contention, Chief Judge Murphy
stated that "[ t]he privacy interests in this case are far more attenuated
than even the minimal interests at issue [in the sobriety cases]" be-
cause in those cases "every driver travelling on a public highway was
stopped and subjected to a temporary seizure." 22 This reasoning con-
fuses the issue, for it suggests that because only those persons travel-
ling down the prison access road are subject to search, the temporary
detention is reasonable. Sobriety checkpoint cases, however, turn on
the weight of the state's interest compared to the intrusion upon the
individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 124 They do not rely on the number of drivers affected by the
state's action.
ChiefJudge Murphy also contended that the danger of drugs en-
tering a prison does not end when a prospective visitor decides to
forego his visit.125 This argument is based on the fact that drug detec-
tion dogs are not used at every gate, on every day, and thus, a visitor
point for illegal immigrants); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 511, 479 A.2d 903, 916 (1984)
(upholding sobriety checkpoints).
119. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455; Little, 300 Md. at 504-06, 479 A.2d at 912-14.
120. This was precisely the rationale of the Gadson court. See Gadson, 341 Md. at 12-13,
668 A.2d at 28.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 21, 668 A.2d at 32 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 21-22, 668 A.2d at 32-33.
124. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455; Little, 300 Md. at 494, 479 A.2d at 907. Both of these cases
upheld limited seizures of motorists to prevent drunk driving, reasoning that if a drunk
driver were permitted to turn back and avoid a sobriety check, the state's interest would
not be served because the intoxicated motorists would remain a threat to the public. See
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452; Little, 300 Md. at 492, 479 A.2d at 906.
125. Gadson, 341 Md. at 22, 668 A.2d at 33 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
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has a "risk-free opportunity to determine whether drug dogs are in
use on any particular day."12 6 Similarly, Chief Judge Murphy asserted
that "[i]n every Fourth Amendment decision, a citizen's privacy inter-
est could have been more fully protected had the state adopted a
more expensive alternative."127
This reasoning, however, cannot support the unreasonable
search or seizure of an individual. Chief Judge Murphy's analysis at-
tempts to curtail an individual's fundamental Fourth Amendment
protections because of inadequate state resources. 128 To announce a
rule that allows the state to insulate itself from liability under the guise
of inadequate resources would, in effect, abolish Fourth Amendment
protections. The state, whether motivated by a lack of resources or an
overzealous police force, could always cloak its actions under the guise
of inadequate resources. 12 9 Hence, no challenge could defeat the sys-
tematic, intrusive nature of some searches and seizures that police
might impose in the routine administration of their duties. The very
protections that the Fourth Amendment seeks to ensure would be-
come thwarted by claims of inadequate resources. Therefore, regula-
tory searches and seizures should be subject to more scrutinizing and
probing judicial review.
5. Conclusion.-The appropriate inquiry in Gadson was whether
the state's goal of preventing drugs from entering the prison out-
weighed Gadson's privacy interest in being free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Trooper Prince had no articulable suspicion or
basis for the seizure of Gadson. Moreover, Trooper Prince had no
specific and articulable facts that would justify the belief that Gadson
was about to commit a crime. The seizure exceeded the scope neces-
sary to ensure that Gadson would not bring drugs into the prison.
Therefore, after balancing the intrusiveness of Trooper Prince's ac-
tions with the interest of the state in maintaining prison security, it is
clear that the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that Gad-
son's detention constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
126. Id.
127. Id. at 23, 668 A.2d at 33.
128. For purposes of this discussion, the inadequacy of state resources is the functional
equivalent of the state choosing a less expensive alternative to carry out its objective.
129. ChiefJudge Murphy later acknowledges, however, that "[t]he alternatives available
to the state are not before [the court]," and, therefore, the court "must balance the means
actually chosen to protect the state's interest against the privacy interest asserted by the
defendant." Gadson, 341 Md. at 23, 668 A.2d at 33 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 26 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
BARRY M. JOHNSON
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
II. CONTRACTS
A. A New Construction of Promissory Estoppel
In Pavel Enterprises v. A.S. Johnson Co.,' the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals adopted the promissory estoppel test of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts' to apply to construction bidding disputes.' In so doing,
Maryland joined numerous other jurisdictions that apply the doctrine
to construction bidding cases. Unlike other jurisdictions, however,
the Pavel court altered the test, somewhat, by refusing to consider a
general contractor's mere use of a subcontractor's bid as sufficient evi-
dence of reliance. The court justified this departure by distinguishing
Pavel from typical construction bidding cases because of a two-month
delay between bid opening and the award of the job to the general
contractor.4 This distinction, however, runs contrary to both Mary-
land precedent' and the holdings of other jurisdictions.6 By disre-
garding precedent and inappropriately applying the Restatement test,
the Court of Appeals incorrectly decided this important case.
1. The Case.-Pavel Enterprises, Inc. (PEI), a general contractor
from Vienna, Virginia, submitted a bid to the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) for a renovation project.7 In computing its bid, PEI
relied on the bids it received from subcontractors, one of which came
from A.S. Johnson Company (Johnson), a mechanical subcontractor
based in Clinton, Maryland.' On July 27, 1993, Johnson submitted a
written scope proposal to PEI that described the work Johnson pro-
posed to perform, but omitted the price for its services.9 Johnson did
not quote a price to PEI until August 5, 1993, the same day that PEI
forwarded its bid to NIH.10 Based on Johnson's verbal price quote of
1. 342 Md. 143, 674 A.2d 521 (1996).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1979).
3. Pave, 342 Md. at 164, 674 A.2d at 531.
4. Id. at 167, 674 A.2d at 533.
5. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
7. Pave 342 Md. at 147, 674 A.2d at 523.
8. I&
9. Id. The court observed that omitting the price term is standard practice in the
construction industry. Id. This omission allows the subcontractor to withhold the price
until shortly before the general contractor submits its own bid to the owner or letting




$898,000,11 PEI submitted a bid of $1,585,000 for the entire NIH
project.' 2
When NIH opened its bids on the afternoon of August 5, 1993,
PEI's proposal ranked second lowest." NIH disqualified the lowest
bidder in mid-August and notified PEI that it would receive the
contract.
14
On August 26, 1993, Thomas Pavel, president of PEI, met with
Johnson's chief estimator, James Kick, to discuss Johnson's proposal.' 5
In that meeting, the two men discussed restructuring Johnson's bid to
allow PEI to contract directly with Johnson's sub-subcontractor, Lan-
dis and Gyr Powers (Powers)6 Johnson did not object. 7 After the
meeting, PEI faxed to all prospective subcontractors, including John-
son, a memorandum requesting a "break out" of the Powers cost sec-
tion of their respective bids." This request reflected PEI's intent to
contract directly with Powers. 9 In the memorandum, PEI requested
revised quotes from the subcontractors "in an effort to allow all pro-
spective bidders to compete on an even playing field."2"
A few days later, PEI verbally informed Johnson that it intended
to use Johnson as its mechanical subcontractor. 2 1 On September 1,
1993, PEI sent Johnson a memorandum formally awarding Johnson
the subcontract.2 2 Upon receipt of the written award, however, John-
son informed PEI that its original bid contained an error 23 and that,
11. At trial, PEI alleged that Johnson's quote contained a fixed cost of $355,000, re-
flecting the cost of a sub-sub-contract with Landis and Gyr Powers, the sole supplier of
electric controls for Johnson and all subcontractors bidding on the mechanical section of
the NIH contract. See id at 147 n.3, 674 A.2d at 523 n.3.
12. Id at 147, 674 A.2d at 523.
13. Id. J.J. Kirlin, Inc. submitted the low bid. Itd
14. Id. NIH disqualified Kirlin from the contract because Kirlin did not constitute a
small business. Id. at 147 n.4, 674 A.2d at 523 n.4. The record did not indicate whether
PEI immediately notified Johnson in mid-August that, due to Kirlin's disqualification, PEI
would be awarded the job. Record Extract at E41-42, Pavel Enters., Inc. v. A.S. Johnson
Co., 342 Md. 143, 674 A.2d 52 1 (1996) (No. 62).
15. Pave, 342 Md. at 147, 674 A.2d at 523.
16. Itt at 148, 674 A.2d at 524. Pavel testified at trial that contracting directly with
Powers would have reduced the price of the bond that PEI needed to obtain, but would
not have affected Johnson's profit. Id. at 148 n.5, 674 A.2d at 524 n.5. See Record Extract
at E36, Pavel (No. 62). Thomas Pavel testified that Johnson's cost for controls was "basi-
cally a pass-through" to Powers. Id.
17. Pave, 342 Md. at 148, 674 A.2d at 524; see also Record Extract at E65, Pavel (No. 62).
James Kick testified that breaking out the controls "wasn't a problem." Id.
18. Pave4 342 Md. at 148-49, 674 A.2d at 524.
19. Id.
20. Id at 149, 674 A.2d at 524.
21. Itt
22. Id
23. Id at 150, 674 A.2d at 524.
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as a result, Johnson's bid to PEI was too lOW.2 4 Johnson had discov-
ered the mistake in its bid in mid-August, but failed to notify PEI at
that time.25 Johnson attempted to withdraw its bid, both by telephone
and by letter dated September 2, 1993.26 Nevertheless, PEI refused to
permit Johnson to withdraw from the project.2 7 When Johnson re-
fused to perform for the price it submitted on August 5, 1993, PEI
secured a replacement subcontractor at a cost of $930,000,21 includ-
ing the Powers component. 2a On September 28, 1993, NIH formally
awarded PEI the contract, and PEI performed the contract using the
services of the replacement mechanical subcontractor . 0
On December 13, 1993, PEI brought suit against Johnson in the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County for damages in the amount
of $32,000. 3 1 PEI based its lawsuit on both traditional breach of con-
tract and promissory estoppel theories . 2 The trial judge, sitting with-
out a jury, held that a contract had not been formed under either of
these theories. 3 The trial court predicated its refusal to find a bilat-
eral contract on two findings of fact: (1) that no meeting of the
minds had occurred between the parties and (2) that prior to NIH's
acceptance of PEI's bid,Johnson had withdrawn its offer.34 As a result
of these findings, the trial judge held for Johnson. PEI appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
certiorari on its own motion before the intermediate court could con-
sider the case.
35
2. Legal Backgound. -Maryland law permits a general contrac-
tor to conditionally accept a subcontractor's proposal before the gen-
eral contractor is awarded the contract by the letting party.3 6
24. Id.; see also Record Extract at E62-63, Pavel (No. 62) (testimony of James Kick).
25. PaveI 342 Md. at 167, 674 A.2d at 533; see also Record Extract at E62-63, Pavel (No.
62). Johnson's chief estimator,James Kick, testified that he did not make PEI aware of the
company's mistake back in mid-August because he believed that the project would be
awarded to Kirlin. Id.
26. Pave 342 Md. at 150, 674 A.2d at 524-25.
27. Id. at 151, 674 A.2d at 525.
28. Id.
29. See supra notes 10, 16-17 and accompanying text.
30. Pave 342 Md. at 151 & n.6, 674 A.2d at 525 & n.6.
31. See supra text accompanying note 11. The difference between PEI's original bid
and its latter bid with the replacement subcontractor was $32,000. See Pave4 342 Md. at
151, 674 A.2d at 525.
32. Record Extract at E5-7, Pavel (No. 62).
33. Pavel, 342 Md. at 151, 674 A.2d at 525.
34. Id. at 162 n.22, 674 A.2d at 530 n.22.
35. Pavel Enters., Inc. v. A.S. Johnson Co., 339 Md. 232, 661 A.2d 733 (1995).
36. See Maryland Supreme Corp. v. Blake Co., 279 Md. 531, 540-41, 369 A.2d 1017,
1024-25 (1977) (finding a valid acceptance by the general contractor of a subcontractor's
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Maryland courts had not addressed, however, the "precise point[ ] on
the timeline" that a subcontractor's offer and a general contractor's
acceptance form a binding contract.17 Numerous other jurisdictions
have entertained this issue, but these jurisdictions disagree as to when
a binding contract exists between a general contractor and a subcon-
tractor.38 Most jurisdictions have decided this issue on either the
traditional contract theory advanced in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel
Bros.,3 9 or promissory estoppel theory applied in Drennan v. Star Pav-
ing Co.'
In Baird, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, applying New York law, considered the claim of a general con-
tractor bidding on a state government building.4" Gimbel, the
subcontractor, submitted a linoleum supply proposal to Baird and to
other general contractors bidding on the same job.4 2 Based on
Gimbel's bid, Baird submitted a proposal to the government.4 3 Later
that afternoon, Gimbel informed Baird that it had made an error in
computing its bid and wished to withdraw its proposal.' Two days
later, the government awarded the project to Baird, which, in turn,
formally accepted the Gimbel proposal.45 Upon Gimbel's refusal to
perform under the original bid proposal, Baird sued for the addi-
tional cost of hiring a replacement subcontractor.46
offer, even though the project had not yet been awarded to the general contractor, but
noting that the question of the existence of an offer is necessarily one of fact, varying by
the specifics of the situation); see also Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 487, 356 A.2d
221, 230-31 (1976) (noting the long recognition of estoppels in Maryland); Kline v. Light-
man, 243 Md. 460, 474-75, 221 A.2d 675, 684 (1966) (same).
37. Pave 342 Md. at 152, 674 A.2d at 526.
38. Id. at 156 & nn.11-12, 674 A.2d at 527-28 & nn.11-12.
39. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933); see, e.g., Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Gunderson
Bros. Eng'g Corp., 305 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1962) (finding that use of prospective sub-
contractor's bid by prime contractor was not legal equivalent of "acceptance" and, thus, no
contract was formed); Cortland Asbestos Prods., Inc. v. J. & K. Plumbing & Heating Co.,
304 N.Y.S.2d 694, 696 (App. Div. 1969) (holding that general contractor did not accept the
subcontractor's bid by merely using the bid in the prime bid); R. J. Daum Constr. Co. v.
Child, 247 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah 1952) (holding that contractor must definitely manifest an
intention to accept subcontractor's bid before enforceable contract is created); Milone &
Tucci, Inc. v. Bona Fide Builders, Inc., 301 P.2d 759, 763 (Wash. 1956) (holding that a
general contractor's use of a subcontractor's bid to compute a prime bid did not constitute
an acceptance of that subcontractor's offer to perform work at the bid price).
40. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). For cases following Drennan, see infra note 58.
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The Second Circuit reviewed the case under traditional contract
law and, in an opinion written by Judge Learned Hand, held that, by
submitting a bid, Gimbel merely made an offer to contract with
Baird.47 The court found that Gimbel could withdraw the offer at any
time before Baird accepted the offer.4" The court found in favor of
Gimbel, ruling that, because Baird did not accept the offer until after
Gimbel withdrew its bid, no contract existed between the parties.49
The court also refused to recognize a binding contract based on the
theory of promissory estoppel, reasoning that promissory estoppel
only applied to cases enforcing charitable pledges."° By allowing the
subcontractor to withdraw its bid after the general contractor relied
upon it to formulate its own bid, however, the Baird decision exposed
general contractors to significant risks.51 While the general is bound
by the numbers submitted by the subcontractor, the subcontractor is
not similarly bound until after formal acceptance by the general con-




50. Id. at 346. It is likely that the Maryland Court of Appeals would have reached the
same result. See Pavel, 342 Md. at 164, 674 A.2d at 531-32 (stating that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel has developed in Maryland similarly to its development nationwide).
Significantly, the Pavel court cited the landmark case of Maryland National Bank v. United
Jewish Appeal Federation, 286 Md. 274, 407 A.2d 1130 (1979), a case involving a charitable
pledge. Given the year of decision of that case, it is not unreasonable to believe that had
Maryland considered the Pavel case some 40 years earlier, it would have reached the con-
clusion that promissory estoppel applies only to cases involving charitable pledges.
51. See Pave, 342 Md. at 153-54, 674 A.2d at 526. The Baird decision has received much
criticism. Even the Pavel court stated: "'If the subcontractor revokes his bid before it is
accepted by the general, any loss which results is a deduction from the general's profit and
conceivably may transform overnight a profitable contract into a losing deal.'" Id. (quoting
Franklin M. Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the Construction
Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 237, 239 (1952)); see also F.B. Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr.
Co., 374 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ark. 1964) (noting severe criticism of the Baird rule and that, in
all fairness, the party who commits the mistake should bear any resulting loss).
52. The Pavel court observed that even though the general contractor is bound to the
owner, it is not bound to any given subcontractor. Pavel, 342 Md. at 153 n.8, 674 A.2d at
526 n.8 (citing Michael L. Closen & Donald G. Weiland, The Construction Industry Bidding
Cases: Application of Traditional Contract, Promissory Estoppel, and Other Theories to the Relations
Between General Contractors and Subcontractors, 13J. MARsHALL L. REv. 565, 583 (1980)). This
encourages the general contractor to "bid shop," before having to commit to a particular
subcontractor. Id. The Pavelcourt observed, however, that this system may create a "neces-
sary symmetry," insofar as the general contractor is free to "bid shop," and the subcontrac-
tor is free to withdraw its submission. Id. Bid shopping occurs when a general contractor
uses a low bid from a subcontractor to pressure other subcontractors to submit even lower




Twenty years later, in Drennan v. Star Paving Co.," the California
Supreme Court addressed the obvious unfairness created by the Baird
decision. In Drennan, the subcontractor refused to perform for the
price set out in its original bid because of a mistake it made in the
bid.54 Applying the test from the Restatement (First) of Contracts,55 the
court reasoned that the general contractor's reliance on the subcon-
tractor's bid rendered the bid irrevocable. 56 In so ruling, Justice Tray-
nor observed that subcontractors are fully aware of the injustice faced
by general contractors that are bound by bids, while subcontractors
are not.
57
A number of courts found Justice Traynor's reasoning persuasive
and adopted it.58 Drennan has also drawn criticism, however.59 Under
53. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
54. Id. at 761.
55. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CoNTRAcTs § 90 (1932). Section 90 stated that "[a] prom-
ise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only be enforcement of the
promise." Id
56. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 759. The Drennan court viewed the general contractor's reli-
ance as consideration for the subcontractor's underlying promise to keep the bid open for
a reasonable time. Id. at 760.
57. Justice Traynor wrote:
When [the general contractor] used defendant's offer in computing his own bid,
he bound himself to perform in reliance on defendant's terms. Though defend-
ant did not bargain for this use of its bid neither did defendant make it idly,
indifferent to whether it would be used or not. On the contrary it is reasonable to
suppose that defendant submitted its bid to obtain the subcontract. It was bound
to realize the substantial possibility that its bid would be the lowest, and that it
would be included by plaintiff in his bid.... [I] t is only fair that plaintiff should
have at least an opportunity to accept defendant's bid after the general contract
has been awarded to him.
Id. at 760.
58. See, e.g., Debron Corp. v. National Homes Constr. Corp., 493 F.2d 352, 357 (8th Cir.
1974) (applying Missouri law and holding that a subcontractor's knowledge that the gen-
eral would use its bid in computing the general's own bid satisfied the reasonable expecta-
tion requirement); F.B. Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 374 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ark.
1964) (finding that the general relied on the subcontractor's bid in computing its own bid
for the project); Mead Assocs. v. Antonsen, 677 P.2d 434, 436 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (stat-
ing that a bid submission could constitute reliance under promissory estoppel); Illinois
Valley Asphalt, Inc. v.J.F. Edwards Constr. Co., 413 N.E.2d 209, 211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(finding it undisputed that a general contractor relied on a subcontractor's bid in prepar-
ing its own); Lichtefeld-Massaro, Inc. v. R.J. Manteuffel Co., 806 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1991) (stating that even though the use of a bid does not form a traditional contract,
it could constitute reliance under promissory estoppel); Constructors Supply Co. v. Bos-
trom Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 71, 73 (Minn. 1971) (finding that the general
contractor relied on the subcontractor's bid in submitting the prime bid); E.A. Coronis
Assocs. v. M. Gordon Constr. Co., 216 A.2d 246, 252 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966)
(adopting the Drennan rule that by using subcontractor's bid, the general had bound itself
to perform in reliance on the subcontractor's terms).
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Drennan and similar decisions, general contractors are free to "bid
shop,"6" "bid chop,"61 or encourage "bid peddling."62 These practices
have led scholars to disapprove of Drennan.63 Additionally, scholars
have reproached the Drennan decision for creating a lack of symmetry
between the parties, in that the subcontractor is bound to the general,
while the general is not bound to the individual subcontractor.64 Nev-
ertheless, the American Law Institute incorporated Justice Traynor's
reasoning in Drennan65 and applies promissory estoppel specifically to
construction bidding cases.' Only a few jurisdictions have actually
adopted the approach of the Second Restatement.
67
One alternative to the Restatement approach is to use the firm of-
fer provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.68 This provision would
59. See Home Elec. Co. v. Hall & Underdown Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 358
S.E.2d 539 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (refusing to allow promissory estoppel as a substitute for
consideration), affid, 366 S.E.2d 441 (N.C. 1988).
60. Pavel, 342 Md. at 156 n.13, 674 A.2d at 528 n.13. The court defined "bid shopping"
as "a tool in negotiating lower bids from other subcontractors post-award." Id.
61. Id. at 156-57, 674 A.2d at 527-28. "Bid chopping" is defined as pressuring successful
subcontractors to lower their bids by threatening to bid shop. Id. at 156-57 n.14, 674 A.2d
at 528 n.14.
62. Id. at 156-57, 674 A.2d at 527-28. The Court of Appeals defined "bid peddling" as
the practice of submitting an initial uncompetitive bid, only to resubmit a lower bid after
the general contractor has been awarded the project. Id. at 157 n.l5, 674 A.2d at 528 n.15.
By waiting until the award, the subcontractor can learn the price of the lowest sub-bid and
beat it, thus saving the administrative cost of preparing an estimate. Id.
63. See, e.g., Thomas P. Lambert, Comment, Bid Shopping and Peddling in the Subcontract
Construction Industy, 18 UCLA L. REv. 389, 394-96 (1970) (discussing six negative repercus-
sions to the industry of bid shopping and bid peddling).
64. See, e.g., Williams v. Favret, 161 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1947) (McCord, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that the law of contracts cannot apply so one-sidedly as to bind one party to
the other, yet leave the other "free to do as he please[s]"). An interesting twist took place
in Electrical Construction & Maintenance Co. v. Maeda Pacific Corp., 764 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.
1985), in which the Ninth Circuit applied the theory of promissory estoppel to force the
general contractor to contract with the subcontractor after the general had used the sub-
contractor's bid to win the project. Id. at 622-23.
65. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 87(2) (1979). This section provides, inter
alia, that "[a]n offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or for-
bearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to the extent nec-
essary to avoid injustice." Id.
66. Pavel 342 Md. at 158, 674 A.2d at 529.
67. See id. at 159, 674 A.2d at 529; Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Veradion,
647 N.E.2d 1174, 1178 (Mass. 1995); Cleveland v. High Country Fashions, Inc., 831 S.W.2d
724, 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). But see, e.g., Arango Constr. Co. v. Success Roofing, Inc., 730
P.2d 720, 725 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (accepting the Drennan reasoning that there is an
implied promise to keep an offer open).
68. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-205 (1992), The code provides:
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its terms
gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of considera-
tion, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no
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hold open as irrevocable subcontractor's written bids, if those bids
give some assurance that they will remain open.
69
Two other alternatives, rooted in traditional contract theories,
have been discussed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Under a
conditional bilateral contract analysis, if the general contractor and
subcontractor exchange promises before bid opening, their agree-
ment could be upheld as valid, but conditional upon the general con-
tractor being awarded the project." Such conditional or contingent
contracts have been recognized in Maryland. 71 The reasoning under-
lying such recognition was observed by the Pavel court to be in direct
conflict with Judge Hand's Baird v. Gimbel72 analysis. 71 Under a unilat-
eral contract analysis, the sub-bid would be regarded as an offer to a
unilateral contract, so that use by the general contractor would consti-
tute acceptance by way of performance. 74 As observed by the Pavel
court, this theory also contrasts with Judge Hand's analysis.75
3. The Court's Reasoning.-
a. Traditional Bilateral Contract.-At the outset, the Court of
Appeals addressed whether a traditional bilateral contract existed be-
tween the parties.76 First, the court reviewed the trial court's finding
that no meeting of the minds had taken place between the parties.
The fact that PEI sent its letter of August 26, 1993, to all subcontrac-
tors requesting resubmissions of quotes, the court held, reflected that
PEI and Johnson lacked "'a definite, certain meeting of the minds on
a certain price for a certain quantity of goods."' 77 Thus, the Court of
Appeals held, substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding
that no meeting of the minds had taken place, and, therefore, the
court's finding was not "clearly erroneous. "78
event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any such term




70. See Loranger Constr. Co. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 384 N.E.2d 176, 180 (Mass. 1978).
71. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
72. 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933); see supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
73. See Pave4 342 Md. at 160, 674 A.2d at 529-30.
74. See Loranger Constr. Co., 384 N.E.2d at 180.
75. See Pave4 342 Md. at 160, 674 A.2d at 530.
76. Id. at 161, 674 A.2d at 530.
77. Id. at 162, 674 A.2d at 531 (quoting Record Extract at E62-63, Pavel (No. 62)).
78. On appeal. the Court of Appeals reviews findings of fact under the "clearly errone-
ous" standard of review, while it reviews issues of law de novo. MD. R. 8-131 (c) ("When an
action has been tried without ajury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law
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Second, the Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's determi-
nation that Johnson had withdrawn its offer to PEI before PEI had
accepted.79 Again, the Court of Appeals found substantial evidence in
the report to support the conclusion of the trial court. Although
Johnson's withdrawal had not arrived until after PEI's acceptance, the
trial court held that PEI could not bind Johnson to the terms of its
offer."a The Court of Appeals found that the trial judge's remark that
"'before there was ever a final agreement reached with the contract
awarding authorities... Johnson made it clear to [PEI] that they were
not going to continue to rely on their earlier submitted bid,'"8
demonstrated that the trial judge had considered Johnson's offer in-
herently contingent upon PEI winning the contract from NIH prior to
final acceptance.8a Because Johnson did not lose the power to revoke
its offer until after NIH awarded the project to PEI, PEI did not make
a "final" acceptance of Johnson's offer on September 1, 1993.8" By
revoking its offer on September 2, 1993,a 4Johnson beat the deadline
for withdrawing its offer by twenty-six days. Therefore, the court
found the trial court's ruling that Johnson had withdrawn its offer
before acceptance not clearly erroneous 5 and affirmed the finding of
the trial court that the parties failed to form a bilateral contract.8 6
b. Promissory Estopel.-The Court of Appeals recognized
that no Maryland court had ever applied "detrimental reliance," or
"promissory estoppel," theory to a construction bidding case.87 Ac-
cording to the court, the doctrine of promissory estoppel originated
in Maryland primarily to enforce pledges to charitable organiza-
tions.8 8 In Maryland National Bank v. United Jewish Appeal Federation,9
and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence
unless clearly erroneous.").
79. Pave, 342 Md. at 163, 674 A.2d at 531.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Record Extract at E76, Pavel (No. 62)).
82. Id.
83. Id. Although NIH initially awarded the contract to PEI in mid-August, NIH did not
formally accept PEI's offer until September 28, 1993. Id. at 151, 674 A.2d at 525; see supra
notes 14 & 28 and accompanying text.
84. Pave4 342 Md. at 151, 674 A.2d at 525.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 164, 674 A.2d at 531. It is more accurate to refer to the doctrine as "promis-
sory estoppel," rather than "detrimental reliance," because detrimental reliance is only one
of several elements necessary for recovery under the theory of promissory estoppel. See
infra note 100 and accompanying text.
88. Pave 342 Md. at 164, 674 A.2d at 531-32. The court mentioned that it first consid-
ered the issue, albeit in another context, in 1854 in Gittings v. Mayhew, 6 Md. 113 (1854).
Pavel, 342 Md. at 164, 674 A.2d at 531.
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the leading Maryland case on promissory estoppel, the court refused
to enforce the promise because the promisee had failed to act in a
"definite or substantial" way in reliance on the promisor" as required
by the Restatement (First) of Contracts.91
After that case, the doctrine evolved and expanded to areas other
than charitable pledges.92 Maryland courts, however, have expressed
confusion about when and how to apply the doctrine.93 For example,
the court pointed out that, in Snyder v. Snyder, 4 the Court of Special
Appeals erroneously held that promissory estoppel requires a finding
of fraudulent conduct on the part of the promisor.95
Further, in Kiley v. First National Bank,9 6 the court stated that "[i] t
is unclear whether Maryland continues to adhere to the more strin-
gent formulation of promissory estoppel, as set forth in the original
Restatement of Contracts, or now follows the more flexible view found in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts."97
In an attempt to resolve this confusion, and because "[t] he bene-
fits of binding subcontractors outweigh the possible detriments of the
doctrine,"98 the Court of Appeals in Pavel adopted the test of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts for construction bidding cases.99 The
court then enunciated the following four requirements for applying
promissory estoppel, regardless of context:
89. 286 Md. 274, 288, 407 A.2d 1130, 1137 (1979) (holding that a charitable pledge
lacks legal consideration and, thus, is legally unenforceable).
90. Id. at 289-90, 407 A.2d at 1138-39.
91. RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
92. See Pavel 342 Md. at 165, 674 A.2d at 532.
93. See id.
94. 79 Md. App. 448, 558 A.2d 412 (1989). In that case, a wife detrimentally relied on
her husband's false promise to transfer property. Id. at 450-51, 558 A.2d at 414.
95. Pavel, 342 Md. at 165-66, 674 A.2d at 532. The "fraudulent conduct" component of
the Snyder holding is not a part of the test adopted in Pavel. See id at 166, 674 A.2d at 532
(setting out the elements of the Restatement test). To the Pavel court, inclusion of such an
element clearly reflects confusion in the lower appellate court. See id.
96. 102 Md. App. 317, 649 A.2d 1145 (1994), cert. denied, 338 Md. 116, 65 6 A.2d 772,
and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
97. Id. at 336, 649 A.2d at 1154. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts deletes the re-
quirement that the action of the offeree be "definite and substantial." Pavel 342 Md. at
166 n.29, 674 A.2d at 532-33 n.29.
98. Pave4 342 Md. at 164, 674 A.2d at 531. In a footnote to this statement, the court
cautioned future litigants that the court's willingness to consider the doctrine does not
carry with it the implication that Maryland will necessarily agree with the holdings of sister
jurisdictions on the issue. Id at 164 n.22, 674 A.2d at 531 n.22 (citing N. Litterio & Co. v.
Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
99. Id. at 166, 674 A.2d at 532 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1)
(1979)). The Court of Appeals adopted the second Restatement's formulation with little
discussion, except to note that the court desired to "resolve ... confusion." Id.
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1. a clear and definite promise;
2. where the promisor has a reasonable expectation
that the offer will induce action or forbearance on the part of
the promisee;
3. which does induce actual and reasonable action or
forbearance by the promisee; and
4. causes a detriment which can only be avoided by the
enforcement of the promise. 10
To the extent that Snyder, and the later case of Friedman & Fuller v.
Funkhouser,10 1 required a showing of fraud, they were disapproved by
the Pavel court.10 2
The Court of Appeals then applied the four-factor test to the facts
of the Pavel case. First, for the general contractor to successfully bind
the subcontractor to its promise, the general contractor must be able
to establish a "clear and definite" offer to perform the job at a given
price. 0 ' Observing that this determination requires a case-by-case fac-
tual analysis, the court held that the trial judge had properly con-
cluded that Johnson had made a sub-bid "sufficiently clear and
definite to constitute an offer," satisfying the first element of the Re-
statement test.10 4 Second, the court held that the trial court had prop-
erly concluded that Johnson had no reasonable expectation that PEI
would rely on its bid.'0 5 As to the reasonableness of a sub-contractor's
expectation, the Court of Appeals noted that evidence of "course of
100. Id. The Court of Appeals noted that this formulation is in agreement with the
requirements stated in Union Trust Co. v. Charter Medical Corp., 663 F. Supp. 175, 178 (D.
Md. 1986), affd, 823 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1987). In that case the district court observed that
"it is not necessary to reach here the question of whether the more stringent standard of
the original Restatement-requiring action or forbearance 'of a substantial and definite
character'-is still the law of Maryland." Id. at 178 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
ComTrRAcrs § 90 (1932)). Cf Maryland Nat'l Bank v. UnitedJewish Appeal Fed'n, 286 Md.
274, 286, 407 A.2d 1130, 1136-37 (1979) (comparing the first Restatement to a tentative draft
of the second).
101. 107 Md. App. 91, 111, 666 A.2d 1298, 1308 (1995) (applying the Restatement rule
from Snyder).
102. See Pave, 342 Md. at 166 n.29, 674 A.2d at 532 n.29.
103. Id. at 167, 674 A.2d at 533.
104. Id.
105. Id. As the Court of Appeals observed, the trial court came to this conclusion for
four separate reasons: (1) Johnson believed that the bidding process remained open; (2)
"it would be unreasonable for offers to continue" for a lengthy period between the date of
bid opening and final award; (3) Johnson believed that Kirlin was the lowest bidder; and




dealing" and "usage of trade" should operate as "strong incidies of
reasonableness."10 6
Third, the Restatement test calls for actual and reasonable reliance
by the general contractor on the bid of the subcontractor. 11 7 The
Court of Appeals observed that, although the trial court made no
mention of the existence or absence of such reliance, 108 it may be
assumed that the trial judge concluded that no actual reasonable reli-
ance existed "based on his statement that 'the parties did not have a
definite, certain meeting of the minds on a certain price for a certain
quantity of goods and wanted to renegotiate."'10 9 The Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the fact that PEI sent the memorandum of Au-
gust 26, 1993,11° to all prospective mechanical subcontractors, and not
Johnson only, supported the trial court's ruling.'11 The Court of Ap-
peals noted that prompt notice by the general that it intends to use a
subcontractor's bid would be "weighty evidence," absent here, that the
general did in fact rely on it." 2 By not producing any weighty evi-
dence of reliance, PEI failed to satisfy the third element of the Restate-
ment test.
113
Finally, because the trial judge did not address the issue directly,
the Court of Appeals inferred that the lower court "did not find [the
Pavel] case to merit an equitable remedy.""' 4 Only ajudge may deter-
mine whether the application of principles of common law equity
should be invoked to prevent injustice, the court held. Further, the
general contractor must come before the court with "clean hands"-
having not engaged in practices such as bid shopping,115 bid chop-
ping,"' or bid peddling' 7-and the court must determine that "jus-
tice compels" an equitable remedy." 8 The Court of Appeals found no
error in the trial court's apparent conclusion that an equitable rem-
edy was unwarranted.
106. Id. at 167 n.30, 674 A.2d at 533 n.30 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 219-223 (1979)).
107. Id. at 167, 674 A.2d at 533.
108. Id. at 168, 674 A.2d at 533.
109. Id. (quoting Record Extract at E76-1, Pavel (No. 62)).
110. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
111. Pave4 342 Md. at 168, 674 A.2d at 533 ("[T]hat the general contractor engaged in
'bid shopping' . . . is strong evidence that the general did not rely on the sub-bid.").
112. Id. The court also observed that jury might infer that a given sub-bid was so low
that no reasonable general contractor would rely on it. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
118. Pave 342 Md. at 168, 674 A.2d at 533-34.
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Based on its analysis of the four factors of the promissory estoppel
test, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the lower court that
PEI had failed to establish its case based on either a traditional con-
tract or detrimental reliance theory.119
4. Analysis.-In Pavel, the Court of Appeals purported to adopt
the promissory estoppel test developed by the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. In fact, however, the Pavel court departed from the trend
of other jurisdictions by applying a different interpretation of the Re-
statement test to the fact situation at issue.12 1
a. Promisor's Reasonable Expectation of Reliance.-The Court of
Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's finding that PEI failed
to show a reasonable expectation of reliance on the part of John-
son.' 22 Although the court may reasonably have concluded thatJohn-
son's expectation of reliance had dissipated over time, the fact
remains that a reasonable expectation nevertheless did. A finding
that Johnson's expectation had dissipated admits the existence of a
reasonable expectation of reliance at one time, and this is all that the
Restatement test requires.' 2 The Court of Appeals, however, imposed
an additional requirement-an expectation of continued reliance.'24
Because "it would be unreasonable for offers to continue," over time,
the court held, Johnson did not have an expectation of reliance.' 25
119. Id. at 168-69, 674 A.2d at 534.
120. See id at 166, 674 A.2d at 532.
121. Evidence existed that would have supported a trial court determination that a tradi-
tional bilateral contract existed between the parties. See id. at 162, 674 A.2d at 531; see also
supra note 34 and accompanying text. Evidence also existed that the parties had a meeting
of the minds about the terms of the agreement notwithstanding the Powers negotiation.
See supra notes 17-18. At least one jurisdiction binds a subcontractor to a contract for the
period before the general contractor is awarded the project. See Alaska Bussell Elec. Co. v.
Vern Hickel Constr. Co., 688 P.2d 576, 580-81 (Alaska 1984) (stating that a subcontractor
is contingently bound to the general contractor before the project is awarded).
122. Pave4 342 Md. at 162, 674 A.2d at 531. The lower court asserted that "it would be
unreasonable for offers to continue" under the circumstances of the instant case. Record
Extract at E76, Pavel (No. 62).
123. See Pave 342 Md. at 166, 674 A.2d at 532. Clearly, there was a substantial likeli-
hood that PEI would rely on Johnson's bid if it turned out to be low and that this would
result in PEI winning the project. Moreover, not only was Johnson aware that PEI would
rely on the bid, but applying Justice Traynor's reasoning from Drennan, Johnson hoped
PEI would use it. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of subcontrac-
tor's expectations. This kind of interest carries a necessary implication that the subcon-
tractor had a reasonable expectation that the general would rely on its submission.




There are two flaws to this holding. First, the notion of continued
reliance is not required by the Restatement test; the Restatement requires
only an initial expectation of reliance. In other jurisdictions, it is well
settled that the "reasonable expectation" requirement of promissory
estoppel is satisfied by the mere use of the subcontractor's bid by the
general contractor. 26 As early as 1964, courts observed that such reli-
ance gives rise to a cause of action for the general contractor's addi-
tional costs of replacing the subcontractor that had supplied figures
for the general's bid.127 In affirming the trial court's finding, the Pa-
vel court cited no authority for its conclusion that anything other than
use of the subcontractor's bid by the general is required to constitute
reliance. By failing to cite any authority and neglecting to discuss the
basis for determining that the test required continued reliance, the
Court of Appeals departed from the rule of other jurisdictions that
mere use of the subcontractor's bid by the general contractor in sub-
mitting the prime bid constitutes reliance.128
Second, whetherJohnson actually expected continued reliance by
PEI should not serve as conclusive evidence of whether that expecta-
tion was "reasonable." The Court of Appeals noted that courts should
consider course of dealing and usage of the trade when determining
the reasonableness of the subcontractor's expectations. 129 The trial
court made no findings of fact regarding either of these issues. It is
not reasonable that a subcontractor would submit a bid to a general in
contemplation of an impending project without the expectation that
the general might rely on the subcontractor's bid, not only to com-
pute the general's bid but also to procure materials and to deal with
the other subcontractors and the letting party. The Drennan opinion
discusses this initial proposition,"' which, accordingly, serves as the
basis for applying promissory estoppel to construction bidding
cases.1 ' By adopting the Restatement test, the Court of Appeals implic-
itly adopted the requirement that use of a subcontractor's bid equals
reliance. Given the trial court's finding that PEI relied on Johnson's
126. See supra note 58 for cases following Drennan.
127. See F.B. Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 374 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Ark. 1964) ("Jus-
tice demands that the loss resulting from the subcontractor's carelessness should fall upon
him who was guilty of the error rather than upon the principal contractor who relied in
good faith upon the offer that he received.").
128. See supra note 58 for authority that use by general contract or of a subcontractor's
bid is "reliance."
129. Pave4 342 Md. at 167 n.30, 674 A.2d at 533 n.30 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRAcrs §§ 219-223 (1979)).
130. See Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757, 760 (Cal. 1958) (discussed supia note
57 and accompanying text).
131. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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bid, the Court of Appeals had no choice but to reverse the lower
court's holding on this issue. The Court of Appeals should have de-
t,rmined that as a matter of law a subcontractor will be deemed to
have a reasonable expectation of reliance.
b. Actual Reliance by the Promisee.-The Court of Appeals
noted that the lower court did not expressly address the third factor of
the Restatement test."' 2 Rather, based on the statement that "'the par-
ties did not have a definite, certain meeting of the minds on a certain
price for a certain quantity of goods and wanted to renegotiate,"' the
Court of Appeals inferred that the trial court had found that PEI had
not actually relied on Johnson's bid."3 The Court of Appeals also
concluded that the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous. In
so ruling, however, the Court of Appeals erred in two significant ways.
First, the context of the quote upon which the Court of Appeals's
affirmation is based strongly suggests that the lower court was refer-
ring to the PEI's traditional bilateral contract claim, not the promis-
sory estoppel claim."M In the first full paragraph, the discussion of
promissory estoppel seems to draw the "continuing promise" finding
from the previous line, while the "meeting of the minds" comment
modifies the court's discussion of the traditional contract claim. 135
The court's repetition of the "meeting of the minds" language in the
following paragraph, by way of summary, strongly implies that the
phrase continued to apply to the contract claim only.136 Moreover,
the Court of Appeals itself used the same "meeting of the minds" lan-
132. Pave4 342 Md. at 168, 674 A.2d at 533 ("[T]he trial judge did not make a specific
finding that PEI failed to prove its reasonable reliance upon Johnson's sub-bid.").
133. Id. (quoting Record Extract at E76-1, Pavel (No. 62)).
134. Id The lower court, having previously discussed the contours of promissory estop-
pel, continued by stating-
I would be unpersuaded by the evidence that there was a continuing promise that
existed that [PEI] was entitled to rely on.
And, so, accordingly I would render on promissory estoppel in favor of the
defendant and judgment on the contract issue for the defendant as well, there
being no meeting of the minds prior to the actual award of the contract [on] 9/
28.
The only interpretation, I think, that is reasonable to put on the August 26th
request for new information is that the parties did not have a definite, certain
meeting of the minds on a certain price for a certain quantity of goods and
wanted to renegotiate whatever that was.
So, for all of those reasons, judgment will be entered for the defendant on
both counts.
Record Extract at E76-E76-1, Pavel (No. 62).




guage to support its affirmation of the trial court's holding for the
traditional contract claim.
Second, use of the subcontractor's bid, rather than continued re-
liance by the general contractor, should satisfy the reliance require-
ment.1 37 If the expectation that the general contractor will use the
subcontractor's bid in its own computation is sufficient to satisfy the
"reasonable expectation of reliance" factor, then certainly the actual
use by the general contractor will satisfy the reliance prong. As dis-
cussed above, many jurisdictions find that the mere use of the bid by
the general contractor constitutes reliance.1 38 Assuming use of the
bid constituted reliance, the Court of Appeals needed to look no fur-
ther than the following finding of fact: "PEI relied upon Johnson's
sub-bid in making its bid for the entire project."' 39 By usingJohnson's
bid, PEI bound itself to NIH to provide the services for the quoted
amount, even though NIH had not yet awarded the contract. 140
The Court of Appeals mentioned that evidence of bid shopping
strongly suggests a lack of reliance by the general on the subcontrac-
tor's bid.' This may be relevant in consideration of whether justice
demands enforcement of the promise, but is not helpful to the discus-
sion of whether the general relied on the subcontractor's bid in com-
puting its own bid. Although bid shopping may be discouraged in the
industry, it is not the practice sought to be remedied by promissory
estoppel. The Court of Appeals noted that this practice and others
were common in the construction industry prior to Baird and con-
tinue to be common today.142 Although one commentator has sug-
gested that promissory estoppel could be used as a remedy to bind the
general contractor to the subcontractor, 4 ' the problem of bid shop-
137. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
138. For cases holding that use of a bid by the prime contractor satisfies the reliance
requirement, see supra note 58.
139. Pave, 342 Md. at 151, 674 A.2d at 525. This was precisely the argument pro-
pounded by PEI on appeal. Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Pavel (No. 62) (arguing that by
submitting a bid to the owner, the prime contractor had already relied on the
subcontractor).
140. See Alaska Bussell Elec. Co. v. Vern Hickel Constr. Co., 688 P.2d 576, 580-81 (Alaska
1984) (using promissory estoppel to bind the subcontractor to the general, because the
general was bound to the letting party even before the owner accepted the bid).
141. Pave, 342 Md. at 168, 674 A.2d at 533.
142. Id. at 153-54 & n.8, 674 A.2d at 526 & n.8 (noting that under Baird, the general
remained free to bid shop, but a necessary symmetry developed in that neither party was
bound to the other); see also id. at 156-57, 674 A.2d at 527-28 (noting that Drennan's reason-
ing has come under criticism because it allows bid shopping, bid chopping, and bid
peddling).
143. See Lambert, supra note 63, at 405-09 (suggesting that promissory estoppel could be
used to bind the general to the subcontractor as a way of dissuading bid shopping).
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ping does not affect the general contractor's reliance on the subcon-
tractor's bid. Therefore, the trial court's determination that PEI did
not rely on Johnson's bid was clearly erroneous.
c. Demands of Justice.-The trial court did not discuss the
fourth element of the promissory estoppel test."M The Court of Ap-
peals concluded that justice did not compel equitable action by the
court.145 It seems more reasonable to conclude that the lack of discus-
sion below indicates that the trial court failed to consider the issue.
Because the trial court determined that the other factors of the Re-
statement test were unsatisfied, it did not entertain the fourth factor.
Because the Court of Appeals had not yet adopted the Restatement test
for detrimental reliance, the trial court did not make separate find-
ings regarding each of the factors. Accordingly, the appellate court
was left to speculate about the reasons for the trial court's holding.
The lower court's finding cannot satisfy the "not clearly erroneous"
standard because it was not even discussed. The Court of Appeals
stated that a finding of "clean hands" on the part of the general con-
tractor would be required to satisfy the fourth factor.14 6 Because the
trial court made no findings on this issue,147 the Court of Appeals had
no basis on which to affirm the judgment. Accordingly, the case
should have been remanded on this issue.
5. Conclusion.-In affirming the trial court's decision and adopt-
ing the promissory estoppel test of the second Restatement, the Court
of Appeals seems to favor the general contractor. In the majority of
jurisdictions applying the Restatements formulation of promissory es-
toppel in contractor-subcontractor bidding disputes, the general con-
tractor can recover so long as there is detrimental reliance. In this
case, however, PEI lost because the court discerned no such reliance.
It is here that the Court of Appeals erred. Given the trial court's find-
ing that PEI relied on Johnson's bid in preparing its own submission
to NIH, the court should have found that PEI satisfied the third prong
of the Restatement test. Additionally, because the Drennan reasoning
persuaded the court to adopt promissory estoppel in construction bid-
ding cases, the court should have maintained Drennan's reasoning re-
garding Johnson's expectations for PEI's use of its bid in calculating
the prime bid as satisfying the "reasonable expectation" factor. To
144. Pavel, 342 Md. at 168, 674 A.2d at 534; see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
145. Pavel, 342 Md. at 168, 674 A.2d at 534.
146. Id., 674 A.2d at 533-34.
147. Id., 674 A.2d at 534.
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stay in line with the modem application of promissory estoppel to
construction bidding cases, the Court of Appeals should have reversed
the trial court's holding on the second and third factors of the Restate-
ment test and remanded the case for determination of the fourth:
whether justice compelled equitable action.
JASON R. SCHERR
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
III. CRIMINAL LAW
A. A "Commonsensical" Approach to Statutory Interpretation
In Spitzinger v. State,1 the Court of Appeals held that a defendant
convicted of felony theft under the consolidated theft statute2 but ac-
quitted of robbery arising from the same act may be sentenced up to
the legislatively created fifteen-year maximum penalty for felony theft
and may not take advantage of the maximum ten-year cap for rob-
bery.3 In reaching this conclusion, the court invoked the Supreme
Court's admonition to give "commonsensical" meaning to statutes
and thereby avoided creating an anomaly in the criminal law.
1. The Case. -A grand jury in Prince George's County indicted
Stephen Lane Spitzinger (Spitzinger) for armed robbery, robbery, fel-
ony theft,4 and misdemeanor theft.' The victim claimed that he was
driving his employer's Pontiac Sunbird, and when he was stopped at a
red light, a man approached.6 The man allegedly produced a small
pistol and instructed the victim to get out of the car." The victim com-
plied, and the man drove away in the car.8 Within minutes, the victim
attracted the attention of an approaching police officer and reported
the robbery.9 Three days later, the police found Spitzinger in posses-
sion of the car."0 The victim identified a photograph of Spitzinger as
the person who approached him with a gun, but the victim failed to
identify Spitzinger at trial.11
At trial, Spitzinger admitted to theft of the vehicle, but denied
that he was the armed robber.12 Spitzinger claimed that he took the
car after finding it unattended at a gas station with the keys in the
ignition and the motor running. 3 The court asked the jury to return
verdicts on the charges of armed robbery, robbery, felony theft, and
1. 340 Md. 114, 665 A.2d 685 (1995).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342 (1996).
3. Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 130, 665 A.2d at 692.
4. Theft of property valued at three hundred dollars or greater constitutes felony
theft. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(0 (1). Theft of property valued under three hun-
dred dollars constitutes misdemeanor theft. See id. § 342(f)(2).
5. Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 117, 665 A.2d at 686.
6. Id. at 117-18, 665 A.2d at 686.









misdemeanor theft.14 The trial judge instructed the jury that, if it
found Spitzinger guilty of armed robbery, the robbery charge would
merge into the armed robbery count. Further, the judge instructed
that, if the jury found Spitzinger guilty of felony theft, the misde-
meanor theft count would merge into the felony theft count.15
The jury found Spitzinger not guilty of armed robbery and rob-
bery, but convicted him of felony theft.16 The trial judge sentenced
Spitzinger to twelve years imprisonment. 7 Spitzinger appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals, arguing that, under the doctrine of merger,
his sentence for the felony theft conviction should have been limited
to a maximum of ten years-the maximum sentence for robbery-
because he had also been charged with robbery.18 The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence in a per curiamn
opinion.19 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to resolve the is-
sue of whether "the legislatively established maximum penalty for fel-
ony theft should be lowered to the maximum penalty for robbery
when the defendant is convicted of theft but acquitted of robbery in-
volving the same property."20
2. Legal Background. -
a. Merger of Offenses.-The doctrine of merger of offenses is
rooted in the classification of criminal offenses as felonies and misde-
meanors at common law. Felonies were those crimes punishable by
forfeiture of the offender's land or goods." Additionally, felonies
could be punished by death, although forfeiture served as the primary
punishment.2" The common law felonies included murder, man-
slaughter, rape, sodomy, robbery, larceny, arson, and burglary.2" The
Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Bannon v. United States:24
"The word 'felony' was used at common law to denote offenses which
occasioned a forfeiture of the land or goods of the offender, to which
capital or other punishment might be superadded according to the
14. Id.
15. Id.




20. Id. at 117, 665 A.2d at 686.
21. See 1 W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 110-11 (Marian
Q. Barnes ed., 7th ed. 1967); 4 WiLuA BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *94-95.
22. See 1 CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 21, at 110-11.
23. Id. at 111.
24. 156 U.S. 464 (1895).
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degree of guilt."25 Misdemeanors, on the other hand, were all crimes
not classified as felonies.2 6 The doctrine of merger applied when a
person was charged with several crimes arising out of the same act.27
As Professor Perkins notes, merger specifically resolved the problem
that arose when a person was charged with both a misdemeanor and a
felony:
Under the English common law the procedure for the trial
of a misdemeanor was so different from that for the trial of a
felony as to preclude ajoinder of the two in the same indict-
ment. And the rule developed that if the same act resulted
in both a misdemeanor and a felony the former was merged
in the latter.28
Thus, at common law, misdemeanors merged into felonies, but felo-
nies did not merge into other felonies. 9
In the modem context, merger of offenses arises when a person
is charged with more than one offense arising from a single act or
transaction. In Gavieres v. United States,3° the defendant was charged
with violating two statutes.3" One prohibited public drunkenness and
the second prohibited certain speech directed at public officials. The
Supreme Court held that, although the charges stemmed from a sin-
gle transaction, the offenses were distinct because each required proof
of an element different from the other.12 The Court, quoting the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Morey v. Commonwealth,"3 stated:
A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a
subsequent conviction and sentence upon another, unless
the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of
them would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction
upon the other. The test is not whether the defendant has
already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been
put in jeopardy for the same offense. A single act may be an
offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an ac-
quittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt
25. Id. at 467.
26. See 1 CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 21, at 114-15.
27. See id.
28. 1 ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 554 (2d ed. 1969).
29. 1 CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 21, at 119.
30. 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
31. Id. at 341.
32. Id.
33. 108 Mass. 433 (1871).
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the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the
other.34
Thus the Court recognized that the critical question of the modem
doctrine of merger is whether the accused has been punished more
than once for the same crime in violation of the constitutional prohi-
bition against double jeopardy." The Court also acknowledged that it
is possible for a defendant to be convicted of more than one crime
arising out of a single transaction, so long as each offense requires
proof of an element not required by the other offenses.36
The Court more clearly articulated this test in Blockburger v. United
States,37 when it stated: "The applicable rule is that where the same act
or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provi-
sions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two of-
fenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not."38 The Blockburger test, also
known as the required evidence test, is the prevailing test applied by
the Court to determine whether a person has been punished more
than once for the same offense. 9 Application of the test usually yields
the result that statutes define the "same offense" because one is a
lesser included offense of the other. One offense is deemed a lesser
included offense of another if all of the elements of the first charge
are present in the offense of the second charge.4" Thus, multiple
punishments are precluded if one offense is a lesser included offense
of another.
Maryland courts have adopted the required evidence test as the
predominant test to determine whether one offense merges into an-
other. The Court of Appeals has been inconsistent, however, in deter-
mining the weight the required evidence test should be accorded. In
some cases, the court has classified the Blockburger test as a tool of
statutory construction that remains subordinate to clear and contrary
34. Gavieres, 220 U.S. at 342 (quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871)).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . .
36. Gavieres, 220 U.S. at 343.
37. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
38. Id. at 304.
39. See Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996) ("For over halfa century we
have determined whether a defendant has been punished twice for the 'same offense' by
applying the rule set forth in Blockburger v. United States.").
40. See, e.g., Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712, 718-19, 421 A.2d 957, 960-61 (1980) ("Since
all of the elements of simple assault are present in the offense of assault with intent to rob
... and both charges are based on the same acts, simple assault is a lesser included offense
of assault with intent to rob.").
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evidence of legislative intent.41 In a more recent decision, State v. Lan-
caster42 the court took a much firmer stand on the required evidence
test, declaring it a "long-standing rule of law."43 This formulation ele-
vates the required evidence test to a threshold test; once it is met,
"'merger follows as a matter of course"' unless the legislature specifi-
cally authorized multiple punishments for a single transaction.44
Maryland courts have uniformly applied the test when presented with
the problem of multiple offenses arising from a single act.45 When
merger is based on the required evidence test, the included offense
merges into the offense with the distinct element, regardless of the
maximum sentence that each offense carries.'
b. Merger of Penalties. -Even if offenses do not merge by ap-
plication of the required evidence test, the Supreme Court has held
that there should be a merger of penalties if Congress did not intend
to impose multiple or consecutive punishments for offenses arising
41. See, e.g., Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 324, 558 A.2d 715, 720 (1989)
(characterizing the required evidence test as "helpful in such cases as an aid in determin-
ing legislative intent, but.., not dispositive").
42. 332 Md. 385, 631 A.2d 453 (1993).
43. Id. at 409, 631 A.2d at 466 ("Under this Court's decisions, the required evidence
test is not simply another rule of statutory construction. Instead, it is a long-standing rule
of law to determine whether one offense is included within another when both are based
on the same act or acts.").
44. Id. at 394, 631 A.2d at 458 (quoting In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 533, 601 A.2d
1102, 1104 (1992)); see also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Eldridge v. State, 329 Md. 307, 319, 619 A.2d 531, 537 (1993) (applying the
required evidence test to hold that defendant could not be convicted of both carrying a
deadly weapon concealed and carrying the same weapon openly with intent to injure aris-
ing out of same incident); Biggus v. State, 323 Md. 339, 350, 593 A.2d 1060, 1065 (1991)
(noting that holding that common law assault or battery merges into a sexual offense con-
viction is consistent with Maryland case law); Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 316, 593 A.2d
671, 673 (1991) (applying the required evidence test to hold that defendant could not be
convicted of both attempted second degree murder and assault with intent to murder aris-
ing out of the same incident); Snowden v. State, 321 Md. 612, 616, 583 A.2d 1056, 1059
(1991) (applying the required evidence test to determine that defendant cannot be con-
victed of assault, battery, and robbery arising out of the same offense).
46. See Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 134, 482 A.2d 474, 480 (1984) ("[I]n Maryland a
defendant charged with a greater offense (that carries a lighter penalty) and a lesser in-
cluded offense (that carries a heavier penalty) is only subject to the maximum penalty of
the greater offense upon conviction."); Johnson v. State, 283 Md. 196, 203-04, 388 A.2d
926, 930 (1978) (holding that, because false pretenses was an included offense in welfare
fraud, it must merge into the conviction for welfare fraud even though welfare fraud car-
ries only a three-year maximum penalty while the maximum penalty for false pretenses was
ten years imprisonment); Flannigan v. State, 232 Md. 13, 19, 191 A.2d 591, 593-94 (1963)




out of the same act.47 The Court of Appeals has also noted that there
are instances in which a merger of penalties should occur because of
legislative intent.48  In these cases, if two offenses arising from the
same transaction are not found to merge under the required evidence
test, the court must engage in statutory interpretation to determine
whether the legislature intended multiple punishments.49 If merger
of penalties is required, the penalty for the lesser included offense
merges into the penalty for the greater offense.5 °
c. Statutory Interpretation.-When a statute is ambiguous or
silent on the issue of merger, a court must engage in statutory inter-
pretation to ascertain legislative intent. The rule of lenity is a princi-
ple of statutory construction that is particularly applicable in merger
cases. The rule of lenity provides that ambiguity as to whether the
legislature intended that there be multiple punishments for the same
criminal act "'will be resolved against turning a single transaction into
multiple offenses."'5 1 The Court of Appeals applied the rule of lenity
in Williams v. State,52 when it considered whether a conviction for as-
sault with intent to murder should merge into a conviction for at-
tempted murder in the first degree when both charges arose out of
the same acts. Although the court determined that attempted first
degree murder and assault with intent to murder do not merge under
47. See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13-16 (1978) (holding that Congress
did not authorize an additional penalty for the commission of a bank robbery with fire-
arms, already subject to enhanced punishment, and finding it unnecessary to apply the
Blockburger test); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 173-78 (1958) (holding that a single
discharge of a firearm that injured more than one federal agent in violation of federal
statute that prohibited interference with any federal agent acting in his official capacity
constituted only one violation of the statute).
48. See State v. Burroughs, 333 Md. 614, 624-25, 636 A.2d 1009, 1015 (1994) (holding
that the defendant was entitled to have convictions and sentences for embezzlement va-
cated under the doctrine of merger by legislative intent because the embezzlement charge
merged into the charge of theft by deception); State v.Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 519, 515 A.2d
465 (1986) (holding that for penalty purposes assault with intent to maim should merge
into assault with intent to murder); Brooks v. State, 284 Md. 416, 423, 397 A.2d 596 (1979)
(noting that there may be situations in which the required evidence test may not be the
sole test for determining the appropriateness of merger, but holding that the instant case
was not such a situation).
49. See supra note 27.
50. See Burroughs, 333 Md. at 626, 636 A.2d at 1015; see also Jenkins, 307 Md. at 521, 515
A.2d at 475 ("[W]here there is merger by legislative intent, the offense carrying the lesser
maximum penalty merges into the offense carrying the greater penalty.").
51. White v. State, 318 Md. 740, 744, 569 A.2d 1271, 1273 (1990) (quoting Simpson v.
United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978) (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84
(1955))).
52. 323 Md. 312, 593 A.2d 671 (1991).
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the required evidence test, the court concluded that merger was ap-
propriate under the rule of lenity."
The rule of lenity is a rule of statutory construction that courts
employ when determining questions of merger of offenses in cases in
which the offenses do not satisfy the required evidence test. The
Court of Appeals has emphasized that the rule of lenity must be used
only in cases of ambiguity and may not be applied simply as a means
to promote leniency in criminal punishment.54
3. The Court's Reasoning.--Spitzinger offered two arguments as
to why the fifteen-year maximum penalty for felony theft should be
reduced to the ten-year maximum sentence for robbery.55 First, Spitz-
inger contended that the two offenses must merge.56 Specifically, he
asserted that the offense of felony theft merges into the offense of
robbery. Second, Spitzinger argued that, even if the offenses do not
merge, the penalties should merge because the legislature did not in-
tend to impose cumulative or successive sentences. 58 Based on this
second contention, Spitzinger argued that the court should reduce his
sentence for felony theft to the penalty for the crime of robbery-ten
years-of which he was acquitted.5 9
The majority began by declaring that legislative intent "controls
the court's determination of the validity of Spitzinger's sentence be-
cause it is for the legislature to define criminal offenses and their pun-
ishments."6" The court concluded that the Blockburger test was critical
to the determination of whether merger of offenses was required. 61
The court further noted that the Supreme Court has directed lower
courts to give "commonsensical" meaning to statutes when engaging
in statutory construction: "[T]he method for resolving the statutory
construction issue of whether there is a merger of statutory crimes
and/or statutory penalties is a common sense search for legislative
53. Id. at 322-23, 593 A.2d at 676.
54. See, e.g., Dillsworth v. State, 308 Md. 354, 365, 519 A-2d 1269, 1274 (1987) ("'Lenity
... serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.'" (alteration in
original) (quoting Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342 (1981))).
55. Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 120, 665 A.2d at 688.
56. Id.
57. Id. Although Spitzinger's precise argument is not clear from the opinion, the gist
of his contention appears to have been that the felony theft offense must merge into the
robbery offense, thereby reducing the fifteen-year maximum sentence for felony theft to
the ten-year maximum sentence for robbery. See id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 119, 665 A.2d at 687.
61. Id. at 120, 665 A.2d at 687.
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intent."6 2 The court ultimately concluded that a legislature exercising
common sense could not have intended the result urged by
Spitzinger.63
As part of its inquiry into legislative intent, the majority consid-
ered robbery and felony theft within the larger context of the criminal
and penal scheme created by the legislature.64 The court determined
that it would "not lack rational basis" for the legislature to determine
that felony theft should carry a greater penalty than robbery based
upon the value of the property stolen.65
The majority rejected the dissent's contention that the there
should be a merger of felony theft into robbery based on historical
practice.66 The majority stated that, regardless of whether larceny
merged into robbery at common law (a claim that the court found
debatable), the fact that the legislature enacted the consolidated theft
statute, which eliminated the crime of common law larceny, rendered
the issue irrelevant.67
The majority rejected Spitzinger's first contention that the felony
theft charge should merge into the robbery charge.6 8 First, the major-
ity held that the two offenses did not merge under the required evi-
dence test because each required proof of an element not required by
the other.69 More generally, the court held that "[tihe statutory of-
fense of felony theft does not merge into robbery under the required
evidence test or under any other test of legislative intent."70
Turning to Spitzinger's second contention-that even if the of-
fenses do not merge, the penalties should merge based on legislative
62. Id. at 129-30, 665 A.2d at 692.
63. Id. at 130, 665 A.2d at 692. The court stated:
A "commonsensical" legislature could not have intended that felony theft of prop-
erty valued at $300 or more carries a maximum penalty of up to 15 years if com-
mitted by stealth, but if committed by violence or threat of violence then the
maximum penalty for felony theft is reduced to only 10 years. At the very least, a
.commonsensical" legislature would have intended that all felony thefts be pun-
ishable by a maximum of 15 years and that 15-year maximum penalty should not
be reduced by one-third just because the felony theft might have been committed
during a robbery.
Id.
64. Id. at 121, 665 A.2d at 688.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 122, 665 A.2d at 689.
67. Id. at 123, 665 A.2d at 689.
68. Id. at 121, 665 A.2d at 688.
69. Id. The court noted that robbery requires proof of violence or putting a victim in a
state of fear, which is not required for felony theft. See id. Felony theft, on the other hand,
requires proof that the property stolen was valued at three hundred dollars or more.
There is no value requirement for robbery. See id.
70. Id. at 123, 665 A.2d at 689.
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intent7 1-the court agreed that Maryland case law indicates that pen-
alties should merge if a defendant is charged with both larceny and
robbery.72 With respect to this point, the court stated: "We... have
some doubts, in light of our prior cases and the history of common
law robbery and common law larceny, as to whether the legislature
intended to authorize successive or cumulative punishment for felony
theft and robbery."75 Basing its decision on the rule of lenity, the
court concluded that the legislature did not intend cumulative or suc-
cessive punishments for robbery and felony theft.7 4
Although the majority accepted Spitzinger's contention that
there should be a merger of penalties based on legislative intent, the
majority refused to accept his argument that felony theft should
merge into robbery for sentencing purposes. 75 Rather, the court con-
cluded: "Where there is a merger of penalties as distinguished from
offenses, on some ground, such as the rule of lenity, the lesser penalty
generally merges into the greater penalty."76 In addition to citing
prior cases that have followed the same rule,7 7 the court discussed the
sentencing hierarchy created by the legislature. 7' The majority noted
that the hierarchy is based on a gradation of severity, with carjacking
ranking as the most severe crime, carrying a maximum penalty of
thirty years imprisonment consecutive to underlying offenses, fol-
lowed by armed robbery, which carries a maximum penalty of twenty
years imprisonment. 79 Felony theft of property valued at greater than
three hundred dollars ranks the next most severe, carrying a maxi-
mum penalty of fifteen years imprisonment, followed by unarmed rob-
bery, with a maximum penalty of ten years. Finally, misdemeanor
theft carries a maximum penalty of eighteen months.80 The court de-
ferred to legislative judgment in the face of this sentencing hierarchy,
stating: "This Court should not proclaim that robbery is per se a more
serious crime than felony theft in spite of the fact that the legislature,
in setting the punishment for both crimes, has dictated precisely the
71. Id. at 124, 665 A.2d at 690.
72. Id. (citing Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 553 A.2d 228 (1989); West v. State, 312 Md.
197, 539 A.2d 231 (1988)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 125, 665 A.2d at 690.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing State v. Burroughs, 333 Md. 614, 626, 636 A.2d 1009, 1015 (1994); State
v. Owens, 320 Md. 682, 688, 579 A.2d 766, 768-69 (1990)).





contrary."8" Based on this reasoning, the court held that the trial
court properly sentenced Spitzinger under the felony theft statute de-
spite his acquittal on the robbery charge."2
Writing for the dissent, Judge Raker, joined by Judges Bell and
Eldridge, disputed the majority's assertion that legislative intent con-
trolled the case.83 Asserting, in accordance with State v. Lancaster,84
that the required evidence test is a "long-standing rule of law," the
dissent took issue with the majority's characterization of the required
evidence test as "'simply another rule of statutory interpretation.' 85
The dissent also argued, however, that other relevant factors must be
considered in addition to the required evidence test, such as the posi-
tion taken by other jurisdictions, historical factors surrounding multi-
ple punishments, and the fairness of multiple punishments within
certain circumstances.86
The dissent argued that the offense of felony theft should merge
into robbery based on historical practice. 7 The dissent based its argu-
ment on "the historical understanding ... that theft was included
within robbery, and that robbery was more severe."88 Although the
dissent cited no cases in which larceny merged into robbery, it relied
upon the principle that statutes displace the common law only where
expressly declared, and concluded that the legislature did not intend
to abrogate the merger of larceny into robbery when it enacted the
consolidated theft statute.8 9 In support of this assertion, the dissent
pointed to a statement in the legislative history surrounding the pas-
sage of the consolidated theft statute that the purpose of the statute
was to eliminate "'these technical and absurd distinctions that have
plagued the larceny related offenses.'" 9"
Furthermore, the dissent cited to the Maryland carjacking stat-
ute9" as support for this position, arguing that the carjacking statute
81. Id.
82. Id. at 130, 665 A.2d at 692.
83. Id., 665 A.2d at 693 (Raker, J., dissenting).
84. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
85. Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 131, 665 A.2d at 693 (Raker, J., dissenting) (quoting State v.
Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 409, 631 A.2d 453, 466 (1993)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 133, 665 A.2d 694.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 134, 665 A.2d at 694 (quotingJoNrr SUBCOMMrrrEE ON THEFT RELATED OF-
FENSES, MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REVISION OF MARYLAND THEFT LAWS AND BAD CHECK
LAws 2 (1978)).
91. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 348(A)(d) (1994). Section (A)(d) of Article 27 states in
pertinent part: "The sentence imposed under this section may be imposed separate from
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specifically includes a cumulative sentencing provision.9" The dissent
reasoned that this fact indicated that the legislature anticipated that
the underlying offenses of carjacking would merge.93 According to
Judge Raker, had the legislature wished to abrogate merger with re-
gard to the theft offenses, it could have included such a provision in
the consolidated theft statute.9 4 Underlying the dissent's argument is
the principle articulated in Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson95 that
". '"statutes are not presumed to make any alterations in the common
law further than is expressly declared.""' 96 Thus, the dissent argued,
because the legislature did not specifically abrogate the common law
doctrine of merger with regard to larceny and robbery, the practice
must continue based on historical practice.97
Finally, the dissent argued that practices in other jurisdictions
also rebut the majority's decision.98 Citing three states that do not
permit separate punishments for grand theft and robbery-Califor-
nia,9 Utah,1"' and Floridal 01-the dissent found the fact that these
three states allow merger to be persuasive. 10 2
4. Analysis.-
a. The Status of the Blockburger Test.-The Spitzinger major-
ity and dissent disagreed about the status of the Blockburger test.1 03 A
significant decision in Spitzinger, although perhaps not emphasized by
the court, is that the Blockburger test is "simply an aid in determining
whether the legislature may have intended to preclude cumulative
and consecutive to a sentence for any other offense arising from the conduct underlying
the offenses of carjacking or armed carjacking." Id.
92. Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 133, 665 A.2d at 694 (Raker, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 335 Md. 661, 672, 645 A.2d 1147, 1152 (1994).
96. Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 132, 665 A.2d at 694 (RakerJ., dissenting) (quoting Richwind,
335 Md. at 132, 645 A.2d at 694 (quoting Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356
(1934))).
97. Id. at 140, 665 A.2d at 697. The dissent discussed at some length the historical
relationship between larceny and robbery and relied primarily upon treatises on criminal
law for the assertion that larceny merged into robbery at common law. See id. at 141-42,
665 A.2d at 698.
98. Id. at 142, 665 A.2d at 698.
99. See People v. Peterson, 721 P.2d 595, 596 (Cal. 1986); People v. Cole, 645 P.2d
1182, 1191 (Cal. 1982).
100. See State v. Branch, 734 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1987).
101. See Sirmons v. State, 634 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 1994).
102. Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 142, 665 A.2d at 698-99 (Raker, J., dissenting).




punishment." 104 This stance regarding the weight of the Blockburger
test stands in direct contrast to the court's statement in Lancaster that
the Blockburger test is "not simply another rule of statutory construc-
tion. Instead, it is a long-standing rule of law." a°5 Lancaster, decided
in 1993, is a more recent decision than those cases cited as support for
the majority's ruling on the decreased significance of the Blockburger
test in this case. 106 The Spitzinger court diluted the importance of the
Blockburger test in favor of more deference to the legislature. Thus,
the court's position demonstrates a clear change in its view of the test,
which will significantly affect subsequent merger cases. If the Block-
burger required evidence test is employed simply as a tool for statutory
interpretation, then it is no longer a threshold test to definitively de-
cide whether merger should follow. Rather, the test is relegated to
the same importance as other factors such as the canons of statutory
construction and historical practice.
b. Statutory Interpretation.-Both the majority0 7 and the dis-
sent' 08 agreed that strict application of the Blockburger test to the facts
of this case permits no merger of offenses. The key difference be-
tween the positions taken by the majority and the dissent, however, is
their approach to interpreting the consolidated theft statute. The ma-
jority relied on the statutory language in concluding that the legisla-
ture intended a fifteen-year maximum sentence for a felony theft
conviction, regardless of whether the defendant was acquitted of rob-
bery.' 09 The court reached this conclusion because it found the stat-
ute unambiguous. Conversely, the dissent concluded that the
legislature intended the penalty for felony theft to merge into the
penalty for robbery because the statute is silent on merger and, thus
ambiguous."' Spitzinger provides a classic demonstration of the diffi-
culty of statutory interpretation. The majority's holding, however,
properly acknowledges the Supreme Court's warning to reach "com-
monsensical" conclusions when interpreting statutes.'
104. Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 121, 665 A.2d at 688.
105. State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 409, 631 A.2d 453, 465 (1993).
106. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
107. Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 121, 665 A.2d at 688.
108. Id. at 132 n.2, 665 A.2d at 693 n.2 (Raker, J., dissenting).
109. See Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 126, 665 A.2d at 691 ("We should presume that, when the
legislature sets a statutory maximum penalty, it intends it to be the maximum penalty for
all defendants convicted of that crime.").
110. See id. at 133, 665 A.2d at 694 (Raker, J., dissenting).
111. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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The dissent's reasoning and conclusion are strained and overly
academic.11 Although Judge Raker employed long-recognized and
well-respected canons of statutory interpretation to reach a plausible
result, it strains the imagination to call her result "commonsenscial."
It would have been inappropriate for the court to read an exception
into a statute that created a clear and deliberate sentencing hierarchy.
c. Maintaining the Balance of Powers.-The legislature en-
acted the consolidated theft statute to embrace the amalgam of com-
mon law theft offenses, such as larceny, larceny under false pretenses,
larceny by trick, and receiving stolen goods.1 13 By enacting the statute
and prescribing penalties for the included offenses, the legislature es-
tablished a sentencing hierarchy.1 4 The prescriptions for maximum
penalties are the direct result of legislative consideration and debate.
The great challenge for courts in interpreting statutes is to avoid in-
fringing legislative territory. Both Maryland and Supreme Court case
law indicate that the determination of the appropriateness of criminal
acts and punishments falls squarely within the realm of the legisla-
ture." 5 The majority correctly observed that reading Spitzinger's de-
sired exception into a legislatively created maximum sentence would
disrupt the legislature's sentencing hierarchy and, in so doing, would
usurp legislative power.1 6
d. Application of the Factors Announced in White v. State.-The
dissent's argument that the majority erred by disregarding factors
such as historical practice, legislative history, and the decisions of
other jurisdictions rested on a perceived ambiguity in the consoli-
dated theft statute.' 17 Because the dissent considered the statute am-
biguous, it insisted on using the interpretive tools noted in White v.
State.' As the court in White made clear, however, the factors only
112. See Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 131-35, 665 A.2d at 693-95 (Raker, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
113. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 341, 342 (1996).
114. See Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 127, 665 A.2d at 691.
115. See Thomas v. State, 333 Md. 84, 92, 634 A.2d 1, 4 (1993) (stating that the creation
of a "binding hierarchy of offenses and sentences" is "a task that is truly a legislative one");
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) ("Reviewing courts, of course, should grant sub-
stantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determin-
ing the types and limits of punishments for crimes ...
116. See Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 127, 665 A.2d at 691.
117. See id. at 132, 665 A.2d at 693 (Raker, J., dissenting).
118. 318 Md. 740, 569 A.2d 1271 (1990). The Spitzinger dissent quotes the following
passage from White: "'[I]n deciding merger questions, we have examined the position
taken in other jurisdictions. We have also looked to whether the type of act has historically
resulted in multiple punishment. The fairness of multiple punishments in a particular
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apply in the case of an ambiguous statute. 19 In White, the defendant
was convicted of both child abuse and murder. 2 ° The Court of Ap-
peals determined that the child abuse statute was ambiguous with re-
gard to whether separate punishments were permitted. 21 In the
Spitzinger case, however, the language was unambiguous. The consoli-
dated theft statute states that the maximum penalty for theft of prop-
erty valued at three hundred dollars or more is fifteen years
imprisonment.1 22 The language of the statute leaves no room for am-
biguity-the legislature determined that a fifteen-year maximum pen-
alty was appropriate for felony theft. The majority properly
concluded its analysis at this point.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the language of the statute was
ambiguous, an analysis of the factors enumerated in White would not
necessarily have yielded the conclusion sought by Spitzinger. The
strongest White-based argument the dissent mustered in favor of limit-
ing Spitzinger's penalty to ten years rested on historical practice.123
Although the references in Maryland case law to robbery as "larceny
from the person, accompanied by violence or putting in fear"'24 are
evidence that the two crimes merged at common law, the remaining
criteria established in White--fairness, the practice of other jurisdic-
tions, and legislative intent-did not clearly require the court to re-
duce Spitzinger's penalty to the maximum allowed under the robbery
charge because of his acquittal on that charge.
Although the dissent did not explicitly argue that fairness mili-
tated against the imposition of consecutive sentences, this issue served
as an important concern in the case of Simms v. State,' 25 and it seems
to have been an underlying concern in the Spitzinger dissent. The
situation is obviously important.'" Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 132, 665 A.2d at 693 (Raker, J.,
dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting White, 318 Md. at 746, 569 A.2d at 1274).
119. See White, 318 Md. at 745, 569 A.2d at 1273.
120. Id. at 741, 569 A.2d at 1272.
121. Id. at 748, 569 A.2d at 1275. The court, in White, stated:
There is nothing in the language of the Child Abuse Statute, or in its legislative
history, indicating whether the General Assembly intended that a parent or one
having custody should be sentenced for both child abuse and murder where the
malicious act causing physical injury ultimately led to the death of the child.
Clearly, in this regard the statute is ambiguous as to whether separate punishment
is in order.
Id.
122. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(f)(1) (1996).
123. See White, 318 Md. at 746, 569 A.2d at 1274 (noting factors to be considered in
determining whether merger of offenses is appropriate, even if the required evidence test
does not apply).
124. West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 202, 539 A.2d 231, 233 (1988).
125. 288 Md. 712, 421 A.2d 957 (1980).
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Simms court stated that "it is unfair to permit the State to exact a more
severe and unanticipated penalty than that which could have been
imposed if the prosecution had been wholly successful."126 The Simms
court explained that had the defendants known they were defending
against the possibility of a much greater sentence in connection with
the common law assault charge-one that was not subject to a legisla-
tively created penalty cap-"their tactics might well have been differ-
ent."12 7 Fairness considerations such as these, however, do not apply
in the Spitzinger case. Spitzinger knew the maximum penalties pre-
scribed for each count against him at the outset of the trial. Because
each of the four counts he faced was subject to a legislatively man-
dated maximum penalty, he necessarily was aware that a conviction
for felony theft could carry a fifteen year sentence regardless of the
verdict on any other count.
The court in Simms attempted to avoid an "extreme anomaly in
the criminal law" in which defendants are punished more severely fol-
lowing acquittal on a more serious charge than they would have been
if convicted of that charge.128 In the Spitzinger case, however, no such
anomaly existed because the legislature created a place for both rob-
bery and felony theft within an overall sentencing scheme.1 2 9 Further,
the conclusion sought by Spitzinger and the dissent would have cre-
ated another unacceptable anomaly in the criminal law: permitting a
defendant to escape the maximum penalty adopted by the legislature
for a theft conviction merely because the State opted to charge the
defendant with robbery in addition to theft.
Second, the dissent argued that other jurisdictions prohibit multi-
ple punishments for theft and robbery. 3 ° Noting specifically that Cal-
ifornia, Florida, and Utah "do not permit separate punishments for
grand theft and robbery,"l"' the dissent ignored the inescapable fact
that in none of the cited cases was a theft sentence with a greater
penalty merged into a robbery sentence with a lower penalty.
132
Although the dissent made a thoughtful argument against the
majority's interpretation of the statute, the majority adhered correctly
to the Supreme Court's "admonition" that "statutes be given a 'com-
126. Id. at 724, 421 A.2d at 964.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 723, 421 A.2d at 963.
129. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
130. Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 142, 665 A.2d at 198-99 (Raker, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Spitzinger, 340 Md. at 129, 665 A.2d at 692.
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monsensical meaning."'133 By holding that the legislatively imposed
maximum penalty for felony theft should be enforced regardless of
any other charges the State decides to bring against the defendant,
the court not only avoided creating a sentencing rule contrary to legis-
lative intent, but also contrary to common sense.
5. Conclusion.-In Spitzinger v. State, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the legislature did not intend to reduce the maximum
penalty for felony theft to the maximum penalty for robbery when a
defendant is convicted of felony theft but acquitted of robbery involv-
ing the same property."' The majority reached the proper result and
refused to engage in overly complex and under-illuminating statutory
interpretation to reach a result that would have interfered with the
clearly established sentencing hierarchy established by the Maryland
General Assembly.
KMRSTEN ANDREWS
B. Confusing the Doctrine of Transferred Intent
In Poe v. State,1 the Court of Appeals, applying the doctrine of
transferred intent, affirmed the conviction of a criminal defendant for
both the attempted murder of his intended victim and for the first
degree murder of a bystander.2 The court reasoned that the defend-
ant's intent to kill his intended victim transferred to the unintended
victim, making the defendant guilty of first degree murder.3
Although the result in this particular case is in accord with no-
tions of fairness and justice, the reasoning employed by the court to
reach this result is problematic. The court not only confused the pol-
icy behind the doctrine of transferred intent with its operation, but
also announced a standard that will surely lead to sentencing that is
disproportionate to a criminal defendant's culpability. Further, the
court's continued application of the transferred intent doctrine is un-
necessary. Maryland courts should explore available alternatives to
the doctrine that do not require courts to walk across a minefield of
faulty reasoning and result-oriented jurisprudence.
133. Id. at 128, 665 A.2d at 691 (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,
344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952)).
134. Id. at 130, 651 A.2d at 692 ("Merely because Spitzinger was acquitted of an armed
robbery and lesser included robbery does notjustify reducing to 10 years the 15-year maxi-
mum penalty for the felony theft for which Spittinger was found guilty.").
1. 341 Md. 523, 671 A.2d 501 (1996).
2. Id. at 528-30, 671 A.2d at 503-04.
3. Id. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504.
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1. The Case.--On August 10, 1993, James Allen Poe (Poe) drove
to the house of his estranged wife, Karen Poe (Ms. Poe), in order to
visit their four children.4 Ms. Poe had heard that day that Poe in-
tended to take the children to Florida with his new girlfriend, and an
argument ensued.5 Ms. Poe began to return to the house to call the
police for help.6 As she walked into the house, Ms. Poe and two other
witnesses saw Poe remove a 12-gauge shotgun from the trunk of his
car.' According to the testimony of one witness, Ms. Poe yelled from
inside the house, "I don't have to take this anymore."8 According to
several witnesses, Poe responded by pointing the gun toward the
house and yelling, "Take this, bitch."9
Poe fired at least one shot into the house.1" The shot passed
through the front screen door, hit Ms. Poe in the arm, and then hit
six-year-old Kimberly Rice (Kimberly), the daughter of Ms. Poe's boy-
friend, in the head." Ms. Poe suffered a nonfatal wound to her arm,
but the shot killed Kimberly instantly. 2
After the shooting, Poe drove away from the house and threw the
shotgun out of the car to the side of the road."3 He then proceeded
to drive to Pennsylvania,14 where the Pennsylvania State Police
stopped him after recognizing Poe's car from a description given over
a police radio broadcast.15 While being placed in handcuffs, Poe told
police that "what he had done was an accident and that he loved
kids."16 While in the police vehicle, Poe stated, "[I] t was an accident,
[I] didn't mean to do it. [I] was holding the gun in the air and the
gun went off."' 7 In a later statement to the Pennsylvania State Police,
Poe explained that he "went to [his] car and got out [his] 12-gauge
shotgun and . . .accidentally fired it into the house."' 8 Poe stated
that, at the time, he did not know what he had hit. 9 Two hours later,
4. Id. at 525, 671 A.2d at 502.












17. Poe v. State, 103 Md. App. 136,142, 652 A.2d 1164,1166 (1995), affd, 341 Md. 523,





however, Poe changed his story. Poe stated that "he retrieved the gun
from his vehicle to dispose of it so that 'he [would not] be caught with
a shotgun.' He changed his mind, however, and was about to return
the gun to the vehicle when he 'tripped over his feet and the shotgun
[discharged].""'0 When asked about the differences in his statements,
Poe answered, "Whatever. She wasn't going to let me see the kids and
what's the use of living if you can't see your kids." 1
The trial judge instructed the jury that "if they believed that the
defendant willfully, deliberately and with premeditation intended to
kill Ms. Poe, then they could find Mr. Poe guilty of first degree mur-
der of Kimberly."22 The jury found Poe guilty of the first degree mur-
der of Kimberly and guilty of attempted first degree murder of Ms.
Poe.2" The judge sentenced Poe to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for the murder of Kimberly and a consecutive
thirty-year sentence for the attempted murder of Ms. Poe.2 4
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Poe challenged his
conviction for the first degree murder of Kimberly on the ground that
the trial judge had improperly instructed the jury on the doctrine of
transferred intent.25 Specifically, Poe argued that, in accordance with
the Court of Appeals in Ford v. State,"6 the doctrine of transferred in-
tent "is not properly applied in any case of attempted murder."27 The
Court of Special Appeals disagreed, however, affirming Poe's convic-
tions." The Court of Special Appeals found that Poe had "misinter-
preted the Court's holding in Ford"'2 9 and explained that, "where the
crime committed against the intended victim is less serious than the
greatest level of culpability that could be achieved by transferring the
intent to the unintended victim, intent must be transferred, otherwise
the greater crime committed against the unintended victim would be
20. Id., 652 A.2d at 1166-67 (alterations in original).
21. Id., 652 A.2d at 1167.
22. Poe, 341 Md. at 527, 671 A.2d at 502. Specifically, the trial judge instructed the jury,
in pertinent part, as follows:
If I intend to kill... Karen in this case, and my mark's not good, or bullet goes
through, and I kill somebody else, and they die instead of Karen, that's still first
degree murder on the second one because the law does not protect a person who
has bad aim or is unfortunate enough to have the bullet go through the first.
That is called transferred intent. The intent follows the bullet.
Id. at 528, 671 A.2d at 503 (alteration in original).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Poe, 103 Md. App. at 145, 652 A.2d at 1168.
26. 330 Md. 682, 625 A.2d 984 (1993).
27. Poe, 103 Md. App. at 151, 652 A.2d at 1171.
28. Id. at 159, 652 A.2d at 1175.
29. Id. at 151, 652 A.2d at 1171.
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inadequately punished.""° Applying this standard to Poe's actions, the
Court of Special Appeals stated, "If [Poe's] intent to kill Ms. Poe is not
paired with the actual harm caused to Kimberly .. . the death of
[Kimberly] would be inadequately punished."" l
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether
the transferred intent doctrine should apply in the case of a criminal
defendant who, "intending to kill one person, shoots and wounds that
person, but the shot passes through the intended victim and kills an
unintended victim. "32
2. Legal Background.-The transferred intent doctrine "had its
earliest roots firmly embedded in the English Common Law."3 3 In the
30. Id. at 152, 652 A.2d at 1171.
31. Id. at 153-54, 652 A.2d at 1172.
32. Poe, 341 Md. at 525, 671 A.2d at 502. The Court of Appeals also considered, as a
secondary issue, whether the trial court properly sentenced Poe. Id. Poe challenged the
sentence on the ground that the trial judge had impermissibly injected his own personal
religious and moral beliefs into the decision-making process. Id. at 531, 671 A.2d at 505.
In support of this contention, Poe pointed to a number of factors-such as the lack of a
criminal record and evidence of good character and remorse-that Poe argued should
have mitigated against such a harsh sentence. Id. at 531-32, 671 A.2d at 505. Poe also
pointed to the following remarks made by the judge during sentencing:
I'm still old-fashioned. Maybe my time is gone, maybe. I still believe in good old-
fashioned law and order, the Bible, and a lot of things that people say I shouldn't
believe anymore. Perhaps I am a dinosaur sitting here, but I'm not going to
change. Maybe one day they will say you should not sit here any more because
you are too much of a dinosaur. You are too conservative in criminal law. You
believe too much in the Bible and law and order.
Id. at 533, 671 A.2d at 505-06.
The court held, however, that the judge's remarks did not warrant reversal. Id. at 534,
671 A.2d at 506. The court stated:
In recognizing a trial judge's very broad discretion in sentencing, we by no means
express approval of the remarks made by [the judge] pertaining to his own per-
sonal religious and moral beliefs. Nonetheless, we find that the sentence im-
posed upon the defendant was not motivated by ill-will, prejudice, or other
impermissible considerations.
Id.
33. Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 390, 330 A.2d 176, 180 (1974). In tracing the his-
tory of the doctrine, the Gladden court noted the following passage from a 1576 case:
"For if a man of malice prepense shoots an arrow at another with an intent to kill
him, and a person to whom he bore no malice is killed by it, this shall be murder
in him, for when he shot the arrow he intended to kill, and inasmuch as he di-
rected his instrument of death at one, and thereby has killed another, it shall be
the same offense in him as if he had killed the person he aimed at, for the end of
the act shall be construed by the beginning of it, and the last part shall taste of the
first, and as the beginning of the act had malice prepense in it, and consequently
imported murder, so the end of the act, viz the killing of another shall be in the
same degree, and therefore it shall be murder, and not homicide only."




"classic" case of transferred intent, the doctrine operates so that "if
one shoots at A and misses him, but kills B, this is murder; because of
the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the
other."34 Transferred intent has often been described by the simple
phrase, "the intent follows the bullet."3 5
The doctrine of transferred intent has been adopted in criminal
cases in some form in a majority ofjurisdictions3 6 Maryland first rec-
ognized the "continuing viability" of the transferred intent doctrine in
Gladden v. State. 7 In that case, the defendant fired four or five gun-
shots at his intended victim.3" Although none of the shots hit the in-
tended victim, one inadvertently entered a nearby home and killed a
twelve-year-old boy. 9 The Court of Appeals affirmed Gladden's con-
viction of first degree murder, reasoning that
"if one intends injury to the person of another under circum-
stances in which such a mental element constitutes mens rea,
and in the effort to accomplish this end he inflicts harm
upon a person other than the one intended, he is guilty of
34. Id. at 391, 330 A.2d at 181 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *201).
35. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 11 (1968).
36. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 649 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. 1994); Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v. Henley, 687 P.2d 1220 (Ariz. 1984); Leonard v. State, 476
S.W.2d 807 (Ark. 1972); People v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288 (Cal. 1996); State v. Hinton, 630
A.2d 593 (Conn. 1993); State v. Gardner, 203 A.2d 77 (Del. 1964); Bello v. State, 547 So. 2d
914 (Fla. 1989); Cook v. State, 340 S.E.2d 843 (Ga. 1986); State v. Clokey, 364 P.2d 159
(Idaho 1961); People v. Shum, 512 N.E.2d 1183 (Ill. 1987); White v. State, 638 N.E.2d 785
(Ind. 1994); State v. Willis, 250 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1977); State v. Garza, 916 P.2d 9 (Kan.
1996); Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. 1987); State v. Jasper, 677 So. 2d 553
(La. Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-KO-1897 (La. Feb. 21, 1997); Commonwealth v.
Drumgold, 668 N.E.2d 300 (Mass. 1996); People v. Jackson, 298 N.W.2d 694 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990); Dykes v. State, 99 So. 2d 602
(Miss. 1957); State v. Tatum, 824 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. CL App. 1991); State v. Abraham, 451
S.E.2d 131 (N.C. 1994); State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990); State v. Gillette, 699
P.2d 626 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1996); State v.
Richey, 595 N.E.2d 915 (Ohio 1992);Jones v. State, 508 P.2d 280 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973);
Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 648 A.2d 295 (Pa. 1994); State v. Cole, 394 A.2d 1344 (RI.
1978); State v. Gandy, 324 S.E.2d 65 (S.C. 1984); State v. Belle, No. 03C01-9503-CR00094,
1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 146 (Mar. 6, 1996), cert. denied, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 609
(Sept. 16, 1996); Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 237 (1995); Riddick v. Commonwealth, 308 S.E.2d 117 (Va. 1983); State v.
Julius, 408 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1991); Murry v. State, 713 P.2d 202 (Wyo. 1986).
37. 273 Md. 383, 405, 330 A.2d 176, 189 (1974). Although the issue of transferred
intent had first been raised in Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 52 A.2d 484 (1947), the Court of
Appeals did not address the applicability of the doctrine at that time. See Gladden, 273 Md.
at 405, 330 A.2d at 188-89.
38. Gladden, 273 Md. at 385, 330 A.2d at 177.
39. Id.
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the same kind of crime as if his aim had been more
accurate."4"
Fourteen years later, in State v. Wilson,41 the court took a second
look at the doctrine of transferred intent and applied it to a crime
requiring a specific intent-attempted murder.42 That case involved
two brothers, Lawrence and Timothy Wilson, who became involved in
a dispute with a third party, Marvin Brown.43 The dispute culminated
with the Wilson brothers firing multiple shots at Brown." Though
none of the shots hit Brown, one shot did hit a bystander, causing him
"paralysis on one side and brain damage that left him unable to walk
or speak."45
A jury convicted the Wilson brothers for both the attempted first
degree murder of Brown and the attempted first degree murder of
the bystander.46 Timothy Wilson appealed, arguing that "the doctrine
of transferred intent was inapplicable to the crime of attempted mur-
der." 7 The Court of Special Appeals agreed and reversed the convic-
tion for the attempted first degree murder of the injured bystander.4 8
The Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that the transferred
intent doctrine does apply to the specific intent crime of attempted
first degree murder.49 The court disagreed with the holding of the
Court of Special Appeals that "the crime of attempted murder re-
quires a specific intent to kill the victim named in the indictment. " "
The Court of Appeals reasoned that "[t]o be sure, attempted murder
is a specific intent crime. However, the intent required is merely the
intent to kill someone."51
More recently, however, in Ford v. State," the Court of Appeals
signaled a possible retreat from the position it took in Wilson. In Ford,
the defendant and three other individuals threw large rocks at cars
40. Id. at 404, 330 A.2d at 188 (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 825 (2d ed.
1969)). The court further noted that "Gladden's culpability under the law and the resul-
tant harm to society is the same as if he had accomplished the result he intended when he
caused the death of the innocent youngster." Id. at 405, 330 A.2d at 188.
41. 313 Md. 600, 546 A.2d 1041 (1988).
42. Id. at 609, 546 A.2d at 1045.
43. Id. at 601, 546 A.2d at 1042.
44. Id.




49. Id. at 609, 546 A.2d at 1045-46.
50. Id. at 605, 546 A.2d at 1043.
51. Id.
52. 330 Md. 682, 625 A.2d 984 (1993).
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traveling on a highway, causing extensive property damage and per-
sonal injuries." The defendant challenged the State's position that
one of the crimes of which he was convicted-assault with intent to
disable-could transfer from the drivers of the cars to the cars' pas-
sengers. 4 Although the court declined to address the issue, the Ford
court made several important declarations in dicta with respect to the
operation of the transferred intent doctrine.55 The court noted that
"the doctrine was intended to enable conviction of a defendant of the
crime he intended to commit only when the crime was not committed upon
the intended victim."
56
The Ford court recognized the inconsistency of its conclusion with
the conclusion reached in Wilson and noted that the Wilson court
"should not have applied transferred intent to attempted murder."57
Because, in Wilson, the attempted first degree murder was completed
on the intended victim as soon as the bullets were fired, the Ford court
reasoned: "The completed crime has been committed on the in-
tended victim, and the fiction of transferred intent would not so much
transfer the intent as replicate it and apply it to another victim, thus
making multiple specific intent crimes from one single act intended
to injure one person."58
53. Id. at 689, 625 A.2d at 987.
54. Id. at 708-09, 625 A.2d at 997. At trial, the judge had instructed the jury that "if it
found Ford assaulted with intent to disable the drivers, this intent could be transferred to
the passengers." Id. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent could not apply to such an offense. See id. at 709, 625 A.2d at 997.
55. The court declined to address the transferred intent doctrine because Ford failed
to object to the trial court's instruction on transferred intent and because, the court con-
cluded, "the evidence sufficiently supported a jury determination that Ford intended to
disable both drivers and passengers in the vehicles." Id. at 709, 625 A.2d at 997. Neverthe-
less, in dicta, the court agreed with the Court of Special Appeals that the doctrine should
not have been applied to the offense in question. See id.
56. Id. at 711, 625 A.2d at 998.
57. Id. at 713-14, 625 A.2d at 999.
58. Id. Although the Ford court disagreed with the application of the transferred intent
doctrine in Wison, the court observed that the trier of fact could have found that Wilson
intended to kill the bystander based on the nature of his attack, reasoning that "[w]here
the Wilsons specifically intended to kill Brown, and attempted to do so by firing multiple
bullets from two handguns, they could have intended a 'kill zone' around Brown ....
[Therefore,] the fact finder could conclude that the Wilsons intended to kill everyone in
the direct path of their bullets." Id. at 717-18, 625 A.2d at 1001. Thus, the Ford court noted
that the court had at least reached the correct result in Wilhon. Id. at 718, 625 A.2d at 1001.
Nonetheless, "the sufficiency of the evidence [to support conviction] should [have been]
based.., on the inference of a concurrent intent to murder the bystander... that could
be drawn from multiple shots fired towards both victims," but not "via transferred intent
theory." Id.
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Judge McAuliffe concurred in the result, yet declined to join the
court's dicta pertaining to transferred intent.5 9 In particular, Judge
McAuliffe rejected the majority's statement that the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent could not be applied "where the crime intended has ac-
tually been committed against the intended victim."6" Judge
McAuliffe pointed out potential problems with the majority's ap-
proach through a hypothetical situation, the facts of which were simi-
lar to those in Poe:.
Assume, for example, that the defendant, intending to kill A,
shoots and wounds him, but the bullet passes through A and
kills B. Under the court's theory, I assume the defendant
would be guilty of the murder of B, although also guilty of
attempted murder or assault with intent to murder A. If A
had also died, the court would hold that the defendant could
not be convicted of the murder of B, but only of battery, or
perhaps manslaughter. What happens, then, if the defend-
ant is convicted of the murder of B while A is still alive, but A
dies of wounds received in the assault within a year and a day
of the shooting.61
Thus, prior to Poe, the court had adopted the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent to convict a defendant of first degree murder where the
defendant missed an intended victim and killed an unintended vic-
tim.62 The court, in dicta, had rejected applying the doctrine to con-
vict a defendant of attempted murder where both the intended victim
and an unintended victim were injured.63 Until Poe, however, the
court had not yet considered a situation in which a defendant shoots
and wounds his intended victim, and the bullet, having passed
through the intended victim, also kills an unintended Victim. 4
59. Id. at 723, 625 A.2d at 1004 (1993) (McAuliffe, J., concurring in result). Judge
McAuliffe was joined by Judges Rodowsky and Karwacki. Id. at 726, 625 A.2d at 1005.
60. Id. at 724, 625 A.2d at 1004.
61. Id. at 726, 625 A.2d at 1005.
62. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
64. Other jurisdictions have addressed factual situations similar to the one reached in
Poe. For a case addressing the situation in which the intended victim was injured and the
unintended victim killed, see People v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288, 289 (Cal. 1996) (upholding the
use of transferred intent to convict defendant of both attempted murder and murder
where defendant shot at and missed his intended victim and killed his unintended victim).
For cases addressing the situation in which both the intended and unintended victims were
killed, see State v. Hinton, 630 A.2d 593, 599 (Conn. 1993) (upholding the doctrine of
transferred intent although the intended victim is killed); State v. Warlock, 569 A.2d 1314,
1325 (N.J. 1990) ("reject[ing] defendant's argument that the successful killing of the in-
tended victim prevents the 'transfer' of that intent to an unintended victim"). But see Peo-
ple v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to apply transferred intent
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3. The Court's Reasoning. -To the Court of Appeals, Poe argued
that the intent to kill had been "used up" on his targeted victim; there-
fore, he could not be charged with the first degree murder of his un-
intended victim. 65 Poe argued that "because he intended to and did
shoot Ms. Poe and was convicted of her attempted murder, there is no
intent left to transfer to Kimberly, the unintended victim."66 In sup-
port of his contention, Poe cited the Ford decision as standing for the
proposition that the transferred intent doctrine is simply inapplicable
to the crime of attempted murder.6 7
The court, however, rejected Poe's argument and held that Poe
could be convicted of both the attempted murder of Ms. Poe and the
first degree murder of Kimberly.6" While recognizing that "the crime
of attempted murder.., was complete when [Poe] fired the shotgun
at [Ms. Poe],"69 the court noted that "[Poe's] intent was to murder,
not to attempt to murder."70 Because Poe intended to murder Ms.
Poe, and Poe killed Kimberly, "his intent to murder was 'transferred'
from Ms. Poe to Kimberly."7' The court labeled the situation "a clas-
sic case of transferred intent."
72
where both the intended victim and unintended victim are killed, for "[w]hen the in-
tended victim is killed . . there is no need for such an artificial doctrine"). For cases
addressing the situation in which both the intended and unintended victims are endan-
gered due to the defendant's intent to kill, see State v. Gillette, 699 P.2d 626, 636 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1985) (upholding three attempted murder convictions in a poisoning case where the
defendant only intended to kill one person). But see People v. Czahara, 250 Cal. Rptr. 836,
839 (Ct. App. 1988) ("The purpose of the transferred intent rule-to ensure that prosecu-
tion and punishment accord with culpability-would not be served by convicting a defend-
ant of two or more attempted murders for a single act by which he intended to kill only
one person.").
65. 341 Md. at 528, 671 A.2d at 503.
66. Id. Specifically, Poe argued:
[W]hat is clear is that the [defendant] was charged with, and convicted of, at-
tempted murder (first degree) of Karen Poe. The crime of attempted murder
was complete.
As the State presented the evidence against the [defendant], and as the jury
so found in its decision, the [defendant] deliberately, with pre-meditation, in-
tended to kill his wife when he fired a shotgun shell at her. Indeed, the shell did
hit her; she was lucky to have survived. The same mens rea was involved whether
Karen Poe lived or died. The (defendant] had accomplished the intended physi-
cal result of shooting his wife .... There was no intent left to transfer from Karen
Poe to Kimberly ....
Id.
67. Id. at 529, 671 A.2d at 504.
68. Id. at 530-31, 671 A.2d at 504-05.
69. Id. at 528, 671 A.2d at 503.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 529, 671 A.2d at 503.
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Relying on Ford, the court explained that "transferred intent links
a defendant's mens rea as to the intended victim, with the killing of an
unintended victim, and, in effect, 'makes a whole crime out of two
component halves.' 73 The court further stated that "[t]he obvious
purpose behind this doctrine is to prevent a defendant from escaping
liability for a murder in which every element has been committed, but
there is an unintended victim."
74
The court then explained how the Poe holding could be recon-
ciled with dicta in Ford, which stated that transferred intent does not
apply to attempted murder.75 The court clarified that Ford was limited
to a situation in which "there is no death." 76 The court likened the
doctrine of transferred intent to that of felony murder, insofar as
"[b] oth doctrines are used to impose criminal liability for unintended
deaths."77 Just as there is no application of the felony murder rule if
no death occurs in the course of a felony, there is no application of
the transferred intent doctrine to attempted murder if no death
occurs.
7 8
The court explained that "[i]n Ford, we made clear that if a de-
fendant intends to kill a specific victim and instead wounds an unin-
tended victim without killing either, the defendant can be convicted
only of the attempted murder of the intended victim and transferred
intent does not apply."79 In contrast, if an unintended victim is killed,
"transferred intent applies because there is a death and the doctrine is
necessary to impose criminal liability for the murder of the unin-
tended victim in addition to the attempted murder of the intended
victim."8
The court concluded that "the doctrine is used when the defend-
ant fails to commit the crime intended upon the targeted victim and
completes it upon another. Thus, the doctrine should be applied to
the instant case."" The court held that "[t]he relevant inquiry in de-
termining the applicability of transferred intent is limited to what
could the defendant have been convicted of had he accomplished his
73. Id., 671 A.2d at 503-04 (quoting Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 710, 625 A.2d 984, 997
(1993)).





79. Id. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citation omitted).
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intended act?" 2 Thus, because Poe could have been convicted of first
degree murder of Ms. Poe if she had died, the trial court, in in-
structing the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent for the killing
of Kimberly, acted properly. 3
Judge Raker authored a separate concurrence. 4 Judge Raker ar-
gued that "neither history nor policy supports the majority's limitation
of transferred intent to cases resulting in death."" Judge Raker ex-
plained that both American and English courts have used the doctrine
in situations in which third parties were injured, but no deaths re-
sulted.8 6 As an example, Judge Raker pointed to the case of Ruffin v.
United States, in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
relying in part on Ford and Wilson, held that, "although neither the
intended victim nor the unintended victim was killed, transferred in-
tent could be applied to permit conviction for assault with intent to
kill the unintended victim." 8
Judge Raker then propounded a policy argument for applying
the transferred intent doctrine when a third party is injured but not
killed. Judge Raker explained that the policy behind transferred in-
tent is "to ensure proportionate punishment of criminal offenses, and
to prevent criminals from escaping culpability due to 'poor aim' or
mistaken identity." s This rationale applies "regardless of whether the
resulting injury to a bystander is fatal or non-fatal."9" Finally, Judge
Raker believed that "if the majority's opinion is interpreted to pre-
clude any use of the doctrine of transferred intent in attempted mur-
der prosecutions, the effect of the decision will be to substantially
increase the difficulty of prosecuting criminals for the harm inflicted
on innocent bystanders." 91
4. Analysis.-In Poe, the court continues a tradition of illogical
application of the transferred intent doctrine. Such a course will cer-
tainly lead to the disproportionate sentencing of criminal defendants.
Society may view this problem as acceptable when balanced against
the importance of holding defendants responsible for their criminal
82. Id. at 530-31, 671 A.2d at 504.
83. Id. at 531, 671 A.2d at 505.
84. Id. at 534, 671 A.2d at 506 (Raker, J., concurring). Judge Rodowsky and Judge
Karwacki joined Judge Raker's concurrence. See id. at 540, 671 A.2d at 509.
85. Id. at 536, 671 A.2d at 507.
86. Id. at 537, 671 A.2d at 508.
87. 642 A.2d 1288 (D.C. 1994).
88. Poe, 341 Md. at 539, 671 A.2d at 508 (Raker, J., concurring).
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acts. Continued adherence to the doctrine becomes less defensible,
however, in light of existing solutions that would eliminate need for
the doctrine without eliminating punishment proportionate to
culpability.
a. Equal Culpability, Unequal Treatment.-The Poe court's pri-
mary rationale for imposing the transferred intent doctrine is that it is
necessary to hold Poe liable for the death resulting from Poe's at-
tempt to murder.92 Yet application of this doctrine results in situa-
tions in which culpability does not match legal responsibility. This
problem is best illustrated by comparing a situation in which the doc-
trine would be applied under a Poe analysis to one in which it would
not.
The court in Poe quoted Ford for the proposition that the doctrine
of transferred intent only applies "when the defendant fails to commit
the crime intended upon the targeted victim and completes it upon
another."93 Thus, where D attempts to kill A, succeeds in killing A,
but also hits and injures B, D is liable for the first degree murder of A
and not for the attempted murder of B.94 Applying the Ford court's
reasoning, because D was already held liable for the first degree mur-
der of A-the act she intended to commit-there is no need to trans-
fer the intent to kill to the act against R95
In a situation similar to that in Poe, in which the defendant in-
jures the intended victim and kills a bystander, D is guilty of both the
attempted murder of the intended victim, A, and first degree murder
of the bystander, B.96 Under Poe, it is necessary, as matter of policy, to
transfer the intent to B to hold D liable for the crime she intended to
commit-first degree murder.97
Thus, depending on which of the intended and unintended vic-
tims are killed or injured, the defendant will be charged with different
crimes. This is true despite the fact that D had the same intention and
caused the same harm in both situations. The Poe court's rationale is
that transferred intent is used only when necessary to charge D with
92. Poe, 341 Md. at 529, 671 A.2d at 504; see supra notes 68-68 and accompanying text.
93. Poe, 341 Md. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504 (quoting Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 711, 625
A.2d 984, 998 (1993)).
94. D would likely be liable for a lesser charge for injuring B, such as criminal battery.
See Ford, 330 Md. at 716 n.14, 625 A.2d at 1000 n.14. The Ford court stated: "We note that
refusal to apply transferred intent to attempted murder by no means relieves a defendant
of criminal liability for the harm caused to unintended victims. The defendant clearly can
be convicted of... some other crime, such as criminal battery, as to other victims." Id.
95. See id. at 712-13, 625 A.2d at 998-99.
96. See Poe, 341 Md. at 525-31, 671 A.2d at 502-05.
97. See id. at 529-31, 671 A.2d at 504-05; see supra notes 68-68 and accompanying text.
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the crime she intended to commit.98 But does holding a person ac-
countable for the crime she intended to commit account for the dis-
parity in sentencing when the culpability is the same? D's charges are
different in each case, although her culpability and the resultant harm
is the same. In both cases she intended to kill one person and an-
other person was struck. There is no logical justification for the differ-
ence in results. Instead, the difference can only be attributable to
luck, which surely should be minimized in a rational system of crimi-
nal justice.99
b. Multiplication of Intent.-Poe also raised the difficult prob-
lem of distinguishing between transfer of intent and multiplication of
intent. In dicta, the Ford court refused to use transferred intent to
hold the defendant liable for assault with intent to disable injured un-
intended victims, if the defendant could be held liable for assault with
intent to disable his intended victims. R00 The Ford court reasoned:
[T] he purpose of transferred intent is not to multiply crimi-
nal liability, but to prevent a defendant who has committed
all the elements of a crime (albeit not upon the same victim)
from escaping responsibility for that crime. If the defendant
charged with attempted murder, shot at but missed the in-
tended victim, the defendant may still be convicted of at-
tempted murder of that victim. The completed crime has
been committed on the intended victim, and the fiction of
transferred intent would not so much transfer the intent as
replicate it and apply it to another victim, thus making multi-
ple specific intent crimes from one single act intended to
injure one person. 101
98. See Poe, 341 Md. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504.
99. It is clear that "luck" or "chance" plays a role in many areas of criminal law. See
Kimberly D. Kessler, Comment, The Role of Luck in Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L. Rav. 2183
(1994). For example, a defendant that shoots a person with intent to kill may be charged
either with murder or attempted murder, depending solely on whether the victim lives or
dies. See id. at 2211. In this situation, however, society has determined that the resultant
harm factors into the extent of the punishment. See id. at 2212-23. Thus, an attempt to
commit a crime is treated less severely than a completed crime. See id. at 2212.
By contrast, in the situations described in this section, both the mental culpability and
the resultant harm to society are the same. The only difference is which of the intended
and unintended victims happens to be injured and which is killed. Thus, the disparity in
charges is less defensible.
100. Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 709, 625 A.2d 984, 997 (1993); see supra notes 51-57 and
accompanying text.
101. Ford, 330 Md. at 714, 625 A.2d at 999.
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The Poe court transferred Poe's intent to kill from Ms. Poe to
Kimberly, making a "whole" crime of first degree murder.10 2 The pol-
icy reason behind this is clear: Transferred intent is necessary to hold
Poe liable for the crime he intended to commit."0 ' Yet the Poe court
also left the specific intent to kill where it started, with the attempted
murder of Ms. Poe. In effect, the intent is not transferred, but
replicated.
In a case involving one bullet that kills both the intended and an
unintended victim, one scholar noted:
If a single bullet is fired, the theorist might be forced to
choose whether the intention that accompanies this act does
or does not transfer; he cannot have it both ways. If the in-
tention transfers, the first victim is killed unintentionally; if
the intention does not transfer, the second victim is killed
unintentionally. A doctrine to hold the defendant guilty of
multiple murders when his single bullet kills both an in-
tended and an unintended victim might be named reproduced
or duplicated intent rather than transferred intent."
The scholar extends this hypothetical to a case identical to the instant
one.10 5 The author asks, "Is the defendant then guilty of two inten-
tional crimes?... If a defendant performs a single intentional act, his
intention must be reproduced or duplicated rather than transferred
in order to convict him of more than one intentional crime." 0 6
The Poe court justified its result by stating that it is necessary to
"transfer" intent to hold Poe liable for first degree murder, the crime
that he intended to commit.' 7 This policy justification goes to the
heart of the doctrine. The court confused policy, however, with the
operation of the doctrine. Under the doctrine, intent is transferred to
hold a defendant guilty of the intended crime, not replicated. As one
judge has stated: "The fiction of transferring intent to an unintended
target should be joined by a fictional relieving of intent from the in-
tended victim for the doctrine to remain consistent. The contrary
102. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 74-69 and accompanying text.
104. Douglas N. Husak, Transferred Intent, 10 NoTRE DAMEJ.L. ETmics & PUB. POL'Y 65,
79 (1996).
105. See id.
106. Id. As to the instant case, there can be no question that there existed a multiplica-
tion-rather than a transfer-of intent. Poe's intent to kill Ms. Poe was used to charge Poe
both with the attempted murder of his intended victim and the murder of Kimberly. The
court, in effect, both transferred the intent to "match up" the crime and simultaneously
left the intent where it started. Because the "intended" crime was on the unintended vic-
tim, it was necessary to use the intent twice.
107. Poe, 341 Md. at 527-31, 671 A.2d at 503-05.
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outcome makes as much sense as holding the defendant liable for two
assaults even if his aim was true."10 8
To replicate intent and convict a defendant of two crimes is to
ignore the difference in culpability between one defendant, who com-
mits one act intending to kill one person, and a second defendant,
who commits two acts intending to kill two people.10 9 To replicate
intent is to hold these two defendants equally culpable. Thus, a de-
fendant such as Poe is treated as equally culpable to a defendant who
fires multiple shots, intending to kill two people but succeeds in kill-
ing only one.110 This is simply unjust.
The court does not address the difficulty of holding the defend-
ant liable for two intentional crimes when clearly the defendant had a
single intent to kill."11 This illustrates the fundamental problem with
the legal fiction of transferred intent. The court can apply the doc-
108. People v. Washington, 547 N.W.2d 661, 662 (Mich. 1996) (Levin, J., dissenting
from denial of leave to appeal).
109. See People v. Czahara, 250 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (Ct. App. 1988); People v. Birreuta,
208 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1984).
110. Often, when a defendant is charged with both a crime against the intended victim
and the murder of the unintended victim, the defendant argues only that transferred in-
tent acted to improperly convict the defendant of the murder of the unintended victim.
See, e.g., Ruffin v. United States, 642 A.2d 1288, 1294 n.10 (D.C. 1994); Poe, 341 Md. at 528
n.1, 671 A.2d at 503 n.1. A court can then easily ignore the issue of whether the trans-
ferred intent doctrine serves to transfer or replicate criminal liability, as it is only the mur-
der conviction that is being appealed and not the crime against the intended victim. See id.
In Poe, the State appeared to anticipate this problem in its own brief. See Brief and
Appendix of Respondent at 11 n.3, Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 671 A.2d 501 (1996) (No.
52). In its brief, the State discussed Ruffin, in which the defendant was charged with both
assault against his intended victim and first degree murder against an unintended victim.
The State noted the observations of the D.C. Court of Appeals in Ruffin that "while Ford
might be read to suggest that Ruffin's conviction of the first-degree murder of Williams
might require reversal of the assault conviction against the intended victim, Ruffin was not
arguing for such an interpretation." Id. (citing Ruffin, 642 A.2d at 1294 n.10). Applying
this reasoning to Poe, the State argued: "Likewise in the instant case, Poe argues only that
his conviction for the first-degree murder of Kimberly ... should be reversed. He raises no
issue with respect to the conviction for the attempted murder of Karen Poe." Id.
The Poe court accepted the State's position that it need not address the attempted
murder charge against Ms. Poe. Poe, 341 Md. at 528 n.1, 671 A.2d at 503 n.1. The court
observed, "We note that the defendant argues only that his conviction for the first degree
murder of Kimberly should be reversed. He has not asked this Court to vacate his sentence
for the attempted murder of [Ms]. Poe." Id. The Poe court thus avoided potential
problems with Poe's attempted murder conviction against his intended victim.
111. The Court of Special Appeals attempted to explain this apparent dilemma of trans-
fer vs. replication in the more recent case of Harvey v. State, 111 Md. App. 401, 681 A.2d
628, cert. denied, 344 Md. 330, 686 A.2d 635 (1996):
Suppose, in addition to the death of the unintended victim, the intended victim
had also been killed or, at least, wounded by the bullet in its flight. If the mens rea
had to be used to prove the crime against the intended victim, what was then left
to be "transferred" to the case involving the unintended victim?... If the mens rea
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trine to reach the end the court seeks, with the justification that the
purpose of the doctrine is to reach this end."2 As one scholar states:
"The fiction operates as a substitute for careful thought; it is nothing
were in limited supply, to which of two crimes should it be allocated? How could
a single meas rea be made to do double duty?
Id. at 418, 681 A.2d at 637.
The court resolved this "dilemma" by reasoning:
By thinking of the mens rea in such finite terms-as some discrete unit that must
be either here or there-we have created a linguistic problem for ourselves where
no real-life problem existed. Criminal acts, consummated or inchoate, are dis-
crete events that can be both pinpointed and counted. A mens rea, by contrast, is
an elastic thing of unlimited supply .... Once we stopped conceptualizing a
defendant's mens rea as a single finite unit that might be "transferred" from one
actus reus to another, we were free to view it as a pervasive state of moral fault or
criminal purpose, of unlimited supply, that could influence any number of ex-
pected or unexpected consequences that might flow from it.
Id. at 419-20, 681 A.2d at 637. The court treats the intent of the defendant as a "pervasive
state of moral fault or criminal purpose." Id. at 420, 681 A.2d at 637. This analysis fails to
address problems of equivalent culpability discussed in this section. Further, consider "the
specter of the single shot over Times Square giving rise to 100,000 assault charges." People
v. Washington, 547 N.W.2d 661, 662 (Mich. 1996) (Levin, J., dissenting from denial of
leave to appeal).
112. This problem is pervasive in the Court of Special Appeals's attempt to clarify the
transferred intent doctrine. The court, seemingly ignoring guidance from the Court of
Appeals, held:
In a nutshell:
THE FATE OF THE INTENDED TARGET IS IMMATERIAL. IF THE UNIN-
TENDED VICTIM IS KILLED, THE TRANSFERRED INTENT DOCTRINE AP-
PLIES. IF THE UNINTENDED VICTIM IS NOT KILLED, THE TRANSFERRED
INTENT DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY.
Harvey, 111 Md. App. at 433, 681 A.2d at 644. Thus, the court would apply transferred
intent if both an intended and unintended victim are killed. See id. Although there is a
split of authority as to the application of the doctrine if both intended and unintended
victims are killed, see supra note 64, this is precisely the scenario in which Maryland had
rejected the application of transferred intent. See Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 711-12, 625
A.2d 984, 998 (1993). The Court of Appeals in Ford stated:
[T]ransferred intent should apply only when, without the doctrine, the defend-
ant could not be convicted of the crime at issue because the mental and physical
elements do not concur as to either the intended or the actual victim.... Where
the crime intended has actually been committed against the intended victim,
transferred intent is unnecessary and should not be applied to acts against unin-
tended victims.
Id. The Ford court concluded: "When the intended victim is killed.., there is no need for
such an artificial doctrine." Id. at 712, 625 A-2d at 998 (quoting People v. Birreuta, 208
Cal. Rptr. 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1984)).
The Harvey court disregarded this and articulated yet another standard for the opera-
tion of the doctrine. The court in fact stated that "[t]here is no doubt that the guilt of the
defendant for the death of the unintended victim would be precisely the same in the Poe
scenario, regardless of whether the intended victim 1) was hit and only wounded or 2) was
hit and killed." Harvey, 111 Md. App. at 422, 681 A.2d at 638. Again, the court demon-
strates a dangerous "flexibility" in the application of transferred intent.
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more than a label to which persons appeal to reach judgments that
they accept intuitively."' 13
c. Alternative Possibilities. -The Court of Appeals correctly
held Poe accountable for both the harm inflicted on Ms. Poe and the
death of Kimberly. Most would agree that it is fair and just that Poe
suffer punishment for the harm resulting from his intention to kill in
these circumstances. It is the means by which the court arrives at its
conclusion that warrants criticism. The transferred intent doctrine, as
applied in Maryland, is inconsistent and shaped to achieve the ends
that the court seeks. The doctrine thus "has the vice of being a mis-
leading half-truth, often given as an improper reason for a correct
result, but incapable of strict application."114 It is thus important to
examine alternatives that may accomplish the same end, without be-
ing subject to the same shortcomings.1 5
First, courts could address the problem at sentencing under the
"principle of proportionate sentences." 16 This principle "requires
paity in sentences when two defendants commit equally serious
crimes."" 7 Thus, if two defendants "act with the same culpability, and
proximately cause the same harm, then they must have committed
equally serious crimes. "118 Consider the following example. If one
defendant (DI) intends to kill B, but merely injures her and instead
kills C, D1 will be sentenced proportionally to a second defendant
(D2), who, under the same circumstances, kills B and injures C. The
culpability and the harm is the same in both cases-thus, the two de-
fendants would receive proportionate sentences.
Second, a defendant, under certain circumstances, may be con-
victed under a theory of concurrent intent. As explained by the Court
of Appeals in Ford: "The intent is concurrent.. . when the nature and
scope of the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are such that
we can conclude the perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the pri-
mary victim by harming everyone in that victim's vicinity."11 9 If for
113. Husak, supra note 104, at 87. For further academic criticism of the doctrine, see
RoLLIN M. PERKrNS, CRiMINAL LAw 822 (2d ed. 1969). Perkins argues that transferred in-
tent "has no proper place in criminal law." Id.; see also Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking
Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REv. 463, 474 (calling the transferred intent doctrine "dubious to
begin with").
114. Perkins, supra note 113, at 822.
115. "Fictions should be created only if they are required to avoid injustice .... " Husak,
supra note 104, at 88 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 92.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 716, 625 A.2d 984, 1000 (1993).
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example, a defendant places a bomb or fires a hail of bullets into a
crowded place with intent to kill his victim, "[tlhe defendant has in-
tentionally created a 'kill zone' to ensure the death of his primary
victim, and the trier of fact may reasonably infer from the method
employed an intent to kill others concurrent with the intent to kill the
primary victim."' 2 Thus, "[t] he defendant's intent need not be trans-
ferred from A to B, because although the defendant's goal was to kill
A, his intent to kill B was also direct; it was concurrent with his intent
to kill A."12 1
Another possibility involves application of a depraved heart analy-
sis. The depraved heart doctrine "treats certain homicides as murder
although the perpetrator does not intend to kill or know that death
will result."'22 Under this doctrine, "[t]he perpetrator must [or rea-
sonably should] realize the risk his behavior has created" and "the
conduct must contain an element of viciousness or contemptuous dis-
regard for the value of human life."' 21
5. Conclusion.-The transferred intent doctrine is used to pun-
ish a defendant when a death results from his intention to commit
murder, regardless of whether the person killed was the intended vic-
tim. This is certainly the desired result. Nevertheless, the doctrine of
transferred intent leads to problems of logic and policy, including dis-
proportionate sentencing and the multiplication of intent. The Court
of Appeals's latest application of the transferred intent doctrine in Poe
v. State illustrates these problems. These problems are unnecessary in
light of alternatives that could allow a court to reach the same end
without the use of an easily manipulated and somewhat illogical legal
fiction.
ELIZABETH F. HARRiS
120. Id. at 717, 625 A.2d at 1001.
121. Id.
122. See Simons, supra note 113, at 488.
123. Both this theory and concurrent intent, unlike transferred intent, do not require
that a fact finder impute an absent state of mind to a defendant. They may, however,
suffer from a similar problem as transferred intent in that they may be easily manipulated
to reach a certain result. For example, the Poe court, without transferred intent, could
have held that Poe, by firing into a house where he knew others may be present, either
displayed extreme indifference to the value of human life or had a concurrent intent to kill
all those inside the house through a "kill zone." These doctrines may, like transferred
intent, serve as devices to hold a defendant responsible for what many intuitively see as
"right"; like transferred intent, they become tools of result-oriented jurisprudence.
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C. Rejecting Inference of Intent to Murder for Knowingly Exposing
Another to a Risk of HIV Transmission
Since the early 1980s, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in-
fection has exploded into epidemic proportions, touching millions of
American lives and sparking intense social and legal debate.' Re-
cently, in Smallwood v. State,2 the Court of Appeals addressed the con-
troversial issue of what, if any, legal inferences may be drawn when an
HIV-positive individual "knowingly exposes another to the risk of HIV-
infection, and the resulting risk of death" by Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome (AIDS).' In this case of first impression, the Court
of Appeals held that a trier of fact may not infer an intent to murder
from the mere fact that an individual has HIV and is aware of the
modes of HIV transmission.4 Although the court reached the correct
decision, its reasoning may have the dangerous effect of promoting
the increasing criminalization of HIV transmission.
1. The Case.-In August 1991, while incarcerated in the Prince
George's County Detention Center, Dwight Smallwood tested positive
for HIV.5 By late September of that same year, Smallwood received
notification that he had in fact tested HIV-positive.6 Health care prov-
iders at the detention center repeatedly warned Smallwood that he
could transmit HIV to others through unprotected sex and advised
Smallwood to take precautions to minimize the risk of transmission.7
Smallwood assured a detention center psychiatrist that, from that time
1. As of October 31, 1995, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
reported 501,310 persons with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in the
United States. See Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, First 500,000 AIDS Cases-
United States, 1995, 44 MoRIDrrv & MORTALITY WK.v. REP. 849, 849 (1995). The World
Health Organization estimates that 18 million adults and 1.5 million children suffer from
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) disease worldwide. Id. at 851. HIV disease has
emerged as the leading cause of death among men and the third leading cause of death
among women between the ages of 25 and 44. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention,
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Update: Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection
Among Persons Aged 25-44 Years-United States, 1994, 45 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
121, 121 (1996).
HIV disease refers to the broad spectrum of HIV infection, ranging from the primary
infection stage to the asymptomatic stage to the advanced disease state. See KURT J. Is-
SELBACHER, M.D., ET AL., HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1567, 1586 (13th
ed. 1994).
2. 343 Md. 97, 680 A.2d 512 (1996).
3. Id. at 103, 680 A.2d at 515.
4. Id. at 109, 680 A.2d at 518.
5. Smallwood v. State, 106 Md. App. 1, 3, 661 A.2d 747, 748 (1995), rev'd, 343 Md. 97,
680 A.2d 512 (1996).
6. SmaUwood, 343 Md. at 100, 680 A-2d at 513.
7. Smallwood, 106 Md. App. at 5, 661 A.2d at 749.
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forward, he would inform future sexual partners, prior to intercourse,
that he had tested HIV-positive.8 After his release, Smallwood re-
ceived additional warnings about the dangers of unprotected sex. In
February 1992, a social worker told Smallwood that he must practice
"safe sex" to avoid transmitting HIV to his sexual partners.9 In July
1993, Smallwood informed health care providers at Children's Hospi-
tal in Washington, D.C., where Smallwood received HIV-related medi-
cal treatment, that he had only one sexual partner and that he always
used a condom during sex."
Nevertheless, in three separate incidents in late September 1993,
Smallwood and an accomplice robbed, abducted, and raped three wo-
men at gunpoint." During all three incidents, Smallwood threatened
to shoot his victim if she refused to cooperate or if she called the
police. 12 Smallwood took no steps to protect his victims from the risk
of HIV transmission by wearing a condom. 13
In three separate indictments, the State charged Smallwood with
the attempted second degree murder of all three victims.14 Addition-
ally, based upon his attack against the second victim, the State
charged Smallwood with attempted "first-degree rape, robbery with a
deadly weapon, assault with intent to murder, and reckless endanger-
ment."1 5 The Circuit Court for Prince George's County tried and con-
victed Smallwood of assault with intent to murder, reckless
endangerment, and all three counts of attempted second degree
murder. 16
8. Id. at 3, 661 A.2d at 748.
9. Smallwood, 343 Md. at 100, 680 A.2d at 513.
10. Smallwood, 106 Md. App. at 3-4, 661 A.2d at 748.
11. Smallwood, 343 Md. at 100, 680 A.2d at 513. On September 26, 1993, Smallwood
and his accomplice robbed a woman, forced her into a grove of trees, and then raped her
while holding a gun to her head. Id. Two days later, Smallwood and his accomplice
robbed a second woman, took her to a secluded location, and raped her. Id. Finally, on
September 30, Smallwood and his accomplice robbed a third woman, forced her to per-
form oral sex on Smallwood, and then raped her. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 101, 680 A.2d at 513.
15. Id. Smallwood pleaded guilty to attempted first degree rape and robbery with a
deadly weapon. Id. at 101 & n.1, 680 A.2d at 513 & n.1.
16. Id. at 101, 680 A.2d at 513-14. Smallwood moved for judgment of acquittal on the
charges of attempted second degree murder, assault with intent to murder, and reckless
endangerment. Smallwood, 106 Md. App. at 4, 661 A.2d at 748. The circuit court denied
Smallwood's motion. Id. Smallwood received concurrent life sentences for attempted
rape, 20 years for robbery with a deadly weapon, 30 years for assault with intent to murder,
5 years for reckless endangerment, and 30 years for each count of attempted second de-
gree murder to be served concurrently. Smallwood, 343 Md. at 101, 680 A.2d at 514.
1997]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Smallwood appealed his convictions of attempted second degree
murder and assault with intent to murder to the Court of Special Ap-
peals on the ground that "one cannot be convicted of those crimes
simply because one knowingly engages in sexual behavior that places
his partner at risk of being infected with HIV."l 7 The Court of Special
Appeals analyzed Smallwood's conviction in light of the requisite ele-
ments for attempted second degree murder: (1) a specific intent to
commit murder coupled with (2) "'some overt act in furtherance of
the intent that goes beyond mere preparation."'1 8 With respect to the
first element, Smallwood contended that the evidence failed to sup-
port the circuit court's finding that he possessed the requisite specific
intent to murder.19 Smallwood argued that because a reasonable
doubt existed about his intent-whether it was intent to murder or
something less-Maryland law required that the circuit court "give
him the benefit of the conclusion that would mitigate his guilt."
2 °
The Court of Special Appeals rejected this contention, stating that be-
cause the circuit court merely applied the law to an agreed upon state-
ment of facts, the rule requiring a trial court to mitigate the degree of
a defendant's guilt when a factual dispute exists did not apply. 2
1
The Court of Special Appeals noted that "'intent must be deter-
mined by a consideration of the accused's acts, conduct, and words,'
and that, under the proper circumstances, 'an intent to kill may be
inferred from the use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the
human body.' 22 The circuit court had found that when Smallwood
Circuit CourtJudge Nichols made the following findings with regard to the attempted
second degree murder charge:
I believe his requisite intent to kill can be found from inferring from the Defend-
ant's knowledge as to his HIV positive status, his knowledge of the transmission of
the disease, and the steps necessary to avoid the transmission of the disease. I
believe that he also had sufficient time to consider the consequences of his act.
Petitioner's Brief and Appendix at App. 22, Smallwood v. State, 343 Md. 97, 680 A.2d 512
(1996) (No. 122).
17. Sma/wood, 106 Md. App. at 4, 661 A.2d at 748.
18. Id. at 6, 661 A.2d at 749 (quoting State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 162, 571 A.2d 1227,
1230 (1990)). With regard to the second element, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the circuit court's finding that Smallwood's "insertion of his penis into his victim's vagina,
with slight penetration, constituted an overt act in furtherance of the intent that went
beyond mere preparation." Id. at 10, 661 A.2d at 751.
19. Id. at 4-5, 661 A.2d at 748-49.
20. Id. at 10-11, 661 A.2d at 751-52 (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 13-14, 661 A.2d at 753. In this case, the parties provided the trial court with
an undisputed statement of facts from which the court could determine Smallwood's inno-
cence or guilt. Therefore, "the trial court did not need to weigh the credibility of the
evidence to determine the ultimate facts of the case." Id. at 13, 661 A.2d at 753.
22. Id. at 14, 661 A.2d at 753 (quoting State v. Raines, 326 Md. 582, 591, 606 A.2d 265,
269 (1992)).
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raped his victims, he knew that he was HIV-positive, that HIV could be
transmitted through unprotected sex, and the fatal consequences of
transmitting HIV to another person.2" Based upon this knowledge
and the reasonable inference that "'one intends the natural and prob-
able consequences of his act,'" the Court of Special Appeals held that
the circuit court could have reasonably concluded that Smallwood
possessed an intent to murder.24 Accordingly, the court affirmed all
of the challenged convictions. 25 The Court of Appeals subsequently
issued a writ of certiorari. 6
2. Legal Background.-
a. Inferring an Intent to Murder.-The crimes of attempted
murder and assault with intent to murder are both specific intent of-
fenses, requiring a specific intent to murder.27 An individual harbors
a specific intent to murder when he has a specific intent to kill "under
circumstances that would not legally justify or excuse the killing or
mitigate it to manslaughter if death should result."28
Often, a criminal defendant will not readily concede his intent or
state of mind. Thus, his intent can only be deduced through circum-
stantial evidence. This can pose a difficult problem because a defend-
ant's intent or state of mind "'is as much a fact as the state of his
digestion.' 29 Hence, it has been said that "[w]e know what a person
thinks not when he tells us what he thinks, but by his actions."30 The
23. Id. at 14-15, 661 A.2d at 753-54.
24. Id. at 15, 661 A.2d at 754 (quoting Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 704, 625 A.2d 984,
994 (1993)). The Court of Special Appeals drew an analogy between Sma//wood and Ford,
which held that "'[i] t is a reasonable inference that a "natural and probable consequence"
of throwing a large rock through the windshield of a fast moving vehicle is permanent
injury of various forms to the vehicle's occupants.'" Id. at 14, 661 A.2d at 753 (alteration in
original) (quoting Ford, 330 Md. at 704, 625 A.2d at 994).
25. Id. at 15, 661 A.2d at 754. The Court of Special Appeals held that, for sentencing
purposes, Smallwood's conviction for assault with intent to murder should merge into his
conviction for attempted second degree murder. Id. at 16, 661 A.2d at 754. On review, the
Court of Appeals reversed his convictions, and, therefore, the merger issue became moot.
Smal/wood, 343 Md. at 101 n.2, 680 A.2d at 514 n.2.
26. Smallwood v. State, 341 Md. 30, 668 A.2d 422 (1995).
27. See State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 163, 571 A.2d 1227, 1231 (1990) (attempted mur-
der); State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 515, 515 A.2d 465, 472 (1986) (assault with intent to
murder).
28. Earp, 319 Md. at 164, 571 A.2d at 1231; accord Jenkins, 307 Md. at 515, 515 A.2d at
472.
29. Smaliwood, 106 Md. App. at 17, 661 A.2d at 755 (Bloom, J., dissenting) (quoting
Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1885)).
30. Issac Beshevis Singer, in BARTLETr's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 861 (15th ed. 1980).
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existence of the required intent may be inferred from the surround-
ing circumstances, including a defendant's acts, conduct, and words.3 '
In certain circumstances, the use of a deadly weapon directed at a
vital part of the human body gives rise to an inference of an intent to
murder. As the Court of Appeals explained over four decades ago:
Since intent is subjective and, without the cooperation of the
accused, cannot be directly and objectively proven, its pres-
ence must be shown by established facts which permit a
proper inference of its existence. Malice and, so intent to
murder, may be inferred from all the facts and circum-
stances of the occurrence. The deliberate selection and use
of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the body is a
circumstance which indicates a design to kill, since in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that
one intends the natural and probable consequences of his
act.
32
Thus, because an individual is understood to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his actions, directing a deadly weapon at a
vital part of the human body creates a permissible inference that the
individual harbored an intent to murder.
b. HIV and the Intent to Murder. -Although Smallwood
presented an issue of first impression in Maryland,33 courts in other
jurisdictions have found an intent to murder based upon somewhat
similar facts.34 In each of these cases, the court inferred an intent to
murder from the defendant's knowledge that he had HIV and from
his verbal or physical expressions of intent.3
5
31. See State v. Raines, 326 Md. 582, 591, 606 A.2d 265, 269 (1992); Earp, 319 Md. at
167, 571 A.2d at 1232-33.
32. Davis v. State, 204 Md. 44, 51, 102 A.2d 816, 819-20 (1954).
33. See Smallwood, 106 Md. App. at 1, 661 A-2d at 747.
34. See infra note 87. There have been several cases of HIV-transmission prosecutions
under military law. SeeJody B. Gabel, Comment, Liability for "Knowing" Transmission of HIV
The Evolution of a Duty to Disclose, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 981, 988-98 (1994) (examining
unique military prosecutions for the knowing transmission of HIV).
35. See Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 20 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Haines, 545
N.E.2d 834, 841 (Ind. CL App. 1989); State v. Caine, 652 So. 2d 611, 617 (La. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 661 So. 2d 1358 (La. 1995); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 507 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1993); State v. Hinkhouse, 912 P.2d 921, 924-25 (Or. Ct. App.), opinion adhered to
as modified &y 915 P.2d 489 (Or. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 925 P.2d 906 (Or. 1996); Weeks v.
State, 834 S.W.2d 559, 565-66 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
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In State v. Haines,6 for example, an Indiana jury convicted an
HIV-positive defendant of three counts of attempted murder3 7 after
he made several threats to police officers and health care providers
stating his wish to transmit AIDS to them and attempted to spit, bite,
scratch, and throw blood on the officers.3" Although a jury found
Haines guilty of attempted murder, the trial court set aside the verdict
and entered judgment on three counts of battery.3 9 The State ap-
pealed, arguing that the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's ver-
dict.4" The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed and reinstated Haines's
conviction for attempted murder.4 1 The court concluded that, taken
together, Haines's knowledge of his HIV-positive status in conjunction
with his verbal threats and conduct amounted to "biological war-
fare"42 and sufficiently established that he specifically intended to kill
the officers.4 3
In 1989, a Georgia court convicted an HIV-positive defendant of
aggravated assault with intent to murder." Two months after the de-
fendant, Gregory Scroggins, tested positive for HIV, a police officer
apprehended him after breaking up an altercation between Scroggins
36. 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
37. Id. at 835. "A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability
required for commission of the crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial
step toward commission of the crime." INn. CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-1 (a) (Bums 1994).
38. Haines, 545 N.E.2d at 835. In August 1987, after police officers arrived at Haines's
apartment in response to a possible suicide, they found Haines lying in a pool of blood
with his wrists slashed and bleeding. Id. Haines stood up and began to charge at one of
the officers, telling the officers that he "should be left to die because he had AIDS," that he
'wanted to f__ [the officer] and give it to him," and that he "would use his wounds." Id.
At this point, Haines began jerking his arms, causing blood to spray into the officer's
mouth and eyes. Id. Haines also stated that "he had AIDS, that he could not deal with it
and that he was going to make [the officer] deal with it." Id. Haines was brought to a
hospital emergency room where he continued to threaten to infect them with AIDS. Id.
Haines then scratched, bit and spat at the officer and struck the officer in the face with a
blood-soaked wig. Id. Haines announced "that he had AIDS and that he was going to show
everyone else what it was like to have the disease and die." Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 836.
41. Id. at 841.
42. Id. at 838.
43. Id. at 841. The court stated:
From the evidence in the record before us we can only conclude that Haines had
knowledge of his disease and that he unrelentingly and unequivocally sought to
kill the persons helping him by infecting them with AIDS, and that he took a
substantial step towards killing them by his conduct believing that he could do so,
all of which was more than a mere tenuous, theoretical, or speculative "chance" of
transmitting the disease.
Id.
44. Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
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and a third party.45 During the time when the officer had Scroggins
in custody, Scroggins bit and spat at the officer and laughed when the
officer asked if he had AIDS.'
Scroggins appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals, contending
that the evidence did not support his conviction for aggravated assault
with intent to murder because HIV cannot be transmitted via human
saliva and, therefore, biting the officer could not constitute the use of
a deadly weapon.47 The Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that a convic-
tion for aggravated assault with intent to murder could stand so long
as Scroggins harbored an intent to murder.4" The court further held
that "[t] he jury's finding of 'intent to murder,' ... [was] supported by
the evidence that [Scroggins] sucked up excess sputum before biting
[the] officer, this being evidence of a deliberate, thinking act rather
than purely spontaneous; and that [Scroggins] laughed when the of-
ficer asked him if he had AIDS."49 Accordingly, the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed Scroggins's conviction for aggravated assault with in-
tent to murder.5 °
In Weeks v. State,51 a Texas court convicted an HIV-positive de-
fendant, Curtis Weeks, of attempted murder for spitting on a prison
guard.52 While being transferred between prison units, Weeks ver-
45. Id.
46. Id. The police officer placed flexicuffs on Scroggins, who then proceeded to as-
sault the officer. Id. Scroggins was heard "making noises with his mouth as if to bring up
spittle" and then bit the officer on the forearm with such force that he tore the officer's
uniform and left a full-mouthed bite wound, which reportedly took ten months to heal. Id.
Later, when Scroggins told a hospital worker that he was infected with HIV, the police
officer approached Scroggins and asked whether he had AIDS. Id. Scroggins responded
by laughing at the officer. Id.
47. Id. at 16. Scroggins argued that transmitting HIV via human saliva was only a "theo-
retical possibility." Id.
48. Id. The Georgia Code states: "A person commits the offense of aggravated assault
when he or she assaults: (1) With intent to murder, to rape, or to rob; (2) With a deadly
weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a
person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-
21(a) (1996).
49. Scroggins, 401 S.E.2d at 18. The Scroggins court held:
Evidence of an intent to murder, coupled with the assault, exists beyond a reason-
able doubt in this case.... [T]he peculiar circumstances of this case.., support
a finding that, by his deliberately biting another and injecting saliva into the
blood stream while knowing he was infected with the AIDS virus, appellant's as-
sault amounted to such wanton and reckless disregard as to whether he might
transmit the disease, that the jury could infer a malicious intent, i.e., to murder.
Id. at 18-19. Georgia law does not require a specific intent to kill. Id. at 19 ("A wanton and
reckless state of mind is sometimes the equivalent of a specific intent to kilt").
50. Id. at 23.
51. 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
52. Id. at 560-61.
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bally threatened that he would transmit HIV to the prison guards and
twice spat in the face of one guard-covering the guard's glasses, lips,
and nose to the point of penetrating his nasal cavity and possibly his
mouth.5" Weeks appealed his conviction to the Texas Court of Ap-
peals, arguing that, because HIV cannot be transmitted through
human saliva, he did not commit an act amounting to more than
mere preparation of the intended offense.54 Although not an issue on
appeal,5 5 the court noted that Weeks's knowledge that he had HIV,
coupled with his actions, sufficiently established his specific intent to
kill.56 Accordingly, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed his convic-
tion for attempted murder.57
In State v. Smith,58 a New Jersey jury convicted an HIV-positive
defendant, Gregory Dean Smith, of attempted murder, aggravated as-
sault, and terroristic threats after biting a corrections officer during an
altercation in a hospital emergency room.59 Smith threatened to
"take out" and kill the officers and went "out of control," exclaiming:
"I'm going to give you AIDS."6 ° Smith snapped his teeth at correc-
tions officers and then bit one officer, telling him that he hoped the
officer died from AIDS.6 Smith appealed his conviction, arguing that
HIV could not be transmitted via a human bite and that he knew this
53. Id. at 561. Weeks threatened that he was "going to take somebody with him when
he went," that he was "medical now," and that he had "HIV." Id.
54. Id. Texas law states: "A person commits an offense if, with specific intent to com-
mit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but
fails to effect the commission of the offense intended." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a)
(West 1994).
55. The Texas Court of Appeals primarily addressed the issue of whether HIV could, in
fact, be transferred through spitting. See Weeks, 834 S.W.2d at 562. The court held that
there was sufficient evidence in the record, albeit controversial, that the defendant could
have transmitted HIV by spitting. Id. at 565.
56. Id. at 562 ("It is undisputed that [Weeks] spit twice on the officer and that [Weeks]
was infected with HIV at the time. The record reflects that [Weeks] believed he could kill
[the prison guard] by spitting his HIV infected saliva on him.").
57. Id. at 566.
58. 621 A.2d 493 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
59. Id. at 495-96.
60. Id. at 497.
61. Id. at 497-98. Smith exclaimed: "I hope you die, you pig" and "now die, you pig,
die from what I have." Id. at 498. The State also introduced testimony concerning two
later incidents that demonstrated Smith's intent to murder. In one incident, Smith re-
sisted being hauled into the shower when he said to a corrections officer: "You know what
I have and I'll give it to you if you... attempt to come in here and cuff and shackle me."
Id. at 498 (alteration in original). The corrections officer believed Smith was referring to
AIDS. Id. In another incident, Smith threatened a corrections officer and reportedly
stated that he "had AIDS, that [Smith] would bite [the corrections officer], [and that the
corrections officer] will die with [Smith]." Id.
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fact when he bit the corrections officer. 62 The Superior Court of New
Jersey declined to address whether HIV could be transmitted through
a human bite and focused instead on whether Smith "'purposely in-
tended to cause the particular result that is the necessary element of
the underlying offense-death.' 63 The Superior Court found that
Smith's violent conduct and verbal threats constituted sufficient "evi-
dence to support the jury's finding of [the] defendant's criminal pur-
pose to kill the correction officer,"' and affirmed Smith's
conviction.65
A Louisiana jury convicted an HIV-positive defendant of at-
tempted second degree murder.' The defendant, Donald Caine,
robbed a convenience store and threatened a store clerk that he
would "GIVE [HER] AIDS" and then stuck the clerk with a hypoder-
mic needle filled with a clear liquid.6" The needle penetrated the
clerk's skin and caused some bleeding.6" Caine appealed his convic-
tion, arguing that the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that
he harbored a specific intent to kill.69 The Louisiana Court of Ap-
peals believed that Caine's specific intent to kill was apparent from his
verbal threats.7 ° Affirming Caine's conviction, the court stated:
"When telling the victim that he would give her AIDS, it could only
mean that [Caine] had the specific intent to kill her."7
Most recently, in State v. Hinkhouse,72 the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the attempted murder conviction of an HIV-positive
defendant for repeatedly and intentionally engaging in sexual activity,
consistently concealing or lying about his HIV status, refusing to wear
62. Id. at 495.
63. Id. at 502 (quoting State v. Rhett, 601 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1992)). The subjective
test for attempted murder does not require a finding that HIV could have indeed been
transferred through a human bite; it only requires that the defendant harbored a pur-
poseful intent to cause death. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-1 (West 1995).
64. Smith, 621 A.2d at 502.
65. Id. at 516.
66. State v. Caine, 652 So. 2d 611, 612 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 661 So. 2d 1358 (La.
1995).
67. Id. at 613.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 615. In Louisiana, the crime of attempted murder requires a specific intent
to kill: "Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act
for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of
an attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the
circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose." LA. Ray. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:27(A) (West 1986).
70. Caine, 652 So. 2d at 617.
71. Id.
72. 912 P.2d 921 (Or. Ct. App.), opinion adhered to as modified &y 915 P.2d 489 (Or. Ct.
App.), rev. denied, 925 P.2d 908 (Or. 1996).
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or pretending to wear condoms, and telling at least one person that
he intended to spread HIV to his sexual partners.7' Hinkhouse ap-
pealed, arguing that the evidence did not support the finding that he
intended to murder his sexual partners.74 In affirming Hinkhouse's
conviction, the Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that because
Hinkhouse knew he was HIV-positive, knew that HIV could be trans-
mitted through unprotected sex, demonstrated a "pattern of [sexual]
exploitation," and expressed his verbal disregard for the welfare of his
partners, Hinkhouse intended to murder his sexual partners.75
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Smallwood v. State, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed Smallwood's convictions for attempted second degree
murder and assault with intent to murder because the evidence failed
73. Id. at 925. Hinkhouse tested positive for HLV in 1989 and learned a year later that
wearing condoms during sex significantly lessened the likelihood of transmitting HIV to
his sexual partner. Id. at 922-23. At that time, Hinkhouse learned that transmitting HIV
"would be killing someone." Id. Between 1989 and 1993, Hinkhouse became sexually in-
volved with several women. Id. Hinkhouse concealed his HIV status from all three women
and refused or pretended to wear condoms while engaging in intercourse with them. Id.
In the fall of 1993, Hinkhouse became romantically involved with a fourth woman, whom
he reportedly hoped to marry. Id. Hinkhouse always wore a condom when having sex with
this woman. Id.
74. Id. at 922. Under Oregon law, "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime
when the person intentionally engages in conduct which constitutes a substantial step to-
ward commission of the crime." OR. REv. STAT. § 161.405(1) (1990). In addition, "'Inten-
tionally' or 'with intent,' when used with respect to a result or to conduct described by a
statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with a conscious objective to cause the
result or to engage in the conduct so described." Id. § 161.085(7).
75. Hinkhouse, 912 P.2d at 925. The Oregon Court of Appeals stated that Hinkhouse
"knew that he was HWV positive and that his condition was terminal." Id. at 924. He knew
that if he transmitted the virus to another person, that person would eventually die. Id. at
924-25. He understood that having unprotected sex would expose his partners to the virus
and that a single sexual encounter could transmit the virus. Id. at 925. He had been told,
and he acknowledged, that having unprotected sex and transmitting the disease was "mur-
der." Id. He even signed an agreement that he would refrain from any unsupervised con-
tact with women without the approval of his probation officer. Id. Nonetheless, the Court
of Appeals noted:
[Hinkhousel engaged in a persistent pattern of recruiting sexual parmers over a
period of many months. He consistently concealed or lied about his HIV status.
He refused to wear condoms, or pretended to wear them, penetrating women
without protection and against their protestations. He engaged in unprotected
sex, including rough and violent intercourse, which increased the chances of
passing the virus to his partners. He bragged about his sexual prowess, even after
acknowledging his HIV status, and told at least one person that he intended to
spread the disease to others by such conduct .... When he engaged in sexual
intercourse with the woman he hoped to marry, he consistently wore condoms




to establish beyond a reasonable doubt a specific intent to murder.76
The Court of Appeals noted that a specific intent to murder is re-
quired for the crimes of attempted murder and assault with intent to
murder.77 This intent may be proved through circumstantial evi-
dence, including the defendant's actions and statements.78
The State argued that inferring Smallwood's intent was analogous
to the situation in State v. Raines,79 in which the Court of Appeals in-
ferred the intent to murder "from the use of a deadly weapon directed
at a vital part of the human body."8" The State contended that the
Raines analysis hinged upon two factors: "(1) Raines knew that his
weapon was deadly, and (2) Raines knew that he was firing [the
weapon] at someone's head.""1 Similarly, the State argued that
Smallwood knew that HIV ultimately leads to death and knew that he
was exposing his victims to a risk of HIV transmission.8 2 Conse-
quently, the State argued, Smallwood's intent can be inferred through
his use of a deadly weapon-HIV-directed at a vital part of the
human body-bodily fluids.8 3
The Court of Appeals rejected the State's approach, noting that
the State's use of Raines ignored the requirement that "[b]efore an
intent to kill may be inferred based solely upon the defendant's expo-
sure of a victim to a risk of death, it must be shown that the victim's
death would have been a natural and probable result of the defend-
ant's conduct." 4 The Court of Appeals stated that in Raines, when the
defendant fired the gun at the victim's head, "the risk of killing the
76. Smallwood, 343 Md. at 109, 680 A.2d at 518. The court reviewed whether the trial
court had sufficient evidence to support the inference that Smallwood possessed a specific
intent to kill. Id. at 100, 680 A.2d at 513.
77. Id. at 103, 680 A.2d at 515.
78. Id. at 104, 680 A.2d at 515.
79. 326 Md. 582, 606 A.2d 265 (1992).
80. Id. at 591, 606 A.2d at 269; see Smallwood, 343 Md. at 104, 680 A.2d at 515. In Raines,
the defendant and a friend were driving on the highway when Raines fired a gun into the
driver's side window of a truck in the adjacent lane and killed the driver of the truck.
Raines, 326 Md. at 585, 606 A.2d at 266. Evidence at trial established that Raines fired the
gun at the driver's window knowing that the driver was immediately behind the window.
Id. at 590, 606 A.2d at 268-69. The Court of Appeals concluded that "Raines's actions in
directing the gun at the window, and therefore at the driver's head on the other side of the
window, permitted an inference that Raines shot the gun with the intent to kill." Id. at 592-
93, 606 A.2d at 270.
81. Smallwood, 343 Md. at 105, 680 A.2d at 516.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 105-06, 680 A.2d at 516. In Raines, the Court of Appeals found that the
probability of death occurring after a defendant fires a bullet at his victim's head is so high
that it sufficiently permits a reasonable inference of an intent to murder. Raines, 326 Md.
at 592-93, 606 A.2d at 270.
[VOL. 56:656
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
victim [was] so high that it [became] reasonable to assume that the
defendant intended the victim to die as a natural and probable conse-
quence of the defendant's actions."85 In contrast to firing a bullet at a
person's head, however, "[i] t is less clear that death by AIDS from that
single exposure is a sufficiently probable result to provide the sole sup-
port for an inference that the person causing the exposure intended
to kill the person who was exposed."86
The Court of Appeals then reviewed the cases from other jurisdic-
tions in which HIV-positive defendants were found to have harbored
an intent to murder.87 The court posited that in each of those cases
the court's finding of the defendant's intent to murder rested on
more than mere knowledge that he had HIV disease and of how HIV
could be transmitted. 88 Rather, those defendants "either made ex-
plicit statements demonstrating an intent to infect their victims or
[took] specific actions demonstrating such an intent and tending to
exclude other possible intents."89 The court concluded that, because
Smallwood neither made statements nor took comparable action
demonstrating an intent to murder, he did not harbor an intent to
murder.9 ° Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed Smallwood's
convictions for attempted murder and assault with intent to murder.9 1
4. Analysis.-
a. Intent and the Knowing Exposure of Another to a Risk of Infec-
tion. -The Court of Appeals correctly observed that-in contrast with
the cases decided in other jurisdictions92-Smallwood did not exhibit
words or conduct that indicated an intent to murder his victims. 93 In
those contrasted cases, either the defendant conceded his intent to
85. Smallwood, 343 Md. at 106, 680 A.2d at 516.
86. Id. The court noted: "Death by AIDS is clearly one natural possible consequence of
exposing someone to a risk of HIV infection, even on a single occasion." Id.
87. Id. (discussing Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Caine, 652 So. 2d 611, 617 (La.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 661 So. 2d 1358 (La. 1995); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 516 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); State v. Hinkhouse, 912 P.2d 921, 925 (Or. Ct. App.), opinion
adhered to as modified &y 915 P.2d 489 (Or. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 925 P.2d 906 (Or. 1996);
Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559, 566 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)).
88. See id. at 107-08, 680 A.2d at 516-17.
89. Id. at 107, 680 A.2d at 516-17.
90. Id. at 107, 109, 680 A.2d at 516, 518.
91. Id. at 109, 680 A.2d at 518.
92. See supra note 87.
93. See Smallwood, 343 Md. at 109, 680 A.2d at 518. It is important to divorce the rape
offenses when considering Smallwood's requisite state of mind. According to the Court of
Special Appeals, Smallwood's attempted first degree rape of the women extended only so
far as to "satisf[y] the furthering overt act, beyond mere preparation prong of the crime of
1997]
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murder,94 or the court inferred intent based upon the accused's ex-
press actions or conduct manifesting an intent to murder. Had
Smallwood stated that he wished to kill his victims with "AIDS"95 or
had he laughed menacingly when asked if he was HIV-positive,96 the
trier of fact could have reasonably inferred that Smallwood harbored
an intent to murder. Inferring an intent to murder without any out-
ward manifestation of intent would require the trier of fact to perform
impermissible legal gymnastics.97
Moreover, criminalizing the knowing exposure of another to a
risk of HIV transmission compromises public health efforts to curb
the spread of HIV disease.98 Criminalizing HIV transmission may
seem attractive at first, especially when one considers the deadliness of
HIV disease. If an individual "knows" that he is infected with a deadly
virus,99 should he not take responsibility if he transmits the virus to
attempted second degree murder." Smallwood, 106 Md. App. at 10, 661 A.2d at 751 (inter-
nal quotations omitted).
94. See Haines v. State, 545 N.E.2d 834, 838, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Weeks v. State,
834 S.W.2d 559, 561, 562 (Tex. CL App. 1992).
95. See Haines, 545 N.E.2d at 835; State v. Caine, 652 So. 2d 611, 613, 617 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 661 So. 2d 1358 (La. 1995); State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 496-97 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
96. See Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
97. In his dissent in Smallwood, Judge Bloom, of the Court of Special Appeals, re-
marked that because Smallwood threatened his victims at gunpoint when he raped them, it
seemed more likely that if he intended to kill his victims he would have used his gun,
rather than "by the transmission of the disease, which is far from a sure and certain
method of killing someone." Smallwood, 106 Md. App. at 20, 661 A.2d at 756 (Bloom, J.,
dissenting). According to one commentator: "Having sex or sharing needles ...is a
highly indirect modus operandi for the person whose purpose is to kill." Martha A. Field &
Kathleen M. Sullivan, AIDS and the Criminal Law, 15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE, Summer
1987, 46, 47.
98. Some commentators, however, support criminalization of HIV transmission. See
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS Epi-
DEMIC 130, 130 (June 24, 1988) ("Just as other individuals in society are held responsible
for their actions outside the criminal law's established parameters of acceptable behavior,
HIV-infected individuals who knowingly conduct themselves in ways that pose a significant
risk of transmission to others must be held accountable for their actions."); David Robin-
son, Jr., AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches and a New Statutory Proposal, 14
HoFSrRA L. REv. 91, 105 (1985) ("[T]he efficacy of the criminal law in the effort to stem
the rate of AIDS virus transmission is likely to be relatively limited .... Nevertheless, we
must do what we can, for each AIDS case prevented will not only avoid much private misery
and public expense, but it will also save human life."); Stefanie S. Wepner, Note, The Death
Penalty: A Solution to the Problem of Intentional AIDS Transmission Through Rape, 26 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REv. 941, 971-73 (1993) (arguing for capital punishment in "AIDS rape" cases).
99. Every HIV-positive individual in Maryland knows, actually or constructively, how
HIV can be transmitted because Maryland law requires that all persons who test positive for
HIV be educated about HIV disease, the modes of HIV transmission, and the methods of
preventing HIV transmission. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-336(b) (2) (1996)
(requiring health care providers to provide pre-test counseling and education about HPV);
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another person and effectively sentences that person to death? Is not
this the same, so the argument goes, as purposefully injecting a deadly
poison into another person?100
Unfortunately, though, the criminalization of HIV transmission
may create more social and legal problems than it solves. Criminaliza-
tion, for example, may divert limited resources away from testing,
treatment, and educational programs in order to pay lawyers fees,
court costs, and prison expenses. Furthermore, criminalization
threatens to discourage voluntary HIV testing, which would signifi-
candy frustrate prevention and education objectives. 01
Recent experience in combatting infectious disease teaches that
conduct that knowingly places another at a risk of HIV transmission,
while reprehensible, may be better addressed as a public health con-
cern. As one commentator eloquently framed the issue:
Any attempt to press the criminal law into service for the pur-
pose of furthering the public health goal of reducing the
spread of the AIDS virus will be expensive, ineffective, and
counterproductive. That is not to say that there will be no
cases where the transmission, or risked transmission, of the
AIDS virus would merit prosecution. One of the principal
purposes of the criminal law is to prevent injury to people.
Where the evidence is solid that the actor intended to trans-
mit the virus and chose an effective way to do so, or know-
ingly created a high risk of transmission, prosecution may be
justified. However, public health interests are best served by
encouraging those at risk to come forward to be tested,
counseled, and otherwise helped in this very difficult time.
Education has been shown to be an effective means of slow-
ing the spread of AIDS. Voluntary programs and guaranteed
protection from discriminatory practices such as unjustified
loss of employment, health care, insurance, and housing can
compliment [sic] and reinforce educational programs. If
MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, §§ 06.01.18A(2)(b) (1996) (enumerating a physician's education
requirements for HIV-positive individuals), 52.08.03 (1996) (listing the requirements for
pre-test counseling), 52.08.040 (1996) (outlining the required pre-test written consent
form), and 52.08.07A (1996) (listing the content of required post-test counseling).
100. See Field & Sullivan, supra note 97, at 46, 47 & n.16. In Smallwood, the State argued
that "[it is beyond cavil that the intent to kill fairly can be inferred from evidence that a
defendant used small doses of poison over the course of many months in the hope, how-
ever vain it might be, that his victim will die." Brief of Respondent at 10, SmaUwood (No.
122).
101. See Field & Sullivan, supra note 97, at 46 ("The social costs of criminalizing AIDS
transmission would far outweigh the benefits of deterrence such a law might have. Serious




history is any indication, resisting the unwise use of coercion
generally, and the criminal law in particular, will not be
easy. 02
Indeed, approaching the spread of an infectious disease as a public
health concern rather than as a criminal problem has not been easy,
but history has shown that criminalization as a response to the spread
of infectious disease has failed in the past precisely because the vari-
ous underlying factors related to the disease were not adequately
addressed.1
0 3
This is not to say, however, that criminal sanctions have no place
in addressing conduct such as Smallwood's. 1°4 Although courts
should not infer an intent to murder based upon the knowing risk of
transmission alone, the facts in Smalwood might permit an inference
that Smallwood acted with reckless disregard for his victim. 105
102. Gene Schultz, AIDS: Public Health and the Criminal Law, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv.
65, 113 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
103. In the early to mid-1900s, coercive measures designed to curb the spread of syphilis
through criminal sanctions were ineffective, largely due to problems in enforcement of
syphilis transmission laws. See Stephen V. Kenney, Comment, Criminalizing HIV Transmis-
sion: L ssons from History and a Model for the Future, 8J. CowrrEMp. H.ALTm L. & POL'y 245,
252-57 (1992). Other coercive approaches, including closing houses of prostitution, quar-
antining of prostitutes, and punitive treatment of World War I servicemen, failed to de-
crease the spread of the disease. See id. at 255. A comprehensive plan by the Public Health
Service of reporting, testing, and education sparked the public to change its attitude about
syphilis "from an affliction of the immoral to a disease of grave public health conse-
quence," thereby leading to a massive federal venereal disease control program that re-
sulted in a "significant reduction in the incidence of syphilis over the next decade." Id. at
256-57.
104. Compare the comments of Professor Schultz, supra text accompanying note 102,
with those of Professor Gostin. Gostin states:
There is an understandable outrage when any citizen acts maliciously to place
another's life in jeopardy. But apart from those rare cases where a person con-
sciously decides to use the virus to kill, there would be little public support for
retribution for transmission of a virus. Persons who transmit HIV are also in-
fected themselves and will probably die from AIDS. Thus, if punishment were to
be sought, it would be directed against a terminally ill patient.
Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1056 (1989).
105. Note that Smallwood was convicted of reckless endangerment. Smalwood, 343 Md.
at 101, 680 A.2d at 514. Some commentators have suggested that conduct such as
Smallwood's might satisfy a "depraved heart" theory of murder. See Linda K. Burdt & Rob-
ert S. Caldwell, Note, The Real Fatal Attraction: Civil and Criminal Liability for the Sexual
Transmission of AIDS, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 657, 689 (1987-88) (using by example the indiffer-
ence of an HIV positive prostitute, who is aware of his status and fails to take precautions,
as evidence of a "depraved heart which is equivalent to an intent to murder"); Thomas
Fitting, Note, Criminal Liability for Transmission of AIDS: Some Evidentiary Problems, 10 CuM.
Jusr. J. 69, 78 (1987) (asserting that if a carrier or rapist knew of his HIV status and chose
to ignore its dangers, his "acts may have the requisite intent to qualify for murder if malice
aforethought is satisfied by reckless disregard for human safety"). That theory would re-
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Limiting the criminal liability for individuals who knowingly ex-
pose others to a risk of HIV infection has become acceptable in the
past decade. Since the late 1980s, a large number of states have
adopted HIV-specific statutes. 10 6 These statutes generally approach
HIV transmission as a public health concern, rather than as a criminal
problem, by narrowly prescribing criminal punishment for conduct
such as Smallwood's in order to discourage risky behavior and thereby
curb HIV transmission.
10 7
b. Seroconversion Probability Problems.-A troubling aspect of
the court's reasoning deals with its treatment of the requisite
probability of death when inferring an intent to kill. In Smalwood, the
Court of Appeals held that because the probability that death will re-
quire, however, that the victim actually die from AIDS, presenting causation problems, and
still leaving unresolved the problems associated with criminalization. See generally Donald
E. Walther, Comment, Taming a Phoenix: The Year-and-a-day Rule in Federal Prosecutions for
Murder, 59 U. CH. L. REX,. 1337 (1992) (suggesting that the year-and-a-day rule should
serve only as a rebuttable presumption in homicide cases involving intentional infliction of
HIV).
106. At least 25 states have adopted HIV-specific statutes. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-
60(c) (1996) (criminalizing the knowing engagement of behavior likely to transmit HIV
without proper disclosure); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West 1996) (criminalizing the
intentional, unconsented exposure of another to HIV). The nationwide adoption of HIV-
specific statutes occurred in response to a federal requirement that, before states may re-
ceive federal assistance for health care programs serving HIV-infected persons, a state must
certify that its criminal statutes can sufficiently prosecute an individual who, knowing that
he or she is HIV-positive, donates blood, semen, or breast milk, engages in sexual activity,
or shares hypodermic needles with the intention of spreading HIV infection. See Ryan
White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104
Stat. 576 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ff-i, 300ff-47 (1994)). A state is not required to pass
an HIV-specific statute if its traditional criminal statutes are sufficient for this purpose. See
42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47(a).
The Maryland General Assembly enacted an HIV-specific statute in 1989 which states:
"An individual who has the human immunodeficiency virus may not knowingly transfer or
attempt to transfer the human immunodeficiency virus to another individual." MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-601.1 (1994). A violation of this provision constitutes a misde-
meanor offense punishable by a fine not exceeding $2500 or three years of imprisonment
or both. Id. Smallwood made the interesting argument that this statute preempts a tradi-
tional criminal conviction for an individual who knowingly exposes another to a risk of
HIV infection. See Petitioner's Brief and Appendix at 14-19, Smallwood (No. 122) (citing
State v. Gibson, 4 Md. App. 236, 246-47, 242 A.2d 575, 581-82 (1968), affld, 254 Md. 399,
254 A.2d 691 (1969)). Unfortunately, the court did not address whether section 18-601.1
preempts Smallwood's prosecution under traditional criminal statutes. See Smallwood, 343
Md. at 102 n.3, 680 A.2d at 514 n.3.
107. See Donald HJ. Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 351, 371 (1990). These punishments differ significantly from tradi-
tional criminal law punishments, especially in that traditional criminal sanctions are often
much more severe in comparison. See generally Michael L. Closen et al., Criminalization of
an Epidemic: HV-AIDS and Criminal Exposure Laws, 46 ARK,. L. REv. 921 (1994) (considering
whether HIV-specific statutes are consistent with public health and criminal law policies).
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suit following a single, vaginal HIV-exposure incident is low, the court
could not infer beyond a reasonable doubt an intent to murder.108
The court suggests that if the probability that death will result follow-
ing a single exposure to HIV were greater, as would be true in in-
stances in which the probability of transmission is higher, then the
State may prove a reasonable inference of intent based solely upon
the knowing exposure of another to a risk of HIV transmission. Un-
fortunately, the court leaves unanswered precisely how probable the
risk of HIV transmission must be.' 0 9
If the probability that death will result were based upon the
probability of infection or seroconversion," ° then scientific data can
provide a gauge as to what modes of transmission would best result in
a reasonable inference of intent. The probability of seroconversion
for a single, unprotected vaginal exposure to HIV is cited at about
1:1000, or 0.1%.111 Some other modes of HIV transmission have
higher seroconversion rates. Perinatal transmission, for example, has
a seroconversion rate of about 25%.2 If a higher probability of infec-
tion is all that the court requires to infer an intent to murder, it may,
although perhaps unwittingly, have opened the door to subjecting
HIV-infected mothers who knowingly expose their fetuses to a risk of
HIV infection to criminal liability."'
108. Smallwood, 343 Md. at 106, 680 A.2d at 516.
109. See id.
110. "Seroconversion" refers to the development of detectable specific antibodies in the
serum as a result of infection. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DicrioNARY 1602 (26th ed. 1995).
111. See Gostin, supra note 104, at 1022 (infected male to uninfected female seroconver-
sion rate, vaginal exposure). Although the infection rate was not discussed in the Court of
Appeals's opinion, Smallwood's brief cited the male-to-female vaginal exposure serocon-
version rate as 1:500. Petitioner's Brief and Appendix at 9, Smallwood (No. 122). See Nor-
man Hearst & Stephen B. Hulley, Preventing the Heterosexual Spread of AIDS: Are We Giving
Our Patients the Best Advice?, 259 JAMA 2428, 2429 (1988) (enumerating various estimated
male-to-female HIV seroconversion rates).
112. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv-
ices, U.S. Public Health Service Recommendations for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Counseling
and Voluntary Testing for Pregnant Women, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITy WvY. REP. 1, 3
(1995). "Perinatal transmission" refers to seroconversion occurring between a pregnant
woman and her fetus or newborn during, or pertaining to, the periods before, during, or
after the time of birth. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIcrIONARY, supra note 110, at 1329.
113. While classifying a fetus as a person may present some difficulties, as the fetus is not
yet a person under the law, women have been recently prosecuted under statutes prohibit-
ing the supply of controlled substances to minors for using illegal drugs during pregnancy.
See Suzanne Sangree, Control of Childbearing by HIV-Positive Women: Some Responses to Emerg-
ing Legal Policies, 41 BUFF. L. REv. 309, 345-46 (1993). Extending the criminalization of
substance-abusing pregnant women to HIV-infected pregnant women would not be diffi-
cult. See id. at 345-47. For example, "[a] creative prosecutor might attempt to proceed on
the theory that during the moments directly after birth before the neonate has had the
birthing blood washed off, there is a person to whom the risk of HIV transmission is im-
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One commentator has pointed out that, in an era of increasing
public support for mandatory testing and counseling of HIV-infected
pregnant women, choosing to "remain pregnant when [her] child has
a 30% chance of becoming infected with HIV might be considered a
conscious act risking transmission."114 Similarly, in light of recent leg-
islative efforts to require that all HIV-infected pregnant women re-
ceive information that perinatal AZT"5 therapy reduces the
probability of perinatal HIV transmission from 25% to about 8%, 11' a
pregnant woman who chooses not to undergo AZT therapy could be
found to consciously place her fetus at a risk of transmission. Such
ominous possibilities call into question the goals of criminalization.
Indeed, criminalizing perinatal HIV transmission to any extent, in-
cluding deducing that HIV-infected mothers intend to murder their
children, presents a host of ethical, practical, and constitutional con-
cerns, and has already unlawfully coerced some women into having
unwanted abortions or undergoing sterilization.
1 17
5. Conclusion.-In refusing to permit an inference that a rapist
intended to murder his victims whom he exposed to a risk of HIV
infection, the Court of Appeals probably did not contemplate that
Smallwoods reasoning might extend criminalization to perinatal HIV
transmission. Nevertheless, the court suggests that when an individual
knowingly exposes another to a risk of HIV infection, so long as the
probability of HIV transmission is likely to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the individual could be prosecuted for attempted
murder.
The court more properly should have held that the facts in
Smallwood in no way support an inference of an intent to murder.
posed." Id. at 355. Nonetheless, "the fact that science cannot accurately determine at what
point perinatal transmission occurs-at conception, during gestation, during birth, or im-
mediately after birth-[may] mitigate against such [an assertion]." Id. (foomote omitted).
114. Id. at 336.
115. AZT is the common term used to describe the drug zidovudine (ZDV). See Centers
for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 112, at 1.
116. Id. at 4.
117. See Sangree, supra note 113, at 311; see generaly Scott H. Isaacman, Are We Outlawing
Motherhood for HIV-Infected Women?, 22 Lov. U. Cm. L.J. 479, 493 (1991) (maintaining that
criminalizing perinatal HIV transmission is "based on a spurious premise and specious
reasoning"); Deborah A. Wieczorkowski Wanamaker, From Mother to Child ... A Criminal
Pregnancy: Should Criminalization of the Prenatal Transfer of AIDS/HIV Be the Next Step in the
Battle Against This Deadly Epidemic, 97 Dic. L. REv. 383 (1993) (arguing that a woman
should not be forced to choose between an abortion and possible criminal prosecution);
Heather Sprintz, Note, The Criminalization of Perinatal AIDS Transmission, 3 HEALTH MATIX
495 (1993) (suggesting that criminal statutes governing perinatal HIV transmission satisfy
no criminal justice goals).
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Criminalizing HIV transmission is a desperate reaction by a society
trying to curtail the spread of HIV. While this is understandable on
an emotional level, in reality criminalization arrests efforts to educate
and treat those infected. Unfortunately, in view of the possible future
applications of the Court of Appeals's reasoning, Smallwood stands as a
crippled step toward effectively dealing with the epidemic of HIV
disease.
ScoTt A. MCCABE
D. Sentencing Leniency May Be Denied to Criminal Offenders Who Fail to
Express Remorse at Allocution
In Jennings v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that a sentencing
judge may consider a criminal defendant's failure to show remorse at
allocution for the crime for which he has been convicted.2 The court
concluded that a sentencing judge may consider lack of remorse on
the issue of a defendant's prospects for rehabilitation.3 Specifically,
the court found that a remorseful defendant, having taken the first
step toward rehabilitation by accepting responsibility for his crime,
may receive a reduced sentence.4 Conversely, the court determined
that a sentencing judge may deny leniency to a defendant who has not
exhibited contrition.' Thus, a defendant who remains silent at allocu-
tion may face a longer period of incarceration.6 Although Jennings is
consistent with Maryland precedent7 and comports with rulings in
other jurisdictions,8 the question arises as to whether this practice
compromises a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-in-
1. 339 Md. 675, 664 A-2d 903 (1995).




6. See id., 664 A.2d at 909.
7. See Saenz v. State, 95 Md. App. 238, 250-51, 620 A.2d 401, 407 (1993) (holding that
a trial judge may consider a defendant's lack of remorse after conviction in imposing a
sentence).
8. See, e.g., State v. Sachs, 526 So. 2d 48, 51 (Fla. 1988) (concluding that a trial judge
may mitigate a sentence when clear evidence exists that the defendant is remorseful); State
v. Manzanares, 866 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) ("[T]he court did not abuse its
discretion by considering [the defendant's] failure to accept responsibility for his ac-
tions."); State v. VanZee, 547 N.W.2d 387, 392-93 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a
trial court properly considered a defendant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor at
sentencing); State v. Baldwin, 304 N.W.2d 742, 752 (Wis. 1981) (holding that a trial judge
did not abuse his discretion by taking into account an offender's lack of remorse at
sentencing).
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crimination.9 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue. Thus,
at least for now, criminal defendants in Maryland may spend more
time in jail should they choose to exercise a fundamental constitu-
tional right.
1. The Case.-On the evening of February 29, 1992, two men
robbed a Baltimore area restaurant at gunpoint." During the rob-
bery, one of the men pointed a machine gun at the restaurant's
owner.11 The other pointed a handgun at the only two customers in
the restaurant at the time.12 Upon demand, the owner handed over
cash from the register, and the customers turned over their wallets.'"
As soon as the two gunmen left the store, the restaurant owner con-
tacted the police.' 4
Several hours later, and less than a mile from the restaurant, the
police attempted to stop three men who fit the description of the rob-
bers. 15 One of the men, Arnold Jerome Jennings, Jr., ran off into a
wooded area and across a stream before being taken into custody. 6
The police followed Jennings into the woods and apprehended him. 7
Shortly thereafter, two of the three robbery victims came to the scene
of Jennings's arrest to identify the suspects.' The restaurant owner
failed to make a positive identification,19 but one of the customers
identified Jennings as a gunman.2 ' Although Jennings was unarmed
at the time of his arrest, the witness identified him as the man who
wielded the machine gun during the robbery.21 One month afterJen-
9. See, e.g., United States v. Clemons, 999 F.2d 154, 157-61 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding
that consideration of a defendant's acceptance of responsibility is consistent with the Fifth
Amendment); United States v. Frazier, 971 F.2d 1076, 1080-87 (4th Cir. 1992) (concluding
that a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility does not offend the Fifth
Amendment). The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person shall...
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend V.






15. Jennings v. State, No. 1474, slip op. at 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 13, 1994), affd,
339 Md. 675, 664 A.2d 903 (1995).
16. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Jennings (No. 116).
17. Id
18. Jennings, No. 1474, slip op. at 2.
19. Petitioner's Brief at 3,Jennings (No. 116).




nings's arrest, two boys found a loaded machine gun in the stream
through which Jennings had run while trying to evade the police.2
A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County convicted Jen-
nings of three counts of armed robbery and one count of use of a
handgun in the commission of a felony.25 Following the conviction,
the court sentenced Jennings to serve a total of twenty years in
prison" out of a maximum penalty of eighty years. 25 At sentencing,
the court invited Jennings to make a statement on his own behalf.26
The following exchange between Jennings and the court ensued:
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, jury found me guilty.
You have got to sentence me. But when you do, can you
make it as least as possible? I'd like to be there with my kid.
THE COURT: Anything further?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: This court doesn't treat lightly the use of
handguns in the commission of crimes and more, especially,
the type of handgun that was used in this crime.
I cautioned you just before you spoke, Mr. Jennings,
that what you had to say to the court was very important be-
cause, according to the PSI [Pre-Sentencing Investigation],
according to the statement from your attorney, the jury
found the wrong guy guilty. And until you can face up to
your problem of your implication in this little event you ha-
ven't learned a thing. For me to give you a minimum sen-
tence just doesn't fit my role.
Nothing is going to be suspended because this gentleman does
not have any remorse, none whatsoever.
All I wanted to hear from you is, you know, what impli-
cation you had this, in this, because you're an innocent. In
your mind you're an innocent man.
Well, I'm sorry. But take your appeal and let's see what
happens there.27
22. Id.
23. Jennings, 339 Md. at 680, 664 A.2d at 905.
24. Id. at 678, 664 A.2d at 904.
25. Id at 680, 684 n.2, 664 A.2d 905, 907 n.2.
26. Id. at 678, 664 A.2d at 904-05.
27. Id at 678-79, 664 A.2d at 905 (emphasis added).
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Subsequently, Jennings filed an application for review of the im-
posed sentence . 8 A three-judge circuit court panel modified the sen-
tence, suspending all but twelve years of Jennings's sentence and
requiring that he be placed on probation upon his release from
prison. 9 Contending that the circuit court judge based his sentence
on an impermissible consideration, Jennings filed an appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals.30 Specifically, Jennings argued that the trial
court improperly considered his failure to admit guilt after conviction
in violation of his right against self-incrimination." The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals rejected Jennings's argument and held that remorse is a
valid sentencing consideration. 2 The Court of Appeals granted certi-
orari "to address whether a sentencing court may consider, in impos-
ing sentence, a defendant's refusal to accept responsibility, or exhibit
remorse, for the crimes for which that defendant has been
convicted.""3
2. Legal Background.-
a. Maryland Law.-In Maryland, a sentencing judge is
'vested with virtually boundless discretion.' The judge is accorded
this broad latitude to best accomplish the objectives of sentencing-
punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation."34 Although a sentencing
judge may take into account a wide range of information about both
the defendant and the crime to achieve these objectives, Maryland law
places some limitations on the types of information that a judge may
consider.3 5 In Johnson v. State,36 for instance, the Court of Appeals
determined that a criminal defendant's choice to stand trial may not
28. Id at 679, 664 A.2d at 905.
29. Id.
30. Jennings v. State, No. 1474, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 13, 1994), affd,
339 Md. 675, 664 A.2d 903 (1995).
31. Jennings, 339 Md. at 681, 664 A.2d at 906.
32. Jennings, No. 1474, slip op. at 10.
33. Jennings, 339 Md. at 677, 664 A.2d at 904. As a threshold issue, the Court of Ap-
peals considered whether the case was moot. Id. at 681-82, 664 A.2d at 906-07. The court
acknowledged that the case was arguably moot because the 20-year sentence imposed by
the trial court was later modified by a three-judge panel. Id. The court, however, decided
to review the sentence originally imposed by the trial court, finding that how "lack of re-
morse is to be treated for sentencing purposes... is a matter of important public con-
cern." Id. at 682, 664 A.2d at 907.
34. State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992) (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 480, 425 A.2d 632, 642 (1981)).
35. SeeJohnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 542, 336 A.2d 113, 116-17 (1975) (noting that
sentencing judges are "confined only by unwarranted and impermissible information").
36. 274 Md. 536, 336 A.2d 113 (1975).
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negatively impact sentencing.3 7 The court reasoned that a defend-
ant's fundamental rights must be protected in the sentencing pro-
cess.5 8 Thus, "a price may not be exacted nor a penalty imposed for
exercising the fundamental and constitutional right of requiring the
State to prove, at trial, the guilt of the petitioner as charged."3 9
One year after Johnson, in Herbert v. State,4 ° the Court of Special
Appeals further restricted a judge's discretion in the area of sentenc-
ing. The court held that a judge may not consider a defendant's
protestations of innocence throughout trial when determining an ap-
propriate sentence. 4' The defendant in Herbert refused to admit in-
volvement in the charged criminal conduct.4 Recognizing his
predicament at allocution, Herbert complained "I really feel I am in a
position where I can rehabilitate myself some if I'm allowed to go out
on the street, and also in a position if I admit that I am guilty it may
affect any appeal I might have."43 The sentencing judge acknowl-
edged this dilemma, but nevertheless took into account Herbert's
claim of innocence at trial in fashioning his sentence. 4  The Court of
Special Appeals reversed, holding that "[t]he mandate of Johnson is
clear. The protestations of innocence throughout the trial must not
influence sentencing 'in any way. '
37. Id. at 544, 336 A.2d at 118.
38. Id at 542, 336 A.2d at 116-17.
39. Id. at 543, 336 A.2d at 117. The Johnson court also recognized in dicta that the
assertion of other constitutional rights cannot be penalized, including the Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination. Id. at 543 n.5, 336 A.2d at 117 n.5.
40. 31 Md. App. 48, 354 A.2d 449 (1976).
41. Id. at 56, 354 A.2d at 453.
42. Id. at 55, 354 A.2d at 453.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. I& at 56, 354 A.2d at 453 (quoting Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 543, 336 A.2d
113, 117 (1975)). In the years following Johnson and Herbert, Maryland appellate courts
continued to address the issue of sentencing considerations. In Colesanti v. State, 60 Md.
App. 185, 481 A.2d 1143 (1984), the sentencing judge reflected that "when somebody
comes into court and they admit their guilt to me, it shows they are remorseful for what
they have done. And I take that into consideration." Id. at 193, 481 A.2d at 1148. The
Court of Special Appeals identified both Johnson and Herbert as controlling and concluded
that the sentencing judge had impermissibly penalized the defendant for maintaining his
innocence and choosing to stand trial. Id at 195, 481 A.2d at 1149.
In Hurley v. State, 60 Md. App. 539, 483 A.2d 1298 (1984), the defendant argued that
his constitutional right to remain silent was offended at sentencing when ajudge took into
account the defendant's refusal to disclose, both at trial and at his sentencing hearing, the
location of the missing victim's body. Id. at 560-63, 483 A.2d at 1309-10. On appeal, the
Court of Special Appeals found that the trial judge had not taken into account an im-
proper sentencing consideration because "[the defendant's] conduct continues to cause
the victims of his crime to suffer." Id., 483 A.2d at 1311-12. Notably, the court acknowl-
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In 1993, the Court of Special Appeals expressly held that a judge
may take into account a convicted defendant's "present absence of
remorse" in fashioning a sentence.46 In Saenz v. State,47 the court de-
termined that both Johnson and Herbert prohibit the consideration of
"a defendant's exercise of certain rights at trial, and his trial attitude
based upon those rights."' The court concluded, however, that
"neither case forbids a sentencing judge to consider a defendant's atti-
tude when no presumption of innocence remains.
b. Other Jurisdictions. -The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, in
section 3E1.1, provide for a sentence reduction when a criminal de-
fendant accepts responsibility for his offense."0 A number of criminal
defendants have challenged this section of the Guidelines on the
ground that the acceptance of responsibility provision violates the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 51 These efforts,
however, have largely been unsuccessful.52 Most federal courts, in-
cluding the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 3
edged, in dicta, that if the trial court had "impose[d] a more severe sentence because he
elected to remain silent ... there would be cause for remand." Id
In Vogel v. State, 76 Md. App. 56, 543 A.2d 398 (1988), affd, 315 Md. 458, 554 A.2d
1231 (1989), a sentencing judge remarked that the defendant had little potential for reha-
bilitation because he was "in a state of denial." Id. at 69, 543 A.2d at 405. The Court of
Special Appeals determined that the sentencing judge had not considered the defendant's
continuous protestations of innocence, but rather, that the judge had simply "[thought]
aloud about the efficacy of a sentence based on deterrence versus a sentence based on
rehabilitation." Id., 543 A.2d at 404-05.
46. Saenz v. State, 95 Md. App. 238, 246, 620 A.2d 401, 405 (1993).
47. 95 Md. App. 238, 620 A.2d 401 (1993).
48. Id, at 243, 620 A.2d at 404.
49. Id
50. 18 U.S.CA § 3El.1 (West 1996). The Guidelines provide for a sentence reduction
"[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense." Id.
Notably, the Guidelines make it clear that "the adjustment is not intended to apply to a
defendant who . . . is convicted and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse." Id.
§ 3El.1 commentary.
51. See supra note 9 and cases cited therein.
52. See supra note 9 and cases cited therein.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, Nos. 92-5571, 92-5587, 1993 U.S. App. WL
336200, at *8 (4th Cir. Sept. 1, 1993) ("Sentencing based on lack of contrition and re-
morse has a long history, and cannot be thought to violate the requirements of due process
... ."); Ebbole v. United States, 8 F.3d 530, 535-37 (7th Cir. 1993) ("'To hold the accept-
ance of responsibility provision unconstitutional would be to say that defendants who ex-
press genuine remorse for their actions can never be rewarded at sentencing. This the
Constitution does not require.'" (quoting United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1012
(11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam))); United States v. Carroll, 6 F.3d 735, 739-40 (lth Cir.
1993) (concluding that section 3El.1 does not penalize a defendant in violation of the
Fifth Amendment); United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 463 (10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a
defendant's self-incrimination challenge to section 3El.1).
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have concluded that section 3EI.1 "does not penalize the defendant
for assertion of his right against self-incrimination in violation of the
Fifth Amendment." '4
Although not bound by the Federal Guidelines, state courts have
consistently held that sentencing judges may consider a defendant's
failure to express remorse.55 For example, in State v. Baldwin, 6 the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin determined that a defendant's lack of
remorse may be considered by ajudge in imposing a sentence. The
court reasoned that a defendant's remorse, or lack thereof, is relevant
to "his need for rehabilitation, and the extent to which the public
might be endangered by his being at large."5" In upholding the deci-
sion of the lower court, Wisconsin's highest court emphasized that
remorse was just one of a variety of factors taken into account by the
sentencing judge. 9 Similarly, in State v. Sachs,6" the Florida Supreme
Court held that remorse is a valid factor to consider at sentencing.
6
'
The court did recognize, however, that "lack of remorse cannot con-
54. United States v. Frazier, 971 F.2d 1076, 1087 (4th Cir. 1992). A few federal courts,
however, have determined that it is unconstitutional to deny a section 3El.1 reduction
because the defendant did not accept responsibility for uncharged criminal conduct. See,
e.g., United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 659-60 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a denied
reduction under section 3El.1 was a penalty); United States v. Piper, 918 F.2d 839, 840-41
(9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (determining that a denied reduction for failure to admit
guilt for criminal conduct other than the offense of conviction violates the Fifth Amend-
ment); United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 626-28 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (criticiz-
ing the penalty-benefit distinction and holding that a defendant cannot be denied a
sentence reduction simply because he refused to accept responsibility for charges that were
dismissed as part of a plea bargain); United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 461-63
(1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that a court may not require acceptance of responsibility for
uncharged criminal conduct).
55. See supra note 8 and cases cited therein. Some states, however, do not allow sen-
tencingjudges to consider lack of remorse as an aggravating factor. See, e.g., State v. Hard-
wick, 905 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("A convicted defendant's decision not to
publicly admit guilt is irrelevant to a sentencing determination, and the trial court's use of
this decision to aggravate a [d] efendant's sentence offends the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination."); State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979, 985 (Mont. 1991) (holding that a
judge may not augment a defendant's sentence because he invokes his Fifth Amendment
rights).
56. 304 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. 1981).
57. 1d at 752 ("[W]hile it is evident that the defendant's failure to admit his guilt and
his lack of remorse were factors in the sentencing decision, we do not believe it was im-
proper or an abuse of discretion.").
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 526 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1988).
61. Id. at 51 (concluding that a trial judge may mitigate a sentence when clear and
convincing evidence exists that the defendant is remorseful).
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stitute a valid reason for an upward departure" or an increased sen-
tence, because of the constitutional implications.62
c. Supreme Court Precedent. -To date, the Supreme Court has
not addressed the issue presented in Jennings. The Court has repeat-
edly held, however, that a state may not coerce a criminal defendant
into relinquishing a fundamental constitutional right by threatening
punitive action.63 Thus, a state "'may not impose substantial penalties
because [a defendant] elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right
not to give incriminating testimony against himself."'
On the other hand, the Court has recognized that not every gov-
ernment-imposed choice that discourages the exercise of a constitu-
tional right is forbidden.6" The Court observed that "'[t]he criminal
process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations re-
quiring "the making of difficult judgments" as to which course to fol-
low.""t For example, a state may encourage a defendant to relinquish
his constitutional right to trial by promising a more lenient sentence
in return.67
3. The Court's Reasoning. -In Jennings, the Court of Appeals held
that a sentencing judge may deny sentencing leniency to a defendant
62. Id.
63. SeeJon M. Sands & Cynthia A. Coates, The Mikado's Object: The Tension Between Rele-
vant Conduct and Acceptance of Responsibility in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 Aiuz. ST.
L.J. 61, 100 (1991) (discussing whether a court may require a defendant to accept responsi-
bility for criminal conduct for which the defendant has not been charged); see also Garrity
v. NewJersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (holding that a state improperly forced two police
officers to choose between incriminating themselves during an investigation or being
fired).
64. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunning-
ham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977)) (holding that incriminating statements made by an of-
fender to his probation officer were admissible); see also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468
(1981) (" [T] he privilege is fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right
'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and
to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.'" (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8
(1964))). The Supreme Court has also refused to "distinguish between the guilt and pen-
alty phases of [a trial] so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege is con-
cerned." Id. at 462-63. As a result, convicted offenders retain this protection at the time of
sentencing. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426 ("A defendant does not lose [his Fifth Amend-
ment] protection by reason of his conviction of a crime .... .").
65. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973) ("'Although a defendant may
have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the
Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.'" (quoting
Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971))).
66. Id. (quoting Crampton, 402 U.S. at 213).
67. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (holding that plea bar-
gaining does not offend a defendant's constitutional right to trial).
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who has refused to express remorse at allocution for the crime for
which he has been convicted.6" In so ruling, the court recognized
that "a sentencing court is 'vested with virtually boundless discretion'
in deciding what factors to consider on the issue of punishment."69 In
an effort to meet the sentencing objectives of punishment, deter-
rence, and rehabilitation,7" sentencing courts are permitted to con-
sider a wide range of information. 71
The Jennings court, nonetheless, recognized a few limitations on a
judge's discretion in the area of sentencing. 72 Certain factors, the
court explained, may not be considered when imposing a sentence.73
For example, the court acknowledged that "'[t] o punish a person be-
cause he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due pro-
cess violation of the most basic sort." 74 Thus, ajudge may not punish
a defendant with a harsher sentence for invoking his right to stand
trial.75 On the other hand, the court specified that a defendant's de-
meanor and veracity are proper sentencing considerations."
At the outset, the court recognized that the Jennings case
presented an issue of first impression for the Court of Appeals.77 The
court contemplated, however, that it may have "implicitly" addressed
the issue of remorse at sentencing in Johnson.8 In Johnson, the sen-
68. Jennings, 339 Md. at 688, 664 A.2d at 909-10.
69. Id. at 683, 664 A.2d at 907 (quoting State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d
1185, 1189 (1992)).
70. See id, at 682, 664 A.2d at 907. Elsewhere in the opinion the court stated that
"'sentences should be determined with an eye toward the "[r]eformation and rehabilita-
tion of offenders."'" Id. at 684, 664 A.2d at 907 (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978) (quoting Williams v. NewYork, 337 U.S. 241, 248
(1949))).
71. Id at 683, 664 A.2d at 907.
72. See idt ("The sentencing court's broad discretion does not permit, however, imposi-
tion of sentences that are cruel and unusual; violative of constitutional requirements; moti-
vated by ill-will, prejudice, or other impermissible considerations; or that exceed statutory
limitations.").
73. Id.
74. Id. at 684, 664 A.2d at 908 (alteration in original) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).
75. See id The court also recognized that a sentencing judge may not consider the fact
that a defendant continuously protested his innocence throughout the trial. Id. at 688, 664
A.2d at 909.
76. Id. at 685, 664 A.2d at 908.
77. Id. at 686, 664 A.2d at 908.
78. Id. The court acknowledged that in Johnson it had vacated the defendant's sen-
tence, but determined that it would not have considered the sentence flawed "absent the
explicit reference to the defendant's failure to plead guilty." let at 687, 664 A.2d at 909. As
a result, the Jennings court looked to Johnson for guidance. See id. at 686-87, 664 A.2d at
908-09 (excerpting and discussing the colloquy between the trial judge and the defendant
at allocution in Johnson).
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tencing judge did not directly mention the defendant's lack of re-
morse.79 Nevertheless, the Jennings court determined that sentencing
leniency was denied in Johnson "because of [the judge's] perception of
the defendant's present attitude." 0 The Court of Appeals in Johnson
did not find fault with this portion of the record upon review.81 As a
result, the Jennings court reasoned that remorse, as evidence of a de-
fendant's present attitude, may be considered at sentencing.8 2 The
court bolstered its determination, in part, by examining court deci-
sions on point in other jurisdictions. Each of those courts held that a
defendant's "lack of remorse is an appropriate sentencing considera-
tion inasmuch as acceptance of responsibility is the first step in
rehabilitation.""
Finally, the Jennings court critically examined the trial judge's re-
marks.84 The court found that the sentencing judge had not consid-
ered the defendant's decision to stand trial or his protestations of
innocence throughout trial, either of which would have constituted
impermissible sentencing considerations.8" Instead, the court deter-
mined that the sentencing judge denied leniency because of Jen-
nings's "present tense refusal to accept responsibility, or show
remorse, for his actions." 6 The court reflected that "[w]hat comes
through in this case is the sense that the trial judge was searching for
the proper sentence."87
The court also emphasized that the trial judge did not enhance
Jennings's sentence, but instead opted against suspending any portion
in mitigation."8 The court found that the judge's remarks "reflect a
refusal to grant [Jennings] the benefit of a lesser sentence ... rather
than the intentional imposition of a greater one [as] punishment."89
Concluding that a defendant's present remorse may be considered in
mitigating a defendant's sentence, the Court of Appeals refused to
vacate the sentence imposed by the trial court.9"
79. See id. at 686-87, 664 A.2d at 908-09.
80. 1L at 687, 664 A.2d at 909.
81. Id. TheJohnson court found only that the trial court's specific comments regarding
the defendant's decision to plead guilty were in error. IM.
82. Id. at 688, 664 A.2d at 910.
83. Id. at 685, 664 A.2d at 908 (citations omitted).
84. See id. at 687-88, 664 A.2d at 909.
85. Id. at 688, 664 A.2d at 909-10.
86. Id., 664 A.2d at 910.
87. Id. at 687-88, 664 A.2d at 909.
88. I& at 688, 664 A.2d at 909.
89. Id.
90. I., 664 A.2d at 910.
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Judge Raker, dissenting, criticized the majority for side-stepping
the constitutional dilemma presented in Jennings.9" Judge Raker
found disturbing the fact that the sentencing judge would have
treated Jennings better at allocution had he abandoned his right to
remain silent and admitted guilt.9" The denial of sentencing leniency,
Judge Raker concluded, constituted ""'a judicially imposed penalty
[on Jennings] for exercising his constitutionally guaranteed
rights."' 93 Thus,Judge Raker maintained that the defendant's consti-
tutional right against self-incrimination was infringed when the trial
court considered Jennings's lack of remorse in fashioning a
sentence. 94
4. Analysis.-The court's ruling in Jennings, although controver-
sial, is by no means unprecedented. The Jennings decision comports
with both Maryland law9' and rulings in other jurisdictions.96 Yet de-
spite this precedence, the court's holding is problematic. The court
condones what is, in effect, a harsher treatment at sentencing of de-
fendants that fail to exhibit contrition after conviction-a practice
that is inconsistent with their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that a state may not
threaten punitive action to coerce a criminal defendant into relin-
quishing his Fifth Amendment rights.97 The Court particularly ex-
pressed "its interest in ensuring that constitutionally protected
conduct should not be considered against a defendant during the sen-
tencing process."9" Because a defendant's right against self-incrimina-
91. Id. at 688-91, 664 A.2d at 910-11 (Raker, J., dissenting). Judge Eldridge joined
Judge Raker's dissenting opinion. Id. at 688, 664 A.2d at 910.
92. Id. at 690, 664 A.2d at 911.
93. Id. at 689, 664 A.2d at 910 (quoting Scales v. State, 219 N.W.2d 286, 293 (Wis. 1974)
(quoting Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941, 946 (5th Cir. 1966))).
94. Id.
95. See Saenz v. State, 95 Md. App. 238, 250-51, 620 A.2d 401, 407 (1993).
96. See supra note 8.
97. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981) ("[A] criminal defendant is guar-
anteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of
his own will, and to suffer no penalty... for such silence.'" (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 8 (1964))); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977) ("[G]overnment
cannot penalize assertion of the constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion .... ").
98. Ellen M. Bryant, Comment, Section 3El.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Bargain-
ing with the Guilty, 44 CATH. U. L. REv. 1269, 1279 (1995) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1969)); see also Estelle, 451 U.S. at 463 ("Given the gravity of the
decision to be made at the penalty phase, the State is not relieved of the obligation to
observe fundamental constitutional guarantees.");Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 542, 336
A.2d 113, 116-17 (1975) (emphasizing that the fundamental rights of a defendant must be
protected in the sentencing process).
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don remains viable throughout the penalty phase, even a convicted
offender may not be penalized for asserting his Fifth Amendment
right at allocution.99 The Jennings court upheld the sentencing
judge's action in part due to its characterization of the harsher sen-
tence as nonpunitive. 100 The court reasoned that the trial judge did
not enhance the defendant's sentence in punishment, but instead de-
nied him the benefit of a lesser sentence. 10 1
Although widely accepted, 10 2 the penalty-benefit distinction for-
warded by the majority is unsound.10 The distinction may make
"sense theoretically but [it] is meaningless from the practical perspec-
tive of defendants. Depriving a defendant of the benefit of a sentence
reduction has the same effect as penalizing him-he spends more
time in jail."1"4 Thus, from a defendant's standpoint, the denial of a
benefit is indistinguishable from the imposition of a penalty. Recog-
nizing this reality, "the Supreme Court has held that the conditioning
of a benefit upon relinquishment of the Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent constitute [s] an impermissible penalty on assertion of
99. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) ("A defendant does not lose this
protection by reason of his conviction of a crime...."); Ellison v. State, 310 Md. 244, 259,
528 A.2d 1271, 1278 (1987) (determining that a convicted defendant is entitled to invoke
the right against self-incrimination until the time period for seeking appellate review ends
or, if an appeal is filed, until the appellate proceedings conclude); State v. Manzanares,
866 P.2d 1083, 1093 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) ("The vitality of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination extends at least through sentencing because the risk of incrimi-
nation ends no earlier than that.").
100. SeeJennings, 339 Md. at 688, 664 A.2d at 909.
101. Id. Concededly, a sentence suspension is a privilege and not a right. See
Manzanares, 866 P.2d at 109.
102. See United States v. Frazier, 971 F.2d 1076, 1081 n.8 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[It is a]
commonly held position that the conditioning of the receipt of a benefit upon the relin-
quishment of a constitutional right can never constitute compulsion within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment."); see also Bryant, supra note 98, at 1303-05 (arguing that a denial of
reduction in sentence is not equivalent to a penalty).
103. In United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1991), for example, the court ob-
served that "[t]he characterization of a denied reduction in sentence as a 'denied benefit'
as opposed to a 'penalty' cannot be squared with the reality of the sentencing calculation."
Id. at 658. Accordingly, the Frierson court held that a denied reduction in sentence is, in
principle, a penalty just as an increase in sentence would be. Id.
104. Anne L. Showalter, Note, Penalties, Benefits, and Baselines: The Constitutional Contro-
versy Surrounding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Acceptance of Responsibility Provision, 3 VA. J.
Soc. POL'V & L. 147, 173 (1995) (discussing acceptance of responsibility for uncharged
criminal conduct). A criminal defendant "does not have 'a free choice to admit, to deny,
or to refuse to answer,' if he knows he will be incarcerated for a longer period of time if he
does not make the incriminating statements." Sands & Coates, supra note 63, at 81 (quot-
ing United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 463 (1st Cir. 1989)).
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that right."1"5 In Jennings, it is clear that the trial court would have
suspended a portion of Jennings's sentence had he abandoned his
Fifth Amendment right.1°6 The trial court, therefore, conditioned the
benefit of a reduced sentence upon relinquishment of Jennings's con-
stitutional right to remain silent, a practice considered improper by
the Supreme Court.
The consideration of remorse at sentencing is troublesome for
other reasons as well. This practice forces defendants to make a Hob-
son's choice.1 °7 On the one hand, a defendant may choose to express
remorse and receive a lesser sentence for doing so. The state, how-
ever, may be able to use any incriminating statements against the de-
fendant in future court proceedings.10 8 For example, should the
defendant prevail on appeal and receive a new trial, an admission
made at sentencing may come back to haunt him.10 9 On the other
hand, a defendant may opt to remain silent but could spend consider-
ably more time in jail as a result.
Placing defendants in such an untenable situation is unneces-
sary.110 Some have argued that the burden placed upon a defendant's
Fifth Amendment right is justified by the sentencing objective of reha-
bilitation.' Concededly, the govemment has a vital interest in reha-
bilitating offenders. Nonetheless, the consideration of remorse at
sentencing is unnecessary to achieving this goal. The judicial system
may assess an offender's rehabilitative potential and preserve his con-
stitutional right to remain silent. Sentencing judges should look to
other important factors-such as the type of crime and the defend-
105. Frazier, 971 F.2d at 1081 n.8 (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984);
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77
(1973)).
106. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
107. See Sands & Coates, supra note 63, at 101 ("The choice is between the lesser of two
evils, and the temptation to limit [the defendant's] present imprisonment ... likely will
prove irresistible.").
108. See Scott M. Solkoff, Note, Judicial Use Immunity and the Privilege Against Setf-Incrimi-
nation in Court Mandated Therapy Programs, 17 NOVA L. REv. 1441, 1455-56 (1993) (discuss-
ing the constitutionality of ordering a defendant to admit guilt during therapy as a
probation condition); see also Christian v. State, 513 P.2d 664, 670 n.6 (Alaska 1973) ("[I]t
may be unreasonable to expect an offender to admit guilt when his case is on appeal. In
such circumstances we think the denial of guilt should not be considered. . .
109. See supra note 108.
110. The government may not "needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional
rights. The question is not whether the chilling effect is 'incidental' rather than inten-
tional; the question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive." United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968) (citations omitted).
111. See Solkoff, supra note 108, at 1482 (weighing the goal of rehabilitating offenders
against the offender's "constitutional privilege against self-incrimination").
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ant's criminal history, cooperation in subsequent criminal investiga-
tions, and post-offense rehabilitative efforts (for example,
participation in counseling, drug treatment programs, or community
service) 1 2 -to assess the likelihood of rehabilitation. Moreover, a few
words of remorse expressed at the eleventh hour offer little insight
into an offender's rehabilitative potential.1 3 Because of the prospect
of a reduced sentence, expressions of remorse at allocution are often
insincere. When freedom is on the line, "[t]he incentive to lie is
great."' 14
5. Conclusion.-The holding of the Court of Appeals in Jen-
nings-that a sentencing judge may consider a defendant's present
lack of remorse when fashioning a sentence-is inconsistent with a
criminal defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Because of the profound constitutional implications in decisions such
as Jennings, the Supreme Court ought to settle the issue in the near
future. Ultimately, the Court will need to strike an appropriate bal-
ance between a criminal defendant's constitutional right to remain
silent and the goal of rehabilitating convicted offenders. Until then,
criminal defendants in Maryland must face a senseless choice between
reduced sentencing and exercising their constitutional rights.
LISA F. ORENSTEIN
E. Restricting the Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses for Bias
In Ebb v. State,1 the Court of Appeals considered whether a circuit
court judge erred by precluding the cross-examination of two State
witnesses about criminal charges pending against them.' The Court
of Appeals held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by
limiting the scope of the cross-examination. 3 The Supreme Court and
112. See 18 U.S.CA. § 3E1.1 commentary (West 1996).
113. Even those who unreasonably refuse to admit guilt or express remorse may be dis-
posed toward rehabilitation without serving the maximum possible sentence. See Christian,
513 P.2d at 670 ("[It may still be possible to bring about a reformation of [the defend-
ant's] conduct in the future through probation. The very fact that [the defendant] is on
probationary status, and that incarceration is an ever present potentiality, may be enough
to make a critical difference."). But see Akhil Reed Amar & Renhe B. Lettow, Fifth Amend-
ment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REv. 857, 867 (1995) (arguing
that remorseful defendants "may need less rehabilitation and deserve less punishment in
the sentencing process").
114. Solkoff, supra note 108, at 1447.
1. 341 Md. 578, 671 A.2d 974, cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 102 (1996).




the majority of other courts that have considered the issue addressed
in Ebb, however, have ruled in favor of allowing the cross-examination
of witnesses about pending criminal charges. This view is consistent
with the requirements of the Confrontation Clause of the United
States Constitution4 and the well-settled rule that a jury, not a judge,
should determine the credibility of witnesses.5 The Court of Appeals
should have followed the dominant, well-reasoned trend of the
Supreme Court, as well as other state courts and found that the trial
judge abused his discretion in precluding such cross-examination.
1. The Case.--On November 28, 1992, James Brodie, owner of
Brodie's Barbershop, and Michael Peters, a customer, died from gun-
shot wounds during an attempted robbery of the barbershop.6 In an
effort to secure the conviction ofJeffrey Ebb (Ebb) for these murders,
the State relied, in part, on the testimony of three witnesses: Todd
Timmons, Lawrence Allen, and Jerome House-Bowman. 7 Timmons,
who was found in possession of the murder weapon, testified that he
had purchased the gun from Ebb.8 Allen testified that Ebb asked him
for money to "get out of town" on November 28, 1992.' House-Bow-
man testified that Ebb told him that he was involved in the "barber-
shop murder" and that he robbed the place because he knew where
the money was kept.1" Each of these witnesses had criminal charges
pending against them and were incarcerated at the time of Ebb's
trial.11
Ebb's attorney sought to cross-examine each of the three wit-
nesses on their pending criminal charges in order to show that each
had a motive to falsify their testimony-to curry favor with the State by
helping the prosecution secure Ebb's conviction in a capital murder
trial. 2 The trial judge held hearings outside the presence of the jury
to determine if the witnesses expected something in return for their
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
5. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
6. Ebb, 341 Md. at 581, 671 A.2d at 975.
7. Id. at 582, 671 A.2d at 976.
8. Id at 592, 671 A.2d at 981 (Bell, J., dissenting). Timmons first testified that he
purchased a gun from Ebb in September or October of 1992 and that he was arrested in
November 1992 for possession of that same gun. Id at 592 n. 1, 671 A.2d at 981 n. 1. Upon
further questioning, however, Timmons changed his testimony to reflect that he had
purchased the gun in November 1992 and, thus, had the gun for only several days, instead
of several months. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id, at 592-93, 671 A.2d at 981.
11. Id. at 593, 671 A.2d at 981.
12. Ebb, 341 Md. at 583, 671 A.2d at 976.
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testimony."t Timmons testified that he had a pending charge for vio-
lation of probation that carried a possible one-year sentence and a
pending motion for reconsideration of a sentence.14 Allen testified
that he had charges pending against him for a handgun violation and
for theft.15 House-Bowman testified that he had a pending charge for
violation of probation relating to two convictions for armed robbery. 6
Only House-Bowman stated that he hoped his testimony would help
him achieve "a favorable disposition" on his pending charge. 7
Neither Timmons nor Allen admitted that they expected or hoped for
favorable treatment from the State.'
Because House-Bowman admitted having hoped for "favorable
treatment," the trial judge allowed defense counsel to cross-examine
him in front of the jury about his potential bias against Ebb. 9 Be-
cause neither Timmons nor Allen admitted to having expectations
that the State would assist them with their pending charges, however,
the trial judge denied defense counsel the right to cross-examine
them about their pending charges in front of the jury. ° The judge
ruled that, in order to cross-examine Timmons and Allen about their
pending charges, defense counsel must first "lay a foundation" that
the witnesses had some hope or expectation of lenience.21 In re-
sponse, defense counsel asserted that, in his experience, whether or
not any explicit promises were made or expected, many witnesses still
consider it in their best interest to testify when given the opportu-
nity. 2 Defense counsel argued that the jury-as sole determiners of
credibility of witnesses-ought to be allowed to determine whether
Timmons and Allen testified truthfully.2" The trial judge, however,
did not modify his ruling.
Obeying the court's directive, defense counsel limited cross-ex-
amination of Allen and Timmons to their prior relevant criminal con-
victions, but cross-examined House-Bowman about his pending
13. Id,




18. Id. at 583-85, 671 A.2d at 976-77.
19. Id. at 585, 671 A.2d at 977.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 583, 671 A.2d at 976. The trial court explained to the defense, "You may ask
[the witness] whatever questions you want that would get a threshold foundation that
would suggest that he expects any kind of lenience." Joint Record Extract, vol. II at 44,
Ebb v. State, 341 Md. 578, 671 A.2d 974 (1996) (No. 117).
22. Joint Record Extract, vol. II at 44-45, Ebb (No. 117).
23. Ebb, 341 Md. at 595, 671 A.2d at 982 (Bell, J., dissenting).
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criminal charges and his motive to testify for the State. 4 Following its
deliberations, the jury convicted Ebb of two counts of felony
murder.25
On appeal, Ebb challenged the trial court's restriction of his
cross-examination of Timmons and Allen. 26 In an unreported opin-
ion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Ebb's conviction, conclud-
ing that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the
petitioner the right to cross-examine Allen and Timmons concerning
their pending criminal charges. 27 Ebb petitioned the Court of Ap-
peals, arguing that decisions about a witness's credibility are within
the province of the jury and that the trial judge abused his discretion
by denying Ebb the right to cross-examine witnesses. 28 The Court of
Appeals granted certiorari29 to "determine whether the trial court
properly limited the scope of the cross-examination of witnesses Tim-
mons and Allen.""0
2. Legal Background.-
a. Cross-Examination for Bias and Issues of Credibility.-Both
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment,"1 as well as Article
21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 2 guarantee a criminal de-
fendant the right to confront witnesses testifying against him.33 The
Supreme Court has interpreted this guarantee as affording a criminal
defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses about matters relating
to each witness's biases, interests, or motives to make false or mislead-
ing statements.34
24. i at 594, 671 A.2d at 982.
25. Id. In addition to the two murder charges, the jury also convicted Ebb of at-
tempted second degree murder, attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, use of a hand-
gun in commission of a felony, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence,
and three counts of assault. I& at 594-95, 671 A.2d at 982.
26. Ebb, 341 Md. at 585, 671 A.2d at 977.
27. Id. at 586, 671 A.2d at 978.
28. Id
29. Ebb v. State, 336 Md. 705, 650 A.2d 295 (1994).
30. Ebb, 341 Md. at 581-82, 671 A.2d at 976.
31. U.S. CONSr. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.").
32. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 21 ("[I]n all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a
right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him... [and] to examine the wit-
nesses for and against him on oath.").
33. Ebb, 341 Md. at 587, 671 A.2d at 978.
34. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
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In Smallwood v. State,35 the Court of Appeals established a frame-
work for cross-examination. The Court of Appeals held that although
trial judges retain the latitude to reasonably limit cross-examination,
limitation should not occur until the defendant reaches the basic
threshold of inquiry that is allowed by constitutional mandate.3 6 The
Court of Appeals cited a line of federal authority suggesting that this
threshold is met only after the trial judge is satisfied that the jury has
sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of the possi-
ble biases and motivations of the witness.3 7
Maryland courts have also consistently recognized that the jury,
not the judge, is the final arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimony.3 8 After outlining the authority of a judge presiding
over a jury trial, the Court of Appeals, in Dykes v. State, 9 explained
that "what evidence to believe, what weight to be given it, and what
facts flow from that evidence are for the jury, not the judge, to deter-
mine."' The Court of Appeals went on to note: "When the trial
judge resolves conflicts in the evidence, in the face of the 'some' evi-
dence requirement, and refuses to instruct [the jury] because he be-
lieves that the evidence supporting the request is incredible or too
weak or overwhelmed by other evidence, he improperly assumes the
jury's role as fact-finder."41
b. Supreme Court Decisions on the Right to Cross-Examine for
Bias.-The Supreme Court considered a defendant's right to cross-
examine prosecution witnesses regarding their potential for bias in
Alford v. United States.4" In Alford, the trial court did not permit the
defense to cross-examine a witness about whether his detention by
federal authorities might influence his testimony.43 In reversing the
trial court's decision, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance
35. 320 Md. 300, 577 A.2d 356 (1990).
36. Id. at 307, 577 A.2d at 359.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 224, 571 A.2d 1251, 1260 (1990) ("[W]hat
evidence to believe, what weight to be given it, and what facts flow from that evidence are
for the jury, not thejudge, to determine."); Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 278-79, 539 A-2d
657, 663 (1988) (noting that the credibility of a witness and the weight to be accorded the
witness's testimony are solely in the province of the jury); Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203, 210,
522 A.2d 1338, 1341 (1987) (stating that the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts); Demp-
sey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 150, 355 A.2d 455, 463 (1976) (stating that the jury makes final
decisions about whether a confession is voluntary).
39. 319 Md. 206, 571 A.2d 1251 (1990).
40. Id. at 224, 571 A.2d at 1260.
41. Id.
42. 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
43. Id. at 688-90.
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of allowing a defendant to "place the witness in his proper setting and
put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without
which the jury cannot fairly appraise them."44 In Alford, the Supreme
Court held that requiring a defendant to establish that cross-examina-
tion for bias would, in fact, have yielded facts that may have discred-
ited the witness's testimony is a violation of a defendant's rights.45
More recently, in Davis v. Alaska,4 6 the Supreme Court held that
refusing to allow a defendant to cross-examine a prosecution witness
about his probationary status constituted a violation of the defend-
ant's right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment.47 The
Court noted that "exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a
proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right
of cross-examination."48 The Davis Court expanded the information
available for cross-examination by holding that simply allowing coun-
sel to ask a witness on cross-examination about bias without allowing
counsel to go further "to make a record from which to argue why [the
witness] might have been biased"49 prevents effective cross-examina-
tion and can constitute "'"constitutional error of the first
magnitude."" 50
The Supreme Court continued this trend of allowing expansive
cross-examination for bias in Delaware v. Van ArsdalL51 In Van Arsdall,
the Court acknowledged that trial judges have "wide latitude" to im-
pose "reasonable limits" on cross-examination for bias, but drew the
line when the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility of
bias on behalf of a prosecution witness regarding dismissal of a pend-
ing charge.52 The Court wrote: "By thus cutting off all questioning
about an event.., that ajury might reasonably have found furnished
the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony, the
44. Id. at 692.
45. Id. The Alford Court wrote, "To say that prejudice can be established only by show-
ing that the cross-examination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tend-
ing to discredit the testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right and withdraw one of
the safeguards essential to a fair trial." Id.
46. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
47. Id. at 320. In Davis, the State's key eyewitness was on probation for burglary. Id. at
311. Because the stolen goods that the defendant was accused of taking were also found
near the witness, the defendant argued that the witness might also have been motivated to
testify for the State in order to focus attention away from himself. Id.
48. Id. at 316-17.
49. Id. at 318.
50. Id. (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968) (quoting Brookhart v.Janis,
384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966))).
51. 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
52. Id. at 679.
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[trial] court's ruling violated respondent's rights secured by the Con-
frontation Clause."
5 3
c. Maryland's Interpretation of Supreme Court Precedent.-De-
spite the broad language used by the Supreme Court to establish that
evidence of the probationary status of a prosecution witness is admissi-
ble, the Court of Appeals has interpreted Supreme Court precedent
narrowly. In Watkins v. State,54 the Court of Appeals addressed
whether a trial judge may refuse to allow the defense to elicit from a
State witness the fact that the witness was on probation.5 5 In Watkins,
the defendant was convicted of two counts of shooting with intent to
disable.56 At trial, the victims, Melvin and Kelvin Brown, testified
against Watkins. 57 The defendant sought to show through cross-exam-
ination that both witnesses were on probation and, therefore, their
testimony may be tainted.58 Following a discussion with the attorneys,
the trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible.5 1 Upholding the deci-
sion of the trial court, the Court of Appeals distinguished Watkins
from Davis on the ground that, unlike in Davis, Watkins had not sug-
gested that the witnesses may have been guilty of the offense for which
the defendant was charged.6 ° The court also noted that, in Watkins,
the defense had evidence available for cross-examination that tended
to show that the prosecution's witness already had a strong motive to
testify favorably for the State.61 In Watkins, the defendant claimed
53. Id. The Court further wrote:
We think that a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause
by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-
examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the wit-
ness, and thereby "to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could
appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the wimess." Respon-
dent has met that burden here: A reasonable jury might have received a signifi-
candy different impression of [the wimess's] credibility had respondent's counsel
been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.
Id. at 680 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318).
54. 328 Md. 95, 613 A.2d 379 (1992).
55. Id. at 103, 613 A.2d at 382-83.
56. Id. at 97, 613 A.2d at 380.
57. Id. at 102, 613 A.2d at 382.
58. Id. at 100, 613 A.2d at 381.
59. Id. at 103, 613 A.2d at 382-83.
60. Id. at 102, 613 A.2d at 382. In Davis, the juvenile witness's prior criminal history
suggested to the defendant that the witness may have had a special motive to deflect police
suspicion away from himself. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 311 (1974). In Watkins, the
Court of Appeals used this fact to distinguish the Davis decision. See Watkins, 328 Md. at
102-03, 613 A.2d at 382. The Court of Appeals concluded that "there was no suggestion
that Melvin or Kelvin Brown had committed any offense for which the defendant was
charged." Id. at 102, 613 A.2d at 382.
61. Watkins, 328 Md. at 103, 613 A.2d at 382.
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that the altercation that gave rise to the charges against him began
over a disputed drug deal.62 Melvin and Kelvin Brown, who were both
on probation, denied on the stand that drugs were involved in the
dispute.6" As the majority noted in Watkins, the jury would under-
stand that the Browns had a clear motive to deny the existence of a
drug deal "because of the danger of being prosecuted for [their] in-
volvement."64 Therefore, the issue of bias-the witnesses' bias to lie
about the drug issue to avoid prosecution-was already in front of the
jury.61 Thus, Watkins appears to stand for the proposition that when
defense counsel already has evidence available to support the de-
fense's claim that a particular witness may be biased, the trial judge
has the discretion to permit or prohibit questions on cross-examina-
tion relating to either probation or pending charges.66
d. Other States.-Of the states that have addressed the issue
of cross-examining witnesses about their pending criminal charges,
most have ruled that such questioning is fair game for a defense attor-
ney.67 At least seven states have explicitly held that a trial court may





66. See id. (holding that allowing cross-examination regarding the probationary status
of the witness is tolerable because the jury would already understand the witness's motive
to lie).
67. See People v. Richmond, 406 N.E.2d 135, 136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (remanding for a
new trial because the trial court did not allow the defense to cross-examine the prosecu-
tion's witness about possible bias stemming from hopes for leniency in return for testify-
ing); Spears v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the
lower court erred in excluding from the jury evidence of a pending indictment against the
witness); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 396 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Mass. 1979) ("Where [criminal]
charges are pending, there is a possibility of bias in favor of the government, and normally
it is for the jury, and not the judge, to determine the effect, if any, of those pending
charges on the witness's testimony."); State v. Baker, 336 A.2d 760, 761 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1975) (holding that the defendant was entitled to cross-examine the prosecu-
tion's witness about the promise of lenient treatment on the indictments pending against
him in return for testifying against the defendant); State v. Roberson, 3 S.E.2d 277, 280
(N.C. 1939) (finding that because the jury may have found that the witness testified with
the "reasonable expectation" of leniency, it constituted error to preclude cross-examina-
tion on the pending charges); Commonwealth v. Evans, 512 A.2d 626, 631 (Pa. 1986)
("[W]henever a prosecution witness may be biased in favor of the prosecution because of
outstanding criminal charges.., that possible bias, in fairness, must be made known to the
jury."); Koehler v. State, 679 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc) (arguing that
"any question asked of a witness on cross-examination, which might have a tendency to
affect the witness' credibility, is always a proper question"); Spain v. State, 585 S.W.2d 705,
710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (holding that it was error for defense counsel to be denied the
opportunity to ask the prosecution witnesses whether they received the benefit of a plea
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Carolina led the way by ruling on the issue in 1939, over thirty-five
years before the Supreme Court's decision in Davis. In State v. Rober-
son,68 the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the trial court's
ruling that excluded evidence of a pending criminal charge against a
prosecution witness despite the fact that the witness denied receiving
any "deal" on his sentence from the prosecutor and that the prosecu-
tor denied making a "deal."69 The court noted:
Although the testimony does not constitute direct evidence
of any agreement... the jury might well find that the facts
and circumstances were such that the witness testified in the
reasonable expectation that he would receive leniency in re-
turn for having turned State's evidence.., and that his testi-
mony, by reason thereof, was unworthy of belief.7 °
In the years after the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, several
states moved to extend protection under the Confrontation Clause by
allowing cross-examination of witnesses about their pending criminal
charges. In Kentucky, 71 Massachusetts, 72 Illinois, 73 New Jersey,7 and
New York, 75 courts reversed trial court rulings to preclude cross-exam-
ination regarding pending criminal charges. Most recently, in Com-
monwealth v. Evans,76 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that a
jury should be allowed to hear about unrelated charges pending
against a prosecution witness during cross-examination.77 Employing
bargain in exchange for their testimony, even though no plea bargain was revealed during
an examination outside of the jury's presence).
68. 3 S.E.2d 277 (N.C. 1939).
69. Id, at 279.
70. Id at 280.
71. Spears v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). Although the
witness denied being promised leniency, the Kentucky Court of Appeals wrote, "In weigh-
ing the testimony the jury should be in possession of all facts calculated to exert influence
on a witness." Id.
72. Commonwealth v. Hogan, 396 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Mass. 1979) (observing that when
criminal charges are pending against a witness, a possibility of bias exists, and it is normally
for a jury, not a judge, to consider those charges as weighing on the witness's credibility).
73. People v. Richmond, 406 N.E.2d 135, 136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (concluding that a
trial court's decision to exclude evidence that a prosecution witness faced pending charges
is reversible error).
74. State v. Baker, 336 A-2d 760, 761 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1975) (holding that the
trial court's exclusion of evidence of pending charges against a prosecution witness on
cross-examination is reversible error).
75. People v. Leonard, 396 N.Y.S.2d 956, 957 (App. Div. 1977) (concluding that even if
the trial court found that there was no "deal," it constituted reversible error to preclude
the defendant from cross-examining the prosecution witness in front of the jury about the
charges pending against the witness).
76. 512 A.2d 626 (Pa. 1986).
77. Id at 632.
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the same reasoning as found in the aforementioned state decisions,
the Evans court found that, regardless of whether actual promises of
leniency have been made or are expected by the witness, "the defend-
ant... must have the opportunity at least to raise a doubt in the mind
of the jury as to whether the prosecution witness is biased.""8
States not adopting this view include Louisiana79 and Texas."8
Courts in these states prevented cross-examination about pending
criminal charges after the witnesses in question denied cutting deals
with the State for their testimony.81
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Ebb, a divided Court of Appeals, ap-
plying the abuse of discretion standard, affirmed the trial judge's deci-
sion to preclude cross-examination of witnesses about their pending
charges.8 2 After briefly reviewing the facts, the majority highlighted
the "considerable discretion" afforded trial courts and stated the gen-
eral rule that "the extent to which a witness may be cross-examined for
the purpose of showing bias rests with the sound discretion of the trial
judge."" The court noted, however, that "[t] he cross-examiner must
... be given wide latitude to establish bias or motive of a witness." 4
Addressing the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses for
bias by asking about their pending criminal charges, the majority
stated that "pending criminal charges are not admissible to impeach a
witness [except when] offered to show bias, prejudice or motive of the
witness in testifying." 5 In cases of bias, prejudice, or motive, the ma-
jority in Ebb stated that the proper role for the trial judge is to apply "a
balancing test giving wide latitude to cross-examine for bias or preju-
dice but not permitting the questioning 'to stray into collateral mat-
ters which would obscure the trial issues and lead to the factfinder's
confusion."'86
78. Id.
79. See State v. Grace, 643 So. 2d 1306, 1307-09 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no error
where the trial judge held a hearing outside the presence of the jury and denied the de-
fendant the right to cross-examine a prosecution witness about pending charges after the
witness denied any "deal" with the state).
80. See Gutierrez v. State, 681 S.W.2d 698, 706-07 (Tex. App. 1984) (denying the de-
fendant the right to cross-examine a prosecution witness about a pending misdemeanor
charge after voir dire questioning failed to expose any evidence of "self-interest, ill will, or
animus").
81. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
82. Ebb, 341 Md. at 581, 671 A.2d at 975.
83. Id. at 587, 671 A.2d at 978.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 588, 671 A.2d at 979.
86. Id. (quoting Smallwood v. State, 320 Md. 300, 308, 577 A.2d 356, 359 (1990)).
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In reviewing relevant precedent, the majority held that Watkins
stood for the proposition that the decision to allow cross-examination
of a witness regarding the witness's probationary status, "rests within
the sound discretion of the trial judge."87 The court read Davis as
limited to cases in which the witness in question was potentially a sus-
pect in the currently litigated event.8 8 In conclusion, the court wrote,
"[P] articularly because the witnesses testified unequivocally that they
expected no benefit from their testimony .... the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in excluding the evidence." 9
Judge Eldridge joined Judge Bell in dissenting from the major-
ity's decision in Ebb.9" Although Judge Bell recognized the wide dis-
cretion properly afforded the trial judge in deciding how far an
attorney can go on cross-examination, he argued that this discretion
applies only after the cross-examiner has been allowed to establish a
threshold level of inquiry into potential bias.9 1
The dissent in Ebb disagreed with the majority's reading of Wat-
kins.92 Furthermore, the dissent argued that evidence of a witness's
pending charges is far more probative than the majority acknowl-
edged.9" The dissent noted that there was no indication from the
facts of the case of an attempt by the defense to use cross-examination
to either harass or embarrass the witnesses. Rather, the inquiry about
pending charges went to the "'very heart' of the witnesses' bias."94
According to the dissent, the trial judge erred by impermissibly mak-
ing a credibility determination that should have been left to the jury
87. Id. at 589, 671 A.2d at 979; see supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Watkins.
88. Ebb, 341 Md. at 589, 671 A.2d at 979. The majority argued that the Watkins court
distinguished Watkins from Davis on the grounds that "Watkins did not suggest that the
State's witnesses had committed any offense for which the defendant was charged." Id.
The court's reasoning suggests that the Supreme Court's ruling in Davis should be limited
by this fact. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Davis.
89. Ebb, 341 Md. at 591, 671 A.2d at 980.
90. Id. (Bell, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 599, 671 A.2d at 984. For an explanation of the phrase "threshold level of
inquiry," see infra note 114.
92. Ebb, 341 Md. at 600, 671 A.2d at 985 (Bell, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that,
even if one accepts the majority's reading of Watkins, it still does not support the court's
decision in this case. Id.; see infra notes 127-131 and accompanying text. The dissent iden-
tified the extent of the charges against Timmons and Allen, along with their incarceration
at the time of the trial, as facts distinguishing Ebb from Watkins. See Ebb, 341 Md. at 600, 671
A.2d at 985 (Bell,J., dissenting). Further, the dissent reasoned, Timmons and Allen served
as important witnesses in a capital murder trial, not as "essentially complaining witnesses
against the party who assaulted them." Id.
93. Ebb, 341 Md. at 601, 671 A.2d at 985 (Bell, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (quoting Smallwood v. State, 320 Md. 300, 310, 577 A.2d 356, 360-61 (1990)
(quoting State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 184, 468 A.2d 319, 324 (1983))).
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and by inappropriately burdening the defendant with the task of prov-
ing the witnesses' states of mind by direct evidence before allowing
the issue of bias to go to the jury.95
Addressing the majority's reliance on State v. Grace96 and Gutierrez
v. State9 7 to support its position,98 the dissent noted that the two deci-
sions were "not persuasive authority for resolution of the case."99 Fur-
ther, the dissent cited at least seven other state court decisions, as well
as Supreme Court precedent, that authorize cross-examination relat-
ing to a witness's pending charges.100
4. Analysis.-In holding that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion by precluding cross-examination of witnesses about their
pending charges, the Court of Appeals approved an impermissible in-
trusion into the province of the jury, allowing the trial judge to deter-
mine the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses against Ebb.0'0 In
so holding, the majority failed to follow the Supreme Court's limited
guidance in this area and, instead, made a ruling contrary to almost
every state court that has addressed this issue.10 2 The Court of Ap-
peals should not have affirmed the trial judge's decision to limit cross-
examination before Ebb had the opportunity to "place the witness in
his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibil-
ity to a test."' 0 3 To achieve this level of inquiry, a defendant may
need, and should be able, to cross-examine a witness about any pend-
ing charges.
a. An Inappropriate Application of the Balancing Test. -The Ebb
court correctly acknowledged that, in Maryland, the trial judge is af-
forded considerable discretion in determining what evidence is rele-
vant.10 4 The majority also correctly observed that in making this
decision about the relevance and materiality of a particular piece of
evidence, the trial judge should "engage in a balancing test" in which
the "wide latitude to cross-examine for bias or prejudice" is weighed
against the court's interest in preventing questions from straying into
95. Id. at 603, 671 A.2d at 986.
96. 643 So. 2d 1306 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
97. 681 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App. 1984).
98. See supra notes 79-80.
99. Ebb, 341 Md. at 602, 671 A.2d at 985-86 (Bell, J., dissenting).
100. 1&, 671 A.2d at 986. For relevant state court cases see supra notes 68-78 and accom-
panying text.
101. See Ebb, 341 Md. at 602, 671 A.2d at 986 (Bell, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 603, 671 A.2d at 986.
103. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931).
104. See Ebb, 341 Md. at 587, 671 A.2d at 978.
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"'collateral matters."' 1 °5 The Court of Appeals erred, however, by ap-
plying this balancing test to evidence of charges pending against Tim-
mons and Allen because no other evidence of bias relating to
Timmons or Allen had been introduced or was allowed to be intro-
duced.0 6 The balancing test that judges employ is designed to assist
in determining whether or not a particular piece of evidence is so
collateral to the issue at hand that its introduction would lead to con-
fusion on the part of the fact finder.'0 7 The cross-examination of
Timmons and Allen regarding their pending charges, however, was
not a collateral matter.10 8 Inquiry on cross-examination concerning
these charges went directly to the heart of whether or not the wit-
nesses were biased in favor of the State.' 09 As noted earlier, the
Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that bias is "'always relevant
as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testi-
mony.""'' 1 As the Supreme Court stated in Van ArsdaU, by "cutting off
all questioning about an event ... that a jury might reasonably have
found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in
his testimony, the [trial] court's ruling violated [the defendant's]
rights secured by the Confrontation Clause.""' Ebb was denied his
right of confrontation when the trial court refused to allow the jury to
hear any evidence of potential bias." 2
In Brown v. State,"3 the Court of Special Appeals recognized that
a trial judge may not exercise his discretion to control the limits of
cross-examination until a basic, constitutionally mandated level of in-
quiry has been afforded the defendant." 4 Yet this is what happened
105. Id. at 588, 671 A.2d at 979 (quoting Smallwood v. State, 320 Md. 300, 308, 577 A.2d
356, 359 (1990)).
106. See id. at 604, 671 A.2d at 987 (Bell, J., dissenting).
107. Ebb, 341 Md. at 588, 671 A.2d at 979.
108. See id. at 601, 671 A.2d at 985 (Bell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the defendant's
proposed inquiry on cross-examination would have gone "to the very heart" of the matter
in question).
109. See id
110. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (quoting 3AJOHN HENRY WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 904, at 775 (James H. Chadbourn rev., 1970)).
111. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).
112. See Ebb, 341 Md. at 604, 671 A.2d at 987 (Bell,J., dissenting) (arguing that Ebb was
denied his "constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry").
113. 74 Md. App. 414, 538 A.2d 317 (1988).
114. Id. at 419, 538 A.2d at 319. To date, Maryland courts have not provided a working
definition of what exactly constitutes a "constitutionally required threshold level of in-
quiry." Id. The Court of Appeals cited to Brown, which referred to a line of federal author-
ity that seems to suggest that this threshold is satisfied if the jury has "sufficient other
information before it, without the excluded evidence, to make a discriminating appraisal
of the possible biases and motivations of the witness." United States v. Tracey, 675 F.2d
433, 437 (1st Cir. 1982), cited in Brown, 74 Md. App. at 419, 538 A.2d at 319. Citing this
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in Ebb. In Ebb, although the judge allowed the defense to cross-ex-
amine Timmons and Allen regarding their credibility, the judge pre-
vented the defense from raising the issue of potential bias or the
motive of these witnesses to testify favorably for the State."1 5 By
preventing Ebb from exposing the witnesses' pending charges to the
jury, the jury was left unaware that both Allen and Timmons each had
a powerful incentive to provide testimony that was favorable to the
State. 6 The jury may or may not have found these witnesses believa-
ble, but the dissent correctly concluded that "being precluded from
pursuing the bias inquiry certainly could have influenced the verdict
and, consequently, is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.""1 7
b. Infringing on the Jury's Role As Final Arbiter of the Facts.--In
Maryland, it is well settled that in ajury trial, it is the function of the
jury, not the judge, to determine the credibility of the witnesses, to
weigh their testimony, and to resolve contested facts.118 The Court of
Appeals has clearly established that a jury's determination of credibil-
ity is "entitled to great deference." '19 In Dykes v. State, 2' the Court of
Appeals wrote unequivocally, "[o]f course, what evidence to believe,
what weight to be given it, and what facts flow from that evidence are
for the jury, not the judge, to determine." 2' The majority in Ebb ap-
parently ignored this principle when it found that the trial judge did
same line of authority, the First Circuit wrote: "If the jury has sufficient evidence before it
bearing on the witness' bias, '[t]he court need not permit unending excursions into each
and every matter touching upon veracity. . . .'" Niziolek v. Ashe, 694 F.2d 282, 289 (1st
Cir. 1982) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fortes, 619 F.2d 108, 118 (1st
Cir. 1980)).
115. Ebb, 341 Md. at 604, 671 A.2d at 987 (Bell, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 602, 671 A.2d at 986.
117. Id. at 604, 671 A.2d at 987.
118. See Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 278-79, 539 A.2d 657, 663 (1988); Gore v. State,
309 Md. 203, 210, 214, 522 A.2d 1338, 1341, 1343 (1987); Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 566,
276 A.2d 214, 221 (1971);Jacobs v. State, 238 Md. 648, 650, 210 A.2d 722, 723 (1965).
119. Ebb, 341 Md. at 597, 671 A.2d at 983 (Bell,J., dissenting); see also Dykes v. State, 319
Md. 206, 222, 224, 571 A.2d 1251, 1259-60 (1990) (stating that if there is some evidence
supporting a defense, the judge must instruct the jury about that defense); Bohnert, 312
Md. at 278-79, 539 A.2d at 663 (remanding case because a witness's opinion that the victim
was telling the truth invaded the jury's function of judging the credibility of witnesses);
Gore, 309 Md. at 214, 522 A.2d at 1343 (remanding case because the jury instruction that
there was sufficient evidence to convict improperly influenced the jury); Branch v. State,
305 Md. 177, 184, 502 A.2d 496, 499 (1986) (upholdingjury's conviction of the defendant
even though the victim's description of the robber differed substantially from the descrip-
tion of the defendant); Dempesy v. State, 277 Md. 134, 150, 355 A.2d 455, 463 (1976)
(remanding case after finding that the trial judge's comment to the jury that the defend-
ant's confession was voluntary violated the jury's role as finder of fact).
120. Dykes, 319 Md. at 206, 571 A.2d at 1251.
121. Id. at 224, 571 A.2d at 1260.
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not abuse his discretion. In Ebb, the trial court determined that the
defendant did not lay the proper foundation to entitle him to cross-
examine two important witnesses in front of the jury.122 In reaching
this determination, the trial judge clearly made a personal judgment
about the credibility of the witnesses by deciding to believe their state-
ments that they did not expect a reward or favorable treatment for
their testimony.
1 23
The Supreme Court has identified cross-examination as the
"principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth
of his testimony are tested." 24 By making a credibility determination
about the witnesses outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge
impermissibly infringed on the jury's role.12 5 Instead of weighing the
relevance of the particular piece of evidence, the trial judge weighed
the credibility of the witnesses. In light of its own precedent concern-
ing the jury's role as the sole judge of a witness's credibility, the Court
of Appeals should have ordered a reversal.
c. Disregarding Supreme Court Guidance and the Majority of
Other States Addressing This Issue.--In reaching the conclusion that the
trial judge did not abuse his discretion, the majority relied on the
Maryland case of Watkins v. State as well as two cases from other
states.1 26 As the dissent in Ebb clarified, however, even if one accepts
that Watkins was decided correctly, its facts are distinguishable from
the present case.1 27
In Watkins, the witnesses' motive to lie on the stand was clearly
established without pursuing information about their pending
charges. The defense simply sought to extend cross-examination of
these witnesses, hoping to establish that their probationary status
"gave them some additional reason to deny any involvement with
drugs."128 Although the trial judge's determination limited the jury's
access to some evidence of motive or bias on the part of these two
witnesses, it did not entirely prohibit all evidence relating to bias.12
In Ebb, however, the trial court prevented the defendant from present-
ing any evidence of Timmons's and Allen's potential bias in favor of
122. Ebb, 341 Md. at 585, 671 A.2d at 977.
123. Id. at 603, 671 A.2d at 986 (Bel, J., dissenting).
124. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
125. Ebb, 341 Md. at 603, 671 A.2d at 986 (Bell, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 601, 671 A.2d at 985; see supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
127. Ebb, 341 Md. at 600, 671 A.2d at 985 (Bell, J., dissenting).




the State."' In Watkins, the question of potential for bias was obvious
to the jury because the witnesses in question testified against the party
who assaulted them."' In Ebb, Timmons and Allen did not possess
such clear motives. Thus, logically, the jury would not perceive bias in
favor of the State unless the court permitted the defendant to elicit
evidence of their pending charges through cross-examination.
Although the majority found two cases to support the holding in
Ebb, these cases are at odds with the majority around the country,
which support the rule that evidence of pending criminal charges
should be placed in front of the jury so that the jury can accurately
and completely assess the value of the witness's testimony.1 3 2 The ma-
jority mentioned none of this case law in Ebb. The Court of Appeals
was in no way bound by precedent to follow the minority of states and
should have followed the better-reasoned and dominant national
trend-resolving such conflicts in favor of giving the jury all evidence
necessary to conduct a complete and fair evaluation as fact finder.1 3
The rule in the majority of states is superior for several reasons.
First, Supreme Court decisions since Davis indicate that the Court is
heading in a direction opposite to that of the majority in Ebb.134 In
Van Arsdall, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred because it
"prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that [the witness] would be
biased."13 5 Despite this precedent, the Court of Appeals cut off any
attempt to present evidence of a particular bias in favor of the
State. 36 Although the defendant in Ebb was allowed to mount a gen-
eralized attack on both witnesses' credibility, the trial court's decision
prevented the defendant from making a more specialized attack on
their potential biases.1 7 The decision in Ebb-that a defendant can-
not present evidence of pending charges unless he first meets some
130. Ebb, 341 Md. at 602, 671 A.2d at 986 (Bell, J., dissenting).
131. See id at 600, 671 A.2d at 985.
132. See id. at 601-02, 671 A.2d at 985-86.
133. See id. at 602-03, 671 A.2d at 986 (arguing that the Gutierre and Grace decisions are
"not persuasive authority" and that giving the jury the opportunity to hear the evidence is
"consistent with the result reached by courts which have considered this issue").
134. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (arguing that the Confronta-
tion Clause of the Constitution demands that an "otherwise appropriate cross-examination
designed to show a prototypical form of bias" shall be exposed to the jury).
135. Id. at 679.
136. See Ebb, 341 Md. at 602, 671 A.2d at 986 (Bell, J., dissenting).
137. See i. at 604, 671 A.2d at 987. The dissent in Ebb wrote, "Evidence of a more
particular reason for challenging the credibility of a witness is more effective than a gen-
eral attack on credibility." Id.
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"threshold foundation"-contradicts the message of both Davis and
Van Arsdall.38
Second, the state court precedent cited to support the majority's
position in Ebb does not provide a strong foundation for the court's
decision. Most important, Gutierrez v. State'39 was handed down before
the Supreme Court decision in Van Arsdall 14 0 Further, other cases
decided by the same court that decided Gutierrez tend to support the
Ebb dissent, not the majority opinion. 41  Gutierrez did not overrule
these decisions. The only other state court case that the majority used
to support its position, State v. Grace,14 1 cited no Supreme Court prece-
dent whatsoever. Although the decision appears to comport with the
Louisiana Code of Evidence, 143 the court provides no explanation of
how its decision is consistent with Supreme Court precedent."'
Finally, the Court of Appeals's decision in Ebb is inconsistent with
the great deference it generally affords juries in evaluating the credi-
bility of witnesses."4 In Dykes v. State, the trial court had refused to
instruct the jury on the defendant's claims of self-defense and imper-
fect self-defense because the judge found them unpersuasive under
the applicable law. 'I In reversing the Court of Special Appeals, the
Court of Appeals agreed that the defendant's version of the facts was
"difficult to accept," but found that the trial court had committed er-
ror by determining the credibility of the defense prematurely.147 In
138. Van Arsdall appears to indicate that if a trial judge limited cross-examination in this
manner, it would be a violation of the Confrontation Clause. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at
679.
139. 681 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App. 1984).
140. Gutierrez was decided two years before Van ArsdalL See supra notes 40 & 80.
141. See Koehler v. State, 679 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc) ("[A]ny
question asked of a witness on cross-examination, which might have a tendency to affect the
witness' credibility, is always a proper question."); Parker v. State, 657 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (holding that it was reversible error to limit the cross-examina-
tion of a witness about a plea bargain between the State and the witness which had evolved
shortly before trial); Spain v. State, 585 S.W.2d 705, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (holding
that it was error for defense counsel to be denied the opportunity to ask prosecution wit-
nesses whether they received the benefit of a plea bargain in exchange for their testimony,
even though no plea bargain was revealed during an examination outside of the jury's
presence).
142. 643 So. 2d 1306 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
143. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 607 (West 1989) ("Except as otherwise provided by
legislation: extrinsic evidence to show a witness' bias, interest, corruption, or defect of
capacity is admissible to attack the credibility of the witness.").
144. See generay Grace, 643 So. 2d at 1309 (holding that the trial court's refusal to allow
cross-examination was not error, but reaching this decision without reference to any
Supreme Court precedent).
145. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
146. Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 222, 571 A.2d 1251, 1259 (1990).
147. Id. at 222-23, 571 A.2d at 1259-60.
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DeLilly v. State,14 the Court of Special Appeals noted, "[t] hat a witness
may be cross-examined on such matters and facts as are likely to affect
his credibility, test his memory or knowledge or the like, is a funda-
mental concept in our system of jurisprudence."' 49 Clearly, allowing
Ebb to let the jury know that Timmons and Allen both had a potent
reason to provide testimony favorable to the State would have been
more consistent with Maryland precedent.
5. Conclusion. -The Court of Appeals should not have endorsed
the balancing test as applied by the trial judge. "0 Instead, the court
should have restricted the trial judge's use of a balancing test until
after the defendant had reached his "constitutionally required thresh-
old level of inquiry.""'1 The Court of Special Appeals has recognized
that cross-examination for bias is a "fundamental concept in our sys-
tem of jurisprudence."152 The pending charges against three of the
prosecution's main witnesses were the only pieces of evidence that the
defendant could use to argue his theory of bias to thejury."'5 In ajury
trial in Maryland, the jury, not the judge, evaluates the credibility of
the witnesses, weighs their testimony, and resolves contested facts.' 54
Jeffrey Ebb was on trial for two murders, and the State was seeking the
death penalty.'55 When the stakes are this high, the Court of Appeals
should tread less heavily on the domain of the jury.
BooTH M. RiPiE
F Crediting Time Spent in Pretrial Home Detention Toward
Subsequent Sentences
In Dedo v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that trial courts must
credit defendants' sentences for time they have spent in certain pre-
trial or pre-sentence home detention programs.' The Court of Ap-
peals based its decision on one particular condition of the defendant's
confinement-the State's ability to charge him with escape for any
148. 11 Md. App. 676, 276 A.2d 417 (1971).
149. Id. at 681, 276 A.2d at 419.
150. Ebb, 341 Md. at 604, 671 A.2d at 987 (Bell, J., dissenting).
151. See id.
152. DeLilly, 11 Md. App. at 681, 276 A.2d at 419.
153. See Ebb, 341 Md. at 602, 671 A.2d at 986 (Bell,J., dissenting) (arguing that "the trial
court's ruling prevented the jury from ever considering whether the witnesses were biased
or otherwise interested in the case").
154. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
155. Ebb, 341 Md. at 581 n.1, 671 A.2d at 975 n.1.
1. 343 Md. 2, 680 A.2d 464 (1996).
2. Id. at 11, 680 A.2d at 469.
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unauthorized absence.' Because this holding should encourage more
defendants to seek alternative means of preadjudication detention,
the Court of Appeals reached the correct result. The court, however,
failed to thoroughly develop and clarify the law in this area enough to
distinguish precedent adverse to its holding. The court also failed to
support its holding with adequate policy justifications. Thus, the
court failed to provide the guidance that Maryland trial courts will
need to address future alternative detention cases.
1. The Case.-Robert Dedo (Dedo) was arrested and charged
with possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous sub-
stance (LSD) on August 15, 1993. The Circuit Court for Wicomico
County later indicted and convicted Dedo of the charge.5 After his
trial, Dedo requested a deferral of his sentence until the end of Au-
gust 1994, promising to abide by whatever terms the court set to en-
sure his return.6 The court placed Dedo under home detention and
granted the State's request that he be electronically monitored within
his home.7 The Wicomico County Department of Corrections
(WCDOC) supervised Dedo's home detention. Dedo signed a home
detention contract8 which stated that, while Dedo was "incarcerated"
in his home, he could be charged with escape for any "unexcused and
unexplained absence during curfew hours."9 As part of his home de-
tention, Dedo agreed to the following conditions: random electronic
monitoring by a video camera connected to his telephone; random
entrances by WCDOC employees to install or inspect the camera
equipment; abstention from alcoholic beverages; random drug and
breath alcohol testing; and punishment for tardiness or failure to
maintain contact with the WCDOC. 1°
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4, 680 A.2d at 465.
5. Id.
6. Id. Dedo requested the sentence deferral for medical reasons. Dedo v. State, 105
Md. App. 438, 452, 660 A.2d 959, 965 (1995), aff'd, 343 Md. 2, 680 A.2d 464 (1996).
7. Dedo, 343 Md. at 5, 680 A.2d at 466. Correctional officials use electronic monitor-
ing as a supervisory alternative to incarceration. See RICHARD ENOS ET AL., ALTERNATIVE
SENTENCING: ELECTRONICALY MONITORED CORRECTIONAL SUPERVISION 47 (1992). Elec-
tronic monitoring, like other alternative correctional programs, generally consists of three
levels: curfew, home detention, and house arrest. See id. Curfews mandate that a defend-
ant remain in the residence during a designated period of time. See id, Home detention
requires the defendant to remain at home except for particular reasons (i.e., work, educa-
tion, or medical leave). See id. House arrest requires the defendant to remain at home at
all times except for necessary medical leave or religious services. See id.
8. Dedo, 343 Md. at 5-6, 680 A.2d at 466.




On September 2, 1994, the circuit court sentenced Dedo to two
years of incarceration in the Department of Corrections."1 Citing Ar-
ticle 27, section 638C(a),1 2 of the Maryland Code, Dedo requested
credit toward his sentence for the time he spent in home detention. 3
The State objected, arguing that because home detention was the
equivalent of pretrial release, the time Dedo spent in home detention
should not be credited toward his sentence.14 The circuit court
agreed, noting that home detention was not the same as jail. 5
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the cir-
cuit court,16 finding that Article 27, section 638C(a), did not require
trial courts to provide credit for time spent under home detention
between conviction and sentencing.17 In addition, the court held that
home detention could not be considered "custody" under section
638C(a)."8 The court reasoned that Dedo had specifically requested
home detention because "it [was] not the equivalent of custody, i.e.,
he could tend to his medical and insurance needs."19 Further, the
court noted that the majority of other state courts which had consid-
ered the issue had reached the same conclusion under their respec-
tive state codes.2" Dedo argued that Article 27, section 645-1I,
mandated credit for home detention because it allowed the WCDOC
to revoke that credit for "violations of trust or conditions prescribed
by the court" or the WCDOC.2 1 The court rejected this interpreta-
11. Id.
12. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 638C(a) (1992). This section provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who is convicted and sentenced shall receive credit against the term
of a definite or life sentence or credit against the minimum and maximum terms
of an indeterminate sentence for all time spent in the custody of any state, county
or city jail, correctional institution, hospital, mental hospital or other agency as a
result of the charge for which sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on
which the charge is based, and the term of a definite or life sentence or the
minimum and maximum terms of an indeterminate sentence shall be diminished
thereby.
Id.
13. Dedo, 343 Md. at 6, 680 A.2d at 466.
14. Id. at 6-7, 680 A.2d at 466.
15. Id. at 7, 680 A.2d at 466.
16. Dedo v. State, 105 Md. App. 438, 462, 660 A.2d 959, 970 (1995), affd, 343 Md. 2,
680 A.2d 464 (1996).
17. Id. at 453, 660 A.2d at 965-66.
18. Id. at 454, 660 A.2d at 966.
19. Id. (footnote omitted).
20. Id. at 454-55, 660 A.2d at 966-67.
21. Id. at 459-60, 660 A.2d at 969 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645-II(e)(1)
(1992)). Section 645-II(a) (1) of Maryland's Annotated Code authorizes the WCDOC to
establish home detention as a correctional program. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645-
II (a)(1). Section 645-II(e)(1) concerns violations of the conditions of an alternative cor-
rectional program and states:
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tion, however, indicating that section 645-II applied only during incar-
ceration or after sentencing.2" Judge Murphy wrote a separate
concurrence and remarked that the court's decision in Dedo should
not prevent trial courts from using their discretion to grant credit for
pre-sentence home detention on a case-by-case basis.2" The Court of
Appeals granted certiorari24 to specifically address whether the Mary-
land Code "requires that a defendant be granted credit toward his
sentence for the time he spent in home detention between his convic-
tion and sentencing."25
2. Legal Background.-Article 27, section 638C, of the Maryland
Code was derived from standards promulgated by the American Bar
Association Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review.26 In cre-
ating section 638C, the General Assembly intended, in part, to elimi-
nate "dead" time-the time a defendant spends in custody pending
an adjudicative outcome.27 Thus, the General Assembly sought to
provide criminal defendants with "as much credit as possible for time
spent in custody as is consistent with constitutional and practical
concerns."
28
In the event of any violation of trust or conditions prescribed by the court or the
Wicomico County Department of Corrections for participation in [home deten-
tion], a prisoner may be removed from [home detention] and any earned dimi-
nution of the period of the prisoner's confinement may be canceled. Failure of a
prisoner to comply with the terms of his authorization for leave shall be consid-
ered a violation ....
Id. § 645-II(e) (1).
22. Dedo, 115 Md. App. at 460, 660 A.2d at 969.
23. Id. at 462, 660 A.2d at 970 (Murphy, J., concurring).
24. Dedo v. State, 340 Md. 649, 667 A.2d 897 (1995).
25. Dedo, 343 Md. at 4, 680 A.2d at 465.
26. STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 3.6 (Ameri-
can Bar Association Special Committee on Minimum Standards for the Administration of
Criminal Justice, Draft Approved by House of Delegates 1968) [hereinafter ABA Standard
§ 3.61. ABA Standard section 3.6(a) states:
Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term should be given to a
defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for
which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a
charge is based. This should specifically include credit for time spent in custody
* .. pending sentence ....
Id.
27. Fleeger v. State, 301 Md. 155, 165, 482 A.2d 490, 495 (1984). Another purpose was
to prevent defendants from "banking" time which they could apply to sentences handed
down after future illegal conduct. Id. at 163, 482 A.2d at 494-95. This would eliminate any
punishment for the crime and, therefore, any deterrent effect jail time might have on the
offender. Id. at 164, 482 A.2d at 495.
28. Id. at 165, 482 A.2d at 495.
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The Court of Appeals first applied section 638C to a sentence,
other than incarceration, in Maus v. State.29 In Maus, the trial court
suspended the defendant's five-year sentence in exchange for five
years' probation on the condition that he successfully complete a drug
rehabilitation program. 0 A few months after Maus had completed a
two-year residential drug treatment program, Prince George's County
Police arrested Maus for drunk driving."1 After his conviction of the
drunk driving charge, the trial court revoked Maus's probation and
reimposed the original five-year sentence it had suspended. 2 The
trial court refused to credit the time Maus had spent at the treatment
center, however, toward his period of incarceration. 3
The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling, holding that the treat-
ment center did not constitute an "other agency"34 under section
638C(a). 35 The court noted that, although the legislative history of
section 638C did not specifically address the issue,36 ABA Standards
did help distinguish between time spent in a rehabilitation program
under civil commitment and time spent as a condition of probation. 7
The court observed that a court could civilly commit a defendant to a
treatment program to evaluate her before making a ruling.38 This in-
voluntary commitment constitutes "custody," the court held, and ABA
Standard section 3.6 mandated that this time be credited toward the
resulting sentence, if any.3 9 Probation, by definition, does not involve
any form of confinement; therefore, the court reasoned, probation
can never constitute custody.4" Contrary to the civil commitment
scheme, Maus had requested the treatment as part of his probation.41
Further, the Court of Appeals interpreted the language of section
29. 311 Md. 85, 532 A.2d 1066 (1987).
30. Id. at 95-96, 532 A.2d at 1071. Maus was convicted of storehouse breaking. Id. at
95, 532 A.2d at 1071.
31. Id. at 96, 532 A.2d at 1071. Maus was also charged with and convicted of a second
count of storehouse breaking in Baltimore City. Id.
32. Id., 532 A.2d at 1071-72.
33. Id. at 97, 532 A.2d at 1072.
34. Id. at 104, 532 A.2d at 1076.
35. See supra note 12.
36. Maus, 311 Md. at 101, 532 A.2d at 1074 ("A mere reading of the statute does not
make clear whether a legislative purpose was to allow credit for time spent in a private,
tightly controlled facility. .. ").
37. Id. at 102-04, 532 A.2d at 1075-76 (construing ABA Standard § 3.6 cmt. b).
38. Id. at 103, 532 A.2d at 1075.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 104-05, 532 A.2d at 1076.
41. Id.,
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638C to require a court to confine a defendant within a public institu-
tion before it could grant credit toward a subsequent sentence.42
In Balderston v. State,43 the Court of Special Appeals first applied
Article 27, section 638C, to home detention. Balderston, convicted of
driving while under the influence of alcohol, requested and received a
suspended sentence in favor of a two-year probationary term that in-
cluded forty-five days of mandatory home confinement.' The deten-
tion program included close monitoring of Balderston's
movements-Balderston wore a bracelet that would set off an alarm if
he moved more than 700 feet from his home telephone.45 Balderston
served his forty-five days in home confinement, but was later found to
have violated his probation.' As a result, the court revoked Balder-
ston's probation and reinstated the remainder of his sentence.47
Balderston argued on appeal that "home confinement is tantamount
to imprisonment, or at least custodial confinement, and that he [was]
entitled to credit against the remainder of his sentence... for the 45
days he spent in home confinement."48
Looking to Maus, the Court of Special Appeals held that section
638C provided credit for time spent in incarceration, "not mere super-
vision."49 Further, like the defendant in Maus, Balderston had re-
quested the alternative sentencing scheme precisely because it was
"not the equivalent of custody."5" Balderston could leave home to go
to work or to take care of familial responsibilities.5 The court, there-
fore, refused to classify Balderston's home confinement as
"custody."52
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In determining whether courts
should credit time spent in home detention toward a criminal defend-
ant's sentence, the Court of Appeals noted the intent of the General
Assembly when it enacted section 638C: to prevent defendants from
42. Id. at 105 n.9, 532 A.2d at 1076 n.9.
43. 93 Md. App. 364, 612 A.2d 335 (1992).
44. Id. at 366, 612 A.2d at 336.
45. Id. at 366 n.2, 612 A.2d at 336 n.2.
46. Id. at 367, 612 A.2d at 336-37. Balderston had failed to attend mandatory treat-
ment programs for alcoholism. Id.
47. Id., 612 A.2d at 337.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 368, 612 A.2d at 337 (citing Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 101, 532 A.2d 1066,
1074 (1987)).
50. Id. at 370, 612 A.2d at 338.
51. Id. Balderston has asked the court for leniency so that he could support his ailing
father. Id. at 366, 612 A.2d at 336.
52. Id. at 370, 612 A.2d at 338.
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losing "dead time" spent in jail while awaiting trial or sentencing.5"
The court concluded the General Assembly intended to grant as
much credit as possible for each day a defendant remained in custody
before his final sentencing.54 To gain credit for preadjudication
home detention under section 638C(a), however, the court held that
a defendant must demonstrate "that he [was] (1) 'in custody' and (2)
in a jail, correctional institution, hospital, mental hospital or other
agency.
55
The court reasoned that when the structure of any home deten-
tion requires punishing a defendant for escape for any "unauthorized
departure from the place of confinement," the defendant is per se "in
custody."56 Such a provision renders the defendant's participation in
the program involuntary. If the home detention does not "impose
substantial restrictions on the defendant's freedom of association, ac-
tivity and movement" so that the defendant cannot be charged with
escape, then the defendant is not "in custody."" In Dedo, the home
detention contract specifically placed Dedo in the custody of the
Wicomico County Detention Center.59 The court concluded that the
conditions placed on Dedo throughout his confinement, particularly
the power of the WCDOC to charge him with escape, indicated that
his freedom had been restricted enough to equate his confinement to
jail time.6 °
Finally, the Court of Appeals examined whether home detention
could constitute an "other agency" under section 638C(a).61 The trial
court had ordered Dedo to remain "incarcerated" at his home.62 Be-
cause Dedo remained under the supervision of the WCDOC, the
court held that he had been placed within the "constructive custody of
a public institution."6 ' Two advisory opinions by the Attorney General
53. Dedo, 343 Md. at 9, 680 A.2d at 467-68.
54. Id., 680 A.2d at 468.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 11, 680 A.2d at 469.
57. Id. at 13, 680 A.2d at 470.
58. Id. at 11, 680 A.2d at 469.
59. Id. at 12, 680 A.2d at 469; see also Corrections-Entidement to Sentence Credit for
Time Served on Pre-Trial Home Detention, 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 279, 284 (1994) ("The deter-
minative factor is not that the defendant is allowed to escape the regimentation of penal
institutions and enjoy comparative freedom of activity, movement, or association, but that
the defendant has been remanded to the custody of the jailor and is subject to the jailor's
immediate control.").
60. Dedo, 343 Md. at 12-13, 680 A.2d at 469-70.
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of Maryland further persuaded the court on this point." One 1991
opinion stated that "the prisoner's home can be said to be an exten-
sion of the local detention center."65 A 1994 opinion stated that "[a] n
inmate on post-conviction home detention is in the custody of the
Division of Corrections pursuant to a court order, and, upon violation
of a condition of home detention, may be remanded to prison."66
Based on these opinions, the court found that Dedo's detention at
home qualified as an "other agency" under Article 27, section
638C(a).67 Consequently, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court must credit the time Dedo spent in home detention toward his
sentence.
68
4. Analysis.-The Dedo opinion expands the right of criminal
defendants to credit time spent in pretrial custody under a home de-
tention program toward their subsequent sentences. With respect to
this issue, the court reached the correct conclusion. Nevertheless, the
court's opinion contains a number of deficiencies. First, the opinion
should have further clarified the law by expanding the list of situa-
tions in which trial courts could credit time spent in home detention
under section 638C. Second, the court should have distinguished ad-
verse precedent under Maryland law and the persuasive authority of
other states, including People v. Ramos,69 an Illinois case cited by the
Court of Special Appeals."0 Finally, the court could have strength-
ened its holding by providing policy reasons for allowing credit for
time spent in home detention and other forms of alternative
confinement.
a. Expanding the List of "Custodial" Home Detention Programs.
Most state courts perform a fact-based examination of the conditions
of a defendant's confinement under an alternative pretrial detention
program to determine whether the defendant was "within custody."71
64. Id. at 13-14, 680 A.2d at 470.
65. Corrections-Reimbursement for Inmates in Home Detention Programs, 76 Op.
Att'y Gen. 189, 192 (1991). The Attorney General's opinion also stated that "a person in
home detention is 'incarcerated.' The surroundings may be far more congenial than ajail
cell, but the significant element of physical restraint remains." Id.
66. Corrections-Entitlement to Sentence Credit for Time Served on Pre-Trial Home
Detention, 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 279, 283 (1994).
67. Dedo, 343 Md. at 14, 680 A.2d at 470.
68. Id.
69. 561 N.E.2d 643 (I11. 1990).
70. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
71. See Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Defendant's Right to Credit for Time Spent in Hafway
House, Rehabilitation Center, or Similar Restrictive Environment As a Condition of Pretrial Release,
1997]
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Trial courts have the discretion to perform this type of examination
on a case-by-case basis7" and should use it.73 A list of set criteria, how-
ever, would provide guidance to Maryland trial courts on when to ap-
ply section 638C to a particular case.74 The court's holding in Dedo
accomplished this, in part, when the court ruled that the ability to
prosecute a defendant for escape establishes custody.75 Furthermore,
the Dedo court noted that the defendant's home detention contract
placed him under the custody and control of the WCDOC, and any
violation of the contract would render it void and result in Dedo be-
ing placed in jail.y"
The manner by which the state monitors each defendant, how-
ever, should also influence a trial court's determination of whether a
defendant is in custody. For example, in Washington State, courts fol-
low a per se rule that electronic monitoring establishes custody over a
defendant.77 Likewise, a California court has ruled that the state pe-
nal statute requires that a home detention program include electronic
monitoring before credit can be granted.78 Clearly, electronic moni-
toring resembles incarceration because "[e]specially if electronic
monitoring is used, long [periods of home confinement] can lead to
'cabin fever"' and "can be excruciatingly boring-a form of solitary
confinement."79
Trial courts should also examine other aspects of a defendant's
home detention when determining if a defendant was in custody. For
example, courts should consider the curfew hours imposed on the de-
29 A.L.R.4th 240, 241 (1984) (finding that courts often focus on the "degree to which the
defendant's freedom was restricted" by the home detention program).
72. See supra text accompanying note 23.
73. See State v. Platt, 610 A.2d 139, 144 (Vt. 1992) (finding that state pretrial release
statute requires a "case-by-case factual determination").
74. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
75. Dedo, 343 Md. at 11, 680 A.2d at 469; see also supra text accompanying note 56.
76. Dedo, 348 Md. at 12, 680 A.2d at 469; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
77. Compare State v. Vasquez, 881 P.2d 1058 (Wash. C. App. 1994), review denied, 891
P.2d 38 (Wash. 1995), with State v. Speaks, 829 P.2d 1096 (Wash. 1992) (en banc). In
Speaks, the Supreme Court of Washington granted credit to the defendant because a state
statute specifically defined home detention as being placed in a private home under elec-
tronic supervision. See Speaks, 829 P.2d at 1098. In Vasquez, on the other hand, the court
denied credit to the defendant because his detention at home did not include electronic
monitoring. See Vasquez, 881 P.2d at 1059. This distinction, however, was clearly worded in
the state code provision. See id.
78. People v. LaPaille, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 395 (Ct. App. 1993) (construing CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 2900.5 (West Supp. 1997)). The court observed that "throughout the bill legis-
lators were referring only to electronic home detention programs authorized by [statute]."
Id.
79. PAUL J. HOFER & BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, HOME CONFINEMENT: AN EVOLVING
SANCrION IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM 28-29 (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1987).
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fendant, the number of random visits and phone calls by correctional
employees to which the defendant is subjected, the frequency of drug
and alcohol testing, and whether other types of monitoring devices
were used.8 0 For example, one federal study has noted:
[Home detention] including a curfew condition, though the
least severe in terms of the hours the offender is required to
be at home, can still be made highly punishing if the curfew
is strictly enforced by electronic monitoring for many
months and if the [confinement] includes random
mandatory drug testing [and fees] .81
Indeed, some defendants have chosen jail time over home detention
because they felt "it would be easier to spend the time in jail" than to
obey the stringent rules of alternative confinement.82
b. Distinguishing Balderston and Maus.-The Court of Ap-
peals faced a difficult task in writing the Dedo opinion because both
the Balderston and Maus courts had ruled against defendants seeking
credit for time spent in alternative detention settings.8" The Dedo
court did attempt to distinguish these cases, but only insofar as they
did not involve alternative confinement programs that subjected the
defendants to prosecution for escape.84 But the court might also have
distinguished Balderston and Maus on a different and more important
ground-both defendants in those cases served their alternative de-
tention while on probation.85 Courts in other jurisdictions have recog-
nized this distinction.86 For example, the Court of Appeals of Indiana
noted:
80. See Garrett v. McDonagh, 796 S.W.2d 582, 583-(Ark. 1990) ("In allowing jail-time
credit for time spent outside a usual prison setting, states have focused on the degree to
which a defendant's freedom is restricted."); see also supra note 71. Although the Court of
Appeals did not mandate review of these various conditions in Dedo, it did examine the
various provisions of the defendant's contract with the WCDOC in ruling that his confine-
ment paralleled custody. See supra notes 9, 58-59 and accompanying text.
81. HOFER & MEJERHOEFER, supra note 79, at 13.
82. Id. at 46; see also id. at 9 (finding similar results in one California-based study).
83. See supra notes 29-33, 43-50 and accompanying text.
84. Dedo, 343 Md. at 11, 680 A.2d at 469. The Court of Appeals also noted that the
Maus court, while reviewing ABA Standard § 3.6, made a similar argument that escape
should be a determining factor in whether the defendant receives credit. Id. at 11-12, 680
A.2d at 469; see Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 103, 532 A.2d 1066, 1075 (1987).
85. See Balderston v. State, 93 Md. App. 364, 367, 612 A.2d 335, 336 (1992) ("As [a]
special condition[ ] of probation, appellant was ordered to spend 45 days in a home con-
finement program . . . ."); Maus, 311 Md. at 96, 532 A.2d at 1071 ("One condition of
probation was that Maus enroll in and complete [a] drug rehabilitation program.").
86. See, e.g., Greer v. State, 669 N.E.2d 751, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding state
statute that does not allow credit for time spent in home incarceration while on parole or
probation); Collins v. State, 639 N.E.2d 653, 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the state
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If a person serving pretrial home detention was not given
credit for time served, he would serve a longer sentence than
a person who posted bond. However, probation is a condi-
tional liberty during which- time the defendant is to be con-
cerned with rehabilitation. The legislature's decision to
deny a probationer the ability to accrue credit time is ration-
ally related to the goal of deterring criminal behavior while
on probation. 7
In formulating pretrial home detention, courts need not consider the
goals of deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation, but only "how
much surveillance is necessary to counteract the predicted threat of
flight." 8 Because defendants waiting for trial are presumed innocent
(unlike defendants on probation), the trial court should seek the least
restrictive means of ensuring their appearance and avoid the "public
scorn" that pretrial detention places on them. 9
c. Distinguishing People v. Ramos.-The Court of Special
Appeals cited several cases standing for the proposition that "the ma-
jority of courts interpreting whether home confinement constitutes
being 'in custody' have held that it does not."9 ° The Court of Appeals
failed to distinguish these cases, except to the extent that a defendant
subject to prosecution for escape is under custody.91
The Court of Special Appeals focused on one case in particular,
People v. Ramos,92 in which the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
custody did not include home detention while a defendant was re-
leased on bond." In the crux of its analysis, the Illinois Supreme
Court noted:
An offender who is detained at home is not subject to the
regimentation of penal institutions and, once inside the resi-
dence, enjoys unrestricted freedom of activity, movement,
and association. Furthermore, a defendant confined to his
residence does not suffer the same surveillance and lack of
statute in question mandated that defendant could not receive credit for home incarcera-
tion while under probation or parole, but failed to preempt earlier court decision that
allowed credit for pretrial home detention).
87. Greer, 669 N.E.2d at 758.
88. Fred L. Rush, Jr., Deinstitutional Incapacitation: Home Detention in Pre-Trial and Post-
Conviction Contexts, 13 N. Ky. L. REv. 375, 404-05 (1987).
89. See id. at 405-06.
90. Dedo v. State, 105 Md. App. 438, 454, 660 A.2d 959, 966 (1995) (citations omitted),
affd, 343 Md. 2, 680 Md. 464 (1996).
91. Dedo, 343 Md. at 11, 680 A.2d at 469.
92. 561 N.E.2d 643 (I1. 1990).
93. Id. at 647.
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privacy associated with becoming a member of an incarcer-
ated population.94
In general, the Ramos court's analysis may be true-home deten-
tion often does not invade a defendant's freedom the way that incar-
ceration does, but courts must examine each case on an individual
basis.9 5 When a particular case involves electronic monitoring, espe-
cially on a continued basis for long periods of time, the amount of
surveillance may invade a defendant's privacy enough to equate the
detention to custody.96 Likewise, monitoring in conjunction with
strict curfews may restrict a defendant's freedom enough to classify his
detention as the equivalent of custody.97
d. Policy Implications.--Granting Dedo credit for time spent
in home detention should encourage future defendants in similar sit-
uations to follow the same course. Greater use of home detention, in
turn, could have a positive impact on Maryland's entire detention and
correctional system.9" Thus, the Court of Appeals should have ad-
dressed specific policy justifications-such as lower costs to correc-
tional institutions, reductions in prison overcrowding, and lower
recidivism rates-to encourage courts to use home detention.
The court should have reviewed the impact home detention
would have on the cost of operating state and local correctional facili-
ties. One advisory opinion issued by the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral recognized that "[a] home detention program requires outlays
for equipment and personnel, but it is much cheaper than housing an
inmate in a facility."99 The opinion noted that, in one jurisdiction,
home detention cost fifty percent less than incarceration, while, in
another jurisdiction, home detention cost "roughly six times" less. 00
Statistics released by one research study found electronic moni-
toring much cheaper than jail and work release programs. Monitor-
94. Id. Ramos had been confined at home with his mother and stepfather and could
not leave without the permission of a probation officer. Id. at 644. Ramos received permis-
sion to leave home on only three occasions-twice for legal matters and once for the birth
of his child. Id.
95. Most courts do scrutinize cases individually. See supra notes 71-73 and accompany-
ing text.
96. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
98. See infra notes 99-102, 107, 110-116 and accompanying text.
99. Corrections-Reimbursement For Inmates in Home Detention Programs, 76 Op.
Att'y Gen. 189, 190 (1991).
100. Id. The costs in the first jurisdiction were $40 per diem for an incarcerated pris-
oner compared to $20 per diem for home detention. Id. In the second jurisdiction, incar-
ceration cost $31 per diem compared to under $5. Id.
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ing costs between $1,460 and $7,300 per inmate, while work release
costs between $10,200 and $20,075.'0 A second study ascertained the
cost of keeping an offender in jail as $40 to $56 per day, while elec-
tronic monitoring costs only $7 to $14 per day. 1°2
These savings occur only after a correctional agency has paid the
initial costs of acquiring monitoring equipment. Thus, agencies must
make frequent use of correctional alternatives, which, in turn, will re-
duce jail or prison expenses.1 0 3 Only "significant use" of home deten-
tion will make it pay off.'0 4 In Contra Costa County, California,
officials found home detention too costly because it had reduced the
daily inmate population by only fifteen percent.'0 5
The court also should have considered the impact of home de-
tention on prison overcrowding, although impact on prison popula-
tions has proven less certain than the impact of home detention on
costs. The Contra Costa County study found that home detention had
not reduced jail populations enough to warrant a reduction in the size
of correctional staffing. 0 6 The State of Florida, however, found that it
conducted "180 fewer commitments to prison per month... resulting
in a 16% reduction in prison intake.' 0 7 In practice, success in reduc-
ing jail populations by diverting prisoners into alternative forms of
detention depends upon the ability of the detention program "to en-
sure the availability of an adequate pool of eligible [defendants] ."108
101. See HOFER & MEIERHOEFER, supra note 79, at 54-55.
102. See ENOS ET AL., supra note 7, at 50. The Rand Corporation found similar results
when comparing the cost of home confinement with the cost of other correctional pro-
grams. The figures listed the annual costs per offender as follows:
Home confinement
Without electronics $2,000-$7,000
With telephone callback $2,500-$5,500
With passive monitoring $2,500-$6,500
With active monitoring $4,500-$8,500
Local jail $8,000-$12,000
Local detention center $5,000-$15,000
State prison $9,000-$20,000
See HOFER & MEIERHOEFER, supa note 79, at 54.
103. See HOFER & MEIERHOEFER, supra note 79, at 54 ("[T]he longer the equipment is
used, the greater the jurisdiction's return on the initial investment.").
104. Id. at 9.
105. See id. at 9-10. Among the reasons cited for poor performance were (1) "Judges
remain reluctant to take risks with an innovative sentence" and (2) "[o]ffenders decline to
apply to programs that may keep them under surveillance for more time than they would
serve in prison." Id. at 9.
106. SeeJeffrey N. Hurwitz, House Arrest: A Critical Analysis of an Intermediate-Level Penal
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To do this in the pretrial and pre-sentence situation, trial courts must
promote the idea of home detention to criminal defendants.' °9
Finally, the Court of Appeals should have reviewed the potential
of home detention to reduce recidivism. By keeping defendants at
home during preadjudication detention, courts remove the opportu-
nity for defendants to adjust to jail conditions and "develop a criminal
outlook and life-style."11 ' Home detention fosters lower recidivism be-
cause defendants can continue to hold a steady job, receive education,
or seek drug and alcohol treatment."' Furthermore, defendants con-
fined to the home are more likely to be performing necessary repairs
or getting to know their families."'
Early statistics have shown slightly positive results.11 3 The Contra
Costa County, California, study noted lower recidivism rates as a result
of the home detention program. After seventeen months, only 8.5%
of home confinement detainees violated the conditions of their pro-
grams and only 2% were subsequently arrested." 4 This contrasts
sharply with the number of probationers who recidivate-in Los An-
geles and Alameda Counties, 65% were re-arrested, 51% were con-
victed on new charges, and 34% were incarcerated.1 5 Another study
109. See RICHARD A. BALL ET AL., HOUSE ARREST AND CORRECTIONAL POUCv. DOING TIME
AT HOME 84 (1988) ("Depopulating thejail depended upon judges employing home incar-
ceration as a sentencing alternative.... According to the jailer, the judges were too con-
servative in their use of home incarceration. Nevertheless, the jailer liked home
incarceration and wished to use it... without the approval of ajudge."); see also supra note
105 and accompanying text.
110. HOFER & MEIERHOEFER, supra note 79, at 51.
111. See id. at 50. The authors note, however, that incarceration presumably has a recid-
ivism rate of zero. See id. For a comparison of home detention and other correctional
programs, see infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
112. See HoFER & MEIERHOEFER, supra note 79, at 51. But see ENOS ET AL., supra note 7, at
158-59 (noting that electronic monitoring may cause problems when the defendant has a
history of intra-family violence or neglect and that family members may serve "the sentence
along with the offender" because of invasions of privacy and restrictions on telephone
use).
113. Most of these statistics review the success of home confinement as a post-sentence
measure. They should be applicable, however, to defendants under preadjudication de-
tention because the conditions under both are typically the same and produce similar re-
sults. See Rush, supra note 88, at 406-07 ("Courts can employ home detention in the pre-
trial setting with a good prognosis for success. It provides a method of intensive supervi-
sion that.., can make inroads into borderline cases and provide an alternative to the
present choice between conditional bail and jail." (foomote omitted)).
114. See Hurwitz, supra note 106, at 787 & n.100. The participants making up this 2%
had been arrested for minor offenses. See id. at n.100. A survey of 76 probationers coming
out of the home detention program revealed that 91% had not committed another of-
fense. See id.
115. See id. at 787-88. Eighteen percent of these probationers were convicted of commit-
ting a violent crime. See id. at 788.
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in Kenton County, Kentucky, also found a sharp difference in recidi-
vism rates. Twenty percent of the "control group" offenders under
normal sentences committed another crime, while only 5.1% of of-
fenders confined at home did.116
Alternative sentencing programs, including home detention,
have proven useful in alleviating problems within our modem correc-
tional system."' The Court of Appeals may have recognized these
benefits when it held that Dedo deserved credit toward his sentence
for the time he spent in home detention." 8 Including these policy
concerns in the Dedo opinion, however, would have guided trial courts
toward using section 638C more frequently and uniformly to credit
time served under alternative detention toward sentences.119
5. Conclusion.-By granting Dedo credit toward his sentence,
the Court of Appeals recognized that, in some instances, home deten-
tion can prove as burdensome on a defendant as incarceration."'
The court, however, left unclear under what circumstances home de-
tention would be considered "custody." Increased use of home deten-
tion could provide numerous benefits to the state correctional system.
To encourage more frequent use of home detention, however, trial
courts must possess both broad discretion to define individual cases of
confinement as custody and the desire to do so. The Court of Appeals
can only grant broader discretion by expanding the definition of cus-
tody into other fields of alternative detention and encouraging their
use by citing policy justifications for doing so.
MICHAEL A. SIMPSON
116. See BALL ET AL., supra note 109, at 87. The researchers felt, however, that they did
not study enough offenders under home incarceration in order to make any definite con-
clusions. See id. at 88.
117. See supra notes 99-102, 107, 110-116 and accompanying text.
118. Dedo, 343 Md. at 14, 680 A.2d at 470.
119. See supra notes 105, 109 and accompanying text.
120. Dedo, 343 Md. at 12, 680 A.2d at 469 ("[T]he restraints placed upon Dedo while in
home detention clearly were sufficiently incarcerative to satisfy the custody requirement of
Art. 27, § 638C(a).").
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IV. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Applying the Tort of Wrongful Discharge to Small Businesses
In Molesworth v. Brandon,' the Court of Appeals unanimously held
that Maryland's Fair Employment Practices Act? constitutes a suffi-
ciently clear mandate of public policy against sex discrimination to
support a tort claim for wrongful discharge against small employers
excluded from the remedial provisions of the Act.' In so ruling, the
court furthers the state's goal of ending sex discrimination in employ-
ment. The court's holding will have sweeping implications for small
businesses, which enjoy an exemption from the Act's administrative
process and, until now, were widely thought to be immune from liabil-
ity for discriminatory practices prohibited by state law.4
1. The Case.--On July 1, 1988, Dr. Linda Molesworth (Moles-
worth), a licensed veterinarian, began employment with a small veteri-
nary practice group in Maryland.5 The practice group, headed by Dr.
Randall Brandon (Brandon), specialized in the care of thoroughbred
racehorses6 and consisted of four full-time veterinarians and several
part-time employees.7 Overall, the group totalled fewer than fifteen
employees.8 Molesworth was the group's first female, full-time
veterinarian.9
During the course of Molesworth's employment, Brandon indi-
cated that he was pleased with her work. He relayed compliments
from clients1" and awarded her merit-based bonuses on four separate
occasions." In July .1989, Brandon renewed Molesworth's contract
and increased her salary. 12
1. 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 14 (1994).
3. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 637, 672 A.2d at 616.
4. See id.
5. Id. at 624, 672 A.2d at 610.
6. Id.
7. Brandon v. Molesworth, 104 Md. App. 167, 174, 655 A.2d 1292, 1296 (1995), affid
in part and revd in part, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996).
8. Id.
9. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 624, 672 A.2d at 610.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 624-25, 672 A.2d at 610. Molesworth received bonuses in December 1988 and
in March, August, and December 1989. Id. When Molesworth received her. bonuses in
1989, she also received notes from Brandon that read, in part, "Linda, you are doing a very
goodjob and I appreciate your efforts" and "you are doing very well in the practice and the
clients are quite happy with you." Id. at 625, 672 A.2d at 610.
12. Id. at 625, 672 A.2d at 610.
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During this same time, however, Molesworth began to experience
some hostility from coworkers. This hostility clearly stemmed from
the fact that Molesworth was a woman. For example, Dennis Man-
ning, a horse trainer with whom Molesworth worked, openly ex-
pressed his dissatisfaction over having to work with a female
veterinarian.' 3 In April 1990, a trainer, not in Brandon's employ,
hosted a going-away party for a veterinarian leaving the practice
group.' 4 Molesworth was not invited. 5 When Molesworth asked why
the group had excluded her, Brandon "laughed and said she would
have been the only woman there."' 6 During this same discussion,
Brandon also informed Molesworth that he had received complaints
from trainers about her work. 7 Nevertheless, Brandon reassured
Molesworth that her performance was "fine" and that the trainers sim-
ply needed to adjust to working with a female veterinarian."'
As the most junior member of the practice group, Molesworth
had assumed primary responsibility for a number of the group's least
desired tasks, such as administering "Lasix shots to horses, approving
medications, and performing other miscellaneous tasks."' 9 Brandon
hired a new veterinarian, Dr. Gregg Fox (Fox), in May 1990.2" When
Molesworth observed that she and Fox were performing an equal
amount of Lasix administration, Molesworth told Brandon that Fox,
as the new junior employee, should take on primary responsibility for
the Lasix work." Brandon refused to re-delegate the job duty, how-
ever, and explained that he wanted Fox to engage in client contact.22
During the next two months, Molesworth received no negative
feedback about her performance, and in fact, Brandon awarded her
another salary increase on July 1, 1990.2" Only twelve days after the
salary increase, however, Brandon told Molesworth that a number of







19. Id. at 624, 672 A.2d at 610 (footnote omitted). Prior to racing, horses are some-
times injected with Lasix, a drug that prevents lung hemorrhaging. Id. at 625 n.1, 672 A.2d
at 610 n.1.
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her contract.24 Molesworth asked Dr. Jeffrey Palmer, a more senior
veterinarian in the group, if she was being fired because of her gen-
der.25 According to Molesworth, Palmer replied, 'Yes, that's part of
it."2 6 Molesworth also claimed that Brandon nodded in agreement
and looked away. 7
On September 20, 1991, Molesworth filed suit for wrongful dis-
charge in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, alleging that
Brandon had fired her because of her sex.28 Specifically, Molesworth
alleged that Brandon's motivation for her discharge contravened a
clear mandate of public policy as set forth in section 14 of Article 49B
of the Maryland Code, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex. 29 Molesworth did not bring her claim under the remedial provi-
sions of Article 49B because the Act exempts from coverage businesses
with fewer than fifteen employees.3" She sought $150,000 in compen-
satory damages, including $28,496.41 in lost wages, and $150,000 in
punitive damages.3 "
The circuit court denied Brandon's motion for summary judg-
ment, and the case proceeded to trial.3 2 The jury rendered a verdict
in favor of Molesworth and awarded her $39,198 in damages.3 3
After the circuit court denied Brandon's motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, for a new trial, and for revision of the
judgment, Brandon appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing
that because Article 49B exempts from coverage employers with fewer
than fifteen employees, "the public policy announced in § 14 does not
apply to those employers."34 The Court of Special Appeals held that
24. Id. at 625-26, 672 A.2d at 610. At trial, several horse trainers testified on behalf of
Brandon that their complaints concerned Molesworth's failure to take necessary measures
to prevent a horse's ankles from swelling and her failure to properly administer shots.
Brandon v. Molesworth, 104 Md. App. 167, 177 nn.4-5, 655 A.2d 1292, 1298 nn.4-5 (1995),
a'd in part and rev'd in part, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996).
25. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 626, 672 A.2d at 610.
26. Id.
27. Id. At trial, both Palmer and Brandon testified that they had responded in the
negative to Molesworth's question. Id, 672 A.2d at 611.
28. Id, 672 A.2d at 610-11.
29. Id. at 628, 672 A.2d at 611; see infra note 47 and accompanying text.
30. Section 15 of Article 49B defines a covered employer as "a person engaged in an
industry or business who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
the twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any
agent of such a person." MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15 (1994).
31. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 627, 672 A.2d at 611.
32. Id at 626, 672 A.2d at 611.
33. Id. at 627, 672 A.2d at 611. Thejury did not award Molesworth noneconomic dam-
ages. Id.
34. Id. at 628, 672 A.2d at 612.
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Molesworth could bring the common law wrongful discharge claim
and that she had presented sufficient evidence to survive Brandon's
motions. 5 Nevertheless, the Court of Special Appeals reversed and
remanded on the ground that the circuit court had improperly in-
structed the jury.36 Both Brandon and Molesworth petitioned for cer-
tiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted.37
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Common Law Employment-At-Will Doctrine. -According
to the common law doctrine of employment-at-will, in the absence of
a contract setting forth the express terms of employment, an em-
ployer may discharge an employee for no reason or any reason what-
soever. 8 The doctrine originated in the latter part of the nineteenth
century with the birth of a laissez faire economy and the premium
value placed on the freedom to contract.3 9 In 1908, in Adair v. United
States,4" the Supreme Court conferred constitutional legitimacy on the
doctrine, holding that an employer's right to discharge an employee
constituted a property right and, therefore, struck down a federal law
prohibiting discharge on the basis of union membership.4" In 1937,
in the landmark case of National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp.,4 2 however, the Supreme Court made a dramatic shift
toward protecting employees from an employer's unfettered discre-
tion to discharge.43 Acknowledging the power inequities between em-
ployer and employee, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
National Labor Relations Act, a federal statute that prohibits employ-
35. Brandon v. Molesworth, 104 Md. App. 167, 186, 655 A.2d 1292, 1302 (1995), affd
in pat and rev'd in part, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996).
36. Id. at 173, 655 A.2d at 1295; see infra note 94 and accompanying text.
37. Molesworth v. Brandon, 339 Md. 739, 664 A.2d 935 (1995).
38. The Court of Appeals explicitly adopted the employment at-will doctrine in 1887.
See McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 557, 11 A. 176, 178 (1887) (holding
that an indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will); see also STANLEY MAZAROFF, MARY-
LAND EMPLOYMENT LAw 50-60 (1990) (providing historical perspective of Maryland's adop-
tion of employment-at-will doctrine); Christopher L. Pennington, The Public Policy Exception
to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1583, 1584
(1994) (describing the prevalence of the employment-at-will doctrine in the United States
at the turn of the twentieth century).
39. See Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L.
REv. 631, 641 (1988).
40. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
41. Id. at 174-75. A few years later, the Supreme Court declared a similar state statute
unconstitutional on the same grounds. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915).
42. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
43. During the 1930s, the United States faced severe social and economic ills caused by
the Great Depression. See GERALD GUNTHER, CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAw 115 (12th ed. 1991).
[VOL. 56:656
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
ers from considering a person's union involvement when making em-
ployment decisions. 4
Today, although the at-will doctrine still provides the backbone of
employment law in the United States,4" most states have enacted fair
employment practice laws, prohibiting discrimination on a variety of
bases. For example, most states have enacted comprehensive civil
rights statutes that prohibit employment discrimination on the basis
of gender, race, and national origin.46 Maryland's Fair Employment
Practices Act is codified in Article 49B of the Maryland Code. Section
14 of Article 49B states, in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Maryland
... to assure all persons equal opportunity in receiving em-
ployment ... regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry or
national origin, sex, age, marital status, or physical or mental
handicap.., and to that end to prohibit discrimination in
44. Jones, 301 U.S. at 30, 33-34. Congress enacted the challenged statute as part of the
New Deal legislation, which was intended to remedy the severe economic crisis caused by
the Great Depression. See GUNTHER, supra note 43, at 115.
45. See LIONEL J. Posric, WRONGFUL TERMINATION: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY at xix
(1994). The State of Montana has replaced the at-will employment doctrine with a "just-
cause termination" statute. See id. In every other state, except California and Georgia, at-
will employment applies and remains a common law doctrine. See id. California and Geor-
gia have enacted "at-will" employment statutes. See id.; see also Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware
the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model Employment Termination Act, 43 Am. U. L. REV. 849,
872 (1994) ("The employment-at-will doctrine is a lumbering dinosaur that can no longer
be rationally defended.").
46. Alabama is the only state that has not yet enacted such a statute. Both Georgia and
Mississippi have statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment against specified pro-
tected classes, but they apply only to public employers. See GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-21-22 &
45-19-29 (1990 & Supp. 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-9-149 (1972).
Each state's fair employment practice statute varies with respect to the size of the
employer covered. For example, in addition to Maryland, Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah limit coverage to employers of fifteen or
more persons. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.02 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/2-101 (West 1993); NEB REV. STAT. § 48-1102 (1993); Nrv. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 613.310 (Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1301 (West Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-13-30 (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1996); TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002 (West 1996
& Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-2 (1994 & Supp. 1996). Statutes in Alaska, Ha-
waii, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, and the District of
Columbia, on the other hand, apply to employers having at least one employee. SeeALAsKA
STAT. § 18.80.300 (Michie 1962 & Supp. 1995); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 378-1 (Michie
1994); MICH. Comp. Laws ANN. § 37.1201 (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01
(West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.010 (1995); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws § 20-13-1 (Michie 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d (1987 & Supp.
1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502 (1981). The remaining states have either limited coverage
to employers with a minimum number of employees somewhere between one and fifteen
or simply have not specified a number.
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employment by any person, group, labor organization, or-
ganization or any employer or his agents.47
The Act prohibits employers of fifteen persons or more from discharg-
ing an employee because of sex (among other enumerated classes),
prescribes administrative procedures for handling discrimination
complaints, and makes remedies available to employees subjected to
discriminatory practices." The Maryland Human Relations Commis-
sion enforces the Act. This Agency investigates complaints of discrimi-
nation and prescribes specific remedies to victims of discrimination.49
The judiciary has also created exceptions to the at-will doctrine.
One judicially created exception, recognized in many states, is the
public policy exception. This exception typically provides an em-
ployee who is fired for a reason that contravenes public policy with a
claim for wrongful discharge.5" Although many states recognize the
exception, no uniformity exists among states concerning recognized
sources of public policy or how broadly or narrowly to apply the ex-
ception.5 1 Violations of public policy may occur when an employee is
discharged for refusing to violate a law, performing civic or statutory
47. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 14 (1994).
48. Id. §§ 15, 16.
49. Id. §§ 10, 11.
50. The public policy exception to the at-will doctrine has its genesis in Petermann v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). In Petermann,
the court held that an employer who had fired an employee for refusing to commit perjury
committed an act of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Id. at 27. The court
reasoned that because a criminal statute existed that made perjury unlawful:
To hold that one's continued employment could be made contingent upon his
commission of a felonious act at the instance of his employer would be to en-
courage criminal conduct upon the part of both the employee and employer and
would serve to contaminate the honest administration of public affairs. This is
patently contrary to the public welfare.
Id.
51. JOHN C. McCARTH, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR WRONCFUL DISCMARGE § 1.27 (2d
ed. 1990 & Supp. 1996); Pennington, supra note 38, at 1594 n.62 & 1627; see also Leonard,
supra note 39, at 658 ("A major difficulty in applying a public exception arises when courts
seek to identify public policy. Who makes public policy for this purpose, and where is it to
be found?").
As a means to encourage uniformity among states, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws drafted and approved the Model Employment Termina-
tion Act. See Posnc, supra note 45, app. A at 793. The Act defines an "employer" as a
business employing at least five persons and provides procedures and remedies for an em-
ployment discharge that is not for good cause. See id. at 799, 804, 808, 810-11. Remedies
include reinstatement, backpay, lump-sum severance pay, and reasonable attorney's fees
and costs. See id. at 810-11. Although the Act preempts state tort actions, it expressly states
that an employee not covered by the statute "retains all common law rights and claims." Id
at 802.
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duties, asserting a legal right or privilege, or for other socially repre-
hensible reasons.52
b. Wrongful Discharge Claim in Mayland.-In Adler v. Ameri-
can Standard Corp.,55 the Court of Appeals first announced that a cause
of action for wrongful discharge may lie in cases in which a termina-
tion is motivated by reasons that contravene public policy.54 The
court acknowledged that "modern economic conditions differ signifi-
candy from those that existed when the at-will rule was first ad-
vanced"55 and recognized the importance of balancing what are often
competing interests-an employee's need for job security, an em-
ployer's need to make sound business decisions, and society's need to
ensure adherence to public policy.56 Yet the court also emphasized
the need for "clarity" when determining whether a pronouncement of
public policy should serve as the basis of a claim.5 7 The court identi-
fied legislative enactments, statutes, administrative regulations, andju-
dicial decisions as valid sources of public policy. 8
In Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 9 the court restricted the availa-
bility of the public policy wrongful discharge claim if the plaintiff
could have sought a statutory remedy for the harm alleged.60 In
Makovi, a former employee sued Sherwin-Williams for wrongful dis-
charge because Sherwin-Williams allegedly forced the employee to
take a leave of absence without pay or medical benefits when she be-
52. See CorneliusJ. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development
of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REv. 719, 744 (1991).
53. 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
54. Id. at 43, 432 A.2d at 471.
55. Id. at 41-42, 432 A.2d at 470.
56. Id. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470.
57. Id., 432 A.2d at 470-71. The court observed:
Where courts differ is in determining where the line is to be drawn that separates
a wrongful from a legally permissible discharge. This determination depends in
large part on whether the public policy allegedly violated is sufficiently clear to
provide the basis for a tort or contract action for wrongful discharge.
Id.
58. Id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472. Although the court adopted the public policy exception,
it ultimately denied Adler's claim. See id. at 43-44, 432 A.2d at 471. Adler had alleged that
his employer discharged him after he took issue with a number of improprieties occurring
within the company-including the payment of commercial bribes and the falsification of
corporate records. Id. at 34, 43, 432 A.2d at 466, 471. Adler relied on a criminal statute
that prohibited corporate employees from engaging in fraudulent activities as the source
of public policy to challenge his discharge. Id. at 43, 432 A.2d at 471. The court held that
Adler made allegations too conclusory and too general in nature to constitute a prima
facie showing that the criminal statute has been violated. See id. at 44, 432 A.2d at 471.
59. 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989).
60. Id. at 626, 561 A.2d at 190.
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came pregnant.61 Before filing her wrongful discharge claim, Makovi
had first filed a charge of sex discrimination, pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),62 with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)-the administrative agency
charged with the enforcement of Title VII.63 The EEOC eventually
rendered a finding in favor of Sherwin-Williams. 64 Having exhausted
her administrative remedies under Title VII, Makovi could have filed a
Title VII suit in federal district court.65 She chose not to, however,
instead initiating a tort claim for wrongful discharge in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City.6 6 Makovi's wrongful discharge claim alleged
that Sherwin-Williams had violated Maryland's public policy against
sex discrimination as announced in both Title VII and Article 49B.6 7
The Court of Appeals refused to allow Makovi's claim of wrongful dis-
charge to proceed, however, on the grounds that Makovi could have
sought statutory relief for the alleged discrimination.68 The court
held that because Makovi had a statutory remedy, "the generally ac-
cepted reason for recognizing the tort, that of vindicating an other-
wise civilly unremedied public policy violation, does not apply."69
61. Id. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180.
62. Title VII states, in pertinent part, that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for
an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994). Title VII defines an "employer" as a per-
son with fifteen or more employees. Id. § 2000e(b).
63. Id. § 2000e-5.
64. Makov, 316 Md. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180.
65. Id.
66. Recovery for wrongful discharge offered Makovi the prospect of a greater monetary
award than the statutory remedies available under Title VII. Id. at 639, 561 A.2d at 197. A
plaintiff may recover both compensatory and punitive damages under the wrongful dis-
charge tort. Id. at 626, 561 A.2d at 190. At the time of Makovi's lawsuit, Title VII did not
permit a plaintiff to recover such damages. See id. at 621, 561 A.2d at 180. In 1991, how-
ever, Congress amended Title VII to include both compensatory and punitive damages. See
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994); see also infra note 145 and accompanying text.
67. Makovi, 316 Md. at 605, 561 A.2d at 180.
68. Id. at 609, 561 A.2d at 182.
69. Id. at 626, 561 A.2d at 190. Judge Adkins, joined by Judges Eldridge and Cole,
vigorously dissented. They argued that Adler articulated only one prerequisite for a wrong-
ful discharge claim-the violation of a clear mandate of public policy. Id. at 627-28, 561
A.2d at 191 (Adkins, J., dissenting). The availability of limited administrative remedies in
Maryland's antidiscrimination statute should not, the dissent argued, preclude an em-
ployee from bringing a wrongful discharge action. Id. at 628, 561 A.2d at 191. Judge Ad-
kins identified three statutory sources-Title VII, Article 49B, and the Maryland
Declaration of Rights-as offering clear mandates of public policy against sex discrimina-
tion in employment. Id. at 629-30, 561 A.2d at 192. The dissent reasoned that, because
Title VII does not "mark the outer boundaries of relief for one who has been harmed by
gender bias in employment," neither should Article 49B. Id. at 631, 561 A.2d 192-93.
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Since Makovi, the Court of Appeals has applied this reasoning in other
discrimination contexts.
70
Thus far, two courts have interpreted Maryland law as providing a
private cause of action for wrongful discharge based on sex discrimi-
nation if the plaintiff has no alternative statutory remedy. In William-
son v. Provident State Bank,71 a case decided in 1981 by the Circuit
Court for Caroline County, a woman sued her employer, a small busi-
ness with fewer than fifteen employees, for wrongful discharge based
on gender discrimination. 72 Pursuant to the Court of Appeals's deci-
sion in Adler, the court acknowledged that the State of Maryland rec-
ognizes a wrongful discharge claim for a discharge allegedly motivated
by a reason that contravenes public policy. 75 After identifying legisla-
tive enactments as one source of public policy, the court cited both
the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment 74 and section 14 of Article
49B as sufficiently clear statements of public policy against discrimina-
tory employment practices to support an employee's tort claim of
wrongful discharge.75
More recently, in Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertainment, Inc.,76 the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland interpreted
Maryland law so as to permit "a common law claim for wrongful dis-
charge based upon alleged sex discrimination when the plaintiff has
no available statutory remedies."77 The court held that a wrongful dis-
charge action for sex discrimination could be brought against an em-
ployer exempt from statutory liability under Title VII and Article 49B
Moreover, the dissent argued that many remedies are needed to uproot "'entrenched dis-
crimination'" and that plaintiffs should have a choice of remedies available to accomplish
that goal. Id. at 635-36, 561 A.2d at 195 (quoting Keller v. Prince George's County, 827
F.2d 952, 957 (4th Cir. 1987)).
70. For example, in Chappell v. Southern Maryland Hospital, Inc., 320 Md. 483, 578 A.2d
766 (1990), the Court of Appeals held that the availability of statutory remedies provided
by Tide VII and Article 49B precluded an employee's wrongful discharge claim based on
allegations that his employer fired him in retaliation for reporting discriminatory practices
to his supervisor. See id. at 496, 578 A.2d at 773. Similarly, in Watson v. Peoples Security Life
Insurance Co., 322 Md. 467, 588 A.2d 760 (1991), the Court of Appeals rejected an em-
ployee's claim of wrongful discharge based on sexual harassment because of the availability
of remedies under Tide VII and Article 49B. See id, at 480, 588 A.2d at 766.
71. 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1335 (Md. Cir. Ct. Caroline County Dec. 11, 1981).
72. Id. at 1335.
73. Id. at 1336.
74. Maryland added the Equal Rights Amendment to its Declaration of Rights in 1972.
It states: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex."
MD. CONST. DECL. OF Ris. art. 46.
75. Wiliamson, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1336.
76. Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertainment, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 733 (D. Md, 1992).
77. Id. at 734.
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because it employed fewer than fifteen persons.78 The court distin-
guished the case from Makovi and its progeny on the basis that the
plaintiff lacked a statutory remedy.79
The court also addressed whether Maryland law recognized a
wrongful discharge action based on sex discrimination. The court
found that section 14 of Article 49B constituted a clear statement of
Maryland's public policy against sex discrimination in employment.80
Citing Williamson and National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Pince George's
County,"1 the federal district court judge stated that Maryland courts
have rejected an interpretation of Article 49B as granting "small busi-
nesses a charter to discriminate," and instead "have held that while
art. 49B exempts small business from its burdensome administrative
requirements, there is no reason to construe art. 49B as exempting
small business from its anti-discrimination policy."82 The Kerrigan
court rejected the employer's argument that the legislature, in enact-
ing Article 49B, sought to avoid burdening small businesses with hav-
ing to defend against discrimination suits.8" The judge reasoned that
the policy statement contained in Article 49B stated a clear mandate
of Maryland public policy prohibiting discrimination by all employers,
regardless of coverage.8 4
c. Preemption.--Critical to the examination of the issues in
Molesworth is whether the General Assembly intended Article 49B to
occupy the field of employment discrimination, thereby preempting
all other related causes of action. The Court of Appeals has answered
this question in the negative. In NationalAsphalt, the Court of Appeals
held that Article 49B does not preempt local ordinances prohibiting
discrimination on the same bases.8 5 In that case, a discharged em-
ployee filed a complaint with the Prince George's Human Relations
Commission, alleging that her employer had violated the Prince
George's County antidiscrimination ordinance by terminating her em-
ployment because of her sex.86 Four days before the county's sched-
uled administrative hearing, the employer instituted an action in
circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that Article 49B ren-
78. Id. at 736.
79. Id. at 735.
80. Id.
81. 292 Md. 75, 437 A.2d 651 (1981); see infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
82. Kerrigarn, 804 F. Supp. at 736.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. National Asphalt 292 Md. at 80-81, 437 A2d at 654.
86. Id. at 77, 437 A.2d at 652.
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dered the county ordinance invalid. 7 Unlike Article 49B, the ordi-
nance applied to employers with fewer than fifteen employees."8 The
plaintiffs employer had fewer than fifteen employees.8 9 On review,
the Court of Appeals rejected the employer's implied preemption ar-
gument.9" In so ruling, the court found the absence in Article 49B of
any reference to already existing local legislation concerning employ-
ment discrimination persuasive evidence that the General Assembly
did not intend Article 49B to preempt the field of employment dis-
crimination law.91 Further, the court noted that the Human Relations
Commission-the agency charged with the administration and en-
forcement of Article 49B-had consistently construed the state statute
as non-preemptive.9 2 Significantly, the court concluded: "Employers
with less than fifteen employees are not permitted by the state statute
to discriminate in their employment practices; they simply are not
covered."9 3
3. The Court's Reasoning. -Writing for the court, Chief Judge
Murphy concluded that although the General Assembly excluded
small businesses from the administrative processes of Article 49B, it
did not intend to exclude small businesses from the statewide public
policy prohibiting sex discrimination.9" To hold otherwise would
87. Id.
88. Id. at 76-77, 437 A-2d at 651-52.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 79 n.3, 437 A.2d at 653 n.3. The employer conceded that the legislature had
not expressly preempted the area of employment discrimination. See id. at 78, 437 A.2d at
652. Implied preemption exists if "the Legislature has acted with such force that an intent
by the State to occupy the entire field must be implied." County Council v. Montgomery
Ass'n, 274 Md. 52, 59, 333 A.2d 596, 600 (1975).
91. National Asphalt, 292 Md. at 79, 437 A.2d at 653.
92. Id. at 80, 437 A.2d at 653-54.
93. Id. at 79, 437 A.2d at 653. Similarly, in Coalition for Open Doors v. Annapolis Lodge No.
622, 333 Md. 359, 635 A-2d 412 (1994), the Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's
holding that a city ordinance prohibiting sex discrimination in a private club was pre-
empted by the state's public accommodation law, which exempted private clubs from cov-
erage. See id. at 383, 635 A.2d at 424. Harkening back to its decision in National Asphalt
the court emphasized the "distinction between a state law which is intended to permit or
authorize a particular matter and a state law which is simply intended to exempt the partic-
ular matter from its coverage." Id. at 380, 635 A.2d at 422. The court determined that
Maryland's public accommodation law was intended to do the latter. See id. at 383, 635
A.2d at 423.
94. Molemsworth, 341 Md. at 628, 672 A.2d at 612. The court also reviewed the decision
of the Court of Special Appeals to reverse and remand the Molesworth case on the ground
that the trial court erred when it refused to give what is commonly referred to as the "same
actor" instruction to the jury. See id. at 637-46, 672 A.2d at 616-21. The "same actor" in-
struction would have required the Moleworthjury to infer that, if the person who hired the
employee also fired the employee, the discharge could not have been motivated by sex
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amount to a conclusion that the legislature intended to permit em-
ployers of fewer than fifteen persons to discriminate-a position the
court found untenable.9" The court based its decision on the plain
language of section 14, the legislative history of Article 49B, and state
and federal court precedent.96
The court first analyzed the plain language of section 14, apply-
ing the rule of statutory interpretation that every word should be
given its full effect.97 The court concluded that the use of the word
"tany" to modify "employer" in section 14's prohibition against discrim-
discrimination. See id. at 646, 672 A.2d at 620-21. The rationale underlying the instruction
is that if the same person that fires the employee also originally hired her, an "obvious
inference" exists that the employee's discharge was not motivated by discrimination. See
Brandon v. Molesworth, 104 Md. App. 167, 202, 655 A.2d 1292, 1310 (1995), affid in part
and rev'd in parA, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996). On this issue, the court reversed the
Court of Special Appeals, limiting the "same actor" inference to only those wrongful dis-
charge claims that lack direct evidence of discrimination. See Molesworth, 341 Md. at 640-46,
672 A.2d at 618-20.
In so ruling, the court pointed to numerous federal court decisions interpreting Title
VII that have applied the "same actor" instruction only in cases following the burden-of-
proof scheme enunciated in McDonnell-Douglas Cop. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Moles-
worth, 341 Md. at 640-46, 672 A.2d at 618-20. The McDonnell-Douglas proof scheme, the
court observed, "is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimina-
tion." Id. at 642, 672 A.2d at 618. The court found no decisions in which a court applied
the instruction when the plaintiff had offered direct evidence of discrimination. See id.,
672 A.2d at 619. Applying this rule to the facts in Molesworth, the Court of Appeals found
that the trial court properly denied the employer's requested "same actor"jury instruction
because Molesworth presented direct evidence of discrimination-specifically, Moles-
worth's testimony that Brandon nodded in agreement to Palmer's statement that Moles-
worth was being fired, in part, because of her gender. See i. at 641, 646, 672 A.2d at 618,
620-21.
The court further held that "Maryland law of evidence also dictates that the 'same
actor inference' is not applicable" in Molesworth. Id. at 642, 672 A.2d at 619. The court
reasoned that the instruction actually creates a presumption of nondiscrimination, rather
than an inference, because it shifts the burden to the plaintiff to produce additional evi-
dence of discrimination. See i. at 642-43, 672 A.2d at 619. The presumption becomes
"inapplicable under Maryland law . . .because Molesworth presented direct evidence of
discrimination." Id. at 643, 672 A.2d at 619. The court drew an analogy between the same
actor presumption and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Id. The court reasoned that, just
as res ipsa loquitur does not apply if the plaintiff is able to produce evidence sufficient to
show negligence, the same actor presumption is unnecessary to show the absence of dis-
criminatory intent when the plaintiff presents direct evidence proving otherwise. See i.
The court also held that the case did "not warrant the creation of a presumption." Id.
Finally, the court noted that the trial court's refusal to grant the instruction did not
preclude the employer from arguing to the jury that it may infer from the fact that Bran-
don had both hired and fired Molesworth "that the discharge was not motivated by dis-
crimination." Id. at 645, 672 A.2d at 620. The court simply refused to elevate such
evidence to the status of a presumption. See id. at 644, 672 A.2d at 620.
95. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 637, 672 A.2d at 616.
96. Id. at 628, 672 A.2d at 612.
97. Id. at 632, 672 A.2d at 613.
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ination in employment by "any employer" would have been unneces-
sary if the legislature had intended to restrict the policy's application
only to an "employer" as defined in section 15(b).98 Judge Murphy
also reasoned that, if the legislature had intended to shield small em-
ployers from liability for common law wrongful discharge actions, it
would have limited the policy statement to reach only "employers as
defined in Section 15."9" Additionally, the court noted the absence of
language indicating that the legislature intended to "abrogate the
common law" and reiterated its holding in National Asphalt that Article
49B does not preempt the field of employment discrimination law.' 0
Because the General Assembly modeled Article 49B after Tide
VII, the court also reviewed federal legislative history to discern the
legislative intent behind the exemption for employers with fewer than
fifteen employees.' 0a While the court conceded that federal legisla-
tive history reflected concern about subjecting small businesses to "ex-
pensive lawsuits and potential bankruptcy,"' 02 the court also noted
Congress's concern over the increased administrative workload that
would result from an expansion of coverage.10 ' The court found that
the desire not to overburden Maryland's Human Relations Commis-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 634, 672 A.2d at 614 (internal quotations omitted).
100. Id. at 632-34, 672 A.2d at 613-14. The court also cited to its decision in Coalition for
Open Doors v. Annapolis Lodge No. 622, 333 Md. 359, 635 A.2d 412 (1994). The court stated
that Brandon's position ran contrary to the prior holdings in Coalition for Open Doors and
National Asphalt that the General Assembly did not intend to authorize small businesses to
discriminate when it exempted them from the administrative process prescribed by Art.
49B. See Molesvorth, 341. Md. at 636, 672 A.2d at 615-16.
101. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 632-34, 672 A.2d at 614-15. Like Title VII, Article 49B, as
originally enacted, defined "employer" as a business having twenty-five or more employees.
See id. at 632, 672 A.2d at 614. In 1972, the legislature expanded Title VII coverage to
include employers of fifteen or more employees. See id. at 632-33, 672 A.2d at 614. In
1973, the Maryland General Assembly amended Article 49B's definition of "employer" to
conform to the federal statute. See id.
The Molesworth court reasoned that, because Article 49B parallels Title VII, "in the
absence of contrary legislative pronouncements on the Maryland law, we may turn to the
legislative history of the federal law to discern the legislative intent behind the § 15(b)
exemption." Id. at 633, 672 A.2d at 614.
102. Id. at 633, 672 A.2d at 614.
103. Id. In reviewing the legislative history of Title VII, the Court of Appeals identified
Congress's concern with overburdening the EEOC. See id. at 633-34, 672 A.2d 614 ("'Addi-
tionally, we fear that, in view of the estimated 18-month to two-year backlog that currently
exists at the EEOC .... to expand the EEOC's jurisdiction will serve only to retard and
frustrate the purposes and objectives of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act [and] will
thrust the EEOC into an administrative quagmire which can only delay the attainment of a
reasonable standard of operational efficiency ....'" (quoting H.R. Rxe. No. 92-238 (1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CA.N. 2137, 2167)).
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sion served as the General Assembly's primary motivation to exclude
small businesses from the administrative processes of the Act.104
Further, the Molesworth court bolstered its holding by pointing to
the ruling of the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land in Kerrigan:115 "'[W]hile art. 49B exempts small businesses from
its burdensome administrative requirements, there is no reason to
construe art. 49B as exempting small businesses from its anti-discrimi-
nation policy."'1
0 6
The Molesworth court found further support for its holding in the
case law of other jurisdictions-such as Ohio and Washington state-
where courts have upheld wrongful discharge claims for discrimina-
tory employment practices as violative of state public policy, when the
employee had no statutory remedy. 107
104. Id. at 634, 672 A.2d at 614 ("[T]he intent of at least some of the [federal] legisla-
tors was to exempt small employers from the administrative process under the Act to avoid
overburdening the EEOC. It is this intent that is reflected in the language of §§ 14 and
15(b).").
105. See supra notes 76-80 and 82-84 and accompanying text.
106. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 634, 672 A.2d 615 (quoting Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertain-
ment, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. Md. 1992)).
107. Id. at 634-35, 672 A.2d at 615. First, the Court of Appeals cited Collins v. Rizkana,
652 N.E.2d 653 (Ohio 1995). In Collins, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld a wrongful
discharge claim in which an employer with fewer employees than statutorily required for
coverage violated state public policy prohibiting employment discrimination. See id. at 660.
The court reasoned that the Ohio legislature intended to exempt small businesses only
from the administrative burden of the statute, not from its antidiscrimination policy. See
id. at 660-61.
Second, the Court of Appeals cited Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1990) (en
banc), in which the Supreme Court of Washington recognized a cause of action for wrong-
ful discharge where the plaintiffs alleged that they were discharged in retaliation for hav-
ing complained of unlawful age discrimination. Id. at 1264. See Molesworth, 341 Md. at 634-
35, 672 A.2d at 615.
Because the Bennett court found that the plaintiffs had an implied cause of action
deriving from a state antidiscrimination statute, which would address the plaintiffs' allega-
tions of age discrimination, the court did not decide whether the employer's conduct also
provided the plaintiffs with a wrongful discharge claim based on the state's public policy
against age discrimination. See Bennett, 784 P.2d at 1263. This same state statute, however,
did not expressly prohibit retaliatory conduct by employers. See id. Likening the em-
ployer's conduct to retaliation against "whistleblowers," which Washington public policy
did prohibit, the court upheld the plaintiff's retaliation claim as similarly violative of state
public policy. See id. at 1263-64.
Although the statute defined an employer as a person who employs eight or more
employees, the court rejected the employer's argument that the plaintiffs' claims were
barred because the employer had fewer than eight employees. See id. at 1265. The court
reasoned that there was nothing within the statute's stated purpose to suggest that the
legislature intended to limit the state's overarching policy against age discrimination to
employers having eight or more employees. See id. Finally, the Bennett court also con-
cluded that the purposes of the small business exemption from regulation would not be
impeded by permitting private causes of action against them. See id. at 1266. The court
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Finally, the court distinguished Makovi and the subsequent case
of Chappell v. Southern Maryland Hospital Inc.118 as involving aggrieved
employees who, unlike Molesworth, had statutory remedies available
to them.109
4. Analysis. -In Molesworth v. Brandon, the Court of Appeals held
that the prohibition against sex discrimination enunciated in section
14 of Article 49B applies to all employers, regardless of whether they
are covered by the administrative processes set forth in the statute. 1
This holding is consistent with both the legislature's intent and prior
Maryland decisions regarding the public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine. Furthermore, the court's decision promotes
the state's laudable goal of ending sex discrimination by affording
protection to employees of businesses of all sizes. Concededly,
though, this ruling places small businesses at a higher risk for large
compensatory and punitive damage awards-much greater damage
awards than those faced by larger employers. This inequity makes lit-
tle sense and demands the attention of the Maryland General
Assembly.
a. Consistency with Prior Case Law.-The court's holding in
Molesworth comports with Maryland precedent on the applicability of
the tort of wrongful discharge. In Adler, the Court of Appeals adopted
the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, but limited this tort
to cases involving violations of clear mandates of public policy.' 1' The
court identified legislative enactments as the most reliable source of
public policy.'1 ' The Molesworth court properly recognized Article
49B as a clear mandate of Maryland public policy prohibiting sex dis-
crimination. Further, the Court of Appeals correctly rejected argu-
ments that Makovi compelled the preclusion of Molesworth's wrongful
discharge claim. 3 Although the Makovi court cautioned against "up-
set[ting] the balance between right and remedy struck by the Legisla-
ture,"1 1 4 the court also emphasized that the wrongful discharge tort
stated that "permitting private actions by individual plaintiffs can only assist the Commis-
sion in furthering the goal of preventing and eliminating employment discrimination." Id.
108. 320 Md. 483, 578 A.2d 766 (1990); see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
109. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 636-37, 672 A.2d at 616.
110. Id. at 637, 672 A.2d at 616.
111. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 47, 432 A.2d 464, 473 (1981).
112. Id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472 ("[D]eclaration of public policy is normally the function
of the legislative branch.").
113. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 636-37, 672 A.2d at 616.
114. Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 626, 561 A.2d 179, 190 (1989).
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served to avoid "the prospect of a remediless employee . . .under-
cut[ting] the policies and goals that other laws sought to further."115
Since 1981, no court has interpreted Maryland law to mean that
the exclusion of small businesses from the definition of "employer" in
Article 49B represents legislative authorization for small businesses to
engage in discriminatory practices. 116 As the Molesworth court stated,
to interpret Article 49B in this way would be "patently ludicrous."'1 7
b. Legislative Intent.-The legislature did not intend Article
49B to preempt the entire field of employment discrimination." 8 No-
tably, the statute contains no express language indicating that the leg-
islature intended employees with no statutory protection to suffer
discrimination without recourse. As the court stated in National
Asphalt- "Unlike the extensive and comprehensive provisions of the
election, education or taxation articles of the Maryland Code, the mat-
ter of employment discrimination is dealt with by five relatively brief
sections in Article 49B which do not comprehensively cover the
field.""' 9
There are several reasons underlying the legislature's exclusion
of small businesses from the administrative procedures established in
Article 49B. First, the legislature, concerned about over-burdening
the Maryland Human Relations Commission, sought to limit the
agency's reach. 20 If the Commission assumed responsibility for inves-
tigating all claims of employment discrimination in the state, an un-
manageable caseload would result. 2 ' This would lead to less effective
law enforcement and more delays in the administrative process. As it
stands now, that agency is already overloaded with cases.
122
115. Id. at 612, 561 A.2d at 183.
116. See Kerrigan v. Magnum Entertainment, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. Md. 1992);
National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Prince George's County, 292 Md. 75, 79, 437 A.2d 651,
653 (1981); Williams v. Provident State Bank, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1335 (Md.
Cir. Ct. Caroline County Dec. 11, 1981).
117. Brandon v. Molesworth, 104 Md. App. 167, 185, 655 A.2d 1292, 1301-02 (1995),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996).
118. See Makovi, 316 Md. at 608, 561 A-2d at 181 ("Art. 49B does not preempt, by occupy-
ing the field, local prohibitions against employment discrimination.").
119. National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n, 292 Md. at 79, 437 A.2d at 653.
120. See Molesworth, 341 Md. at 633, 672 A.2d at 614.
121. See Brandon v. Molesworth, 104 Md. App. 167, 185 n.14, 655 A.2d 1292, 1301 n.14
(1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 341 Md. 621, 672 A.2d 608 (1996).
122. Michael Ollove, After 7 Years, Md. Bias Complaint Is Still Unresolved, BALT. SUN, Dec.
26, 1989, at IA (describing the plight of a Jewish man in bringing a discrimination claim
before the Maryland Human Rights Commission); Justice Denied, BALT. SUN, Mar. 30, 1989,
at 12A ("Discrimination in the workplace has gone unpunished as thousands of Mary-
landers who turned to the state for help received only a frustrating run-around.").
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Second, the legislative history of Title VII suggests that another
reason for the small business exemption was a desire to protect small
businesses from the burdens of complex administrative oversight. 2
Senator Stennis, expressing this concern, explained that small busi-
nesses do not have the "assets or capability to cope with the legal and
administrative tangle that can be thrust upon them arbitrarily by the
Commission." 24 Further, the Senator argued, to force small busi-
nesses to comply with restrictions on employment decisions and de-
prive them of the opportunity to "take the case to court . . . [is]
downright ridiculous."12 5  Similarly, Senator Ervin stated that the
small businessperson is "in no financial condition to contest his Gov-
ernment with all its wealth arrayed against him on the side of his
adversary."12
6
c. Economic Impact on Small Businesses. -The National Feder-
ation of Independent Business (NFIB) 127 and the Maryland Chamber
of Commerce filed ajoint brief as amicus curiae, expressing concerns
that small businesses will suffer severe economic hardship if exposed
to tort liability for wrongful discharge. 128 Specifically, these groups
raise concerns that the Molesworth decision will produce a flood of law-
suits and large verdicts that will force many small businesses into bank-
ruptcy.' 29 The NFIB and the Chamber of Commerce also take issue
123. Senator Stennis, during legislative debates over Title VII, stated:
[T]he large companies, with their capital, with adequate funds with which to em-
ploy talent in the legal profession, for instance, and in management, and so forth,
have a much better chance to meet obligations which might be imposed on them
by a law like this .... We have illustrations all over the country of little shops
closing up and going out of business due to harassment, because of the require-
ments and demands made on them which they cannot meet. They cannot put up
with a running battle with the Federal Government all the time.
118 CONG. REc. 2388 (1972) (statement of Sen. Stennis).
124. Id. at 2389.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1977 (statement of Sen. Ervin).
127. The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) is a nationwide agency
that promotes small businesses. See Molesworth, 341 Md. at 627, 672 A.2d at 611.
128. See Brief of the Maryland Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of
Independent Business as Amicus Curiae at 20-22, Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 672
A.2d 608 (1996) (No. 83).
129. See Catherine Brennan, Small Businesses Fear Bloom of Wrongful Discharge Claims:
Court of Appeals Decision Endorses Award Based on Sex-Discrimination in Case of Veterinarian Who
Brought Suit Against Four-Vet Practice, DAILY REc., Mar. 6, 1996, at 9; Angela Zimm, Business
Groups Join Forces to Limit Discrimination Suits: State Chamber of Commerce, National Independ-
ents' Federation Asking High Court for Narrow Read of Md. Fair Employment Practices Act, DAILY
REc., Jan. 3, 1996, at 4 (reporting statement of lobbyist for the NFIB that "the legislature
left out businesses with fewer than 15 employees in order to protect them from 'million-
dollar lawsuits' they would not be able to afford").
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with the fact that small businesses will be subject to compensatory and
punitive damages while large businesses are not."' As discussed be-
low, small businesses are neither likely to be bombarded with wrong-
ful discharge actions nor likely to face damage awards large enough to
bankrupt them. Nevertheless, because small businesses may now be
potentially liable for greater damage awards than larger businesses,
the legislature should take steps to remedy this inequity.
Just as small businesses are concerned with the expense of litigat-
ing employment discrimination suits, so are employees. 3 1 Employers
can be sure that these costs will prevent many employees from ever
filing wrongful discharge claims in the first place.132 Workers who do
not earn an annual salary of at least $30,000 will most likely be unable
to retain an attorney on a contingency-fee basis because, even if they
prevailed, the amount of money recovered in lost wages would not be
enough to compensate an attorney. 133 That employees must find at-
torneys willing to undertake this costly litigation on a contingency ba-
sis will certainly limit the number of claims filed.
Moreover, the costs of employment litigation often match, if not
exceed, the amount of compensation a wrongfully discharged plaintiff
eventually recovers.'3 4 In addition to attorney's fees, litigation often
involves expenditures for travel, depositions, and photocopying-
costs that can add up to tens of thousands of dollars.'3 5 These costs
usually are not recoverable at common law and, consequently, are de-
130. See Brief of the Maryland Chamber of Commerce and the National Federation of
Independent Business as Amicus Curiae at 33-34, Molesworth (No. 83) ("[it is irrational to
subject a small employer that is not statutorily prohibited from discriminating in its em-
ployment decisions to full tort remedies (compensatory and punitive damages) ... when
an employer who is statutorily prohibited from such discriminatory practices is only liable
to equitable damages for back pay. .. ").
131. See Brennan, supra note 129. Counsel for the Human Relations Commission,
Glendora Hughes, rejected small business claims that the Molesworth decision would create
a flood of wrongful discharge suits, stating, "No one should be panicking in the business
community because if they check the statistics, there just are not a lot of wrongful dis-
charge employment cases." Id. Hughes pointed out, "It's expensive to bring these suits,
and a person fired from their job is usually more concerned with getting another job than
with filing a lawsuit." Id.
132. Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 644, 561 A.2d 179, 199 (1989) (Ad-
kins, J., dissenting) ("The remedy available through the administrative process may be
more desirable because it sometimes is more expedient and less expensive. . . ."); see also
Ollove, supra note 122 (quoting discrimination complainant as saying "If I could have af-
forded it, I probably would have gone through federal court, and it would have been done
by now").
133. See Sprang, supra note 45, at 887-88.
134. See id. at 888.
135. See id.
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ducted from the plaintiffs award. 36 In the absence of either a sizea-
ble savings account or the willingness of a plaintiffs attorney to
advance these costs, litigation becomes impossible for many wrong-
fully discharged employees. 137
Large verdicts are sometimes awarded in wrongful discharge
cases, particularly because of the availability of punitive damages. It is
estimated, however, that the majority of plaintiffs who recover such
verdicts are "middle- or upper-level management, professionals, or
other highly paid personnel."13 8 It seems logical that not many busi-
nesses with fewer than fifteen persons would need large numbers of
middle- and upper-level managers. Furthermore, "[rlank-and-file
workers prevail only infrequently."
1 39
Judicial review of jury awards also provides a check against inap-
propriate awards. The plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing
evidence the basis for any award of punitive damages.1" Should a
court find an award of punitive damages improper, the judge may re-
duce the award, or vacate and remand for trial on the issue of dam-
ages.141 In determining the amount of punitive damages to award, a
jury must consider a defendant's financial status and is prohibited





138. Posrc, supra note 45, app. A at 795; see also Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law As the
Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REv. 7, 25-26 (1988) (noting that occa-
sional recovery of large awards by plaintiffs in wrongful discharge suits conceals the fact
that "most wrongfully discharged workers are unsuccessful in litigation, so the law becomes
a lottery with a few big winners and many losers").
139. Posnc, supra note 45, app. A at 795.
140. See Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 735, 664 A.2d 916, 917 (1995). Puni-
tive damages may only be awarded in a case in which the plaintiff has proven the defendant
acted with malice. See MAzAuorr, supra note 38, at 313. Malice is "unlawful conduct that is
without legal justification or excuse and undertaken with an evil motive influenced by hate
for the purpose of deliberately and willfully injuring the plaintiff." Id.; see also Montgomery
Ward, 339 Md. at 735, 666 A.2d at 933 ("[P]unitive damages should only be awarded where
there exists heinous conduct, characterized by fraud, ill will, spite, evil motive, conscious
wrongdoing, or intent to injure.").
141. See, e.g., Ellerin v. Fairfax Say., 337 Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995) (vacating ajury's
award of punitive damages and remanding for trial on the issue of punitive damages).
142. Id. at 242, 652 A.2d at 1129-30 ("Upon request, a jury should be instructed that
punitive damages should not be disproportionate to . . .the defendant's ability to pay.
Moreover, like any award of damages in a tort case, the amount of punitive damages
awarded by a jury is reviewable by the trial court for excessiveness."); see also Fraidin v.
Weitzman, 93 Md. App. 168, 217, 611 A.2d 1046, 1070 (1992) (vacating the jury's verdict
and remanding the case for reconsideration of grant of remittitur or new trial after finding
that the trial court had not considered appellants' net worth during its review of the jury's
punitive damage award). In Weitzman, the Court of Special Appeals explained that, in
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Although an award of punitive damages against a small business
found liable for wrongful discharge may be rare, that prospect never-
theless remains reality for small businesses as a consequence of the
Molesworth decision. Small businesses are liable for compensatory and
punitive damages because, as with other torts, such damages may be
awarded in a wrongful discharge action.14 3 By contrast, employers
subject to Article 49B's administrative processes are shielded from pu-
nitive and compensatory damages because Article 49B limits monetary
relief to a maximum of three years of backpay. 144 Plaintiffs may win
compensatory and punitive damage awards from large employers by
bringing a claim under Title VII,145 but large employers are still, to a
great extent, shielded under federal law as well. Title VII caps the
total amount of damages that may be awarded to a plaintiff according
to the size of the employer. 146 The statute sets the maximum amount
allowable for combined future and nonpecuniary compensatory and
punitive damages at $50,000 for employers with between 15 and 100
employees, $100,000 for employers with between 101 and 200 employ-
ees, $200,000 for employers with between 201 and 500 employees, and
$300,000 for employers with more than 500 employees. 147
awarding punitive damages, ajury "may only punish appellants for their conduct, not destroy
or bankrupt them." Id. at 218, 611 A.2d at 1071; see also Mary E. Medland, Harassment Victim
Wins $144k: Punitive Damages Included in P. G. Jury Award for Boss's Ex-Girfriend, DAILY REc.,
Mar. 16, 1996, at Al (describing wrongful discharge case in which a Prince George's
County judge granted employer's post-trial motion to strike the jury's entire $75,000 puni-
tive damage award on the ground that no evidence was adduced at trial of the employer's
financial resources). The Maryland pattern jury instruction for punitive damages states
that "an award of punitive damages should be proportionate to the wrongfulness of the
defendant's conduct and the defendant's ability to pay but not designed to bankrupt or
financially destroy a defendant." STANDING COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
MARYLAND STATE BAR Assoc., INC., MARYLAND CIIL PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 49 (3d ed.
Supp. 1996).
143. See MAzAROFF, supra note 38, at 306. Compensatory damages in a wrongful dis-
charge action include backpay, relief for mental anguish and emotional distress, and fu-
ture loss of earnings. See id. at 306-12. Discharged employees must, however, attempt to
mitigate damages by seeking other suitable employment. See id. at 312. For a discussion of
punitive damages, see supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
144. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 11 (1994). Under Article 49B, an employee may be
awarded injunctive relief and other types of "make whole" remedies, such as hiring, pro-
motion, or reinstatement. See id.; see also MAZAROFF, supra note 38, at 566 ("The basic prem-
ise underlying the nature and extent of relief in employment discrimination cases is that
the victim of the discrimination should be placed in the same position he would have been
but for the act of discrimination, or, in other words, 'made whole.'").
145. Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, awards under a Title VII claim may include
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To hold small businesses liable for damages from which large
businesses are statutorily protected defies reason. The legislature
needs to craft a solution that will correct the current disparity without
interfering with the state's strong stance against discrimination in em-
ployment. The General Assembly recently rejected legislation (HB
602) ,148 proposed by the Maryland Chamber of Commerce, to limit
remedies for wrongful discharge to backpay only.149 A more effective
solution would be to amend Article 49B to include compensatory and
punitive damages that would be capped according to the size of the
employer, thereby parallelling Title VII, and to pass legislation setting
an appropriate cap for damages awarded in a wrongful discharge
action.
The Court of Appeals will also have to resolve the question of
whether plaintiffs that have a remedy under local antidiscrimination
ordinances are precluded from recovering under the tort of wrongful
discharge. The Molesworth court did not reach this issue, finding that
the employer had not properly raised it at the trial level.' 5 ' The issue
must be addressed because several Maryland counties have enacted
such ordinances.' 5 ' At least one circuit court judge in Maryland has
already rejected an employer's argument that a plaintiff who had a
remedy under a local ordinance could not bring an action under
wrongful discharge. 5
d. Fairness.-Termination from employment due to unlaw-
ful discrimination is perhaps the greatest restriction on personal free-
dom that an employee can suffer. As the Supreme Court of Virginia
recently noted, "gender discrimination practiced in the work place is
148. Md. H.B. 602, 1997 Sess.
149. Catherine M. Brennan, Damage Limit for Discrimination Suits Fails: House Vote Kills
Bill to Level Field Between Different-Sized Companies, DAILY REC., Mar. 18, 1997, at 1A. The
Maryland Chamber of Commerce is likely to reintroduce the legislation next year. See id. at
15A; see also Catherine M. Brennan, Wrongful Discharge Bill Hits Floor: Black Caucus Decries
Limits on Workers'Rights, DAILY REC., Mar. 14, 1997, at 3A (discussing the strong opposition
of the Legislative Black Caucus to the proposed legislation because passage of the bill
would give small businesses permission to discriminate).
150. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 637 n.5, 672 A.2d at 616 n.5.
151. See, e.g., BALTIMORE CouNTY, MD., CODE §§ 19-31 (Supp. 1997) (prohibiting em-
ployers of five or more employees from employment discrimination based on sex); MONT-
GOMERY COUNW, Mn., CODE §§ 27-17 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (prohibiting employers of six or
more persons from employment discrimination based on sex); PRINCE GEORGE'S CouNrv,
MD., CODE §§ 2-185 (1995) (prohibiting employers of one or more employees from em-
ployment discrimination based on sex).
152. See Medland, supra note 142 (reporting that the judge denied employer's motion
for partial summary judgment on this issue, rejecting the argument that because plaintiff




not only an invidious violation of the rights of the individual, but such
discrimination also affects the property rights, personal freedoms, and
welfare of the people in general."1"3 An employer should not be per-
mitted to wield its power in ways that undermine these personal rights
and freedoms. It would be inherently unfair, absent an explicit legis-
lative pronouncement preempting the common law, to permit an em-
ployer with fourteen employees to discharge an employee on the basis
of sex discrimination, while protecting another employee from such
discrimination because the employer happens to employ fifteen
persons. 1
54
As Chief Judge Murphy noted, "the legislature did not intend to
abrogate the common law, absent a clear statement to the con-
trary."' 55 The court properly found that Article 49B contained no
such contrary pronouncements.' 56 Had the legislature intended the
statute to preempt the entire field of employment discrimination, it
would have so stated.'57 If the General Assembly decides that the
Court of Appeals has incorrectly interpreted the meaning of the small
employer exemption of Article 49B, it could amend the statute. 158
e. Unresolved Questions.-The Court of Appeals is unclear
about whether the policy statement against sex discrimination in Arti-
cle 49B serves as an independent mandate of public policy or whether
it must be supported by other sources.' 9 The court will soon need to
clarify this issue because Article 49B includes several other protected
classes in addition to gender, including race, color, ancestry or na-
153. Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 439 S.E.2d 328, 331 (Va. 1994) (rec-
ognizing race and gender discrimination as narrow exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine applicable in Virginia).
154. See Peck, supra note 52, at 772 ("Society has an interest in ensuring that all employ-
ees are protected from abuse of employer power. . .
155. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 632, 672 A.2d at 614.
156. Id. at 634, 672 A.2d at 614.
157. Id.
158. The General Assembly could amend Article 49B in a number of ways. For example,
it could include a provision that precludes wrongful discharge claims, similar to language
that the State of Utah uses in its antidiscrimination statute, which states, "the procedures
contained in this section are the exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrim-
ination based upon race, color, sex, retaliation .... ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-7.1(15)
(1994 & Supp. 1996). The legislature might also then reduce the size of businesses cov-
ered by the statute from the current minimum of 15 employees to balance the preemptory
effect of the statute created by such an amendment. See supra note 46.
159. The Molksworth court described the public policy of Maryland against sex discrimi-
nation as "ubiquitous" and observed that "Section 14 is one of at least thirty-four statutes,
one executive order, and one constitutional amendment in Maryland that prohibits dis-
crimination based on sex in certain circumstances." Molesworth, 341 Md. at 632, 672 A.2d
at 613.
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tional origin, age, marital status, religion, and disability.16 ° The Court
of Appeals needs to provide clear guidance as to the discriminatory
practices that will give rise to a wrongful discharge tort. For example,
the issue of whether a wrongful discharge action based on age dis-
crimination may be brought against an employer is likely to become
an important one over the next few years.1 61 At least one state court
has determined that the tort will lie for sex discrimination, but not for
age discrimination."'
5. Conclusion.-In Molesworth v. Brandon, the Court of Appeals
properly made available the common law tort of wrongful discharge
to an employee terminated because of gender, a discriminatory prac-
tice clearly violative of Maryland public policy. 163 The court's decision
is consistent with Maryland precedent and the legislative intent under-
lying the small business exemption from the administrative process set
forth in Article 49B. Nevertheless, the current disparity in liability be-
tween small businesses and those large enough to be covered by Arti-
cle 49B needs to be remedied.
The court also needs to clarify what effect, if any, local antidis-
crimination ordinances would have on a former employee's ability to
recover under a wrongful discharge tort. Finally, the court needs to
clarify whether the policy statement contained in section 14 of Article
49B is independently sufficient to support a wrongful discharge claim
for discriminatory practices against the other protected classes enu-
merated in the statute. Despite the need for further clarification, the
160. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 14 (1994).
161. See Liz Halloran, Whole Lot of Graying Going on As Boomers Age: Exped Changes in the
Workplace, HARTFORD CouRArr, Aug. 14, 1996, at Al ("Age discrimination in the workplace
will become the civil rights issue of the next decade... as the 76 million boomers con-
tinue-through their sheer numbers-to dominate the workforce well into the next cen-
tury."); Lisa Stansky, New Age Woes: Lawyers Are Preparing Now for a Possible Wave of Age
Discrimination Suits by Baby Boomers, 83 A-B.A. J., Jan. 1997, at 66.
162. The Supreme Court of California, inJennings v. Marralle, 876 P.2d 1074 (Cal. 1994),
held that the wrongful discharge tort was unavailable to a discharge based on age discrimi-
nation by an employer too small to be covered by the administrative remedies provided in
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). See id. at 1082-83. The court
distinguished "the age-related rights created by the FEHA from the fundamental rights
against discrimination on other bases, rights which predate the FEHA and have their ori-
gin in the Constitution, other statutes, or common law." Id
In Badih v. Myers, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229 (Ct. App. 1995), a lower California court held
that sufficient public policy existed against sex discrimination to uphold a wrongful dis-
charge claim based on sex discrimination. See id. at 233. The court identified the state
constitution as a source of public policy against sex discrimination. See id.
163. Molesworth, 341 Md. at 637, 672 A.2d at 616.
1997] 847
848 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 56:656
Molesworth decision moves Maryland one step closer to eradicating dis-
criminatory employment practices on the basis of sex.
DEBORAH M. SHELTON
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
V. EVIDENCE
A. Judicial Discretion in the Admission of "In Life" Victim Photographs
A deceased victim's "in life" photograph represents a "silent wit-
ness"' to the past. This type of photographic evidence communicates
a powerful message with the "vital, mirror-like appearance of a photo-
graph... capable of inciting [the] passions and prejudices of ajury."2
In State v. Broberg,3 the Court of Appeals addressed whether a victim's
in life photographs are admissible during a criminal trial. Holding
that it is within a trial judge's discretion whether to allow the display
of a victim's in life photographs to the jury,4 the court declined to
adopt a per se rule enabling all juries to become acquainted with a
homicide victim through the display of in life photographs.5 The
court rejected an interpretation of Maryland's constitutional and stat-
utory provisions that would have prevented a trial judge from exercis-
ing discretion over the admission of a victim's in life photographs.6
With American society's increasing concern for the rights of
crime victims, many states have adopted legislation to bring victims
and their rights fully and visibly back into the courtroom. The Mary-
land Legislature's enactment of a constitutional amendment on vic-
tims' rights7 signaled a dismissal of the traditional notion that victims
and their families should be kept outside the legal system because
they might be too biased to participate in the prosecution.8 The
Broberg decision continues the national trend towards increasing a vic-
tim's presence during criminal trials.
1. The Case.-During an early April evening in 1993, Paul
Broberg (Broberg) became involved in a tragic automobile accident.9
1. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 790, at 220 (James
H. Chadbourn rev., 1970).
2. 2 CHARLES C. SCOTr, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE: PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION
§ 1001, at 296 (2d ed. 1969).
3. 342 Md. 544, 677 A.2d 602 (1996).
4. Id. at 562-65, 677 A.2d at 610-12.
5. Id. at 565, 677 A.2d at 612.
6. Id. at 565-66, 677 A.2d at 612 (interpreting Article 47 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights and Article 27, Section 643D of the Maryland Annotated Code). See MD. CONST.
DECL. OF RTS. art. 47; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 643D (1992).
7. Article 47 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states, in pertinent part: "[I]n a
case [arising] in a circuit court, a victim of crime shall have the right .... upon request
and if practicable, to be notified of, to attend, and to be heard at a criminal justice pro-
ceeding." MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 47.
8. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: PROTECTING VICTIMS'
RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1994).
9. Broberg, 342 Md. at 549, 677 A.2d at 604.
1997] 849
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Broberg was driving his truck along New Design Road, a two-lane rural
road in Frederick County with a posted speed limit of fifty miles per
hour.1" At the same time, eleven-year-old Thomas Blank, Jr. (Blank),
operating a lawn tractor, crossed the road." When Broberg drove
over the crest of a hill, he struck and killed Blank. 2 The police esti-
mated Broberg's speed at approximately sixty-four miles per hour.'"
Following the accident, police took Broberg to the hospital, where his
blood alcohol level was measured at 0.17.14
Subsequently, the State indicted Broberg on thirteen charges, in-
cluding manslaughter by automobile, homicide by motor vehicle
while intoxicated, and driving while intoxicated. 5 He was tried
before a jury in the Circuit Court for Frederick County. 6 Prior to
trial, Broberg stipulated to the identity of the victim. 17 During its
opening argument, the State displayed to the jury two in life photo-
graphs of the victim"aone a sixth-grade school portrait of Blank and
another of Blank in a little league uniform. 19 In response to the
State's display of these photographs, the defense made a timely objec-
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Evidence at Broberg's trial indicated that drivers on New Design Road are un-
able to see the portion of the roadway where the accident occurred until they reach the
top of a hill, about 250 feet south of the point of impact. State v. Broberg, No. 458, slip op.
at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 12, 1994) (per curiam), rev'd, 342 Md. 544, 677 A.2d 602
(1996).
13. Broberg, 342 Md. at 549, 677 A.2d at 604.
14. Id. The policy of the Frederick County Sheriffs Department is to extract blood
samples for alcohol testing when there is "a fatality or strong possibility of pending death."
Broberg, No. 458, slip op. at 2.
15. Broberg, 342 Md. at 549, 677 A.2d at 604. The State also charged Broberg with
homicide by motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, driving while under the
influence of alcohol, two counts of reckless driving, negligent driving, exceeding the speed
limit, speed greater than reasonable and prudent, failure to reduce speed to avoid acci-
dent, failure to drive in a single lane, and failure to drive right of center. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 550, 677 A.2d at 604. Before bringing in the jury, the trial judge held a bench
conference with both State and defense counsel present. Record Extract at 15, Broberg v.
State, 342 Md. 544, 677 A.2d 602 (1996) (No. 22). Broberg's attorney stated to the court,
"[W] e're stipulating to the identity of the deceased, so it won't be necessary to show photo-
graphs." Id. The court responded, "To the identity of the victim, yes, sir." Id.
18. Broberg, 342 Md. at 549, 677 A.2d at 604. The State began its opening statement by
telling the jury that "[y]ou've all heard the expression that life begins at 40, but [you]
needn't try and tell that to [Thomas Blank, Jr.'s parents]." Record Extract at 17, Broberg
(No. 22). Broberg's attorney objected on the basis that "[t] his is going to be the beginning
of a long series of attempts to evoke sympathy from the jury." Id.
19. Broberg, 342 Md. at 549, 677 A.2d at 604.
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tion2 ° and moved for a mistrial."1 The trial judge overruled the de-
fense's objection and denied the motion for mistrial.22
Later, when the victim's father testified, the State again showed
the photographs of the victim.2" Blank's father cried when asked to
look at the photographs and identify his son.24 At this point, the de-
fense made another objection and moved a second time for a mis-
trial.25 The defense argued that the photographs were not relevant
because both parties had stipulated to the victim's identity.26 The
State responded by disputing the scope of the stipulation, stating
"that's not what [the defense] stipulated to, your honor, for the rec-
ord."27 Again, the trial judge overruled the objection and allowed the
State to display the photographs to the jury.2" Following its delibera-
tions, the jury convicted Broberg of homicide by motor vehicle, driv-
ing while intoxicated, and several lessor related offenses. 9 In a
motion for a new trial, Broberg's attorney argued that the trial judge
erred by allowing the State to display in life photographs of the victim
because its sole purpose was "to evoke Uury] sympathy."3 0
20. Id. Broberg's defense counsel objected to the State's showing of the photographs
to the jury on the basis that they had not been admitted into evidence. Id. The only
mention in the trial transcripts that the court admitted the victim's photographs into evi-
dence was when defense counsel, in his initial motion for a mistrial, asked that the photo-
graphs be admitted for the "purpose of protecting the record in ... [his] motion for a
mistrial." Record Extract at 219, Broberg (No. 22).
21. Broberg, 342 Md. at 549, 677 A.2d at 604.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 550, 677 A.2d at 604.
24. Id.; see also Dennis O'Brien, Md High Court to Rule on Photos: Some Believe Victims'
Pictures Can Lead Juries to Convict, BALT. SUN, Oct. 30, 1995, at 1B (reporting that Thomas
Blank, Sr. broke down in tears when prosecutors showed him photos of his 1 1-year-old
son). Following the father's testimony, Broberg's attorney renewed his motion for a mis-
trial, stating that when the State "showed the photographs of Tommy Blank to his father,
his father began to cry and the jury saw that .... and I want the record to reflect that."
Record Extract at 34, Broberg (No. 22).




29. Id. Broberg, in his brief to the Court of Appeals, stated that the jury was permitted
to see the victim's in life photographs in the jury room during deliberation. Brief of Re-
spondent at 16, Broberg v. State, 342 Md. 554, 677 A.2d 602 (1996) (No. 22). The State, in
its reply brief, did not refute this contention, but, rather, argued that it was defense coun-
sel's responsibility to alert the trial court to the fact "that because the photographs had not
been admitted into evidence, they should not accompany the jury into the jury room."
Reply Brief of Petitioner at 3 n. 1, Broberg v. State, 342 Md. 554, 677 A.2d 602 (1996) (No.
22).
30. Record Extract at 57, Broberg (No. 22). The State argued that the trial court prop-
erly allowed the display of photographs because a trial is "not some sterile hearing where
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After considering both arguments, the trial judge concluded that
allowing the jury to see in life photographs of the victim did not con-
stitute error, "at least [to] the extent [that] a picture can acquaint
someone with the victim.""1 Thus, the trial judge denied Broberg's
motion for a new trial.32 Broberg appealed.33
Broberg argued to the Court of Special Appeals that, because he
had stipulated to the victim's identity, the trial court committed re-
versible error by repeatedly allowing the prosecution to display in life
photographs of the victim to the jury.34 Broberg contended that the
photographs had no probative value and were shown "purely to
arouse the passion and sympathy of the jury."35 In an unreported
opinion, the Court of Special Appeals agreed.36 The court held that,
although "[p]ictures of a homicide victim taken before his or her
death, will sometimes be relevant to the issue of identity," the photo-
graphs in Broberg were inadmissible because "the parties stipulated to
the victim's identity prior to trial."37 The court further held that the
error was not harmless. 8
Concluding that the State displayed the photographs of the vic-
tim "simply to arouse the passions of the jury,"39 the Court of Special
Appeals reversed the trial court's verdict and ordered a new trial.4"
The State filed a petition for certiorari, ' and the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari on the question of whether it is permissible to "al-
we can't talk about a victim, we can't refer to a victim, we just have to... accuse ... Mr.
Broberg of killing... and leave it at that." Id. at 158.
31. Id. at 160.
32. Id. at 161.
33. Broberg, 342 Md. at 550, 677 A.2d at 604.
34. See State v. Broberg, No. 458, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 12, 1994) (per
curiam), rev'd, 342 Md. 544, 677 A.2d 602 (1996).
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id. at 6. The Court of Special Appeals observed: "'As a general rule a photograph
that is "entirely irrelevant and immaterial to any issue in the cause and which is of such a
character as to divert the minds of the jury to improper or irrelevant considerations should
be excluded from evidence."'" Id. (quoting Evansville School Corp. v. Price, 208 N.E.2d
689, 691 (Ind. App. 1965) (quoting Kiefer v. State, 153 N.E.2d 899, 900 (Ind. 1958))).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 4.
41. The State challenged the Court of Special Appeals decision primarily because of
the recent passage of victims' rights legislation by the Maryland General Assembly. See
O'Brien, supra note 24. According to Gary Bair, chief of the Attorney General's criminal
appeals division, "the state has [an interest] in this case, because the legislature has specifi-
cally spoken out on victims' rights." Id.
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low[ ] the jury to become acquainted with the homicide victim
through a display of 'in life' photographs of the victim. "42
2. Legal Background.-
a. General Admissibility of Photographic Evidence. -Maryland
courts consistently have held that the admissibility of photographs is
subject to the same standards of admission as other forms of evi-
dence.4' Maryland courts utilize a two-pronged test to evaluate the
admissibility of photographic evidence.' First, photographs, like
other forms of evidence, are inadmissible if irrelevant under Maryland
Rule 5-402. 45 Second, under Maryland Rule 5403,6 photographs are
subject to exclusion if the trial judge determines that their probative
value is substantially outweighed by their unfairly prejudicial effect on
the jury.47
Maryland law dictates that a photograph must be relevant if it is
to be admitted into evidence.' In Johnson v. State,49 the Court of Ap-
peals discussed the types of photographs that have been found rele-
vant in Maryland:
[W] e have permitted the reception into evidence of photo-
graphs depicting the condition of the victim and the location
of injuries upon the deceased, the position of the victim's
42. Broberg 342 Md. at 567, 677 A-2d at 613 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
43. See Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 43, 527 A-2d 3, 8 (1987), vacated on other grounds, 486
U.S. 367 (1988). In Mil/s, the Court of Appeals stated that "the admissibility of photo-
graphs turns upon a balancing of their probative value against their potential for preju-
dice." Id., 527 A.2d at 7; acordJohnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 502, 495 A.2d 1, 8 (1985); see
also Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 676, 566 A.2d 111, 119 (1989) (holding that admissibil-
ity of photographs is determined by a balancing of the probative value against the potential
for improper prejudice to the defendant); Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 245, 539 A.2d 637,
647 (1988) (quoting the balancing test announced in Mills).
44. SeeJOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 1102, at 58 (2d ed.
Supp. 1996) (discussing the admissibility of photographic evidence).
45. See MD. R. 5-402 ("Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible."); see also MD. R. 5-
401 (defining relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence").
46. Rule 5-403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." MD. R. 5-403.
47. See Mi/ls, 310 Md. at 43, 527 A.2d at 7; see also Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 692, 637
A.2d 117, 133 (1994) (stating that the trial judge has the discretion to decide whether a
photograph has practical value to a particular case and is therefore admissible).
48. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
49. 303 Md. 487, 495 A.2d 1 (1985).
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body at the murder site, and the wounds of the victim. On
certain occasions, photographs have also been admitted to
allow the jury to visualize the atrociousness of the crime-a
circumstance of much import where the factfinder must de-
termine the degree of murder.5 °
The Court of Appeals repeatedly has acknowledged that most
photographic evidence is cumulative, even though it still may be rele-
vant and possess probative value.51 Although the court has given
broad discretion to trial courts with regard to the admission of photo-
graphic evidence, the court has stated that the trial judge's discretion
does not extend to admission of irrelevant evidence.52 In Buch v.
Hulcher, the court, in an action for alienation of affections,54 found
that photographs of a wife surrounded by her children were irrelevant
because of the wife's presence in court.55 In most evidentiary deci-
sions, however, the Court of Appeals tends to give deference to the
trial court's decision as to whether evidence is relevant.56 The court's
50. Id. at 502, 495 A.2d at 8-9 (citations omitted); see also Clarke v. State, 238 Md. 11,
21-22, 207 A.2d 456, 461-62 (1965) (stating that crime scene and autopsy photographs of
homicide victims were relevant to a broad range of issues).
51. See Johnson, 303 Md. at 503-04, 495 A-2d at 9. The Court of Appeals stated that "all
photographic evidence is in some sense cumulative. The very purpose of photographic
evidence is to clarify and communicate facts to the tribunal [or jury] more accurately than
by mere words. ... [lit is for the trial judge, in his discretion, to determine if the pictures
are probative and admissible." Id. (citation omitted); see also Grandison v. State, 305 Md.
685, 730, 506 A.2d 580, 602 (1986) (stating that admitting photographs that represent
undisputed facts already in evidence is not improper); MuPHui-, supra note 44, at 386 (stat-
ing that, although photographic evidence is usually cumulative, it seldom should be ex-
cluded from admission).
52. See Void v. State, 325 Md. 386, 393, 601 A.2d 124, 127 (1992).
53. 180 Md. 309, 23 A.2d 829 (1942).
54. The tort of alienation of affections is premised on willful and malicious interfer-
ence with the marital relationship by a third party without justification. See Donnell v.
Donnell, 415 S.W.2d 127, 132 (Tenn. 1967).
55. Buch, 180 Md. at 313, 23 A.2d at 831.
56. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, discussing why a trial
judge's evidentiary rulings should be given great deference, stated: "We give wide latitude
to the trial judge in determining the admissibility of evidence because he is in the best
position to assess the impact and effect of evidence based upon what he perceives from the
live proceeding of a trial, while we can only review a cold record." United States v. Ford,
632 F.2d 1354, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980). As one judge described it:
On the appellate court, nearly all of what the judges see is a rerun of what has
first played live and in color in the trial court. But the reruns are condensed,
edited, and produced in black-and-white. The difference between trying a case
on the district level court and merely reading the briefs on appeal is only a little
less marked than the difference between watching Gone with the Wind and reading
the TV Guide description of iL
Alice M. Batchelder, Some Brief Reflections of a Circuit Judge, 54 OHIO ST. LJ. 1453, 1453
(1993).
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rationale for giving such deference is that a trial judge's decision is
based on the circumstances surrounding the entire trial, whereas an
appellate decision is premised primarily on a sterile reading of the
trial transcript.5
7
b. Admissibility of "In Life" Photographs.-In Grandison v.
State, 8 the Court of Appeals applied the standard two-pronged eviden-
tiary test to evaluate the admissibility of a victim's in life photo-
graphs.59 Concluding that the trial court's decision to admit a victim's
in life photographs was not "plainly arbitrary," the court refused to
disturb the trial court's ruling.6 ° The Court of Appeals found that a
victim's photographs were relevant to an issue of mistaken identity 1
and, therefore, were admissible. Further, the court held that the trial
judge did not commit prejudicial error, "since the photographs are
mere graphic representations of undisputed facts already in evi-
dence"; therefore, "their introduction could not be held to have in-
jured the accused."6 2
In other jurisdictions, there is a split of authority on the admissi-
bility of a victim's in life photographs. Courts in California, New York,
Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, for example, have held
the admission of in life photographs to be erroneous, without provid-
ing an evidentiary basis.63 In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed a murder conviction based on the admission of in life photo-
57. See Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly
Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REv. 497, 499 (1983) ("Implicit in the creation of this
discretionary power is the assumption that truth and justice cannot be captured by mere
language, but require the intervention of human sensibilities.").
58. 305 Md. 685, 506 A.2d 580 (1986).
59. Id. at 729, 506 A.2d at 602.
60. Id. at 729-30, 506 A.2d at 602.
61. Id. at 729, 506 A.2d at 602.
62. Id. at 730, 506 A.2d at 602.
63. See Parker v. State, 731 S.W.2d 756, 763 (Ark. 1987) (holding that the "photograph
of the victims while alive had ... no probative value, and it should not be admitted on
retrial"); People v. Kimble, 749 P.2d 803, 814 (Cal. 1988) (reasoning that in life photo-
graphs of a victim "probably should be excluded" where they are irrelevant to any material
issue of the case); People v. Esdaille, 554 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (App. Div. 1990) ("We agree
with the defendant's contention that the photograph of the... victim had no probative
value and was inadmissible."); Franks v. State, 636 P.2d 361, 366 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981)
(stating that admission of an in life photograph of a child victim constituted an abuse of
the trial court's discretion because "it provided no proof and was prejudicial"); Richie v.
State, 632 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (holding that an in life photograph of
a deceased child victim had "questionable" probative value and "could be highly prejudi-
cial"); Avirett v. State, 84 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1935) (stating that if no issue as
to the "identity of [the] deceased" exists, the State should not be allowed to introduce an
in life photograph of the victim).
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graphs of the victim.6 4 Other states, however, such as Washington,
Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Oregon, have held that in life vic-
tim photographs are either always admissible or that their admissibil-
ity is within the discretion of the trial court.65
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the constitu-
tional implications of using in life photographs in the landmark case
of Payne v. Tennessee,66 in which the State had introduced in life photo-
graphs to show the homicide victim as a "uniquely individual human
64. See Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 157 (Pa. 1978). The Commonwealth
argued that the jury was entitled to know that the victim was "'more than a body'" and
should be allowed "'to get some feel for ... [the victim's] life.'" Id. at 159. Nevertheless,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the photographs "totally irrelevant to the determi-
nation of the appellant's guilt or innocence." Id. at 160. In response to the trial judge's
decision that the photographs were not prejudicial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated that to "'hold such evidence not prejudicial to the defendant is to disregard the
realities of trial atmosphere and the emotional frailties of human nature.'" Id. (quoting
Knight v. State, 142 So. 2d 899, 910 (Ala. 1962)).
65. See OR. REv. STAT. § 41.415 (Supp. 1996) ("In a prosecution for any criminal homi-
cide, a photograph of the victim while alive shall be admissible evidence when offered by
the district attorney to show the general appearance and condition of the victim while
alive."); State v. Williams, 828 P.2d 1006, 1012-13 (Or. 1992) (en banc) (concluding that
the Oregon statute, in effect, declares in life victim photographs as relevant per se and not
subject to a balancing analysis); Williams v. State, 451 So. 2d 411, 421 (Ala. Crim. App.
1984) (stating that an in life photograph of a victim standing by a Christmas tree was not
subject to a balancing test because the photograph was used to help a witness identify the
victim); Drane v. State, 455 S.E.2d 27, 32-33 (Ga. 1995) (holding that an in life photograph
of a victim was relevant to prove identity); State v. Aswegan, 331 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Iowa 1983)
(concluding that the admission of victim's in life photographs was within the trial court's
discretion); People v. Sullivan, 296 N.W.2d 81, 83 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted for the purpose of identification a
photograph showing the victim posing with his wife and small child); Bullock v. State, 391
So. 2d 601, 609 (Miss. 1980) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
judge to admit high school portrait of the victim); State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14, 23 (R.I.
1991) (concluding that a victim's in life photograph is relevant to establish identity); State
v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889, 902 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (holding that admission of a victim's in
life photograph was not an abuse of discretion). But see State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092,
1100 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (stating that the trial court properly did not allow the State
to present in life photographs where the victim's identity was not at issue and the photo-
graphs were not tied to any other issue).
66. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). The Supreme Court first considered the admissibility of vic-
tim impact evidence in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). The Court held unconstitu-
tional the use of victim impact statements during capital sentencing proceedings. Id. at
509. Again, in South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), the Court extended the hold-
ing of Booth, prohibiting a prosecutor from including victim impact statements in closing
argument to the jury in a capital murder case. Id. at 810. In Payne, however, the Court
explicitly overturned both Booth and Gathers, holding that victim impact evidence enables a
"jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability." Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. The
Booth decision, the Payne Court held, "deprives the State of the full moral force of its evi-
dence and may prevent the jury from having before it all the information necessary to
determine the proper punishment." Id. But see id. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We
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bein[g] ."67 The trial court had admitted photographs of the victim
during the sentencing phase of the trial.68 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the trial judge's decision and stated that photographs could be
used during sentencing hearings to humanize the victim for the
jury.69
c. Effect of Stipulations on the Admission of Evidence.-Mary-
land's case law defines a stipulation as an agreement between oppos-
ing counsel-much like a contract.7" Courts interpret stipulations
that are based on mutual assent to effectuate the intent of the par-
ties. 71 Generally, parties are bound by their stipulations.72 Although
a stipulation is based on mutual assent, opposing counsel often dis-
pute the scope of the stipulation and the extent to which it precludes
a party from offering evidence of the stipulated fact.73
In determining whether to admit evidence to a stipulated fact,
courts in other jurisdictions have sought to balance the competing
interests of the parties.7 ' The parties to a stipulation are usually enti-
fled to the benefit of their bargain. 75 This broad rule is subject to the
discretion of the trial judge, however, who must balance one party's
interest in excluding inflammatory evidence with the other party's in-
terest in the "legitimate moral force of his evidence."76 Although
Maryland case law does not address admission of evidence in light of a
prior stipulation, the Court of Appeals stated in Grandison that photo-
do not hold today that victim impact evidence must be admitted, or even that it should be
admitted.").
67. Payne, 501 U.S. at 822 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 814-16. Paynewas a capital murder case. Id. The defendant was convicted in
Shelby Criminal Court of first degree murder, and was sentenced to death. Id. at 816. The
Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits a
jury from considering victim impact evidence during a capital sentencing hearing. Id. at
817.
69. Id. at 830.
70. See Burke v. Burke, 204 Md. 637, 645, 106 A.2d 59, 63 (1954).
71. See id.
72. See Bloom v. Graft, 191 Md. 733, 736, 63 A.2d 313, 315 (1949).
73. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Stipulations by the Defense to Remove Other Act Evidence 9
CriM. JusT. 35, 39 (1995) (stating that in many cases a stipulation does not always make
clear to a trial judge exactly what is being conceded or what is being disputed).
74. See, e.g., State v. Gilmore, 332 So. 2d 789, 795-96 (La. 1976) (stating if the State's
proof has been rendered unnecessary by a stipulation, the prejudicial nature of the evi-
dence assumes added significance and reduces the State's legitimate interest in the admis-
sion of the particular evidence).
75. Id.
76. 9JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2591, at 824 (James H. Chadbourn rev., 1981).
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graphs do not lack probative value simply because they depict an un-
contested issue. 77
d. Harmless Error in the Admission of Evidence.-The modem
source of the harmless error rule is found in rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which directs that "[a]ny error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall
be disregarded." 78 In State v. Enriquez,79 the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals held that harmless error occurs only if the error played no role
in the fact finder's verdict."0 Further, in Bruno v. State,"l Judge Bell,
writing in dissent, stated that appellate review of harmless error "is
supposed to be strict, [and] that it 'has been and should be carefully
circumscribed."'' 2 In analyzing the application of the harmless error
rule, a majority of the court stated that trial errors should be ex-
amined in light of whether other evidence presented at the trial
amounts to overwhelming evidence.8" Because the trial judge is in the
best position to evaluate factual evidence in each particular case,
Maryland case law holds a trial court's determination will not be dis-
turbed unless it is "plainly arbitrary."8 4 Additionally, in Dorsey v. State5
the Court of Appeals stated:
77. See supra notes 51, 58-62 and accompanying text.
78. FED. R. CUM. P. 52(a); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). In
Fulminante, the Court stated that "the harmless-error doctrine is essential to preserve the
'principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of
the defendant's guilt or innocence, and [it] promotes public respect for the criminal pro-
cess by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevita-
ble presence of immaterial error.'" Id. at 308 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 681 (1986)).
79. 327 Md. 365, 609 A.2d 343 (1992).
80. Id. at 374, 609 A.2d at 347; see also MD. R. 8-131(b) ("[T]he Court of Appeals may
consider whether [an] ... error was harmless or non-prejudicial even though the matter of
harm or prejudice was not raised in the petition.").
81. 332 Md. 673, 632 A.2d 1192 (1993).
82. Id. at 697, 632 A.2d at 1204 (Bell, J., dissenting) (quoting Younie v. State, 272 Md.
233, 248, 322 A.2d 211, 219 (1974)). In Younie, the Court of Appeals stated:
"Continued expansion of the harmless error rule will merely encourage prosecu-
tors to attempt to get such testimony in, since they know that, if they have a strong
case, such testimony will not be considered to be reversible error, yet if they have
a weak case, they will use such testimony to buttress the case to gain a conviction
and then hope that the issue is not raised on appeal."
272 Md. at 248, 322 A.2d at 219 (quoting People v.Jablonski, 195 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1972)).
83. See Bruno, 332 Md. at 694-95, 632 A.2d at 1202-03 (holding that error was harmless
where admitted evidence did not have any influence on the verdict).
84. Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 502, 495 A.2d 1, 8 (1985).
85. 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976).
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[W] hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error,
unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of
the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such
error cannot be deemed 'harmless' and a reversal is man-
dated.... [A] reviewing court must thus be satisfied that
there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence com-
plained of-whether erroneously admitted or excluded-
may have contributed to the rendering of the guilty verdict.86
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In State v. Broberg, the Court of Ap-
peals held that it is within a trial judge's discretion whether to allow
the display of in life photographs of a victim to the jury.87 In so rul-
ing, the court considered several important issues, such as (1) the pro-
bative value of the photographs versus their prejudicial effect,88 (2)
the relevance of the photographs in light of the parties' stipulation to
identity," and (3) a victim's right to be present at trial under the Vic-
tims' Bill of Rights.9"
Initially, the court focused on whether the probative value of the
in life photographs of the victim outweighed their potential prejudi-
cial effect.9" In Maryland, the State must establish the identity of the
victim. Photographs of the victim, either in life or postmortem, may
be used for this purpose.9" The Broberg court reasoned that the in life
photographs "were probative of the deceased victim's identity because
his father's testimony connected the [photographs of his son] .. . to
the person killed in the accident."93 The court concluded that,
although display of the photographs to the jury did prejudice the de-
fendant's case, the display was not unfairly prejudicial.94 Because the
State did not use the photographs as part of a "before and after" com-
parison with autopsy photographs, the court found that the photo-
graphs were no more prejudicial than autopsy photographs, which
courts routinely admit in homicide cases. Thus, the court held, the
86. Id. at 659, 350 A-2d at 678.
87. 342 Md. at 562-65, 677 A.2d at 610-12.
88. Id. at 561, 677 A.2d at 610.
89. Id. at 562-65, 677 A.2d at 610-12.
90. Id. at 565-66, 677 A.2d at 612.
91. Id. at 561, 677 A.2d at 610.
92. Id. Prior to Broberg, the Court of Appeals had held that the prosecution in a homi-
cide case must establish the death of the person for which the case is being tried. SeeJones
v. State, 188 Md. 263, 272, 52 A.2d 484, 488 (1947). In Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 506
A.2d 580 (1986), the Court of Appeals held that either in life photographs or photographs
taken after death may be used to establish the victim's identity. Id. at 729, 506 A.2d at 602.




trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the in life
photographs. 5
Next, the court examined the relevancy of the photographs in
light of the defendant's stipulation to the victim's identity prior to the
beginning of trial.96 Citing the trial transcript, the court ruled that,
because there was conflicting information regarding the scope of the
stipulation, the decision to admit the photographs was within the dis-
cretion of the trialjudge.97 In addition, the court explained that even
with a clear stipulation as to the victim's identity, a stipulation does
not deprive the photographs of all relevance." Past decisions by the
Court of Appeals indicate that photographs need not possess "'essen-
tial evidentiary value' to be admissible."99 In fact, photographs used
during trial generally do not provide new information, but instead
provide the jury orjudge with an "alternative form" of information. 100
Finally, although the court found that the in life photographs in
the Broberg case were admissible, it declined to adopt a per se rule that
would make in life photographs admissible in every criminal case.1" 1
The court did not interpret Maryland's constitutional and statutory
protections of victims' rights to include a requirement that in life pho-
tographs automatically be admitted.' Alternatively, the court em-
phasized that Maryland's victims' rights provisions do not preclude a
trial judge from exercising discretion when deciding whether to admit
in life photographs into evidence.10 3
4. Analysis.--Continuing the current trend in Maryland evi-
dence law, the Broberg decision provides wide discretionary power to
trial courts in deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence. In
Broberg, the Court of Appeals held that a trial judge has the ultimate
discretion to determine whether in life photographs are admissible to
establish the identity of a crime victim.'0 4 The decision reflects the
95. Id.
96. Id. at 562, 677 A.2d at 610.
97. Id. at 562-65, 677 A.2d at 610-12.
98. Id. at 565, 677 A.2d at 612 (citing Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 729, 506 A.2d
580, 602 (1986)).
99. Id. (quoting Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 677, 566 A.2d 111, 120 (1989)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
103. Broberg, 342 Md. at 565-66, 677 A.2d at 612.
104. Id. at 552, 677 A.2d at 605-06. The court stated that all photographic evidence will
be evaluated using the standard two-prong assessment: (1) the court must decide if the
photograph is relevant, and (2) the court must balance the evidence's probative value
against its prejudicial impact. Id. at 552-53, 677 A.2d at 605-06.
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Court of Appeals's traditional reluctance to disturb trial court rulings
on evidentiary questions.10 5 Initially, the court granted certiorari in
Broberg to consider whether a victim's in life photographs could be
displayed to the jury so it could become acquainted with the homicide
victim;'0 6 nevertheless, the court declined to adopt a rule making
these types of photographs per se admissible." 7
The Broberg decision is problematic for several reasons. First, the
court's holding does not enhance the predictability of Maryland's law
of evidence. Rather, the decision leaves practitioners less certain
about what photographic evidence is admissible under Maryland Rule
5403. Evidentiary rulings made by trial judges will remain inconsis-
tent throughout the Maryland Circuits.
Second, the Broberg court's ad hoc approach adds to the difficulty
of predicting how trial judges will determine whether photographic
evidence is unfairly prejudicial. Without adopting an objective test for
what is unfairly prejudicial, the court has further complicated the task
for practitioners and judges to determine the discretionary limits for
admission of disputed evidence.
a. Relevancy of a Victim's In Life Victim Photographs in Light of a
Prior Stipulation to Identity.-For evidence to be admissible in a crimi-
nal prosecution it must be relevant.' The relevance of a piece of
evidence is measured by its propensity to establish or disprove a fact
that is at issue in the case.'0 9 In State v.Joynes," the court articulated:
There are two important components to relevant evidence:
materiality and probative value. Materiality looks to the rela-
tion between the propositions for which the evidence is of-
fered and the issues in the case. The second aspect of
relevance is probative value, which is the tendency of evi-
dence to establish the proposition that it is offered to
prove."'1
105. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
106. Broberg 342 Md. at 549-50, 677 A.2d at 604.
107. Id. at 565, 677 A.2d at 612.
108. SeeState v. Joynes, 314 Md. 113, 119, 549 A.2d 380, 383 (1988).
109. Id.
110. 314 Md. 113, 549 A.2d 380 (1988).
111. Id. at 119, 549 A.2d at 383; see ahso Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 736-37, 679 A.2d
1106, 1113 (1996) (quoting with approval the standard articulated in Jaynes).
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These principles are embodied in Chapter 4 of the Maryland Rules of
Evidence.' 1 2
Although the court in Broberg correctly applied principles of rele-
vancy and concluded that in life photographs of the victim were rele-
vant to establish identity, it failed to address the photographs'
relevance in light of a prior stipulation to the victim's identity. This is,
perhaps, the most glaring problem in Broberg because, in this instance,
the court ignored the clear stipulation to the victim's identity prior to
trial. In a homicide case, the State has the burden to prove the iden-
tity of the victim."3 The trial transcript of Broberg indicates, however,
that no dispute existed over the identity of the victim.1 1 4 In fact, on at
least two occasions, the defense stipulated to the victim's identity.1 5
The Court of Appeals stated that the trial judge had the discre-
tion to admit the photographs, even though the victim's identity was
not at issue.1 16 The court justified this incomprehensible conclusion
by contending that (1) "photographs need not possess 'essential evi-
dentiary value' to be admissible" and (2) that even though a photo-
graph "does not provide the factfinder with new information ... [it
does provide] an alternative form of information." 7 Clearly, without
a dispute over identity, the in life photographs of the victim had slight
relevance. Consequently, in future cases when the defense clearly
stipulates to the victim's identity, the State will still be allowed to pres-
ent photographic evidence of identity, subject, of course, to the trial
judge's discretion.
b. The Effect of Maryland Evidence Rule 5-403 on the Admission
of In Life Victim Photographs.-Maryland Evidence Rule 5403, modeled
after its federal counterpart, is the most important exclusionary rule
in the rules of evidence. 8 The most fundamental policy underlying
the Maryland and Federal Rules of Evidence is the advancement of
112. SeeAlan D. Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Suruey, Analysis, and Cri-
tique, 54 MD. L. REv. 1032, 1036-37 (1995). Chapter 4 of the Maryland Rules of evidence
was essentially modeled after Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See id.
113. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
116. See Broberg 342 Md. at 565, 677 A.2d at 612.
117. Id. (quoting Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 677, 566 A.2d 111, 120 (1989)).
118. Maryland Rule 5-403 is analogous to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Hornstein,
supra note 112, at 1036-37. Maryland Rule 5-403 is an important exclusionary rule because
"[iut establishes the basic formula for the admission and exclusion of evidence, a formula
embodied in other [Maryland] rules' applications to particular situations." Id. The other
Chapter 4 rules "combine the underlying principle of Rule 5-403 with a number of policy
overlays." Id. at 1037.
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accurate fact-finding and the promotion of fairness.119 Accordingly,
Maryland Rule 5-403 grants trial judges the ultimate discretion to ex-
clude evidence even if it is admissible under other evidence rules. Un-
derlying this formulation is the assumption that justice cannot be
captured by sterile application of the rules, but, instead, requires in-
terpretation by reasonable judges. By providing flexibility, Rule 5-403
endeavors to advance fairness in the trial process. 1
2 1
Under Maryland law, if the probative value of proffered evidence
is "substantially outweighed" by the needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence, Maryland Rule 5-403 grants the trial court discretion to
exclude such evidence. The language of Rule 5-403 clearly establishes
a judge's discretion to exclude relevant evidence if the balance be-
tween probative value and unfair prejudice is uncertain.1 2 1 For exclu-
sion of relevant evidence, however, there must be a substantial tipping
of the scales against the evidence's probative worth.
One guide that courts have used to evaluate the admissibility of
potentially prejudicial evidence is to ask whether the same fact can be
proven with less provocative evidence.1 22 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has set forth a test that other courts may
use in this balancing process: "Although sensational and shocking evi-
dence may be relevant, it has an objectionable tendency to prejudice
the jury. It is, therefore, incompetent unless the exigencies of proof
make it necessary or important that the case be proved that way."121
IN Broberg, the trial court faced the question of whether the pro-
bative value of the photographs outweighed the danger of unfair prej-
udice to the defendant. Given the factual circumstances of the case,
the trial court's decision that the photographs were not unfairly preju-
dicial is especially troubling in light of the Court of Appeals's holding
119. See FED. R. EVID. 102; MD. R. 5-102. But see D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A
Constitutional Challenge to the Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64
WASH. L. REv. 289 (1989). Lewis contends that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 "substantially
increases the risk of erroneous decisionmaking and prescribes a balancing test that uncon-
stitutionally places the major risk of decisionmaking error on the defendant." Id. at 289.
120. See United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that the
primary purpose of Rule 403 is "limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative proba-
tive force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect").
121. The analogous Federal Rule of Evidence 403 has been portrayed as "the major rule
explicitly recognizing the broad discretionary power of the judge in controlling the intro-
duction of evidence." 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
403[01] (1994).
122. See 10 JAMEs WM. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACITICE § 403.02[31 (Daniel R.
Coqvillette et al. eds., 2d. ed. Supp. 1996).
123. United States v. 88 Cases, 187 F.2d 967, 975 (3d Cir. 1951) (setting forth a test for
balancing probative value versus unfair prejudicial effect).
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that such decisions are within the seemingly limitless discretion of the
trial judge. Although the trial judge's discretion should continue to
play an important role on issues of evidence, it should not be without
boundaries. The Court of Appeals should have held that the admis-
sion of in life photographs to prove identity is at the discretion of the
trial court, but such discretion is subject to limitations-namely, that
trial judges must clearly articulate and justify their evidentiary rulings.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals in Broberg incorrectly de-
cided that a victim's in life photographs were admissible. The deci-
sion contains a detailed and accurate discussion of how a trial judge
should resolve a photographic evidence issue when the opposing
party objects on the basis of unfair prejudice.124 Nevertheless, the
court's well-reasoned discussion does not correspond with the "as-
tounding, and erroneous" decision that the display of in life victim
photographs did not unfairly prejudice the defendant's case and in no
way influenced the jury's verdict.125 Given the factual context of the
Broberg decision, it is likely that in future trials judges will admit in life
victim photographs without hesitation or justification for their
decisions.
Although the court declined to interpret the broad provisions of
victims' rights statutes as providing for the admission of in life photo-
graphs in every case, the court achieved the functional equivalent.
Without requiring a trial judge to justify an evidentiary ruling, particu-
larly for the admission of in life victim photographs, the court has
moved away from the original intent of Rule 5-403 to provide fairness
and justice in the trial process. It is difficult to imagine a set of facts
that would make a victim's in life photographs inadmissible.
In effect, the Broberg decision implicitly grants a trial judge the
ability to admit these types of photographs. In future trials,judges will
neither have to provide a careful explanation of a photograph's preju-
dicial effect nor will judges fear a possible reversal of their decision on
appeal. If Maryland trial judges are not required to articulate clearly
their underlying reasons for evidentiary decisions, and if the Maryland
Court of Appeals continues to uphold these decisions on the basis of
judicial discretion, the courts will continue to further an age-old
maxim: "The discretion of ajudge is the law of tyrants.... In the best
124. See MuRPHY, supra note 44, § 1102, at 58 (Supp. 1996).
125. Id. at 58-59 (Supp. 1996).
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it is oftentimes caprice; in the worst it is every vice, folly, and passion,
to which human nature is liable."' 26
SEAN W. BAKER
B. Eliminating the Middle Ground of Discretion
In Armstead v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that, under sec-
tion 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Mary-
land Code,2 the admissibility of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile
evidence cannot be challenged on the basis of its general reliability.3
The court also held that this statute eliminates the trial judge's discre-
tion to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial
effect,4 that the statute renders "random match probability statistics"
admissible,5 and that case-specific challenges to the manner in which
tests are conducted generally go to the weight of the evidence rather
126. The King v. Almon, 5 Geo. 3 (Hilary Term 1765), reprinted in 8 St. Tr. (Howell) 54,
57 (1810) (quoting Hindson v. Kersey, (C.P. 1765) (Lord Camden, C.J.)).
1. 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221 (1996).
2. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-915 (1995). This section provides:
(a) Definitions.- (1) In this section the following words have the meanings
indicated.
(2) "Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)" means the molecules in all cellular forms
that contain genetic information in a patterned chemical structure of each
individual.
(3) "DNA profile" means an analysis that utilizes the restriction fragment
length polymorphism analysis of DNA resulting in the identification of an individ-
ual's patterned chemical structure of genetic information.
(b) Putposes.-In any criminal proceeding, the evidence of a DNA profile is ad-
missible to prove or disprove the identity of any person, if the party seeking to
introduce the evidence of a DNA profile:
(1) Notifies in writing the other party or parties by mall at least 45 days
before any criminal proceeding; and
(2) Provides, if requested in writing, the other party or parties at least 30 days
before any criminal proceeding with:
(i) Duplicates of the actual autoradiographs generated;
(ii) The laboratory protocols and procedures;
(iii) The identification of each probe utilized;
(iv) A statement describing the methodology of measuring fragment size
and match criteria; and
(v) A statement setting forth the allele frequency and genotype data for
the appropriate data base utilized.
(c) Prerequisites.-If a party is unable to provide the information required under
subsection (b) of this section at least 30 days prior to the criminal proceedings,
the court may grant a continuance to permit such timely disclosures.
Id.
3. Armstead, 342 Md. at 66, 673 A.2d at 235.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 81, 673 A.2d at 242.
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than to its admissibility.6 The Note argues that the court's holding
both ignores the legislative history of section 10-915 and neglects to
apply commonly accepted rules of evidence.
1. The Case.-On January 29, 1991, an assailant broke into the
home of a Howard County woman while she was home alone.7 Dur-
ing the break-in, the assailant demanded that the woman turn over
her valuables, raped her, and then fled the scene.' Based upon the
description given by the victim, the police arrested Michael Devon
Armstead (Armstead). 9
Using physical evidence (semen) collected from the victim, the
state conducted a standard blood group test10 and a DNA profile anal-
ysis." The blood group test showed that Armstead was within the
4.7% of the population that could have been the source of the se-
men." The testing laboratory then created the DNA profile' 3 using
the restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) method.14 The
lab declared the existence of a "match" between Armstead's DNA and
the sample taken from the victim."
6. Id. at 66, 673 A.2d at 235.
7. Id. at 44, 673 A.2d at 223.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The standard blood group test is the test commonly used to determine a person's
blood "type." See COMMITrEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 27 (1992) [hereinafter NRC
REPORT].
11. Armstead, 342 Md. at 44, 673 A-2d at 224. The DNA profile analysis in Armstead was
conducted using the restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) method. Id. The
RFLP method of DNA profile analysis has been the most commonly used method to create
profiles used as evidence in court. See NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 131. The RFLP
method uses enzymes to "cut" DNA sequences into pieces (restriction fragments). Id. at
36. Each enzyme specifically targets a particular DNA sequence. Id. at 35. Due to natural
variation, each fragment will be a different length. Id. at 37. After the fragments have
been cut, they are separated according to size by placing them into a gel through which an
electric current is passed (electrophoresis). Id. Due to the differing sizes of the fragments,
each migrates through the gel at different rates. Id. After binding to a radiolabeled probe,
the fragments are then photographed using autoradiography. Id. at 37-38. The autoradio-
graph shows a band where one or more fragments migrated. Id. at 38. The series of bands
can be compared with another sample to determine variations. Id.
12. Armstead, 342 Md. at 44, 673 A.2d at 224.
13. Section 10-915 of the Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article defines a DNA profile
as "an analysis that utilizes the restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis of DNA
resulting in the identification of an individual's patterned chemical structure of genetic
information." MD. CODE ANN., Ors. &JUD. PROC. § 10-915 (1995). Thus, Armstead's "DNA
profile" is the autoradiograph that resulted from the procedures outlined in supra note 11.
14. Armnstead, 342 Md. at 44, 673 A.2d at 224.
15. Id.
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Prior to trial, Armstead filed a motion in limine to exclude the
DNA evidence.16 Armstead argued that recent scientific develop-
ments called into question the reliability of RFLP testing.1 7 The Cir-
cuit Court for Howard County rejected Armstead's motion, however,
holding that the court did not possess the discretion to exclude DNA
evidence under section 10-915 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article.1 8
At trial, the State presented both DNA profile evidence and ex-
pert testimony.1 9 Prosecution experts offered statistics showing the
likelihood of a random match.2" The State proffered two sets of
probability statistics 2 -probability based upon the product rule 22 and
16. Id. at 45, 673 A.2d at 224.
17. Id. Additionally, Armstead argued that (1) section 10-915 was unconstitutionally
vague, (2) the use of the DNA evidence violated his right to due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights, (3) section 10-915 of the Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article denied
him his right to confrontation of those who conducted the DNA tests, and (4) section 10-
915 violated separation of powers. Id.
18. Armstead, 342 Md. at 46, 673 A.2d at 224. The circuit court held a five-day eviden-
tiary hearing to decide if the evidence was so unreliable that its admission would violate
due process. Id. at 45-46, 673 A.2d at 224. The court rejected the due process challenge.
Id. at 46, 673 A.2d at 224.
19. Id. at 46, 673 A.2d at 224.
20. Id. at 47, 673 A.2d at 225. A random match is a false positive and would occur
when the DNA sample taken from the crime scene did not come from the defendant, but
DNA profile results nevertheless show a match between the defendant and the sample
taken at the crime scene. Id. at 52, 673 A.2d at 228. Assuming no procedural or analytical
error, this would occur when the two samples were taken from different people "whose
DNA patterns in the target regions investigated are the same." NRC REPORT, supra note 10,
at 44.
21. Armstead, 342 Md. at 46, 673 A.2d at 225. Scientists agree that no two people, with
the exception of identical twins, have exactly the same DNA sequence. See NRC REPORT,
supra note 10, at 9. Current typing systems, however, do not allow for the comparison of
entire DNA sequences. See id. Current methods only compare between three and five
sites, or loci, between two samples. Id. There is a chance that two randomly selected peo-
ple will have matching DNA at those sites. See id. Thus, it is necessary to calculate the
probability of such "random matching" in order to give the results of a "match" any mean-
ing. See id. The probability statistics generally used in DNA forensics are based upon theo-
retical models premised upon principles of population genetics. See id. at 10. The
frequency of a particular DNA sequence at any tested site is population specific and is
determined by testing samples from the appropriate population. See id. at 9-10. The Na-
tional Research Council recommends that three major racial populations, such as Cauca-
sians, African Americans, and Western Hispanics, should be used in this analysis. See id. at
15.
22. The product or "multiplication" rule is a methodology used to calculate the
probability of a random match. See NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 10-11. The method
multiplies the frequency of the DNA sequence found at each individual locus tested to
achieve the frequency of a member of the relevant population having the same DNA se-
quence at all loci tested. See id. Thus, if three loci are tested and each had a frequency of
10%, the frequency of a random match containing all three loci would be .10 times .10
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probability calculated according to the ceiling principle.23 The State
also presented the jury with the testing laboratory's error rates.24
Although Armstead did not use expert testimony to challenge the
State's DNA evidence, he did cross-examine the State's experts on the
controversy over DNA probability statistics.
25
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Armstead of
"first degree rape, first degree sexual offense, perverted practices, as-
sault, burglary, and attempted robbery."26 He received a sentence of
two consecutive life terms plus twenty years in prison.27 Armstead
filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.28 On appeal,
Armstead argued that the trial court should have excluded the prose-
cution's DNA evidence. 29 Further, Armstead claimed that the court
erred when it refused to conduct a hearing to determine the reliability
of the evidence and that the use of outmoded methods of DNA analy-
sis rendered the evidence so unreliable that the use of such evidence
violated his constitutional right to due process."0 The Court of Spe-
times .10, which equals 0.1%. See id. The validity of this statistical methodology is pre-
mised upon each factor being statistically independent. See id.
23. The ceiling principle is a conservative methodology for calculating the probability
of a random match. See id. at 82-83. The method is designed to account for population
substructuring, i.e., differences in allele frequencies between segments of a sample popula-
tion. See id. The product rule assumes a homogenous population. See id. Subpopulations
do tend to mate within themselves, however, which possibly renders statistics gained from
the population as a whole inaccurate within any given subpopulation. See id. The ceiling
principle accounts for such substructuring by using "an upper bound for the allele fre-
quency that is independent of the ethnic background of a subject" and then applying the
product rule method to determine the frequency of the genotype. Id.
24. Armstead, 342 Md. at 47, 673 A.2d at 225. Proficiency testing conducted by
Cellmark Laboratories through 1991 revealed a 0.7% error rate. See Petitioner's Brief at 9,
Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221 (1996) (No. 133). The error rate resulted
from two instances in which the lab declared that samples from two different sources came
from the same source. See id.
25. Armstead, 342 Md. at 47, 673 A.2d at 225. During cross-examination of the prosecu-
tion's experts, Armstead revealed disagreement within the scientific community on which
methodologies should be used to determine the probability of a random match. Armstead
v. State, No. 1958, slip op. at 7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 22, 1993), affd, 342 Md. 38, 673
A.2d 221 (1996). Also through cross-examination, Armstead demonstrated that the
probability of a random match was much lower under the ceiling principle than the prod-
uct rule and that the laboratory error rate was 0.7%. Id. at 7-8.




30. Id. Armstead argued that the disagreement within the scientific community con-
cerning the use of the unmodified product rule showed that the conclusion given to the
jury that there was 1 chance in 480,000,000 that another African American would have his
same DNA profile was erroneous. Armstead, No. 1958, slip op. at 7. He argued that "'[a]
part of the due process guarantee is that an individual not suffer punitive action as a result
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cial Appeals, however, affirmed Armstead's convictions."1 Specifically,
the Court of Special Appeals held that (1) the trial court did not err
in its refusal to conduct a preliminary hearing on the RFLP technique
because "the DNA profile's admissibility is incontestable," 2 (2) the
court did not err in its refusal to exclude the proffered statistical anal-
ysis because such evidence is admissible under section 10-915," 3 and
(3) the court's admission of the DNA evidence did not violate Arm-
stead's right to due process.3 4 The Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari35  to consider whether (1) section 10-915 impacts the
"gatekeeping" function of the trial court in screening DNA evi-
dence;36 (2) section 10-915 encompasses population genetics statistics,
in addition to the "raw" evidence of a DNA match; 7 and (3) the appli-
cation of the product rule calculation, the rate of laboratory error, or
the specific laboratory procedures used in the case rendered the re-
sulting data so unreliable as to violate Armstead's due process rights.3 8
2. Legal Background.-
a. Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence. -The issues in Arm-
stead center on the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Frye v.
United States 9 set forth the prevailing standard by which courts mea-
sured novel scientific evidence for nearly seventy years.' In Frye, the
of an inaccurate scientific procedure.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Higgs v. Wil-
son, 616 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D. Ky. 1985)).
31. Armstead, No. 1958, slip op. at 17.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 8. The court reasoned that Armstead's due process rights had not been vio-
lated because the jury had been fully informed of the disputes in the scientific community
over different methods for determining the probability of a match. Id. at 7. Additionally,
the jury was presented with probability calculations based upon the ceiling principle as well
as the product rule. Id. at 8.
35. Armstead v. State, 333 Md. 201, 634 A.2d 62 (1993).
36. Arrstead, 342 Md. at 49, 673 A.2d at 226. Specifically, the court addressed two
"gatekeeping" issues raised by Armstead. Id. The court first considered whether the trial
court may "conduct an 'inverse Fye-Reed hearing' if the opponent of DNA evidence chal-
lenges its reliability." Id. The court then considered whether the trial court may "engage
in a weighing exercise to determine if the probative value of DNA evidence is substantially
outweighed by the prejudicial effect." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
40. Id. at 1014 (holding that a systolic blood pressure deception test (precursor to the
polygraph) had not gained sufficient approval in the scientific community to allow its ad-
mission into evidence); see also ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND




United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
scientific evidence "must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."4 1 Fed-
eral and state courts widely adopted this "general acceptance" stan-
dard4" and used it to determine the threshold question of whether the
theory or principle underlying a particular scientific technique is ade-
quately reliable to allow evidence to be admitted.43 This reliability is
gauged by whether the "relevant" scientific community accepts the
theory or principle."
The Court of Appeals adopted the Frye standard in Reed v. State.45
The Court of Appeals reasoned that fairness dictates that a litigant is
entitled to "a scientific judgment on the reliability of [a scientific pro-
cess]" before that process can be used against him.46 According to the
court, the Frye standard "assures that th [e] most qualified [people] to
assess the general validity of a scientific method will have the determi-
native voice. " "
In 1993, the Supreme Court held in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4" that the Federal Rules of Evidence displaced the
Frye test.49 The Supreme Court identified Federal Rules 702,5" 703,51
41. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
42. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5 (2d
ed. 1993) (discussing the pervasive adoption of the Frye standard). For a comprehensive
list of United States Courts of Appeals and state courts that adopted the Frye standard, see
Stuart J. Graham, Abandoning New York's "General Acceptance" Requirement: Redesigning Pro-
posed Rule of Evidence 702(b) After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 BuFF. L.
REV. 229, 233 n.17-18 (1995).
43. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (1978) (adopting the Frye
standard in Maryland).
44. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The Supreme Court noted that "Frye made 'general accept-
ance' the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony." Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
45. 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (1978) (holding that "voiceprint" technology
had not reached the level of general acceptance and was, thus, inadmissible). Although
the court expressly adopted the Frye standard, it noted that an earlier case, Shanks v. State,
185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945), "recognized the standard of general scientific acceptance
in connection with the admissibility of blood test evidence." Reed, 283 Md. at 383-84, 391
A.2d at 369.
46. Reed 283 Md. at 385, 391 A.2d at 370.
47. Id. (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). The
court also expressed concerns that the Frye standard is necessary to prevent the admission
of "junk science" because "lay jurors tend to give considerable weight to 'scientific' evi-
dence when presented by 'experts' with impressive credentials. We have acknowledged the
existence of a . . . 'misleading aura of certainty which often envelopes a new scientific
process, obscuring its currently experimental nature.'" Id. at 386, 391 A.2d at 370 (quoting
Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P.2d 382, 390 (Cal. 1966)).
48. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
49. Id. at 589. The Court premised its holding upon its decision in United States v. Abe4
469 U.S. 45 (1984), in which it recognized that, in principle, a common law of evidence no
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706,2 and 40353 as governing the admissibility of scientific evidence.54
Many state rules of evidence, including Maryland's, are based upon
the federal rules. Therefore, many of those states subsequently
adopted Daubert as the controlling standard for admissibility of novel
scientific evidence. 5 Maryland, however, did not. Eight days follow-
ing the Daubert decision, the Court of Special Appeals held that the
Frye-Reed standard would remain the law in Maryland.56
Since Reed, Maryland courts have consistently applied the Frye
standard.57 Although most of the Maryland Rules of Evidence are
longer exists under the Federal Rules. Id. at 51. See generally, G. Michael Fenner, The
Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGrTON L. REv. 939
(1996) (discussing the implications of the Daubert holding).
50. Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
51. Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
FED. R. Evm. 703.
52. Rule 706 provides in pertinent part: "The court may on its own motion or on the
motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be
appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint
any expert wimesses... of its own selection." FED. R. EVID. 706.
53. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EID. 403.
54. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. Professor Fenner summarizes the holding of Daubert as
follows:
[T]he test for admissibility of expert evidence is ... whether the evidence is "sci-
entific knowledge," whether it will assist the trier of fact, and whether its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury. The trial judge must assess the reliability and
the relevance of the theory and methodology. This involves assessing each of
them both in general and as applied by these particular witnesses to this particu-
lar case.
Fenner, supra note 49, at 947-48.
55. See Graham, supra note 42, at 250 n.120 (citing examples of states adopting the
Daubert decision, including Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Washington).
56. Keene Corp. v. Hall, 96 Md. App. 644, 656, 626 A.2d 997, 1003, cert. granted, 332
Md. 741, 633 A.2d 102 (1993) (placed in inactive status, Dec. 22, 1993); see a/sOJOsEPH F.
MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 1406 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the holding
of Keene Corp.).
57. See, e.g., Sabatier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 323 Md. 232, 249, 592 A.2d
1098, 1106 (1991) (explaining that "Frye was deliberately intended to interpose a substan-
tial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence in criminal cases based upon new
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based upon the federal rules, the committee note to Maryland Rule 5-
70258 makes clear that Reed and "other cases adopting the principles
enunciated in Frye" are controlling law on the issue of novel scientific
techniques or principles.59 Moreover, the committee note states ex-
plicitly that Rule 5-702 does not overrule Reed or its adoption of the
Frye standard.60 Rather, the admission of novel scientific techniques is
left to develop through case law.6 ' In Maryland, expert testimony
must meet the Frye standard only if an essential element of the ex-
pert's opinion is a scientific test result "controlled by inexorable, phys-
ical laws."6 2 The Frye requirement may also be satisfied by judicial
notice of the test's reliability,6" or by legislative codification of the ad-
missibility of certain evidence.6
scientific principles"); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 681, 464 A 2d 1028, 1034 (1983) (con-
firming Frye-Reed as the applicable standard in Maryland); Cobey v. State, 80 Md. App. 31,
43, 559 A.2d 391, 398 (1989) (determining the admissibility of DNA evidence under the
Frye-Reed standard); Haines v. Shanholtz, 57 Md. App. 92, 98-99, 468 A.2d 1365, 1367-68
(1984) (applying Frye-Reed in civil case); Akonom v. State, 40 Md. App. 676, 680, 394 A.2d
1213, 1216 (1978) (ruling that a stipulation by parties may not serve as the basis for admis-
.sibility where scientific evidence fails the Frye-Reed test). See generally Kevin M. Carroll, Note,
Codifying the Rule on Epert Testimony: Why Traditional Analysis Should Be Generally Acceptable,
54 Mn. L. REv. 1085 (1995) (discussing the admissibility of expert testimony under the new
Md. R. 5-702 and 5-703).
58. Rule 5-702 provides:
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the
court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In making that determination, the court
shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert
testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis ex-
ists to support the expert testimony.
MD. R. 5-702.
59. MD. R. 5-702 committee note. Although the rule is not intended to mirror FED. R.
EVI. 702, the two rules are substantially similar. Compare MD. R. 5-702, supra note 58, with
FED. R. EVID. 702, supra note 50. The Maryland rule and the federal rule both incorporate
the first prong of the Maryland rule. Although the language of the federal rule does not
include the second two prongs enumerated under the Maryland rule, federal courts have
construed these requirements in the federal rule. See Carroll, supra note 57, at 1090-91
(discussing federal cases that support the second two prongs of the Maryland test).
60. MD. R. 5-702 committee note.
61. Id.
62. State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 98, 517 A.2d 741, 745 (1986).
63. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 380, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (1978).
64. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Crs. &JuD. PROC. §§ 10-915 (Supp. 1995) (admissibility of
DNA profiles), 10-302 (1995) (breathalyzer test to prove intoxication), 10-301 (1995) (ra-
dar test to prove speed of motor vehicles); Mn. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 5-1029 (1991)
(DNA test and related probability statistics to show paternity); see also 5 LYNN McLAJN,
MARYLAND PRAcriCE § 401.4(c) (1987 & Supp. 1995).
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b. Admissibility of DNA Evidence in Maryland. -DNA profiling
evidence was first used in the United States in 198765 and was her-
alded as a foolproof scientific breakthrough that could identify
criminals with near certainty.66 Not long after its first introduction,
courts across the country began to confront the issue of admitting
DNA profile evidence.67 Today, most courts permit the admission of
the RFLP technique.'
Maryland appellate courts first considered the admissibility of
DNA profile evidence in Cobey v. State, in 1989.69 In that case, the
defendant faced charges of rape and sodomy, and the State presented
DNA profile evidence to the jury.70 The evidence consisted of an
RFLP-derived "match" between the defendant's DNA and DNA recov-
ered from the crime scene. 71 On appeal to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, Cobey claimed that laboratory methods used to analyze the
DNA failed to meet the general acceptance standard of Fye-Reed.72
The Court of Special Appeals disagreed, however, and affirmed the
trial court's holding.73 Yet the Cobey court limited its holding, stating
that its decision should not be interpreted to mean that "DNA finger-
printing is now admissible willy-nilly in all criminal trials." 74 Rather,
the court held, the trial judge in Cobey properly admitted the evidence
65. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (admitting DNA profile
evidence to link defendant with crime of rape).
66. See NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 28 (noting that after the introduction of forensic
DNA usage, "the term 'DNA fingerprint' carried the connotation of absolute identifica-
tion" and was fixed in the public's mind as having such capabilities). But see Jonathan J.
Koehler, DNA Matches and Statistics: Important Questions, Surprising AnsUw, 76 JUDICATURE
222, 222 (1993) (emphasizing that "It]here is now an increased awareness that DNA analy-
ses are subject to error and more deserving of careful scrutiny").
67. See NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 28. For a brief discussion of the process of DNA
profiling by the RFLP analysis see Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 51-54, 673 A.2d 221, 227-28
(1996), and NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 36-40. In November 1993, the Committee on
DNA Forensic Science of the National Research Council released The Evaluation of Forensic
DNA Evidence, a revision to the 1992 edition.
68. See Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108
HARv. L. REv. 1481, 1557-58 (1994) (noting the widespread acceptance of DNA evidence);
NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 135 (noting that under the Frye standard "[t]he overwhelm-
ing majority of trial courts ruled that such evidence was admissible").
69. 80 Md. App. 31, 559 A.2d 391 (1989).
70. Id. at 34, 559 A.2d at 392.
71. Id. Although the Cobey court noted that the defendant had challenged the
database used by the laboratory, the court gave no details on the statistical probability
analysis presented at trial. See id. at 43, 559 A.2d at 398.
72. Id. at 34, 559 A.2d at 392.




because the defendant had presented no evidence to contradict the
finding. 75
That same year, the Maryland General Assembly enacted section
10-915.76 This legislation declared that a DNA profile is admissible at
a criminal proceeding to prove or disprove a defendant's identity.
77
In 1991, the General Assembly amended the statute to its present
form. 78 The legislature intended the statute "to eliminate the neces-
sity of holding a [preliminary] 'Frye-Reed' hearing to prove that the
[DNA profiling] technique has gained general acceptance in the rele-
vant scientific community."
79
A few appellate cases have directly interpreted section 10-915.1°
It is well established that the statute conclusively resolved the issue of
whether RFLP profiling satisfies the Frye-Reed standard.8 1 The statute,
by its terms and legislative history, reflects the General Assembly's de-
termination that the scientific community has generally accepted
DNA testing using the RFLP technique and, therefore, that the tech-
nique is reliable. Maryland courts have clearly recognized this legisla-
tive determination. In Jackson v. State,"2 a defendant convicted of
sexual assault and rape8 3 argued on appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals that the trial court had erred when it refused to compel dis-
covery of all past testing procedures implemented by the testing labo-
ratory.84 In affirming the trial court, the Court of Special Appeals
declared that "[a] defendant may attack the reliability of the DNA test-
ing in his particular case but, unless he is challenging the validity of
75. Id.
76. Act of May 19, 1989, ch. 430, 1989 Md. Laws 2892 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., C's.
&JUD. PROC. § 10-915 (1995)).
77. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-915(b).
78. For the full text of section 10-915, see supra note 2.
79. SENATEJUD. PROC. COMM., FLOOR REP., H.B. 711, Md. Gen. Assembly 2 (1989).
80. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 92 Md. App. 304, 323-25, 608 A.2d 782, 791-92 (1992)
(holding that, under section 10-915, a defendant may not challenge the admissibility of
DNA testing in general, but only the reliability of the DNA testing in his own particular
case and that probability statistics were not necessary to support the evidence of a DNA
profile "match"); Wheeler v. State, 88 Md. App. 512, 524, 596 A.2d 78, 85 (1991) (holding
that the defendant was not prejudiced by a trial delay during the enactment of section 10-
915 because the statute merely codified the Fye-Reed standard for admissibility of novel
scientific evidence).
81. See Wheeler, 88 Md. App. at 524, 596 A.2d at 84 (noting that the statute determines
the same standard as the Fye-Reed test);Jackson, 92 Md. App. at 323, 608 A.2d at 791 (find-
ing that the statute determined the general reliability of DNA testing).
82. 92 Md. App. 304, 608 A.2d 782 (1992).
83. Id. at 308-09, 608 A.2d at 783-84.
84. Id. at 321, 608 A.2d at 790.
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§ 10-915 itself, he may not challenge the admissibility of evidence re-
garding DNA testing in general."85
Three years later, the Court of Special Appeals again considered
probability statistics under section 10-915 in Keirsey v. State.86 In Keir-
sey, a Worcester County jury convicted the defendant of rape. 7 At
trial, the prosecution presented evidence of a DNA profile "match"
supported by probability statistics calculated using the product rule.88
On appeal, Keirsey claimed that the court should not have admitted
statistics based on the product rule on the ground that the scientific
community had accepted the ceiling principle as more accurate. 89
Thus, Keirsey argued, the product rule did not meet the Fye-Reed stan-
dard.9" Affirming Keirsey's conviction, the Court of Special Appeals
held that the admissibility of probability statistics is not predicated on
the Frye-Reed standard. 9 ' The court reasoned that the Fye-Reed test ap-
plies only to testimony that is based on a "scientific test result 'con-
trolled by inexorable, physical laws,"'92 and that probability statistics
do not meet this criteria.9
3
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Armstead v. State, the Court of Ap-
peals concluded that section 10-915 eliminates the discretion of trial
courts to hold either Frye-Reed hearings or "inverse Frye-Reed' hearings
on the admissibility of DNA evidence94 and eliminates judicial discre-
tion with respect to weighing the probative value of DNA evidence
85. Id. at 323, 608 A.2d at 791. Jackson marked the first time that a Maryland court
addressed the relationship between DNA profile evidence and probability statistics. At
trial, the prosecution presented no probability statistics showing the likelihood of a ran-
dom match. Id. at 324, 608 A.2d at 791. Jackson claimed that "without proper evidence
regarding the probability of a match, evidence that a match was declared has no relevance"
and, thus, "does not tend to make it more or less likely that (Jackson] was the assailant."
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). Although the court held that
Jackson had waived this argument, it also stated that because the General Assembly deter-
mined that DNA testing is reliable, "[t]here was simply no need for the State to offer
additional evidence, such as probability calculations, to establish that the testing proce-
dures employed were reliable." Id., 608 A.2d at 792.
86. 106 Md. App. 551, 665 A.2d 700 (1995), vacated, 342 Md. 120, 674 A.2d 510 (1996).
87. Id. at 554, 665 A.2d at 701.
88. Id. at 573, 665 A.2d at 711.
89. Id. at 574-75, 665 A.2d at 711.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 575, 665 A.2d at 712.
92. Id. (quoting State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 98, 517 A.2d 741, 745 (1986)).
93. Id.
94. Armstead, 342 Md. at 60, 673 A.2d at 232.
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against its prejudicial effect.95 The Armstead decision also renders
probability statistics admissible.96
a. Frye-Reed Hearings Precluded.-The court, implementing ca-
nons of statutory interpretation, 97 noted several aspects of section 10-
915 in concluding that this section precluded Frye-Reed hearings. First,
the court determined that the language of section 10-915 "strongly
suggests that the Legislature intended DNA profile evidence to be ad-
mitted without reevaluation of the technique's general reliability. 98
The court emphasized that the language of the statute is compulsory,
rather than permissive. 9 Second, the court noted that the Senate Ju-
dicial Proceedings Committee's report explicitly stated that "the in-
tent of the bill is to eliminate the necessity of holding a 'Frye-Reed'
hearing to prove that the technique has gained general acceptance in
the relevant scientific community. ' 1°° Third, the court looked to the
General Assembly's 1991 amendment to section 10-915-particularly
provisions imposing new discovery procedures-as evidence that the
legislature intended to eliminate Frye-Reed hearings.1"1 Specifically,
the amendment modified notice requirements, permitting the admis-
sion of DNA evidence only if the party offering the evidence notifies
the opposing party within forty-five days of trial of his intent to use
such evidence and delivers certain specified documents to the oppos-
ing party within thirty days of trial.1" 2 From these provisions, the
Court of Appeals reasoned that the General Assembly intended "to
establish the general reliability and admissibility of the evidence, per-
mitting the opponent to attack the weight of the evidence through
95. Id. at 62, 673 A.2d at 232.
96. Id. at 83, 673 A.2d at 243.
97. The court noted that "the cardinal rule in statutory construction is to effectuate the
Legislature's broad goal or purpose." Id. at 56, 673 A.2d at 229. The court also noted that
"[t]he primary source of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself." Id. The
court opined that, in reading statutory language, common sense should be used "to avoid
illogical or unreasonable constructions" and that words should be given their "common
meanings" unless the legislative intent is otherwise. Id. If the language of the statute is
unclear or ambiguous, then the court should look to other sources to "discern the Legisla-
ture's purpose." Id.
98. Id. at 57, 673 A.2d at 230.
99. Id. The court stated that "the plain language of the statute explicitly states that
DNA evidence 'is admissible to prove... identity,' rather than using conditional language
such as 'may be admissible.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 10-915 (1995)).
100. Id. (quoting SENATEJUD. PROC. COMM., FLOOR REP., H.B. 711, Md. Gen. Assembly 2
(1989)).
101. Act of May 24, 1991, ch. 631, 1991 Md. Laws 3447.
102. Id.
[VOL. 56:656
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
cross-examination" by requiring early disclosure.103 Finally, the court
noted that the statute's preamble itself reflects the General Assembly's
confidence in DNA testing procedures by noting the impressive accu-
racy of such procedures.104
b. Trial Court's Discretion to Weigh Probative Value and Prejudicial
Effect.-The court next considered whether a trial court should weigh
the probative value of DNA evidence against its prejudicial effect.10 5
The court concluded that, under section 10-915, a trial court cannot
conduct such a balancing test.'0 6 The court's rationale for this con-
clusion is simple. The court reasoned that "the Frye test was designed
to serve the same purpose as the trial judge's discretionary balancing
of probative value against prejudice."'0 7 Thus, because the statute
eliminates the Frye-Reed hearing, the General Assembly implicitly "de-
termined that the probative value of DNA evidence outweighs any
prejudicial effect."108
The court also emphasized that the trial judge has discretion to
exclude DNA evidence only when laboratory errors "render it so unre-
liable that it would not be helpful to the trier of fact."'" The court
stated that "individualized errors in application of the DNA technique
[should generally be treated] as matters of weight," not
admissibility.1 10
103. Armstead, 342 Md. at 60, 673 A.2d at 231.
104. Id. at 59, 673 A.2d at 231-32. The preamble states, in pertinent part: "'[M]eans of
identifying that unique DNA structure have been refined far beyond any previous means of
human tissue analysis, to a level of scientific accuracy that approaches an infinitesimal mar-
gin of errorf.]'" Id. at 60, 673 A.2d at 231 (alteration in original) (quoting Act of May 19,
1989, ch. 430, 1989 Md. Laws ch. 2892 (Preamble)).
105. Id. Rule 5-403 of the Maryland Rules of Evidence states: "Although relevant, evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." MD. R. 5-
403.
106. Armstead, 342 Md. at 62, 673 A.2d at 232.
107. Id. at 61, 673 A-2d at 232.
108. Id. Although the court held that section 10-915 precludes all general attacks on
DNA evidence, the trial court must still determine that the evidence is logically relevant
before it may be admitted. Id. at 62, 673 A.2d at 233.
109. Id. at 63, 673 A.2d at 233.
110. Id. at 64, 673 A.2d at 234. The court implied that measurement errors do not
generally require that evidence be excluded, but that errors from testing procedure devia-
tions may. Id. The court stated that "[i]n determining whether an alleged error in DNA
testing constitutes the type of error that warrants exclusion of DNA evidence, trial courts
must distinguish mere measurement error... from deviations from accepted testing proce-
dures." Id. at 65 n.18, 673 A.2d at 234 n.18.
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Thus, in determining if a party has the right to a hearing on a
motion in limine, a trial court must distinguish between general at-
tacks on DNA testing and particularized challenges to the procedures
used.' 1 If the court determines that the motion is based upon partic-
ularized challenges, then the trial court must determine if the party
claims an error of measurement or deviations from accepted testing
procedures. 112
The Court of Appeals concluded that Armstead's arguments con-
cerning the use of the product rule and the rate of laboratory error
were "general challenges" and thus precluded. 1 3 As such, the court
concluded that "the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declin-
ing to conduct an 'inverse Frye-Reed hearing' and in refusing to bal-
ance the probative value of DNA evidence against its prejudicial
effect."' 
14
c. Section 10-915 Admissibility Provision Includes Probability Statis-
tics.-The decision of the Court of Appeals in Armstead also estab-
lished that population genetics statistics115 fall within the purview of
section 10-915.116 In so ruling, the court conducted a detailed review
of the two population statistic methodologies used at trial and the de-
bate surrounding their use" 7 and concluded that both the product
rule and ceiling principle were generally accepted methodologies." 8
111. Id. at 65, 673 A.2d at 234.
112. Id.
113. Id. The court also noted Armstead's challenge to the test results based upon the
presence of "shadow bands" on the autoradiograph. Id. at 65-66, 673 A_2d at 234-35. The
court dismissed this challenge as unpreserved because, although Armstead raised the issue
before the trial court, "he did not argue that the trial court retained its discretion under
the statute to exclude the DNA evidence due to the shadow banding." Id. at 66, 673 A.2d
at 235.
114. Id. at 67, 673 A.2d at 235.
115. Population statistics are used to indicate the probability that an analysis of a ran-
domly chosen person would match the DNA sample tested. See NRC REPORT, supra note
10, at 74-75. There is much controversy surrounding the statistical methodologies used to
calculate these probabilities. See id. at 75.
116. Armstead, 342 Md. at 77-83, 673 A.2d at 240-43.
117. See id. at 67-77, 673 A.2d at 235-40.
118. The court rejected and distinguished the holding of the Court of Special Appeals
in Keirsey v. State, 106 Md. App. 551, 575, 665 A.2d 700, 712 (1995), vacated, 342 Md. 120,
674 A.2d 510 (1996), that probability statistics in DNA analyses are not subject to the Frye-
Reed test. Armstead, 342 Md. at 80 n.33, 673 A.2d at 242 n.33. The Court of Appeals rea-
soned that the Keirsey analysis was too narrow because it improperly analyzed the nature of
the statistical techniques under consideration. See id. The court stated that, although
there are circumstances in which the choice between statistical techniques is "merely a
choice between equally valid methods of describing the same underlying scientific data,"
the choice between statistical analyses involved in DNA analysis is "dependent on an under-
lying scientific phenomenon or principle." Id. The court concluded its analysis by holding
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The court determined that the language of section 10-915 demon-
strated that "the Legislature... intended the supporting statistics to
be routinely admitted along with the DNA match evidence."1 19 Thus,
"the statute render[ed] Frye-Reed analysis unnecessary." 120 Although
section 10-915 does not expressly state that supporting statistics are
admissible, nor does it specifically address the issue, the Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that the statute "encompasses both the evidence of a
DNA match and the supporting statistics." 21 The court dismissed as
unimportant the statute's lack of specificity as to which statistical
methods should be recognized as admissible122 and gave several rea-
sons why a lack of specificity is preferable. In fact, the court went so
far as to impute an intent by the legislature to "carefully [refrain]
from adopting any specific tests."1 23 Thus, according to the court's
holding, the admissibility of population genetics statistics may only be
attacked on due process grounds "if scientific opinion shifts so dra-
matically that previously accepted methods are considered unrelia-
ble." '24 The court found that both statistical methods presented at
Armstead's trial were both reliable and accepted in the scientific com-
that the point is moot since the "Maryland General Assembly has determined that statistical
evidence of the odds of a random DNA match is admissible." Id.
119. Armstead, 342 Md. at 77, 673 A.2d at 240.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 81, 673 A.2d at 242. The court based this conclusion on "several indications
in the statute." Id. at 77, 673 A-2d 240. These indications include: (1) the statute itself,
which by requiring disclosure of the allele frequency and genotype data, "clearly indicates
that the [liegislature was aware that population genetics were used in support of DNA
evidence" and that such information would probably be offered at trial; (2) language in
the statute's preamble referring to an "'infinitesimal margin of error'" which indicates that
the legislature was aware that "statistical calculations were routinely applied to gauge the
accuracy of DNA profile evidence"; (3) the fact that the legislature deleted the words
.uniquely" and "unique" from the statute's preamble indicates that it was aware of the
possibility of random matches and that, thus, the issue would be at issue in a trial; and (4)
language in the statute "stating that DNA profile evidence is admissible 'to prove or dis-
prove . . . identity,'" which "indicates that the [Elegislature viewed population genetics
statistics as a necessary component of DNA evidence." Id. at 77-78, 673 A.2d at 240-41.
The court concluded that probability statistics are an essential component of DNA
evidence. Id. at 79, 673 A.2d at 741. This reasoning is in direct opposition to the holding
of the Court of Special Appeals in Jackson v. State, 92 Md. App. 304, 608 A.2d 782 (1992).
There, the court denied the appellant's claim that the trial court had erred by allowing
evidence of a DNA match without supporting statistics to be admitted. Id. at 324-25, 608
A.2d at 792. The Armstead court averred that "[tlo the extent that [Jackson] is inconsistent
with this holding, it is hereby disapproved." Armstead, 342 Md. at 79 n.32, 673 A.2d at 241
n.32 (citation omitted).
122. Armstead, 342 Md. at 81, 673 A.2d at 242.
123. Id. at 82, 673 A.2d at 242 (quoting Haines v. Shanholtz, 57 Md. App. 92, 96, 468
A.2d 1365, 1367 (1984)).
124. Id., 673 A.2d at 243.
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munity and, as such, did not raise due process concerns. 2 5 There-
fore, the court held, "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the statistical evidence regarding the probability of a ran-
dom DNA match calculated using the product rule."
12 6
d. Due Process Rights Were Not Violated.--Finally, Armstead as-
serted that the DNA evidence presented at trial was so unreliable "that
its use violate[d] his due process rights." 127 He challenged the use of
DNA evidence generally and claimed specific defects in the testing
procedures used in his case. 128 Armstead's general attacks concerned
the use of the product rule to determine random match frequency
and laboratory error rates that he claimed rendered the statistical evi-
dence unreliable. 1
2 9
The court opined that "'a part of the due process guarantee is
that an individual not suffer punitive action as a result of an inaccu-
rate scientific procedure."""0 The court also recognized, however,
that scientific test results "need not be infallible to meet the standard
for due process."' 3 ' The court noted that due process only bars the
admission of evidence that is "'so extremely unfair that its admission
violates "fundamental conceptions of justice. ""' '132 For evidence to vi-
olate this standard because of its unreliability, the acts complained of
must "be of such quality as necessarily prevent a fair trial."' 33
Although recognizing that "fundamental fairness" is a case-specific in-
quiry, the court articulated a standard that trial courts should apply
when the reliability of scientific evidence is questioned.' 3 4 The court
stated that "the essence of the due process 'fundamental fairness' in-
quiry is whether there was a balanced, fully explored presentation of
the evidence. This balance in turn depends on the jury's ability to
weigh the evidence, and the defendant's opportunity to challenge the




129. Id. Armstead's case-specific attacks included the claim that the laboratory used ex-
cessively large "match windows" and that the statistical method used failed to account for
genetic similarities between Armstead and his siblings. Id. at 83-84, 673 A.2d at 243-44.
130. Id. at 84, 673 A.2d at 244 (quoting Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226, 230 (W.D. Ky.
1985), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part on other grounds sub nom. Higgs v. Bland, 888
F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1989)).
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 (1990) (quoting United
States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977))).
133. Id. at 85, 673 A.2d at 244 (quoting Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431, 452, 404 A.2d
244, 255 (1979) (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941))).
134. Id. at 87, 673 A.2d at 245.
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evidence."1" Prior to Armstead, the Maryland judiciary had not con-
sidered a due process challenge to the reliability of scientific evi-
dence. 136 The court formulated the due process standard from its
decision in Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nurs-
ery,13 7 as well as from the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in
Kammer v. Young. 138
Applying the new due process standard, the court found that
Armstead's due process rights were not violated. 139 The court noted
that because Armstead "had the opportunity to challenge the DNA
evidence" and the jury was fully informed of the possible error, Arm-
stead's due process rights were not violated."
Judge Bell filed a dissenting opinion in which he took issue with
most of the majority's holdings.' Judge Bell concurred with the ma-
jority's holding that section 10-915 precludes the trial court from con-
ducting a Frye-Reed or "inverse" Frye-Reed hearing, but disagreed with
the rest of the opinion.' 42
4. Analysis.-In Armstead v. State, the Court of Appeals broadly
interpreted section 10-915 to create a strong presumption of admissi-
bility for DNA evidence. 4 3 According to the court, the statute ren-
ders both the DNA profile and probability statistics related to the
profile presumptively admissible.1"4 This interpretation misinterprets
the statute and ignores traditional rules of admissibility.
a. Elimination of Frye-Reed Hearings.-The Floor Report of
the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on House Bill 711 stated
that the purpose of section 10-915 was "to eliminate the necessity of
135. Id.
136. Id. at 86, 673 A.2d at 245.
137. 317 Md. 573, 600, 565 A.2d 1015, 1028 (1989) (holding that the exclusive use of
hearsay evidence in an administrative hearing did not violate the petitioner's due process
rights in part because the petitioner had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses).
138. 73 Md. App. 565, 535 A.2d 936 (1988). The Court of Special Appeals rejected the
claim of the appellant that calculations of the probability of his paternity were so unrelia-
ble as to violate due process. Id. at 576-77, 535 A.2d at 941. The court held that because
the appellant offered non-genetic evidence, which both disputed his paternity and at-
tacked the probability figure, his due process rights were not violated. Id. at 577, 535 A.2d
at 942. Thus, the appellant's ability to counterbalance the questionable scientific evidence
served to protect his due process rights." Id.
139. Armstead, 342 Md. at 88, 673 A.2d at 246.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 89, 673 A.2d at 246 (Bell, J., dissenting).
142. See id.




holding a 'Frye-Reed' hearing to prove that the [DNA profiling] tech-
nique has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific commu-
nity. '"45 The General Assembly defined a DNA profile as "an analysis
that utilizes the restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis of
DNA resulting in the identification of an individual's patterned chem-
ical structure of genetic information."146 This "patterned chemical
structure" described by the committee is the arrangement of DNA se-
quences resulting from the RFLP procedure. 47 Thus, section 10-915
should logically be interpreted as eliminating the need for trial courts
to conduct Frye-Reed hearings to determine whether the RFLP process
resulting in the arrangement of DNA sequences has gained general
acceptance in the scientific community. Yet the Armstead court gave a
much broader interpretation to the statute than is warranted. The
court held that the General Assembly intended for section 10-915 not
only to apply to DNA profile evidence, but also to the underlying pop-
ulation statistics.' 4 The court also held that the statute eliminates
much of a trial court's discretionary gatekeeping functions.1 49
Because the General Assembly defined the scope of its Act, inter-
pretation of the Act should be limited to that scope. The Frye stan-
dard of general acceptance determines the threshold issue of the
reliability of the underlying scientific theory of proffered novel scien-
tific evidence. 5 ° The Court of Appeals recognized this aspect of the
Frye test in Reed v. State5 1 when it stated the following:
Our adoption of the Frye standard does not, of course, dis-
turb the traditional discretion of the trial judge with respect
to the admissibility of expert testimony. Frye sets forth only a
legal standard which governs the trial judge's determination
of a threshold issue. Testimony based on a technique which
is found to have gained "general acceptance in the scientific
community" may be admitted into evidence, but only if a trial
judge also determines in the exercise of his discretion, as he
must in all other instances of expert testimony, that the pro-
posed testimony will be helpful to the jury, that the expert is
properly qualified, etc. Obviously, however, if a technique
145. SENATEJUD. PROC. COMM., FLOOR REP., H.B. 711, Md. Gen. Assembly 2 (1989).
146. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-915(a) (3) (1995).
147. See NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 57-59 (describing the identification of DNA
patterns).
148. Armstead, 342 Md. at 79, 673 A.2d at 241.
149. Id. at 66, 673 A.2d at 235.
150. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (1978).
151. Id.
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does not meet the Frye standard, a trial judge will have no
occasion to reach these further issues.
152
Although the standard is cited as the Fye standard of admissibility, it is
applied in Maryland as a standard of exclusion.1 13 The court interprets
section 10-915 as predetermining the acceptance of DNA evidence in
every case unless the evidence is either "not ... helpful to the fact
finder" or violates due process.1 54
At trial, Armstead claimed the right to a pretrial evidentiary hear-
ing to determine the admissibility of the DNA evidence offered
against him.1 55 The trial court held that section 10-915 precluded
challenges to the admissibility of the DNA evidence and that Arm-
stead's "constitutional arguments lacked merit." '56 Although the
holding of the Court of Appeals goes a long way toward correcting the
interpretive error of the trial court on this issue, its discussion leaves
the issue somewhat clouded.
The appellate court agreed with Armstead's argument that the
trial court retains some discretion to exclude DNA evidence if the pro-
cedures used do not measure up to procedural standards. 57 Accord-
ing to the Court of Appeals, the trial court retains the discretion to
exclude DNA evidence if it is found either not relevant or not "helpful
to the factfinder." 58 Both standards find meaning in the Maryland
Rules of Evidence. 59 Pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-702, a trial court
must make three findings when determining if proffered evidence will
assist the trier of fact: (1) "the witness is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education"; (2) expert testi-
mony is appropriate on the particular subject under consideration;
and (3) the expert testimony is supported by a sufficient factual ba-
sis. 6 ' The third prong of this "helpfulness" determination was at is-
152. Id. (citation omitted),
153. The satisfaction of the Frye-Reed test does not automatically render scientific evi-
dence admissible in Maryland. After the test is satisfied, evidence may be admitted only
after it is shown that the person using the technique was qualified and proper procedures
were followed. See 5 MCL.AJN, supra note 64, at § 401.4 (Supp. 1995) (discussing prerequi-
sites for admissibility of scientific evidence in Maryland).
154. Armstead, 342 Md. at 66, 673 A.2d at 235.
155. Id. at 45, 673 A.2d at 224.
156. Id. at 46, 673 A.2d at 225.
157. Id. at 63, 673 A.2d at 233. The court emphasized that "trial courts still exercise an
important function in determining whether DNA evidence is logically relevant to the case
at hand." Id. at 62, 673 A-2d at 233.
158. Id. at 64, 673 A.2d at 234.
159. See MD. R. 5-702 and MD. R. 5-401.
160. MD. R. 5-702; see Alan D. Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey,
Analysis and Critique, 54 MD. L. REv. 1032, 1063 (1995) (discussing similarities between
Maryland Rule 5-702 and Federal Rule 702).
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sue in Armstead.'61 The court wisely recognized that errors in the
testing process may warrant the exclusion of DNA evidence. 162 The
court drew a distinction, however, between "procedural" errors and
errors that it labeled as "measurement" errors. 163
b. Measurement Errors vs. Deviations from Accepted Testing Proce-
dures.-The court implied that measurement errors do not warrant
the exclusion of evidence.' 64 The presence of any errors, measure-
ment or procedural, calls into question the foundational adequacy of
proffered evidence.165 Regardless of whether the cited error may be
categorized as measurement or procedural, the errors affect the relia-
bility of the final expert opinion. '  The defendant should have the
right to a hearing to determine if the proffered DNA test fully com-
ports to the RFLP process, which was deemed by the legislature as
generally accepted in the scientific community.167 The Armstead court
held that such questions will ordinarily go to the weight of the evi-
dence rather than its admissibility.' 68 In Evans v. State,169 however, the
court rejected the proposition that "the adequacy of the basis for the
opinion goes only to the weight to be given the testimony."170 Addi-
161. Armstead challenged the procedures used in the testing of the DNA used against
him at trial, claiming that errors in the testing rendered the results of the test unreliable.
Armstead, 342 Md. at 48-49, 673 A.2d at 225-26. Thus, Armstead questioned the adequacy
of the foundation upon which prosecution experts declared a "match."
162. Id. at 64 n.18, 673 A.2d at 234 n.18 ("In determining whether an alleged error in
DNA testing constitutes the type of error that warrants exclusion .of DNA evidence, trial
courts must distinguish mere measurement error, which is inherent in any scientific proce-
dure, from deviations from accepted testing procedures.").
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Developments in the Law-Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108
HARv. L. REv. 1481, 1521 (1995) (commenting that judges should have the flexibility to
weigh both the "facts" and the "methodology" of a procedure in order to determine its
reliability).
166. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994). In the Paoli case,
the Third Circuit recognized that both types of errors affect the reliability of the expert's
opinion. The court stated:
[I] t is extremely elusive to attempt to ascertain which of an expert's steps consti-
tutes part of a "basic" methodology and which constitute changes from that meth-
odology. If a laboratory consistently fails to use certain quality controls so that its
results are rendered unreliable, attempting to ascertain whether the lack of qual-
ity controls constitutes a failure of methodology or a failure of application of
methodology may be an exercise in metaphysics.
Id. at 745.
167. See supra note 79 and accompanying texL
168. Armstead, 342 Md. at 66, 673 A.2d at 234.
169. 322 Md. 24, 585 A.2d 204 (1991).
170. Id. at 35, 585 A.2d at 209 (holding that if a party fails to provide an adequate basis
for an expert's opinion, the opinion should not be admitted).
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tionally, the trial court has the discretion to exclude expert testimony
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of un-
fair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or waste of time. 171
c. Weighing Probative Value and Unfair Prejudice.-The Court
of Appeals, in upholding the trial court's finding that section 10-915
eliminates judicial discretion to exclude DNA evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice,172 failed to con-
sider the limited role of the Frye-Reed test. As noted earlier, the Frye-
Reed test determines a threshold issue on which case-specific facts have
no bearing.173 Central to the court's holding in Armstead was its con-
clusion that the legislature determined that the risk of unfair preju-
dice from DNA evidence does not outweigh its probative value.174 If
this is true, it can only be valid in an abstract, theoretical sense. The
probative value of DNA evidence is directly affected by the quality of
the specific test performed. 175 This quality can only be determined
on a case-by-case basis. 176 Curiously, the Court of Appeals noted in
dictum that the Frye-Reed test serves the same purpose as weighing the
probative value of scientific evidence against unfair prejudice. 177
Thus, the court reasoned that, by making the Frye-Reed determination
through section 10-915, the General Assembly also determined that
171. See MD. R. 5-403; see also State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 110, 517 A.2d 741, 752
(1986). The Allewalt court cautioned that a trial judge, after determining the Frye-Reed
issue, but before admitting expert testimony concerning post-traumatic stress disorder,
should "weigh the benefit of the evidence not only against potential unfair prejudice, but
also against the complexity of possibly accompanying issues and against the time required
properly to try the expanded case." Id.
172. Armstead, 342 Md. at 61-62, 673 A.2d at 232.
173. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
174. Armstead, 342 Md. at 61-62, 673 A.2d at 232. The Armstead court stated that "[bly
enacting § 10-915 and thereby eliminating Frye-Reed hearings, the General Assembly legisla-
tively determined that the probative value of DNA outweighs any prejudicial effect." Id. at
61, 673 A.2d at 232.
175. Id. at 64 n.18, 673 A.2d at 234 n.18. The Court of Appeals quotes the National
Research Council as stating:
The validity of [the] assumption... that the analytical work done for a particular
trial comports with proper procedure ... can be resolved only case by case and is
always open to question, even if the general reliability of DNA typing is fully ac-
cepted in the scientific community. The DNA evidence should not be admissible
if the proper procedures were not followed. Moreover, even if a court finds DNA
evidence admissible because proper procedures were not [sic] followed, the pro-
bative force of the evidence will depend on the quality of the laboratory work.
Id.; see also NRC REPORT, supra note 10 at 149 ("The adequacy of the method used to
acquire and analyze samples in a given case bears on the admissibility of the evidence and
should, unless stipulated, be adjudicated case by case.").
176. Armstead, 342 Md. at 64 n.18, 673 A.2d at 234 n.18.
177. Id. at 61, 673 A.2d at 232.
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the probative value of DNA profile evidence is not outweighed by un-
fair prejudice. 7 8 Through this line of reasoning, the court held that
section 10-915 leaves the trial court no discretion to conduct such a
weighing.179 United States v. Yee' 8° is the only support that the court
cited for its conclusion that the trial court has no discretion to balance
the probative value of DNA evidence against its prejudicial effect.181
The court relied on a passage from Yee that was taken from a magis-
trate's recommendation to the district court in which the magistrate
made a Fye-based recommendation. 8 2 When taken out of context,
the passage appears to stand for the proposition that the Frye doctrine
serves the same purpose as Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence."8 3 The magistrate did conclude that the proffered evidence
met the Frye general acceptance standard, but he refused to render an
opinion on the weight of probative value against the prejudicial ef-
fect. 184 According to the magistrate, "the record is not ready for a
Rule 403 analysis, which would appear of necessity to be case- and fact-
specific."' 85 Thus, if the passage stands for anything, it stands for the
exact opposite proposition from the Armstead court's holding. The
question of weighing probative value against prejudicial effect is nec-
essarily a case-specific inquiry.186 Such an inquiry cannot be pre-de-
termined by the legislature.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 62, 673 A.2d at 232.
180. 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
181. Armstead, 342 Md. at 61, 673 A.2d at 233.
182. Id. at 61, 673 A.2d at 232. The majority quoted the following passage: "The Frye
doctrine developed . . .out of the same concerns that led to the adoption of Rule 403
[providing the authority to weigh probative value against prejudicial effect]: namely, the
concern that layjurors might be misled by testimony that was unfairly prejudicial, confus-
ing, or misleading." Id. (quoting Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 212).
183. Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 162-63. Rule 403, see supra note 53, provides an exception to the
admissibility of relevant evidence if a trial judge determines that its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, delay, waste of time, or
the presentation of cumulative evidence.
184. See Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 213.
185. Id.
186. See Armstead, 342 Md. at 92, 673 A.2d at 248 (Bell, J., dissenting). In his dissent,
Judge Bell noted the position of the Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Houser, 490
N.W.2d 168 (Neb. 1992):
[T]he trial court, in determining admissibility of DNA evidence, must first be
satisfied, and find, as to the general acceptance of relevant DNA theories in the
scientific community and must be satisfied as to the acceptance and validity of the
methodology of testing DNA used. The trial court then determines if specific
procedures were properly followed in the case before the court.
Id. at 181; see also United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Although
several courts have found DNA evidence to be admissible because it is reliable and gener-
ally accepted, many cases state that DNA evidence remains subject to attack based on preju-
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Maryland Rule of Evidence 5403 codified the common law rule
that probative evidence may be excluded in the interest of avoiding
unfair prejudice, waste of time, or confusion of the issues.1"' These
concerns apply no less to DNA evidence. In fact, due to the "conclu-
sive" aura that surrounds the results, concerns of unfair prejudice and
confusion of the issues should weigh more strongly when a court con-
siders DNA evidence.188 The court overlooked two important points
when it held that if errors in the testing procedures exist, the evidence
should be admitted and the fact finder given the opportunity to weigh
the evidence. 189 First, the testing and determination of a DNA match
require precision. Second, the DNA match is presented to the jury as
nearly conclusive in terms of infinitesimally small probabilities of a
false match. Even when errors occur in the process, the jury will likely
only remember the one-in-a-billion odds of a random match.
d. Probability Statistics Are Necessary and Subject to Frye-Reed
Analysis.-The court held that section 10-915 renders supporting
probability statistics admissible as part of a DNA profile. 9 ° The court
premised this holding upon the conclusion that probability statistics
are necessary in order to give a DNA profile meaning. 9' The latter
dice, relevancy, and laboratory procedures."); Ex parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242, 250 (Ala.
1991) (holding that the Frye test does not automatically render scientific evidence admissi-
ble, but the court must also determine that the laboratory performed and interpreted the
tests in accordance with the generally accepted technique without error).
187. See supra note 105. Prior to the adoption of this rule, courts recognized that com-
mon law rules of evidence provided for exclusion of relevant evidence in the interest of
avoiding cumulative evidence, see, e.g., Ali v. State, 314 Md. 295, 307, 550 A.2d 925, 931
(1988); unfair prejudice, see, e.g., Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 132, 36 A.2d 699, 700
(1944); and confusion of the issues, see, e.g., Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 193-94, 218 A.2d
184, 189 (1966).
188. See Armstead, 342 Md. at 104, 673 A.2d at 254 (Bell,J., dissenting). In dissentJudge
Bell noted:
The complexity of DNA evidence, the unfamiliarity that most lay jurors have with
respect to the subject and the likelihood that it will be perceived by such jurors as
conclusive on the ultimate issue of identity has caused one court to observe [that]
"[t] he juror would simply skip to the bottom line-the only aspect of the process
that is readily understood-and look at the ultimate expression of match
probability, without completely accessing the reliability of the process by which
the laboratory got to the bottom line."
Id. (quoting People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 742 (Ct. App. 1992)); see alsoJayne L.
Jakubaitis, Note, 'Genetically' Altered Admissibility: Legislative Notice of DNA Typing, 39 Cuv.
ST. L. REv. 415, 418 (1991) (stating that "there is reason to treat DNA evidence with more
care" than other expert testimony because of its "potential for far greater effects" on
jurors).
189. Armstead, 342 Md. at 56-58, 673 A.2d at 230.




conclusion directly opposes the position of the Court of Special Ap-
peals in Jackson v. State'92 that "[t]here was simply no need for the
State to offer additional evidence, such as probability calculations, to
establish that the testing procedures were reliable.""'3 In Jackson, the
appellant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the admission
of DNA profile evidence without supporting probability statistics.' 94
He claimed that "without proper evidence regarding the probability
of a match, evidence that a match was declared has no relevance."' 95
The Court of Appeals, in Arnstead, reasoned that because probability
statistics are necessary to give evidence of a DNA match meaning, the
legislature must have intended section 10-915 to encompass the sup-
porting probability statistics.' 96
The court's conclusion that evidence of a DNA match requires
supporting probability statistics to be probative of a person's identity is
well founded. The additional conclusion that section 10-915 renders
probability statistics admissible, however, is not. In a somewhat self-
defeating move, the Court of Appeals rejected the holding of Keirsey v.
State,'9 7 in which the Court of Special Appeals held that probability
statistics are not subject to the Frye-Reed standard.19 8 Thus, in order
for the legislature to have intended statistical evidence to be admissi-
ble under section 10-915, it would have had to determine the reliabil-
ity of such statistics under the Frye-Reed standard. The statute refers
only to "DNA profile" evidence, specifically naming the RFLP tech-
nique. 9 9 There is no evidence in the language of the statute or legis-
lative history indicating that the General Assembly contemplated the
reliability of probability statistic methodologies.
Despite the fact that the Arrnstead court held that probability sta-
tistics are admissible under section 10-915, it nevertheless undertook a
detailed analysis of the two methodologies challenged in the case-
the "product rule" and the "ceiling principle." °° The court, although
holding that section 10-915 renders statistical evidence admissible,
conducted a Frye-type analysis on the general acceptance of the prod-
192. 92 Md. App. 304, 608 A.2d 782 (1992).
193. Id. at 324, 608 A.2d at 792.
194. Id., 608 A.2d at 791.
195. Id.
196. Armstead, 342 Md. at 79, 673 A.2d at 241.
197. 106 Md. App. 551, 665 A.2d 700 (1995), vacated, 342 Md. 120, 674 A.2d 510 (1996)
(vacating and remanding in light of the decision in Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d
221 (1996)).
198. Armstead, 342 Md. at 81 n.33, 673 A.2d at 242.
199. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 10-915(a)(3) (1995).
200. Armutead, 342 Md. at 67-76, 673 A.2d at 235-40.
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uct rule and declared the product rule generally accepted in the sci-
entific community.2 ' This determination is not outside the province
of the Court of Appeals. It is odd, however, that the court imputes
this intention to the legislature. The question remains-what is the
trial court to do when statistical evidence is proffered that is premised
neither on the product rule nor the ceiling principle? The statute
fails to mention probability statistics at all, much less statistics pre-
mised on any particular methodology. The court, in ruling that sec-
tion 10-915 renders such evidence admissible, has left open the
admissibility of statistical probability evidence that is premised upon
theories that are not generally accepted.2" 2
The Court of Appeals's holding essentially renders probability sta-
tistics admissible per se.2"' This holding incorrectly interprets the lan-
guage and intent of the statute, as well as the current controversy over
the methodology of deriving probability statistics. A review of the leg-
islative history and the language of section 10-915 shows that the legis-
lature was not considering probability statistics when it enacted the
statute.20 4 Although the legislature chose not to make a Frye-type de-
termination regarding probability statistics, the court made a detailed
analysis of the level of "general acceptance" of the two methodologies
used in Armstead.2°5 The court determined that both methodologies
201. Id. at 76, 673 A.2d at 240.
202. There exists a strong argument that the product rule currently is not generally
accepted in the scientific community. See NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 12. As noted
earlier, the product rule is premised upon two assumptions, neither of which has been
proven. See supra notes 22-23. Thus, there remains strong opposition within the scientific
community to its use. It is not a situation in which the results have been shown to be
inaccurate, but more similar to the situation encountered by the Massachusetts court in
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 1975). There, the court admitted evidence
testimony based upon voiceprint analysis, andJustice Kaplan, in his dissent, noted that "the
decisions thus reflected less a consensus in the relevant scientific community [that the
scientific method was reliable] than an absence of study on which an informed opinion
could be based one way or the other." Id. at 680 (Kaplan, J., dissenting).
The National Research Council has warned that the unmodified product rule may
yield probability estimates that are inaccurate. See NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 12-15
(discussing the need for the use of the conservative ceiling principle). The Court of Ap-
peals dismissed the Council's finding, ignoring the warnings the court gave in Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978). There, the court emphasized the importance of the
Frye hearing by stating that "[t ] he purpose of the Fye test is defeated by an approach which
allows a court to ignore the informed opinions of a substantial segment of the scientific
community which stands in opposition to the process in question." Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at
377.
203. See Armstead, 342 Md. at 81, 673 A.2d at 242.
204. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-915; SENATEJUD. PROC. COMM., FLOOR
REP., H.B. 711, Md. Gen. Assembly 2 (1989).
205. See Armstead, 342 Md. at 67-77, 673 A.2d at 235-40.
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pass muster under Frye.206 The primary concern arising from this
holding is that both statistical methodologies used by the Arnstead
court have not achieved "general acceptance" in the scientific commu-
nity."' The majority dismisses the persuasive authority that questions
the reliability of such statistics. 20
8
5. Conclusion.-In Arnstead, the Court of Appeals attempted to
resolve the controversy regarding DNA evidence in Maryland courts.
It did so by placing several pertinent issues under the umbrella of
section 10-915. Unfortunately, though, the umbrella is not that
broad. By concluding that the General Assembly intended to render
probability statistics admissible, the court has left a decision-making
void within its jurisprudence. Moreover, by holding that the trial
court lacks discretion to apply Maryland Rule 5-403 to such cases, the
Court of Appeals has left a void in the evidentiary safeguards that have
long protected the rights of the accused in Maryland.
One cannot seriously dispute the general reliability of DNA evi-
dence derived from the RFLP method, nor can the probative strength
of such evidence in determining identity be contested. Yet no two
cases are alike, nor are generally accepted methodologies always ap-
plied properly. When a trial court is confronted with DNA evidence
about which there is a serious question of reliability, the evidence
must now go to the jury unless the flaws are so extreme as to violate
due process. There no longer exists any middle ground for the trial
court to prevent possible unfair prejudice.
The issue on the reliability of probability statistics is unique. It is
unique because the court has held that a concept was rendered "gen-
erally accepted" by the scientific community. As noted, section 10-915
deals with DNA evidence satisfying the Fye-Reed test. Premises and
theories on population genetics are constantly changing. The Gen-
eral Assembly, having addressed none of the theories, has not deter-
mined the reliability of any population theory. Thus, despite the
court's holding, it will remain incumbent upon trial courts to monitor
the evolution of such theories and to evaluate critically the reliability
206. The majority held that section 10-915 renders probability statistics admissible,
although it was the court's taking judicial notice of the reliability, not the legislature's. See
id. at 82, 673 A.2d at 242.
207. See NRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 74-75.
208. Armstead, 342 Md. at 70-73, 673 A.2d at 237-38.
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of new or mutated forms of DNA population genetics offered as the




A. Resignation of Guardianship: The Applicable Standard and
Its Implications
In In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935,1 the Court of Appeals
held that the "best interests of the child" standard applies to petitions
for resignation of guardianship.' The court determined that resigna-
tion of guardianship is a separate issue from whether the guardian has
assumed a duty of support.' Thus the resolution of one issue does not
influence the outcome of the other; the resignation of a guardian
does not terminate a duty of support, if a duty of support has been
assumed by the guardian.4
The issue raised in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935 was one
of first impression in Maryland. This Note will argue that the court's
approval of the guardian's petition for resignation was in the best in-
terests of the children involved. Further, this Note will argue that
there are few instances in which a court should reject a petition for
resignation of guardianship. In granting the petition in this case, the
court also guaranteed that the public policy of encouraging voluntary
guardianship would not be adversely affected.
1. The Case.-In 1989, Carl and Mavis Bauer (the Bauers) peti-
tioned the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for guardianship of
three minor children, James, Charles, and Daniel.5 Ms. Bauer's son,
and Mr. Bauer's stepson, Steven Fountain, had been the guardian of
the three children since 1985.6 Steven had fathered both James and
Daniel,7 while Charles was the child of Steven's ex-wife, Annie Marie
Geiger.8 Although Steven Fountain served as the court-appointed
1. 342 Md. 615, 679 A.2d 530 (1996).
2. Id. at 630, 679 A.2d at 537. The best interests standard is applied to all proceedings
related to the guardianship of a child. Id. at 625, 679 A.2d at 534; see infra notes 51-54 and
accompanying text.
3. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, 342 Md. at 629-30, 679 A.2d at 537.
4. Id. at 629, 679 A.2d at 536.
5. Id. at 618-19, 679 A.2d at 531. The Bauers had obtained the consent of the chil-




8. Id. Steven and Annie Marie married in 1979, and this marriage produced James.
Id. Steven and Annie Marie divorced in 1982, and Annie Marie marriedJohn Geiger later
that year. Id. While married to John Geiger, Annie Marie gave birth to Charles. Id.
Thereafter, Annie Marie and John separated. Id. Steven and Annie Marie reunited and
Daniel was born. Id. Annie Marie and Steven broke up shortly after Daniel's birth, and
following the break-up, Annie Marie moved to North Carolina, leaving all three children
with Steven. Id.
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guardian of the three minor children, the children lived primarily
with Carl and Mavis Bauer.9 The petitions for guardianship filed by
the Bauers stated that they sought guardianship so that they could
cover the children under their "health insurance policy, provide
schooling ... and perform all other acts necessary to the raising of the
[children]."" Each petition also stated that the Bauers were "fully
able to support the minor child,"'1 and that Steven Fountain had
agreed to pay the Bauers one hundred dollars per month per child as
child support.12 Annie Marie andJohn Geiger, the biological parents
of Charles, consented to the appointment of the Bauers as guardi-
ans.13 The circuit court granted the petition for guardianship of the
person 4 of the three minor children on June 16, 1989.15
In October 1994, Mr. Bauer petitioned the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County to resign as co-guardian of the three children.16
Mr. Bauer had moved out of the family home in May of 1994, and Ms.
Bauer filed for divorce, seeking alimony and child support.1 7 Mr.
Bauer petitioned for resignation pursuant to sections 220 and 221 of
the Estates and Trusts Article of the Maryland Code and Maryland
Rule V81.' 8 Ms. Bauer opposed Mr. Bauer's petition for resignation as
9. Id. at 619, 679 A.2d at 531. Mavis Bauer asserted that the three children had lived
with the Bauers most of their lives. Brief of Appellant at 3-5, In re Guardianship/Adoption
No. 10935, 342 Md. 615, 679 A-2d 530 (1996) (No. 48). Carl Bauer asserted, however, that
Steven Fountain lived with Carl and Mavis while Steven had custody and guardianship of
the children and that Steven raised the children until he was incarcerated in 1993. In re
Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, 342 Md. at 620-21 & n.2, 679 A.2d at 532 & n.2.
10. Id. at 619, 679 A.2d at 531.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 618, 679 A.2d at 531. By that time, Annie Marie had remarried and still
resided in North Carolina. Id. at 619, 679 A.2d at 531. John Geiger had moved to Penn-
sylvania. Id.
14. Guardianship of the person does not include control of the ward's property. See
MD. CODE ANN., Es-r. & TRUSTS § 13-702 (1991). Mr. and Ms. Bauer became co-guardians
of the person of the three minor children. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, 342 Md.
at 619, 679 A.2d at 531. Hereinafter, guardianship of the person will be referred to as
.guardianship."
15. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, 342 Md. at 619, 679 A.2d at 531.
16. Id., 679 A-2d at 532.
17. Id., 679 A.2d at 531-32. Ms. Bauer sought a limited divorce on the ground of aban-
donment. Id. She also sought alimony and child support. Id. The divorce action was still
pending in circuit court when the Court of Appeals decided this case. Id., 679 A.2d at 532.
18. Id. As the court pointed out, these sections of the Estates and Trusts Article apply
to the resignation of a guardian of property and not to the resignation of a guardian of the
person, and are thus not directly applicable to this matter. Id. at 623, 679 A.2d at 533. The
court interpreted the petitions under the applicable sections of the Maryland Code dealing
with guardianship of the person. See infra note 62 and accompanying text. Maryland Rule
V81 applies to the resignation of a fiduciary. MD. R_ V81.
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co-guardian,19 arguing that Mr. Bauer had a duty to support the chil-
dren. Ms. Bauer based her argument on equitable estoppel and con-
tract theories."0 Further, Ms. Bauer asserted that it would not be in
the best interests of the children to allow Mr. Bauer to resign as co-
guardian and thereby shirk his duty to support them.21
Mr. Bauer, on the other hand, denied having a duty to support
the children. 2 Mr. Bauer argued that "severe depression," caused by
the demands placed upon him by Ms. Bauer to support her, her chil-
dren, and her grandchildren, rendered him unable to function as a
co-guardian. 23 Mr. Bauer also argued that because he no longer re-
sided in the family home and had to avoid the home due to Ms.
Bauer's "aggressive behavior and emotional abuse,"24 it was difficult to
perform his duties as co-guardian.
At trial, counsel for Ms. Bauer agreed with the court that guardi-
anship usually does not carry with it a duty of support.25 Her counsel
also stated that, except for the duty of support, Ms. Bauer did not
object to the resignation of Mr. Bauer as co-guardian.26 Having deter-
mined that the issue before the court was whether Mr. Bauer had a
duty to support the minor children, the trial court found that "there
[was] . . .no legal basis" to require support.27 Thus, the trial court
granted Mr. Bauer's petition to resign as co-guardian without impos-
ing a duty to support. 28 Ms. Bauer appealed to the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals. 29 The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari
before the Court of Special Appeals commenced proceedings.3 0
19. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, 342 Md. at 619, 679 A.2d at 532.
20. Id. at 620, 679 A.2d at 532. Ms. Bauer contended that Mr. Bauer had induced her,
the children, and the children's parents to rely upon his "representations" that he would
support the children, and, therefore, he should be estopped to resigning as guardian and
denying his duty to support the children. Id. Mr. Bauer countered that he had never
assumed the role of a father to the children, arguing that Steven Fountain had performed
the role until his incarceration in 1993. Id. at 620-21, 679 A.2d at 532. Consequently, Mr.
Bauer argued, he had no contractual or equitable duty to support the three children. Id.
at 621, 679 A.2d at 532.
21. Id. at 620, 679 A.2d at 532.
22. Id. at 620-21, 679 A.2d at 532.
23. Id. at 621, 679 A.2d at 532. Mr. Bauer also attributed his condition to trauma re-
suiting from Steven Fountain's having murdered his girlfriend. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 621-22, 679 A.2d at 533.
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2. Legal Background.-A great number of cases have addressed
termination of guardianship,"1 but few cases have involved the resigna-
tion of a guardian. Due to the limited number of cases focusing on
the resignation of a guardian, it is helpful to examine cases from both
the early English common law and jurisdictions throughout the
United States to fully understand the development of the law in this
area.
a. Early English Common Law.-In eighteenth-century Eng-
land, a guardian generally could not resign or assign his guardianship.
In Spencer v. Chesterfield,32 for example, although the court permitted
the resignation of a testamentary guardian, the court pointed out that
special circumstances justified its decision.33 The court specifically
warned that courts should not regard the case as precedent for al-
lowing guardians to resign in the future. 4 Although in Spencer, the
court permitted the guardian's resignation, in Shaftsbuiy v. Shaft-
sbury,3 5 the court held that a guardian in socage 3 6 could never assign
his guardianship.37 The court found that "the Guardian in Socage has
no Interest of Profit; it is an Interest of Honour and for the Honour of
the Family committed to his next of Kin, and therefore is inherent to
the Blood, and can't be assignable."3"
b. United States.-In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries, courts in the United States held that a guardian did not
have a common law right to resign." In Wackerle v. People,4" an Illinois
31. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. Even in those cases involving the termina-
tion of guardianship, most involve a guardian that opposes, rather than requests, the termi-
nation. See, e.g.,Jain v. Priest, 164 P. 364, 369 (Idaho 1917) (upholding the termination of
guardianship in favor of the children's natural parents).
32. 27 Eng. Rep. 94 (Ch. 1752).
33. Id. at 95. These special circumstances included the mother's consent to the resig-
nation and the fact that the ward was going abroad. Id. at 94-95. A testamentary guardian
is "one appointed by the deed or last will of the child's father or mother." BLACK'S LAw
DicnoNARv 706 (6th ed. 1990).
34. Spencer, 27 Eng. Rep. at 95.
35. 25 Eng. Rep. 121 (Ch. 1752).
36. A guardian in socage was "[a]t the common law.., a species of guardian who had
the custody of lands coming to the infant by descent, as also of the infant's person, until
the latter reached the age of fourteen." BLACK'S LAW DicToNARY, supra note 33, at 707.
37. Shaftsbury, 25 Eng. Rep. at 124.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Wackerle v. People, 48 N.E. 123, 124 (Ill. 1897) (stating that a guardian
does not have an absolute right to resign); Young v. Lorain, 11 Ill. 625, 633 (1850) (finding
that before the passage of a statute authorizing the resignation of guardians, a guardian
could not resign and a court could not accept his resignation); In re Dixon's Estate, 9 Pa. D.
& C. 79, 80 (1927) ("It is not good practice to discharge a guardian who has been duly
appointed simply because he desires to be relieved of the responsibilities of his office
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court held that a guardian could not resign at common law and that
even pursuant to a statute authorizing resignation the guardian's right
to resign was subject to the court's discretion and was not absolute."1
Similarly, in Young v. Lorain,"2 the court observed that prior to a stat-
ute authorizing the resignation of a guardian for good cause a guard-
ian had no right to resign."3
Although a guardian did not have an absolute right to resign at
common law, courts in many states eventually began to allow the resig-
nation or termination of guardianships, either at the request of the
guardian or at the request of a third party."4 These courts have exer-
cised wide discretion in the granting of resignations or terminations."5
For example, in Young, the court noted that although "the court of
probate had power to remove the guardian, for good and sufficient
reason, . . .the statute does not specify any particular reasons, but
leaves the sufficiency of the cause with [the probate] court."46
There are a number of cases in which the termination of a guard-
ianship is at issue."7 At present, courts in most states permit the termi-
nation of a guardianship when it is in the best interests of the child or
when there is good cause to do so. 48 Few cases have arisen, however,
... ."); Evans v. Johnson, 19 S.E. 623, 625 (W. Va. 1894) (observing that at common law a
guardian did not have a right to resign).
40. 48 N.E. 123 (II. 1897).
41. Id. at 124.
42. 11 Ill. 625 (1850).
43. Id. at 633.
44. See, e.g., Jain v. Priest, 164 P. 364, 369 (Idaho 1917) (affirming the grant of a peti-
tion filed by the natural parents of two children to terminate the guardianship and return
the children to their parents); In re Guardianship of Huntsman, 21 N.W. 555, 555-56
(Minn. 1884) (granting the guardian's petition to resign and ordering his removal as
guardian); In re Wachter, 149 A. 315, 315 (Pa. 1930) (per curiam) (affirming a decree
granting a petition filed by a third party to discharge the present guardian because the
present guardian's whereabouts were unknown).
45. See Wacker/e, 48 N.E. at 124 ("Resignation, then, of the office of guardian, is not an
absolute right, but subject to a determination of its propriety by the court."); Young, 11. Ill.
at 633 (holding that the probate court determines sufficiency of the reasons proffered for
the resignation).
46. Young, 11 111. at 633.
47. See, e.g., In re Alicia 0., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 119, 124 (Ct. App. 1995) (affirming the
termination of guardianship and the appointment of a new guardian for a mentally incom-
petent ward); In re Guardianship of Walpole, 639 So. 2d 60, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(affirming the denial of a petition to terminate a guardianship of the property regarding a
ward who no longer resided in the state); Jain, 164 P. at 369 (affirming the grant of a
petition filed by the natural parents of two children to terminate the guardianship and
return the children to the parents).
48. See, e.g., Hooks v. Pratte, 920 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the
evidence sufficiently established that it was in the child's best interests to terminate the
guardianship and reunite the child with his mother); In re Guardianship of Markham, 795
S.W.2d 931, 933 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that the evidence sufficiently established that
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in which the guardian himself petitions the court for his resignation, 49
and there are few if any reported cases that involve the resignation of
a guardian when the ward is a child.
c. Maryland.-Prior to In re Adoption/Guardianship No.
10935,50 Maryland courts had not confronted a case involving the res-
ignation of a guardian. Similarly, few Maryland cases exist that involve
the termination of guardianship. Therefore, to determine if a guard-
ian may resign, one must look to Maryland cases involving the ap-
pointment of guardians and to Maryland statutory law.
Maryland courts have made clear that the decision of whether to
appoint an individual to the position of guardian depends upon the
best interests of the ward. In Compton v. Compton,51 for example, the
Court of Appeals stated that "[i] t is the duty of the Orphans court, in
appointing his guardian, to consult the interests, rather than the
wishes of the infant."52 In Sudler v. Sudler,53 the Court of Appeals
it was in the child's best interests not to terminate the guardianship and return the child to
her natural parents); San Diego County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Superior Court, 496 P.2d
453, 461 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (stating that the court is guided by what is in the best
interests of the child when making guardianship decisions); Martin v. Sand, 444 A.2d 309,
315 (Del. Farn. Ct. 1982) (stating that guardianship will not be terminated unless such
termination would be in the best interests of the child); Estate of Brown v. Purcell, 431
N.E.2d 457, 460 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (stating that the evidence sufficiently established that it
was in the child's best interests to remain with the guardian and not with the child's natu-
ral father); In re Guardianship of RB., 619 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (conclud-
ing it was in the best interests of minor child to terminate guardianship of grandmother
and return child to her biological mother); Zvorak v. Beireis, 519 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Iowa
1994) (stating that the "determining factor" in child custody cases is the best interests of
the child); In re Guardianship of Stewart, 369 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Iowa 1985) (stating that
the "governing consideration" in all child custody cases is the best interests of the child); In
re Guardianship of Sams, 256 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Iowa 1977) (stating that the "determinative
factor" in all child custody cases is the best interests of the child); Guardianship of Gabriel
W., 666 A.2d 505, 510 (Me. 1995) (affirming the denial of the natural mother's petition to
terminate guardianship because continuing the guardianship is in the best interests of the
child); Masitto v. Masitto, 488 N.E.2d 857, 860 (Ohio 1986) (per curiam) (stating that an
original custody award will not be modified unless in the best interests of the child); In re
Guardianship of Palmer, 494 P.2d 233, 237 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (affirming the proposi-
tion that before depriving the natural parents of a child of custody it must be shown that
such would be in the best interests of the child).
49. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barth, 536 N.E.2d 973, 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (affirming the
dismissal of a petition by a former guardian of property requesting that the resignation be
vacated); State ex rel. McWilliams v. Armstrong, 9 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Mo. 1928) (en banc)
(holding that the guardian of property did not resign and the probate court's order to
discharge him was void).
50. 342 Md. 615, 679 A.2d 530 (1996).
51. 2 Gill 241 (Md. 1844).
52. Id. at 253. The Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from the Orphans Court
contesting the appointment of someone other than the ward's choice as guardian. Id.
53. 121 Md. 46, 88 A. 26 (1913).
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noted that in controversies surrounding the appointment of a guard-
ian, the best interests of the ward must be considered. 4
The statute governing guardianship in Maryland is found in sec-
tion 13-702 (a) of the Estates and Trusts Article of the Maryland Code
and reads as follows:
General rule.-If neither parent is serving as guardian of the
person and no testamentary appointment has been made, on
petition by any person interested in the welfare of the minor,
and after notice and hearing, the court may appoint a guard-
ian of the person of an unmarried minor. If the minor has
attained his 14th birthday, and if the person otherwise is
qualified, the court shall appoint a person designated by the
minor, unless the decision is not in the best interests of the
minor. This section may not be construed to require court
appointment of a guardian of the person of a minor if there
is no good reason, such as dispute, for a court
appointment.55
Unfortunately, the statute does not clarify whether a guardian
may resign, nor does it reveal the standard a court should apply to
decide if resignation should be permissible. In Wentzel v. Montgomery
General Hospital, Inc.,56 the court asserted that the Maryland legislature
purposely did not define the duties and powers of a guardian in sec-
tion 13-702 to afford courts the freedom to make decisions based on
the minor's best interests.57 The Wentzel court specifically stated:
In enacting § 13-702, expressly recognizing the authority of
circuit courts to appoint a guardian of the person of a minor,
but without delineating the guardian's powers and duties,
the legislature intended that circuit courts would exercise
their inherent equitable jurisdiction over guardianship mat-
ters pertaining to minors, adopting standards with respect
thereto as would be consistent with and in furtherance of the
incompetent ward's best interests.5 8
54. Id. at 56, 88 A. at 30. The Court of Appeals held that the Orphans Court located in
the ward's domicile at the time of the death of the ward's mother had jurisdiction to ap-
point a guardian. Id.
55. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-702(a) (1991). There is also a statute in the
Family Law Article that pertains to the head of a child placement agency petitioning for
guardianship and discusses the implications and rights of all parties involved. MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-317 (1991). Because the children in this case were not taken from
their parents by a child placement agency, this Note deals only with section 13-702 of the
Estates and Trusts Article.
56. 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982).
57. Id. at 701-02, 447 A.2d at 1252-53.
58. Id. at 701, 447 A.2d at 1252.
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Although Wentzel dealt with the appointment of a guardian for the
sole purpose of consenting to a medical procedure for a mentally in-
competent individual,59 the court's interpretation of section 13-702 is
relevant to guardianship in general. It logically follows from the early
cases and the interpretation of section 13-702 that any decision re-
garding guardianship should be governed by the "best interests"
standard.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Court of Appeals affirmed the
grant of Mr. Bauer's petition for resignation of guardianship and held
that any duty to support the children constituted an entirely separate
issue.6 ° Relying on Wentzel, the court found that the standard to ap-
ply in guardianship cases arising under section 13-702 was the best
interests of the child standard.62
The court recognized that the resignation of guardianship issue
was one of first impression in Maryland. After examining the evolu-
tion of law in other states, however, the court concluded that the peti-
tion should be granted if it served the best interests of the children.6"
The court first looked to English common law and found that, origi-
nally, a guardian did not have a right to resign.64 The court then
examined the law of other jurisdictions in the United States and
found that, although a guardian did not possess an absolute right to
resign at common law,6 5 the authority suggested that a guardian
should be allowed to resign if good cause exists or if resignation is in
the best interests of the child.' Further, the court stated that both
common sense and the child's best interests would ordinarily lead to
the conclusion that a court should grant a petition to resign as guard-
59. Id at 701-02, 447 A.2d at 1252-53.
60. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, 342 Md. at 629-30, 679 A.2d at 537.
61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text for the quoted passage from Wentzel on
which the Court of Appeals relied.
62. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, 342 Md. at 624-25, 679 A.2d at 534.
63. Id. at 625, 679 A.2d at 534.
64. Id. at 625-27, 679 A.2d at 534-35. The court distinguished the different types of
guardianship and the rules that applied to the resignation of those guardians. Id.; see supra
notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
65. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, 342 Md. at 627, 679 A.2d at 535 (relying on
Wackerle v. People, 48 N.E. 123 (Ill. 1897); Young v. Lorain, 11 Ill. 625 (1850); Evans v.
Johnson, 19 S.E. 623 (W. Va. 1894)); see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
66. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, 342 Md. at 627-28, 679 A.2d at 535-36 (rely-
ing onJain v. Priest, 164 P. 364 (Idaho 1917); Wackere, 48 N.E. at 123; In re Guardianship
of Huntsman, 21 N.W. 555 (Minn. 1884); Ex parte Crumb, 2 Johns. Ch. 439 (N.Y. Ch.
1817); Nicoll v. Trustees of Huntington, 1 Johns. Ch. 166 (N.Y. Ch. 1814); In re Wachter,
149 A. 315 (Pa. 1930) (per curiam); In re Dixon's Estate, 9 Pa. D. & C. 79 (1927)).
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ian "when the guardian is unwilling to continue serving in that
capacity."67
After deciding that the best interests of the child standard should
apply to petitions for resignation of guardianship, the court consid-
ered whether Mr. Bauer had assumed a duty to support the three chil-
dren and, if so, whether his resignation would terminate that duty.68
The court observed that, depending upon the circumstances, a guard-
ian may or may not have assumed a duty of support.69 The court
pointed out that Maryland courts have held that even an individual
who is neither a parent nor a court-appointed guardian may in some
instances acquire a duty to support a child.70 On the other hand,
Maryland courts have also appointed guardians "simply for the pur-
pose of making a particular type of decision for that minor."71 In such
cases, the guardian has no duty to support.72 Thus, the mere appoint-
ment of an individual as guardian, the court held, does not create a
presumption of a duty to support.73 The court found that the two
issues are entirely separate.7 1 If Mr. Bauer had assumed a duty of sup-
port, his resignation as co-guardian would not relieve Mr. Bauer of
that duty. 75
The court determined that only the best interests of the child or
good cause should be considered in granting or denying a guardian's
petition to resign.76 Thus, the court found that the trial court erred
when it considered the duty to support issue as a factor in determin-
ing whether to grant Mr. Bauer's petition to resign as co-guardian.77
Because the sole consideration in granting or denying such a petition
is good cause or the best interests of the child, the court held that the
support issue should be resolved in the parties' pending divorce pro-
ceedings. 78 The court stated that although proper judicial procedure
requires that the issue of guardianship be remanded to determine the
67. Id. at 627, 679 A.2d at 536.
68. Id. at 628, 679 A.2d at 536.
69. Id.
70. Id. (relying on Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 288, 412 A.2d 396, 404 (1980) (hold-
ing that a stepfather who contractually assumed the duty of support for a stepchild could
not be incarcerated for failing to fulfill that obligation)).
71. Id. (relying on Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d
1244 (1982)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 629-30, 679 A.2d at 537.
74. Id. at 629, 679 A.2d at 536.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 630, 679 A.2d at 537.
78. Id.
[VOL. 56:656
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
best interests of the children, in this instance the court would not do
so because Ms. Bauer had agreed that the court should grant the peti-
tion so long as the support issue was not affected. 79 The court found
that due to Mr. Bauer's wish to resign as co-guardian and Ms. Bauer's
desire to remain guardian, "good cause and best interests of the chil-
dren required the granting of the petition."80 The Court of Appeals
then affirmed the circuit court's order granting Mr. Bauer's petition
to resign as co-guardian while modifying the order so as to exclude
the "duty to support issue."81
4. Analysis.-The court's decision to allow an individual to re-
sign as co-guardian invites several important questions. First, was the
court correct to separate the issue of support from the issue of resig-
nation? Second, what factors determine the best interests standard in
a guardianship resignation case? Third, is it ever in a child's best in-
terests to force someone to remain a guardian? Finally, what implica-
tions will the court's decision have with respect to children, voluntary
guardianship, and future cases?
a. Separating the Resignation of a Guardian from the Duty to Sup-
port.-The court correctly held that a guardian does not assume the
duty to support a minor simply by virtue of being appointed guard-
ian.8" Individuals may assume a duty to support a child with or with-
out being appointed guardian.83 The Maryland case law and the law
79. Id. at 630-31, 679 A.2d at 537. The court pointed out that normally it would re-
mand a case when the trial court had applied an erroneous standard. Id at 630, 679 A2d
at 537. Noting that usual practice dictates the affirmance of summaryjudgment based only
on the grounds put forth by the trial court, the court held that the unusual circumstances
of the case permitted the court's making an exception. Id. at 630-31, 679 A.2d at 537.
80. Id. at 631, 679 A.2d at 537.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 628-29, 679 A.2d at 536.
83. Id. at 628, 679 A.2d at 536.
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of other states agree on this point.84 No correlation exists between a
duty to support and guardianship.8"
Whether an individual has a legal duty to support a child depends
on the relationship between the child and that individual. It is well
established in Maryland that both parents are jointly and severally lia-
ble for, and have a legal and moral duty to support, their children.86
Section 1-205 of the Estates and Trusts Article defines a child to in-
clude "a legitimate child, an adopted child, and an illegitimate child
to the extent provided in §§ 1-206 through 1-208 of this title. A child
does not include a stepchild, a foster child, or a grandchild or more
remote descendant."8 7 The fact that an individual assumes guardian-
ship of a child does not, under the Maryland statutory or case law,
make the child a "legal child" for the purpose of creating a duty to
support. Thus, if a guardian has a duty to support a child, it does not
arise from his status as guardian, but arises under equitable estoppel
or other contract theories. Resigning as guardian, therefore, will not
terminate an assumed duty to support. The court was correct in sepa-
rating the duty to support from the resignation of guardianship, as the
duty to support should be resolved in the divorce proceedings, not in
the proceeding to terminate guardianship.
b. The "Best Interests" Standard.-In all child custody cases,
including petitions for sole custody, joint custody, and guardianship,
Maryland courts apply the best interests standard. 8 A court must con-
84. See, e.g., Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 538-39, 510 A.2d 546, 552 (1986) (refusing to
equitably estop petitioner to denying support to a child who was not his own, even though
the petitioner held the child out as such); Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 194, 448 A.2d
353, 359 (1982) (holding that petitioner's wife was not entitled to use of the family home
for petitioner's stepchildren because stepchildren were not included within the scope of a
statute permitting a spouse with custody of children to retain the family home to protect
the best interests of natural or adopted children); Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 284, 412
A.2d 396, 402 (1980) (holding that a stepfather cannot be incarcerated for failing to honor
a contract to support his stepchild because a contract to support is not the same as the duty
of support owed by a parent to a "legal child"); Miller v. Miller, 478 A.2d 351, 357-58 (NJ.
1984) (holding that an obligation of support may arise for a stepchild on the basis of
equitable estoppel if the stepparent's conduct establishes "representation, reliance, and
detriment").
85. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, 342 Md. at 628, 679 A.2d at 536.
86. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203 (b) (1) (1991) ("The parents of a minor child
... are jointly and severally responsible for the child's support, care, nurture, welfare, and
education . . . ."); Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 459, 648 A.2d 1016, 1018-19 (1994).
87. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-205 (1991).
88. See Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512, 531, 639 A.2d 1076, 1085 (1994) (stating that "the
best interests of the child standard is always determinative in child custody disputes"); Tay-
lor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303, 508 A.2d 964, 970 (1986) (stating that the "paramount
concern" in any child custody case "is the best interest of the child"); Ross v. Hoffman, 280
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sider all relevant factors to determine what is in the best interests of
the child.89 In Taylor v. Taylor,9" the court noted that "[f] ormula or
computer solutions in child custody matters are impossible because of
the unique character of each case, and the subjective nature of the
evaluations and decisions that must be made."91 In Ross v. Hoffman,912
the Court of Special Appeals commented that it would not create set
criteria to judge child custody cases because custody determinations
require case-by-case analysis.9" Although "[t]he definition of a child's
best interest is an elusive one,"94 the best interests standard appears to
be whatever the court perceives would be the most beneficial and least
detrimental situation for the child.
The best interests standard gives a trial court a great deal of dis-
cretion. Although in some cases this discretion may lead a court to
decide a case based on prejudices and bias, adhering to an inflexible
list of factors in child custody or guardianship cases would most likely
cause greater injury. Because every custody case involves unique cir-
cumstances, the court must exercise broad discretion.
c. The "Best Interests" Standard and the Resignation of a Guard-
ian.-In In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, the Court of Appeals
failed to list factors or set forth guidelines to aid future trial courts in
determining when a guardian's resignation would be in a child's best
interests. The court did not explain why it thought the granting of
Mr. Bauer's petition for resignation as co-guardian was in the best in-
terests of the children involved, other than to comment that common
sense required it.95 The lack of applicable statutory or case law (in
Md. 172, 175, 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977) (stating that the best interests of the child standard
controls in child custody disputes between the biological parents or between a biological
parent and a third party); Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 61, 480 A.2d 820, 826 (1984)
("Under any circumstances, the ultimate test for custody and visitation is the best interests
of the child.").
89. See Taylor, 306 Md. at 303, 508 A.2d at 970 ("The best interest of the child is there-
fore not considered as one of many factors, but as the objective to which virtually all other
factors speak.").
90. 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d 964 (1986).
91. Id. at 303, 508 A.2d at 970.
92. 33 Md. App. 333, 364 A.2d 596 (1976), modified and af'd, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d
582 (1977).
93. Id. at 343, 364 A.2d at 602.
94. See Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 49, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993).
95. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935, 342 Md. at 627-29, 679 A.2d at 536. The
court stated that "the authorities, as well as common sense, support the position that ordi-
narily it is in the best interests of the minor to permit a guardian to resign when the
guardian is unwilling to continue serving in that capacity." Id. at 627, 679 A.2d at 536. In
deciding that the case should not be remanded, the court further stated that because Mr.
Bauer wished to resign as co-guardian and Ms. Bauer wished to remain a guardian of the
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Maryland and in other states) concerning the resignation of a guard-
ian is likely due to the infrequency with which guardians voluntarily
resign. Thus, it is necessary to look to analogous cases to determine if
it would ever be in the best interests of a child to require an individual
to remain a guardian when that individual wishes to resign.
Joint custody, grandparental visitation, forced visitation, and ab-
rogation of adoption cases offer some helpful insight to this difficult
question. Had the court denied Mr. Bauer's petition, Mr. and Ms.
Bauer would have remained co-guardians of the children-a situation
bearing some resemblance to cases in which joint custody or grandpa-
rental visitation is awarded to an individual living outside the family
home. Courts could apply the same factors used to determine the
appropriateness ofjoint custody or grandparental visitation to decide
if the resignation of a co-guardian would be in a child's best interests.
In deciding whether to award joint custody, the Taylor court de-
clared that the most important factor is the "[clapacity of the [plarents to
[ciommunicate and to Jreach [s]hared [diecisions [alffecting the [cihild's
[w]elfare."96 The court cautioned that "[r] arely, if ever, should joint
legal custody be awarded in the absence of a record of mature con-
duct on the part of the parents evidencing an ability to effectively
communicate with each other concerning the best interest of the
child."97 Analogizing from the joint custody context, it is clear that
communication problems between co-guardians would make it un-
likely that continued guardianship involving a reluctant guardian
would be in the best interests of a child. It is likely that the parties in
In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10935 would not have communicated
effectively or conducted themselves on a mature level due to the dete-
rioration of their marital relationship.98 Thus, without considering
other factors enumerated by Maryland courts to determine whether
joint custody is in a child's best interests,99 it appears that forcing Mr.
children, "good cause and the best interests of the children required the granting of the
petition." Id. at 631, 679 A.2d at 537. Consequently there was no need to remand the case.
Id.
96. Taylor, 306 Md. at 304, 508 A.2d at 971.
97. Id. Further, the Taylor court stated: "Only where the evidence is strong in support
of a finding of the existence of a significant potential for compliance with this criterion
[i.e., the capacity of the parents to communicate and reach shared decisions affecting the
child's welfare,] should joint legal custody be granted." Id. at 307, 508 A.2d at 972.
98. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
99. The other factors listed by the Taylor court to be considered in joint custody cases
are: (1) "willingness of parents to share custody"; (2) "fitness of parents"; (3) "relationship
established between the child and each parent"; (4) "preference of the child"; (5) "poten-
tial disruption of child's social and school life"; (6) "geographic proximity of parental
homes"; (7) "demands of parental employment"; (8) "age and number of children"; (9)
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Bauer to remain co-guardian would not have been in the best interests
of James, Charles, and Daniel.
Similarly, in grandparental visitation cases, the courts have enu-
merated factors to use in determining whether grandparental visita-
tion would be in the best interests of a child. As in joint custody cases,
courts consider factors such as the relationship between the person
who has custody of the child and the person who has requested visita-
tion with the child. 0° In discussing the factors to be considered in
grandparental visitation cases, the Court of Appeals has warned that
"trial court[s] should also be alert to the psychological toll the visita-
tion dispute itself might exact on a child in the midst of contesting
adults.""01 Employing this "potential for conflict" factor in the Bau-
ers' situation would have been helpful in a best interests analysis.
Although a trial court using this test would likely have reached the
same result as the Court of Appeals, the articulation of relevant factors
to consider would have assisted future determinations.
Just as a court is concerned in joint custody and grandparental
visitation cases about the damage done to a child when the parties are
incommunicative and hostile, courts are also concerned about the po-
tential emotional trauma to a child in forced visitation situations. 10 2
Thus, in guardianship resignation cases, a court must consider
whether it would be in the child's best interests to force a guardian to
remain a part of a child's life. In a situation such as this, the factors
used to award joint custody or grandparental visitation are no longer
adequate to determine what is in the child's best interests.
(i) Forced Visitation.-In co-guardianship situations, in which
another party is caring for the child and able to make decisions for
the child, the only logical explanation for the denial of a resignation
"sincerity of parent's request"; (10) "financial status of the parents"; (11) "impact on state
or federal assistance"; (12) "benefit to parents"; and (13) "other [unenumerated] factors."
Taylor, 306 Md. at 307-11, 508 A.2d at 972-74.
100. Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 50, 622 A.2d 121, 126-27 (1993). The other
factors set out in Fairbanks are:
[1] the nature and stability of the child's relationships with its parents; [2]
the nature and substantiality of the relationship between the child and the grand-
parent, taking into account frequency of contact, regularity of contact, and
amount of time spent together; [3] the potential benefits and detriments to the
child in granting the visitation order; [4] the effect, if any, grandparental visita-
tion would have on the child's attachment to its nuclear family; [5] the physical
and emotional health of the adults involved; and [6] the stability of the child's
living and schooling arrangements.
Id., 622 A.2d at 126-27.
101. Id. at 50, 622 A.2d at 127.
102. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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petition would be that the child's best interests require that the child
have contact with that individual. This would be equivalent to order-
ing forced visitation between the guardian and the child. In joint cus-
tody and grandparental visitation cases, all of the parties want to be
involved in the child's life-a vastly different situation than one in
which a person no longer wants to be involved in the child's life.
Forced visitation cases are difficult for two reasons. First, courts
are often concerned about the psychological effects of requiring visita-
tion. 03 Second, in some jurisdictions, it is unclear whether a court
can enforce such an order. 104
Assuming that Maryland courts have the authority to force a
guardian to visit a child, it is questionable whether doing so would
ever be in the best interests of a child. There are obvious differences
between a parent and a guardian, but it is hard to imagine how a child
would benefit from visitation with someone who did not desire to see
the child. The guardian might manifest resentment toward the child
in the form of inadequate care or verbal or physical abuse.
The guardian (who carries the responsibility of making important
decisions for the child) may ignore the child and the child's welfare.
Common sense dictates that forcing someone to remain a part of a
child's life is not in the best interests of that child.
103. See, e.g., In reJ.C., 617 N.E.2d 1378, 1381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In this case, an
Illinois appeals court affirmed a trial court's decision to order a mother who wished to
terminate her parental rights to visit her daughter. Id. at 1380-81. Originally, the child
had been in the custody of her father. Id. at 1378. After learning that the father had
physically abused the child and that the mother had neglected her, however, the trial court
placed the child in the custody of a guardian. Id. at 1379. Nevertheless, fearing that the
child would blame herself for what had been done, the trial court held that the best inter-
ests of the child required that the mother visit her. Id. at 1380-81; see also Lumpkin v.
Gregory, 559 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Ark. 1977) (en banc) (holding that forced visitation would
not serve the best interests of the child because the child feared her father). But see String-
fellow v. Stringfellow, 553 So. 2d 1161, 1162-63 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989) (holding that the
children could be forced to visit with the father even though one of the children testified
that she feared him).
104. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hamilton, 667 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (per
curiam), appeal denied, 662 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio 1996). In Hamilton, an Ohio appeals court
reversed the decision of a trial court ordering a father to regularly visit his severely disabled
daughter. Id. at 1258. The mother of the child had sought an increase in child support,
arguing that due to the child's need for around-the-clock care, the court should require
that the child's father both pay additional support and help care for the child. Id. The
trial court ordered an increase in support and that the father take on additional care-
taking responsibilities. Id. at 1259. The appeals court upheld the increased support, but
would not force a non-custodial parent to visit with the child on the ground that visitation
was a right and not a duty. Id. at 1260.
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(ii) Abrogation of Adoption.-Perhaps the situation most simi-
lar to the resignation of guardianship is the abrogation of adoption.
Although abrogation of adoption more closely resembles resignation
of guardianship than joint custody or grandparental visitation, the dif-
ference between abrogation of adoption and resignation of guardian-
ship cannot be overlooked. An adopted child becomes the "legal
child" of the adoptive parent, and all of the duties that are owed to a
biological child by biological parents are owed to an adopted child by
an adoptive parent. °5 Guardianship does not carry all of these duties
and responsibilities. Thus, it is appropriate that courts make it more
difficult to abrogate an adoption than to terminate a guardianship.
In cases in which only one adoptive parent wishes to abrogate the
adoption, the adoptive parents have usually separated, and the non-
custodial parent requests the abrogation. 10 6 Courts have been reluc-
tant to grant petitions for abrogation of adoption because, if the abro-
gation is granted, the duty to support the child also terminates. 7
Although these cases resemble guardianship resignation cases, they
differ in that an additional factor-the duty to support-is introduced
into the best interests determination for abrogation cases. Thus, the
decision to grant or deny a petition to abrogate does not rest solely on
the determination that continued contact with the parent seeking ab-
rogation would be in the child's best interests as it would in guardian-
ship resignation cases. The duty to support issue, which significantly
influences court decisions in abrogation cases, therefore renders a
comparison of analysis between abrogation and guardianship virtually
useless.
Although courts have held that abrogation of adoption should
not be permitted unless some type of fraud or misrepresentation has
taken place,1 08 abrogation of adoption has been permitted when the
child has abandoned the adoptive parents or the child has seriously
misbehaved.10 9 Courts have also allowed abrogation of adoption
when it was in the best interests of the child."0 One New York court
105. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
106. See In re Sherman's Adoption, 78 N.Y.S.2d 794, 797 (Surr. Ct. 1948) (denying the
petition by the adoptive father to abrogate the adoption).
107. Id. at 796.
108. See In re Adoption of L., 151 A.2d 435, 437 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1959) (denying
abrogation of adoption on grounds that it would not serve the best interests of the child
and because there was no contention that there had been fraud or misrepresentation).
109. See, e.g., In re Souers, 238 N.Y.S. 738, 744 (Surr. Ct. 1930) (approving the petition
for abrogation of adoption due to the child's ill behavior and abandonment of his adoptive
parents).
110. SeeM.L.B. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 559 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (Nesbitt, J., concurring) (stating that the trial court must consider
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has held that in deciding whether to grant a petition for abrogation of
adoption, a court must consider the best interests of both the parents
and the best interests of the child, but the best interests of the child
are the primary concern."1 Courts have not enumerated factors to
consider in determining when abrogation is in the best interests of a
child, nor have they given any clear rules to follow. The court in In re
Adoption of L. stated:
[C]ourts will not allow an abrogation of an adoption if it is
premised on the desire of the foster parents to rid them-
selves of a "bad bargain" or a change in heart on the part of
the natural parents. The courts have uniformly agreed that a
mere change in attitude or regret does not of and in itself
constitute proper grounds for annulment." 2
Although it is unclear when a court will abrogate an adoption, it
is clear that a court will allow an adoption to be abrogated if it is in the
best interests of the child. Because the courts have broad discretion
in child custody cases, it is conceivable that a court could remove the
child from the adoptive home and place the child with a guardian, but
still deny the petition to abrogate the adoption, thereby continuing
the duties of the .adoptive parents while also ensuring proper care for
the child. This option is not available in resignation of guardianship
cases simply because the guardianship must be terminated to place a
child with another guardian. The different legal obligations of adop-
tive parents could allow the court to require that adoptive parents sup-
port a child that may not be in their care. This possibility may make
courts less likely to abrogate an adoption than to approve a guardian-
ship resignation.
Adoptive parents, unlike guardians, make a lifelong commitment
to a child, and they have the duty to support that child. Accordingly,
the resignation of guardianship should be subject to a less scrutinizing
inquiry than the abrogation of adoption. Courts have occasionally de-
termined that abrogation of adoption is in the best interests of a child
even when that meant terminating all duties that the adoptive parent
whether abrogating the adoption would be in the best interests of the child); In re Anony-
mous, 352 N.Y.S.2d 743, 745 (Surr. Ct. 1968) (holding that it would be in the best interests
of the child to abrogate the adoption). Even in cases in which fraud or misrepresentation
had been found on the part of the adoptive parents, courts have been reluctant to abro-
gate the adoption if it is not in the best interests of the child. See, e.g., In re Abrogation of
Adoption of G.B.W., 345 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (Fam. Ct. 1973).
111. In re Buss, 254 N.Y.S. 852, 853 (App. Div. 1932) (holding that the adoption would
not be abrogated because the child's behavior could not be considered ill behavior).
112. In reAdoption of L., 151 A.2d at 437.
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owed to the child.11 If adoptive parents are adamant in their desire
to abrogate an adoption, it is likely that a court would take the child
from the parents and place the child with a guardian, citing concern
for the child's welfare. Any refusal to abrogate the adoption in such a
case would have to rest on financial considerations, which are not rel-
evant to resignation of guardianship. If the best interests of the child
required the abrogation of adoption, then it certainly would require
allowing a guardian to resign. Guardianship does not carry with it the
duties and responsibilities that adoption carries. Thus a guardian
should be permitted to resign to serve the best interests of the child.
d. Policy Considerations. -In determining that a guardian
should be permitted to resign if the resignation is in the best interests
of the child, or for good cause, the Court of Appeals avoided a severe
blow to the institution of voluntary guardianship. Forbidding a guard-
ian to resign would essentially make guardianship a compulsory, life-
long commitment. There is no doubt that if it were impossible or
extremely difficult to resign as guardian, people would be less willing
to become guardians. In addition, one has to question the quality of
care a guardian would provide if forced to care for a child, against the
guardian's wishes. The child would undoubtedly suffer, if not from
lack of care, then from possible resentment directed at the child.
To ensure the continuation of voluntary guardianship, and to
protect the child, a petition for resignation of guardianship should be
granted even if the child must become a ward of the state. The best
interests of the child and the public policy of encouraging voluntary
guardianship require the granting of a petition for resignation of
guardianship.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals properly separated the is-
sues of resignation of guardianship and the duty to support. The sep-
aration of these issues left little doubt that the petition for resignation
should be granted. The best interests standard, which governs all situ-
ations dealing with child custody, requires that a petition for resigna-
tion be granted in almost any case. A decision to deny a petition for
resignation of guardianship would have a chilling effect on voluntary
guardianship, thus leaving little choice but to grant the petition. Fur-
thermore, concern about the quality of care that a child would receive
113. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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from a "forced" guardian strongly suggests that a petition for resigna-
tion of guardianship be granted.
TAmm" L. GRIFFIN
B. Court-Imposed Grandparental Visitation of Children in Intact
Nuclear Families
In Maner v. Stephenson,' the Court of Appeals held that grandpar-
ents have a statutory right to petition for visitation of grandchildren in
an intact nuclear family.2 The court specifically declined to recognize
a rebuttable presumption in favor of grandparents.' Rather, the court
held that determinations concerning the propriety of grandparental
visitation are within the discretion of the trial court, which must ad-
minister rulings in accordance with the "best interests of the child"
standard.4 Maner represents the first time the Court of Appeals has
addressed whether parents of an intact nuclear family may bar contact
between their children and their children's grandparents. Because
the grandparents in Maner failed to show that visitation was in the best
interests of the children, the court properly denied the grandparents'
petition for visitation. This decision leaves unresolved, however, the
more fundamental issue of whether Maryland's grandparental visita-
tion statute is constitutional as applied to intact nuclear families.
1. The Case.-Kita and Jim Stephenson (the Stephensons) had
been married for thirteen years and were raising their two children,
Katie and Trey.5 The family lived together in Salisbury, Maryland, as
1. 342 Md. 461, 677 A.2d 560 (1996).
2. Id. at 467-68, 677 A.2d at 563 ("The plain language of [Section 9-102 of the Family
Law Article] ... clearly reflects the legislature's intent to allow courts to grant grandpar-
ents visitation, even where the parents' marriage is intact, if it is in the best interests of the
children.").
3. See id at 470, 677 A.2d at 564 ("[C]ourts may not apply a rebuttable presumption in
favor of grandparent visitation. Nothing in the language of the statute or the legislative
history supports such a presumption.").
4. See id. at 469, 677 A.2d at 564 ("'[D]eterminations concerning visitation are within
the sound discretion of the trial court as it is in the best position to assess the import of the
particular facts of the case and to observe the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses.'"
(quoting Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 703, 655 A.2d 901, 908 (1995))).
5. See Reporter's Official Transcript of Proceedings at 99-100, Maner v. Stephenson,
342 Md. 461, 677 A.2d 560 (Md. 1996) (No. 113). Herein, the term "intact nuclear family"
refers to a family consisting of a mother and father who are married, have a dependent
minor child or children, and are not separated or seeking separation or divorce. Excluded
from the scope of this Note are issues concerning visitation in non-intact marriages-mar-
riages in which the spouses disagree about grandparental isitation, childrens' rights, fam-
ily definition, and issues concerning grandparents who are acting, or have acted in loco
parentis.
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did Kita's parents, Arnold and Barbara Maner (the Maners).6 The
children enjoyed "a loving and healthy relationship with their par-
ents."7 By all accounts, however, Kita and her mother, Barbara, had
suffered a strained relationship since Kita's childhood, and the rela-
tionship did not improve when Kita reached adulthood.8 The rela-
tionship between the Maners and the Stephensons deteriorated to
such an extent in 1993 that the Stephensons eventually denied the
Maners all regular visits with Katie and Trey beginning in October of
that year.9 On July 14, 1994, the Maners filed a petition for visitation
in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County.1" In their original answer,
the Stephensons acknowledged the importance of maintaining the
grandparent-grandchild relationship and, thus, allowed the Maners to
visit with the children on five occasions after the Maners had filed the
petition for visitation." The Stephensons later amended their answer
and requested that the court deny the Maners' petition.12
Because the case involved an intact nuclear family, the circuit
court judge described it as "one of first impression, because former
grandparent visitation cases did not involve intact nuclear families."'"
The judge, nevertheless, found that the legislature intended the
grandparental visitation statute "to permit grandparents to petition
for visitation of grandchildren in both dissolved and intact nuclear
families. 1 4 The circuit court denied the grandparents' petition,' 5
noting that any decision concerning grandparental visitation of
grandchildren "lies within the sound discretion of the trial court,
guided solely by the best interests of the grandchild."16 Applying this
standard, the court reasoned that "the children's relationship with
their parents [was] substantial and stable," 17 while the association
with the grandparents had been "at best sporadic" and irregular. 8
The court concluded that a grant of visitation under these circum-
6. Mane, 342 Md. at 462-63, 677 A.2d at 560-61.
7. Id. at 463, 677 A-2d at 561.
8. See id. at 464, 677 A.2d at 561. The court found that the grandmother was critical
of her daughter in front of the children, that the mother described the grandmother as a
"relationship destroyer," that the mother felt dominated by the grandmother, and that the
grandmother displayed favoritism toward Kita's brother and sister-in-law. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 463, 677 A.2d at 561.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 464, 677 A.2d at 561.
14. Id. at 464-65, 677 A.2d at 561.
15. Id. at 466, 677 A.2d 562.





stances "would have a deleterious effect on the nuclear family." 9 The
court also indicated concern for "'the psychological toll [the] visita-
tion dispute itself might exact on a child in the midst of contesting
adults."'20 The Maners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but
before the Court of Special Appeals considered the case, the Court of
Appeals issued a writ of certiorari" to decide whether the trial court
had erred in denying the grandparents' petition.2 2
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Constitution and Parental Privacy Rights.-The Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 23 The federal courts have developed a strict scrutiny
level of review for rights that fall within the first ten Amendments or
are embraced within the Fourteenth.24 To survive strict scrutiny, any
legislation infringing upon a fundamental right must be justified by a
compelling state interest, and the relation between that objective and
the means must be narrowly tailored.25 In a long line of cases, the
Supreme Court has given substance to the liberty interest that parents
traditionally have enjoyed. In Meyer v. Nebraska,26 the Court stated that
a liberty interest " [w]ithout doubt . . . denotes . . . the right of the
individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up children ...
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."27 In
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,28 the Court held that states may not enact
legislation that "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
19. Id. at 466, 677 A.2d at 562.
20. Id. at 465, 677 A.2d at 562 (alteration in original) (quoting Fairbanks v. McCarter,
330 Md. 39, 50, 622 A.2d 121, 127 (1993)).
21. Id. at 466, 677 A.2d at 562.
22. See id. at 469, 677 A.2d at 564.
23. U.S. CON T. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (indicating
that presumption of constitutionality is lessened when statute appears to defy a specific
constitutional prohibition).
25. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (concluding that abortion is a per-
sonal privacy right and that legislation imposing restrictions on the exercise of that right
would be subject to exacting scrutiny).
26. 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (striking down a state statute prohibiting the teaching of
foreign languages to children before the ninth grade, on the grounds that it was an uncon-
stitutional state intrusion into parental child-rearing).
27. Id. at 399.
28. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating a state statute requiring all children to
attend public schools).
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under their control."2 9 The Court noted: "The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations."3"
The Court again examined and reaffirmed the fundamental right
to parental child-rearing in Wisconsin v. Yoder.3" The Court observed:
"The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradi-
tion of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their chil-
dren. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition."32
Since Yoder, the Court has reasserted its "historical recognition
that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a funda-
mental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. " "
In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court noted that parents do not lose their
fundamental liberty interest "in the care, custody, and management of
their child" simply because they are not ideal parents.3 4 Rather, the
Court noted that parents have an even stronger need for procedural
protections when they are faced with the possibility of the dissolution
or disruption of their family unit. 5
By contrast, grandparents traditionally have not been accorded a
liberty interest in the rearing of grandchildren. At common law,
grandparents enjoyed no legal right to visit grandchildren without pa-
rental permission.36 In L.F.M. v. Department of Social Services,37 the
29. Id. at 534-35.
30. Id. at 535.
31. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Yoder Court held that a state statute compelling Amish
parents to send their children to high school was unconstitutional. Id. at 234-35.
32. Id. at 232; see also Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 37-38 (1981).
The Court in Lassiter stated:
At stake here is the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children. This interest occupies a unique place in our
legal culture, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning
and responsibility. [F]ar more precious... than property rights, parental rights
have been deemed to be among those essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men.
Id. at 38 (internal quotations omitted).
33. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that, due to the fundamen-
tal rights involved, parental rights may be terminated only by clear and convincing
evidence).
34. Id.
35. See id. at 753-54.
36. SeeJudith L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on Grandparents' Vsita-
tion Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 118, 118 (1986); see also Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 200-




court refused to recognize a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in grandparental visitation, stating:
In each of the cases we have examined ... which extended
the "family life" liberty interest beyond the marital or parent-
child relationship, the petitioning party had had, at some
point, either actual or legal custody of the child or children
involved.... [W] e have found no authority to suggest that
the visitation appellants enjoyed . . . was a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. 38
b. Parens Patriae and Maryland Law.-The state's power to
involve itself in child-rearing issues derives from the principle of
parens patriae, which authorizes the state to care for "those who can-
not take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and
custody from their parents."39 While acknowledging a parent's funda-
mental right to child-rearing, the Supreme Court has cautioned that
this right will be overcome by the state's compelling interest in limit-
ing the parental right "if it appears that parental decisions will jeop-
ardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for
significant social burdens."4" The principle of parens patriae has
been codified in section 1-201 of the Maryland Family Law Article:
(a) In general.-An equity court has jurisdiction over:
(5) custody or guardianship of a child;
(6) visitation of a child;
(b) Custody, visitation, guardianship, or support of child.-In ex-
ercising its jurisdiction over the custody, guardianship, visita-
tion, or support of a child, an equity court may:
37. 67 Md. App. 379, 507 A.2d 1151 (1986). The L.F.M. court held that grandparents
hold no right to petition for visitation over the objection of the guardian when the natural
parents' rights have been terminated and the child has been placed in a prospective adop-
tive home. Id. at 396, 507 A.2d at 1160.
38. Id. at 387, 507 A.2d at 1155.
39. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990); see also Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86
A.2d 463 (1952). The Ross court observed:
This principle is based upon the theory that, while the law of nature gives to
parents the right to the custody of their own children, a child from the time of
birth owes allegiance to the State, and the State in return is obligated to regulate
the custody of the child whenever necessary for its welfare.
Id. at 351, 86 A.2d at 468.
40. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
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(2) determine who shall have visitation rights to a
child ....41
c. Best Interests of the Child.-When resolving visitation dis-
putes, Maryland courts must apply "the best interests of the child"
standard.42 This standard is deeply rooted in Maryland law and is
deemed to be of paramount importance.43 As the Court of Appeals
stated in Ross V. Hoffman: "
"Even when father and mother are living together, a court
has the power, if the best interest [sic] of the child require it,
to take it away from both parents and commit the custody to
a third person. In other words, a court of chancery stands as
a guardian of all children and may interfere at any time and
in any way to protect and advance their welfare and
interests."45
The standard for assessing mandatory visitation of grandchildren by
grandparents remains the same: the best interests of the
grandchild. 46 Although "[tihe definition of a child's best interest is
an elusive one,"4 7 the court's determination is based on "all relevant
factors and circumstances pertaining to the grandchild's best inter-
ests."4 8 In Fairbanks v. McCarter,49 the court outlined a non-exclusive
list of factors to be evaluated in making the determination:
[T] he nature and stability of the child's relationships with its
parents; the nature and substantiality of the relationship be-
tween the child and the grandparent, taking into account
frequency of contact, regularity of contact, and amount of
time spent together; the potential benefits and detriments to
the child in granting the visitation order; the effect, if any,
41. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 1-201 (1991).
42. JOHN F. FADER II, DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAw 133 (1996) ("There is only one stan-
dard applicable for the court to apply to resolve custody/visitation disputes, 'The best in-
terest of the child.' ... The development and application of this standard shows that the
standard itself is one of the 'Eternal Truths' of family law.").
43. See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174-79, 372 A.2d 582, 585-87 (1977) (using the
best interests standard to award custody to a third party over the protest of the natural
mother).
44. 280 Md. 172, 372 A-2d 582 (1977).
45. Id. at 176, 372 A.2d at 585-86 (quoting Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 117-18,
43 A.2d 186, 192 (1945) (quoting In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308, 309-10 (1881))).
46. See Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 50, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993) (stressing that
the trial court exercises its discretion in deciding grandparental visitation cases by utilizing
the best interests of the grandchild standard).
47. Id. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126.
48. Id. at 50, 622 A.2d at 126.
49. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993).
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grandparental visitation would have on the child's attach-
ment to its nuclear family; the physical and emotional health
of the adults involved; and the stability of the child's living
and schooling arrangements. 50
The court also cautioned that children, caught in the middle of visita-
tion battles between family members, may pay a psychological toll,
and this may be a factor in the trial court's decision.5"
In determining the best interests of the child, courts have also
been aware of the parents' constitutional liberty interest in child-rear-
ing. In Ross v. Pick,5 2 the court stated that "there is a prima facie pre-
sumption that the child's welfare will be best subserved in the care
and custody of its parents rather than in the custody of others."53 In
In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941,"4 the court recognized that a
parent's constitutional, common law, and statutory right to raise a
child could not be taken away without clear justification.55 The court
nevertheless determined that the best interests of the child out-
weighed the parent's interest in child-rearing.56 In other words, while
there is a presumption that parents will make decisions in the best
interests of their children, this presumption may be overcome, and
custody will be denied in circumstances in which the parents are not
serving the child's best interests.
d. Maryland's Grandparental Visitation Statute: Interpretation,
Evolution.-Almost all states have enacted some version of a grandpa-
rental visitation statute58 in response to a trend of politically active
50. Id. at 50, 622 A-2d at 126-27.
51. See id., 622 A.2d at 127.
52. 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952).
53. Id. at 351, 86 A.2d at 468.
54. 335 Md. 99, 642 A.2d 201 (1994) (per curiam).
55. Id. at 112, 642 A.2d at 208.
56. Id. at 113, 642 A.2d at 208.
57. See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178-79, 372 A.2d 582, 587 (1977). The Ross court
stated that "custody will be denied if (a) the parent is unfit to have custody, or (b) if there
are such exceptional circumstances as make such custody detrimental to the best interest of
the child." Id. (emphasis added). The rationale for this holding derives from Melton v.
Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 148 A.2d 387 (1959), in which the court observed:
Normally a parent is to be preferred to others in determining custody, largely
because the affection of a parent for a child is as strong and potent as any that
springs from human relations and leads to desire and efforts to care properly for
and raise the child, which are greater than another would be likely to display.
Id. at 188, 148 A.2d at 389.
58. See ALA_ CODE § 30-3-4 (Supp. 1996); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 1995); ARtz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337 (West 1991); AR& CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie Supp. 1995);
CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 310-3104 (West 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-117 (West 1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (Supp. 1996);
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grandparents, the legislative recognition of their power, as well as the
legislative concern about increases in the divorce rate and family mo-
bility.59 Several states allow grandparental visitation in intact nuclear
families over the objection of the parents.6"
In 1981, Maryland adopted Senate Bill 333, which added the first
grandparental visitation language to section 3-602 (a) (4) of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article.6 ' It provided in pertinent part:
A court of equity has jurisdiction over the custody... [and]
visitation . . . of a child. In exercising its jurisdiction, the
court may:
(4) Determine who shall have visitation rights to a child. At
any time following the termination of a marriage, the court may con-
sider a petition for reasonable visitation by one or more of the grand-
parents of a natural or adapted child of the parents whose marriage
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (Supp. 1996); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(7) (Michie Supp. 1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607(b)(1)
(West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7-2 (Michie Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 598.35 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b) (1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.021
(Banks-Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, §§ 1001-1004 (West Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West 1993 &
Supp. 1996); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 722.276 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022
(West 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (West Supp.
1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1995); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-1802 (1993); NEv. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 125A.340 (Michie 1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1992); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1995); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.051, 3109.11 (Anderson
Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.121
(Supp. 1996); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5311-5313 (West 1991); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-
24.1 to 24.3 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420 (33) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws §§ 25-4-52 to -54 (Michie 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-302 (1996); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.433 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 1011-1016 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie Supp. 1996); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 48-2B (1996); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.245 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-2-113(c), 20-7-101 (Michie
1994).
The State of Idaho repealed its statute. See IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1996) (repealed
1994). Courts in the states of Tennessee, Florida, and Georgia have ruled unconstitutional
statutes that pertain to intact nuclear families. See infra notes 125-135 and accompanying
text.
59. See Anne Marie Jackson, Comment, The Coming of Age of Grandparent Visitation
Rights, 43 Am. U. L. REv. 563, 563-64 n.3 (1994) (noting additional changes to the tradi-
tional family structure such as "fractured extended families" and the increased lifespan and
political activity of grandparents).
60. See state statutes for Alabama, Delaware, Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New York, and North Dakota, supra note 58.
61. For complete legislative history of section 3-602(a), see Evans v. Evans, 302 Md.
334, 335-42, 488 A.2d 157, 157-61 (1985).
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has been terminated, and may grant such visitation if the court be-
lieves it to be in the best interests of the child .... 62
In Skeens v. Paterno,63 the Court of Special Appeals held that the
statute did not limit grandparental visitation only to those situations in
which the parents' marriage had been terminated,64 but that visitation
could be allowed under other circumstances.65 More notably, in
dicta, the court also stated that "[i]t may well be . . .that custody
should be granted to a grandparent (as against a parent) only under
exceptional circumstances. That may also be true as to grandparental
visitation."66
The following year, in Evans v. Evans,67 the court stated that it
agreed with Skeens that the legislative history did not show that the
purpose of the bill was to limit grandparental visitation.6" The court
further noted that "it [is] clear that the 1981 amendment to § 3-
602 (a) (4) was not intended to affect the law in any context but that of
grandparental visitation after the termination of a marriage."69
The question left open in Skeens-whether grandparental visita-
tion could be awarded only upon a showing of "exceptional circum-
stances"-was addressed by the court in Fairbanks v. McCarter.7" In
Fairbanks, the court held that a demonstration of special circum-
stances for grandparental visitation is not required.7 In negating the
presumption in favor of natural parents, the court reasoned that visita-
tion awards are not as significant as matters of custody.72 Therefore,
visitation should be measured solely by the best interests of the
grandchild, rather than by the higher standard embodied in the ex-
ceptional circumstances test that is used for awards of custody.7"
In 1993, the legislature amended the grandparental visitation
portion of the statute by enacting chapter 252 of the Acts of 1993."M
62. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-602(a) (1981) (recodified as amended at
MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 9-102 (1991)).
63. 60 Md. App. 48, 480 A.2d 820 (1984).
64. Id. at 59-61, 480 A.2d at 825-26.
65. Id. at 61, 480 A.2d at 826. The case involved grandparental visitation of an illegiti-
mate child. The court did not expand its definition of which circumstances would be
allowed. See id.
66. Id. (citation omitted).
67. 302 Md. 334, 488 A.2d 157 (1985).
68. Id. at 342, 488 A.2d at 161.
69. Id. at 343, 488 A-2d at 161.
70. 330 Md. 39, 622 A.2d 121 (1993).
71. Id. at 48, 622 A.2d at 126.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 49, 622 A.2d at 126.
74. The amendment changed the statutes from:
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The legislature withdrew the requirement that visitation petitions by
grandparents may come only after termination of the parents' mar-
riage. 5 This action left open the possibility that grandparents could
seek visitation of grandchildren living in intact nuclear families when
the parents oppose visitation.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Maner, the court focused primarily
on whether the trial court, in considering the best interests of the
child, was presumptively deferential to the parents in an intact nuclear
family.76 The court also looked at whether visitation by grandparents
is presumptively in the best interests of the grandchild.77 Before ad-
dressing these issues, however, the court summarily put to rest any
question as to whether the statute applied to intact families.78 Look-
ing to the House Floor Report at the time of the most recent amend-
ment to the statute, the court held that "[t]he plain language of the
statute . . .clearly reflects the legislature's intent to allow courts to
grant grandparents visitation, even where the parents' marriage is in-
tact, if it is in the best interests of the children."79
In addressing the primary issue, the Court of Appeals extended
the rationale of Fairbanks, concluding that grandparents need not
show exceptional circumstances as a precondition to their petition,
even in cases involving intact nuclear families."0 The court stated that
the mere mention by the trial court that the case was one of first im-
pression regarding intact nuclear families did not imply that the judge
was deferring to the parents' wishes or imposing an exceptional cir-
cumstances test on the grandparents. 81 Thus, according to the court,
At any time after the termination of a marriage by divorce, annulment, or
death, an equity court may:
(1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation by a grandparent of a
natural or adopted child of the parties whose marriage has been terminated; and
(2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of the child, grant
visitation rights to the grandparent.
MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAW § 9-102 (1991), to:
An equity court may
(1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation of a grandchild by a
grandparent; and
(2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of the child, grant
visitation rights to the grandparent.
MD. CODE ANN., FAs. LAw § 9-102 (Supp. 1996).
75. See § 9-102 annot. (Supp. 1996) (Effect of 1993 amendment).
76. Maner, 342 Md. at 470, 677 A.2d at 564.
77. Id. at 470-71, 677 A.2d at 564.
78. Id. at 467-68, 677 A.2d at 562-63.
79. Id., 677 A.2d at 563.
80. Id. at 468, 677 A.2d at 563.
81. Id. at 470, 677 A.2d at 564.
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regardless of the fact that the grandchildren were being raised in an
intact nuclear family, "'[t]he outcome of the grandparents' petition
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, guided solely by the
best interests of the grandchild."' 82
In concluding that the trial judge acted within his discretion, the
Court of Appeals emphasized that the relationship between the par-
ents and the grandparents may be a factor for consideration in deter-
mining the best interests of the child. 3 The court looked to a
decision by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Daugherty v. Ritter,8 4 which
stated: "While the [grandparent-grandchild] relationship may, in any
given case, be sufficient to make grandparent visitation in the child's
best interest, notwithstanding the dissension between the parent and
grandparent, it may not be sufficient to overcome the effects of the
discord on the child in another."" The Maner court also cited with
approval the trial court's use of the factors outlined in Fairbanks to be
used when deciding the best interests of the child.86
The Court of Appeals dismissed the grandparents' argument that
there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of grandparental visita-
tion.8 7 Looking at recent decisions by other courts with similar stat-
utes, 8 the court found that "[a] presumption that grandparent
visitation is in the best interests of the child would undermine the trial
court's discretion and conflict with the unambiguous language of the
statute."8 9
4. Analysis.-In Maner v. Stephenson, the Court of Appeals ad-
hered to precedent. The court held that grandparents have the right
to seek visitation of grandchildren in intact nuclear families 90 and that
such visitation may be granted if the trial court determines that it is in
the best interests of the child.9' Because "[i ] t is an almost undeviating
rule of the courts, both State and Federal, that a constitutional ques-
tion will not be decided except when the necessity for such decision
82. Id. at 468, 677 A.2d at 563 (quoting Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 31, 49, 622
A.2d 121, 126 (1993)).
83. See id. at 470, 677 A.2d at 564.
84. 646 N.E.2d 66 (Ind. Ct. App.), affd, 652 N.E.2d 502 (Ind. 1995).
85. Id. at 68; see Maner, 342 Md. at 470, 677 A.2d at 564.
86. See supra note 50.
87. Maner, 342 Md. at 470-71, 677 A.2d at 564.
88. Id. (citing Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 643 (Utah CL App. 1995); Brooks
v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773 (Ga. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 377 (1995)).
89. Id. at 471, 677 A.2d at 564.
90. See id. at 467-68, 677 A.2d at 563.
91. See id. at 469-70, 677 A.2d at 563-64.
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arises"9 2 and the grandparents had not even met the low best interests
of the child standard, the court correctly decided the case. Neverthe-
less, the question remains whether judicially imposed grandparental
visitation violates the constitutional rights of parents in an intact nu-
clear family.
The extent to which the state may involve itself in visitation dis-
putes between grandparents and parents in an intact nuclear family is
an emerging issue.9' In the relatively few states that statutorily grant
grandparental visitation in intact nuclear families, those statutes have
increasingly come under constitutional challenge.94 If the Maner
court had decided that exceptional circumstances must exist in order
for grandparents to seek visitation with grandchildren in an intact
family, it would have been a clear acknowledgment of the parents'
fundamental right to decide with whom their children may visit. In-
stead, the court aligned itself with those states that compel parents in
intact families to allow grandparents contact with a grandchild if the
court deems it to be in the grandchild's best interests. In this regard,
the court incorrectly departed from precedent set forth in Ross, which
gives parents a prima facie presumption of acting in the child's best
interests.95
In Fairbanks, the Court of Appeals stated: "Visitation is a consid-
erably less weighty matter than outright custody of a child, and does
not demand the enhanced protections, embodied in the exceptional
circumstances test, that attend custody awards."96 Although Fairbanks
did not involve an intact, nuclear family, it closely followed the logic
of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Herndon v. Tuhey,97 which upheld
a Missouri statute9" against constitutional challenge.99 In Herndon, the
court reasoned that because grandparental visitation did not amount
92. Jeffers v. State, 203 Md. 227, 230, 100 A.2d 10, 11 (1953). The Supreme Court, also
addressing this doctrine of judicial restraint, has stated: "If there is one doctrine more
deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we
ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoida-
ble." Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
93. SeeJackson, supra note 59, at 563 n.2.
94. See generally id. at 578-81.
95. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
96. Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 48, 622 A.2d 121, 126 (1993).
97. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
98. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (West Supp. 1997). The statute states, in pertinent part:
1. The court may grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparents of
the child and issue any necessary orders to enforce the decree. The court may
grant grandparent visitation when:
(3) A grandparent is unreasonably denied visitation with the child for a
period exceeding ninety days.
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to a significant infringement of parental rights to child-rearing, there
was no need to apply the rigorous strict scrutiny standard. a00
The Maner court's reference to "the special role grandparents
may play in a child's life"' 0'1 follows a second line of reasoning used to
justify the constitutionality of grandparental visitation statutes-that
of the compelling need to reinforce the bond between grandparents
and grandchildren.1 1 2 The Kentucky Supreme Court used this rea-
soning in King v. King3 when it held that Kentucky's grandparental
visitation statute 10 4 did not "constitute[ ] an unwarranted intrusion
into the liberty interest of parents to rear their children as they see
fit."' 05 The King court justified its decision by finding "it ... essential
2. The court shall determine if the visitation by the grandparent would be in
the child's best interest or if it would endanger the child's physical health or
impair his emotional development. Visitation may only be ordered when the
court finds such visitation to be in the best interests of the child. The court may
order reasonable conditions or restrictions on grandparent visitation.
Id.
99. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209.
100. See id. at 208 ("'Not every regulation that the State imposes must be measured
against the State's compelling interests and examined with strict scrutiny .... .' The re-
quirement that state interference 'infringe substantially' or 'heavily burden' a right before
heightened scrutiny is applied is not novel in our fundamental-rights jurisprudence .... "
(quoting Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992))).
101. Maner, 342 Md. at 469, 677 A.2d at 563; see Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 702,
655 A.2d 901, 908 (1995) ("That grandparents play an entirely different role in a child's
life than parents is, we think, very clear; their love and affection for the child complements,
rather than supplants, the position of the parent in the child's life.").
102. See Mark Moody, Note, Constitutional Questions Regarding Grandparent Visitation and
Due Process Standards, 60 Mo. L. REv. 195, 210 (1995) ("Rather than relying on the protec-
tion of the best interest of the child, the Kentucky Court found the 'strengthening of fam-
ily bonds' to be the justification behind the [grandparental visitation] statute." (quoting
King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992)); see a/soJackson, supra note 59, at 582-83
(noting that courts generally agree that maintaining the relationship between grandparent
and grandchild is the primary goal of grandparental visitation legislation); Shandling,
supra note 36, at 124-25 ("[C]ourts have tended to rely on their own intuitive sense that the
relationship between a grandparent and a grandchild is a special one.").
103. 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992).
104. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1995). The statute states in
pertinent part
REASONABLE VISITATION RIGHTS TO GRANDPARENTS
(1) The circuit court may grant reasonable visitation rights to either the pa-
ternal or maternal grandparents of a child and issue any necessary orders to en-
force the decree if it determines that it is in the best interest of the child to do so.
Id.
105. King, 828 S.W.2d at 631 (upholding visitation against an intact, nuclear family
which had become estranged from the grandfather and finding no reason to disrupt the
grandchild-grandparent bond because of "a trivial disagreement" between the grandfather
and the father). But see id. at 633 (Lambert, J., dissenting) (explaining that evidence
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that some semblance of family and generational contact be
preserved."1 06
These justifications for the grandparental visitation statute, how-
ever, should not be applied to an intact nuclear family. The proposi-
tion that children in an intact family will be harmed if they are not
permitted to form a grandparent-grandchild bond is far from cer-
tain.10 7 As Justice Lambert noted in his King dissent, it may be true in
many cases that the lives of the grandchild and grandparent are en-
riched by their association, but "mere improvement in quality of life is
not a compelling state interest and is insufficient tojustify invasion of
constitutional rights."108 In fact, commentators have noted that the
effect of such a lawsuit can be quite detrimental to the child.'09
While Maner has structurally safeguarded parental rights to some
degree by placing emphasis on numerous factors that strongly favor
the intact family, these factors alone do not provide parents adequate
constitutional protection against state intrusion in child-rearing deci-
sions. To determine the best interests of the grandchild-a standard
that the court concedes eludes easy definitionl °1 -a trial judge may
consider the parents' attitudes and feelings toward the grandpar-
ents, " the potential disruption to the lives of the children by judi-
cially imposed visitation,1 ' the health of the grandparents," 3 and the
effect of grandparental visitation on the child's attachment to her par-
clearly supported the father's contention that the grandfather was "an overbearing individ-
ual who intruded with impunity upon [the parents'] family life demonstrating total indif-
ference to their wishes").
106. King, 828 S.W.2d at 632; see also Sketo v. Brown, 559 So. 2d 381, 382 (Ha. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (upholding constitutionality of grandparental visitation statute against a chal-
lenge by widowed mother in a non-intact family); People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 429
N.E.2d 1049, 1049 (N.Y. 1981) (upholding grandparental visitation statute against the
adoptive parents of child whose natural parents were deceased); Campbell v. Campbell,
896 P.2d 635, 643 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of Utah's grand-
parental visitation statute and stating that the "[I]egislature promulgated [the statute] to
promote intergenerational contact and strengthen the bonds of the extended family").
107. See Shandling, supra note 36, at 123 (noting that "[iun fact, there is very little re-
search on the effect of a grandparent-grandchild relationship on children's
development").
108. King, 828 S.W.2d at 634 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
109. See Shandling, supra note 36, at 124 ("It is clear from the psychological literature
that a lawsuit over visitation rights, with its accompanying intrusions by psychological ex-
perts and lawyers and its inevitable disruption of the nuclear family, often creates extreme
anxiety and dislocation for a child.").
110. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
111. See Maner, 342 Md. at 470, 677 A.2d at 564.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 465 n.2, 677 A.2d at 562 n.2.
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ents.11 The court also emphasized that litigation to enforce mainte-
nance of the grandparent-grandchild relationship over the parents'
objection could have a deleterious effect on a child.115 In addition,
the court should weigh the psychological toll that the family strife
might play on the child." 6 All of these factors weigh heavily in favor
of the intact family that objects to visitation.
On the other hand, trial judges may also consider "the nature
and substantiality of the relationship between the child and the grand-
parent, taking into account frequency of contact, regularity of contact,
and amount of time spent together,"" 7 as well as the potential benefit
to the child of grandparental visits.11 These factors embody the no-
tion addressed in King that the strengthening of the grandparent-
grandchild relationship is a compelling state interest. 9
The best interests of the child standard, when applied to intact
nuclear families, will significantly infringe on parental rights to child-
rearing. For instance, parents may be forced to expose intimate rea-
sons for objecting to visitation 120-reasons that might include past
sexual or other misconduct by a grandparent, which a parent may not
otherwise want to be exposed.1 2' Grandparents will have the ability to
take the grandchildren to visit other people and places despite par-
ents' objections.1 22 Additionally, under the Maryland statute, nothing
would prevent the parents in an intact nuclear family from creating an
environment hostile to the grandparents, then protesting to the court
that the child must be protected from the "psychological toll" of
grandparental visitation on the child.1 2 1
114. See id.
115. Id. at 470. 677 A.2d at 564.
116. See id. at 465, 677 A.2d at 562.
117. Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 50, 622 A.2d 121, 126-27 (1993).
118. See id., 622 A.2d at 127.
119. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
120. See Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 n.2 (Tenn. 1993).
121. See id.
122. See id. at 577 (recognizing that during visitation periods grandparents have total
control over the children and have the ability to take them wherever they please); see aLso
King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting) (expressing disap-
proval of the fact that the grandfather "openly cohabits with... a woman to whom he is
not married, and that the trial court granted [her], a woman with no marriage or blood
kinship to the infant child, a right to pick up the child for visitation").
123. See Michael J. Minerva, Jr., Grandparent Visitation: The Parental Privacy Right to Raise
Their "Bundle ofJoy," 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 533, 554-55 (1991) (noting that "[a] parent
might be so bitter about the situation that they refuse to encourage a good relationship
between the child and the grandparent, while avoiding affirmatively sabotaging it" and that
"[s]ome courts ... have refused to allow parents to 'manipulate' the litigation by fostering
hatred towards the grandparent, then using that hostility as basis [sic] for arguing against
visitation").
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By adhering to the best interests of the child standard for deter-
mining visitation in intact families, the greatest danger is that the
court will impose its own opinion upon good and fit parents, which
"represents a virtually unprecedented intrusion into a protected
sphere of family life."1 24 Three states have invalidated their grandpa-
rental visitation statutes for this reason. For example, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee invalidated that state's statute, holding that, "with-
out a substantial danger of harm to the child, a court may not consti-
tutionally impose its own subjective notions of the 'best interests of
the child' when an intact, nuclear family with fit, married parents is
involved."125 The court ruled that there must be a showing that pa-
rental decisions to disallow visitation would result in significant harm
to the child before grandparents would be allowed visitation.' 26
"When applied to married parents who have maintained continuous
custody of their children and have acted as fit parents, [court-ordered
grandparent visitation under the statute] constitutes an unconstitu-
tional invasion of privacy rights under the Tennessee Constitution."127
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that "a judge cannot
impose grandparental visitation upon an intact family."'12  The por-
tion of the Florida statute pertaining to intact nuclear families 129 was
held unconstitutional under the state constitution because it
amounted to undue government intervention upon the rights of par-
ents to raise their children.1 30
Another recent challenge to the constitutionality of a grandpa-
rental visitation statute was successful for similar reasons. In Brooks v.
124. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 577.
125. Id. at 579.
126. See id. at 580. The Hawk court stated that "[t]he requirement of harm is the sole
protection that parents have against pervasive state interference in the parenting process."
Id. "'For the state to delegate to the parents the authority to raise the child as the parents
see fit, except when the state thinks another choice would be better, is to give the parents
no authority at all.'" Id. (quoting Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent
Refuse?, 24J. FAM. L. 393, 441 (1985-86)).
127. Id. at 582.
128. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1996).
129. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01(1)(e) (West Supp. 1997). The pertinent part of the stat-
ute granted grandparental visitation if:
The minor is living with both natural parents who are still married to each other
whether or not there is a broken relationship between either or both parents of
the minor child and the grandparents, and either or both parents have used their
parental authority to prohibit a relationship between the minor child and the
grandparents.
Id.
130. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1272.
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Pa*erson,"'3 Georgia's highest court overturned its grandparental visi-
tation statute13 2 on both federal and state constitutional grounds.1 3 3
In his concurrence, Justice Sears noted:
Our law has always recognized that the relationship between
parents and their children is the most mutually beneficial re-
lationship possible, in an imperfect world, and in this coun-
try parents' decisions concerning visitation with a
grandparent or anyone else have always been constrained, if
at all, by moral and religious forces rather than legal ones.13
4
Justice Sears further stated that he could "not believe in either the
constitutionality or the political correctness of any law that allows a
court... to pierce the delicate, complex and sacred unity of parent
and child against the wishes of fit parents and without a showing of
absolute necessity."
13 5
These cases indicate a strong trend toward recognizing parental
autonomy as a protected liberty interest. Perhaps the Maner court was
waiting for a better case, but it took the opportunity to clarify its posi-
tion on the most crucial issue of grandparental visitation: who makes
the decision? If the court is inferring by its decision that courts may
grant grandparental visitation absent a compelling state interest, the
court has ignored the emerging trend.
5. Conclusion.-In Maner v. Stephenson, the Court of Appeals
made clear that grandparents can obtain visitation in an intact nuclear
family by demonstrating that visitations would be in the best interests
of the child. 13 6 The court found that the grandparents in Manercould
not meet this standard.'13  The Court of Appeals has left open
whether, in light of parents' well-established fundamental right to au-
tonomously raise their children, the best interests of the child stan-
dard is too intrusive to pass constitutional muster. Given the explicit
statutory requirement that the courts use the best interests of the
131. 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga.), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 377 (1995). Brooks involved a petition
by a maternal grandmother that was opposed by both child's parents in an intact nuclear
family. Id. at 773.
132. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(c) (1991). The statute states that "the court may grant any
grandparent of the child reasonable visitation rights upon proof of special circumstances
which make such visitation rights necessary to the best interests of the child." Id.
133. Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 774.
134. Id. at 775 (Sears, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 774.
136. See Maner, 342 Md. at 467-68, 677 A.2d at 563.
137. See id. at 470, 677 A.2d at 564.
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child standard, only a clear constitutional challenge will resolve this
issue.
EMILY A. KosclmNslu
C. Dismissing the Purpose and Public Policy Surrounding Spousal Support
In Gordon v. Gordon,' the Court of Appeals held that the term
"cohabitation," for the purpose of terminating spousal support pursu-
ant to a separation agreement, requires more than the mere sharing
of a common residence or sexual intimacy.' Rather, the court held
that the term "connotes [a] mutual assumption of the duties and obli-
gations associated with marriage."3 Therefore, the court established a
broad scope of inquiry regarding the establishment of cohabitation,
directing courts to determine the nature of the relationship by look-
ing at such factors as common residence, sexual relations, shared fi-
nances, and recognition by the community.4 By declining to make
specific economic factors dispositive of cohabitation,5 however, the
court failed to acknowledge the purpose of spousal support and the
numerous ways in which a spouse can use it to exert unjust and inap-
propriate control over the recipient's personal life.6 The court's fail-
ure to apply these policy considerations to its interpretation of the
term "cohabitation" will likely result in the disparate adjudication of
future cases concerning the termination of spousal support.
1. The Case.--On December 26, 1990, the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County entered a judgment of absolute divorce termi-
nating the marriage of Sara (Mrs. Gordon) and Joel Gordon (Mr.
Gordon) .' The judgment "incorporated but did not merge" the par-
ties' separation agreement, which provided for contractual spousal
support.8 Specifically, the agreement provided, in pertinent part:
1. 342 Md. 294, 675 A.2d 540 (1996).
2. Id. at 308, 675 A.2d at 547.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 308-09, 675 A.2d at 547-48. The court noted that "no one factor is an abso-
lute prerequisite for cohabitation." Id. at 309 n.12, 675 A.2d at 548 n.12.
5. Id. at 309 n.12, 675 A.2d at 548 n.12. The court found it unhelpful to define a level
of financial contribution that would constitute cohabitation.
6. Through this Note, all references to the genders of parties in separation agree-
ments will mirror those of Mr. and Mrs. Gordon's respective roles as support provider and
recipient.
7. Gordon, 342 Md. at 296, 675 A.2d at 541.
8. Id. For a discussion of the relevance of incorporating a separation agreement into
a divorce decree see infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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Husband shall pay to Wife as alimony the sum of $6,000 per
month in advance, commencing on the first day of Decem-
ber, and continuing on the first day of each and every month
thereafter. The said payments shall terminate upon the
death of the Husband, the death of the Wife, the remarriage
of the Wife, or at such time as the Wife reaches the age of 59
1/2, whichever first occurs. The said payments shall also termi-
nate in the event the Wife resides with any unrelated man without
the benefit of mariage for a period continuing for beyond sixty (60)
consecutive days.9
Mr. Gordon acted in compliance with the provisions of this support
clause for over two years." Between February andJuly of 1993, how-
ever, Mr. Gordon learned that a man unrelated to Mrs. Gordon, Wil-
liam Shankland (Mr. Shankland), resided at Mrs. Gordon's home.11
Consequently, on July 25, 1993, Mr. Gordon notified Mrs. Gordon
that he would terminate alimony payments in accordance with the
provisions of the separation agreement.12
Mr. Gordon also petitioned the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County to confirm the termination of his alimony payments and to
order Mrs. Gordon to return all payments made in violation of the
support clause of the separation agreement.13 The Circuit Court re-
ferred the matter to a Domestic Relations Master for an evidentiary
hearing.1 4 During the hearing, Mr. Gordon introduced evidence to
show that Mrs. Gordon's home served as Mr. Shankland's exclusive
residence for more than sixty consecutive days.15 Mr. Gordon also
presented evidence that Mr. Shankland used Mrs. Gordon's phone
number as his own on a community theater phone list. 6 In addition,
Mr. Gordon presented checks made out to Mrs. Gordon from Mr.
Shankland amounting to approximately twelve thousand dollars. 7
In her defense, Mrs. Gordon testified that Mr. Shankland had
consistently maintained a separate residence apart from her home
and that she and Mr. Shankland did not share living expenses.' Mrs.
Gordon asserted that Mr. Shankland used her phone number to avoid
9. Gordon, 342 Md. at 296-97, 675 A.2d at 541-42.
10. Id. at 297, 675 A.2d at 542.
11. Id. at 297-98, 675 A.2d at 542. Mr. Gordon came to this conclusion because of his
own personal observations and through the use of professional surveillance services. Id.
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receiving calls from his former spouse and that the checks from Mr.
Shankland constituted loan repayments, including interest, and his
share of expenses for joint vacations.19
In consideration of the evidence before her, the Domestic Rela-
tions Master concluded that Mr. Shankland used Mrs. Gordon's home
as his exclusive residence for the period in question and that, as a
result, Mrs. Gordon had resided with an "unrelated man" for more
than sixty days, thus violating the support clause of the separation
agreement.20 Making no further findings regarding the relationship
between Mrs. Gordon and Mr. Shankland, the Master recommended
that the court confirm the termination of Mr. Gordon's alimony pay-
ments to his former spouse.2 Mrs. Gordon filed several exceptions to
the Master's Report, which the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
subsequently overruled. 2 The court raised, sua sponte, the issue of
whether public policy precluded enforcement of the agreement.23
Nevertheless, after a briefing and oral arguments regarding the
preclusive effects of public policy on the enforcement of the agree-
ment's support clause, the circuit court ordered the termination of
Mr. Gordon's support obligation.24
Following Mrs. Gordon's appeal to the Court of Special Appeals,
the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari25 on its own motion to
clarify the scope of factual inquiry appropriate to establishing the
existence of cohabitation for purposes of terminating spousal
support. 6
2. Legal Background.--Under Maryland law, "alimony" refers to
spousal support that a court may both award and modify.27 Alterna-
tively, "contractual spousal support" results from a private agreement
between the parties.28 Thus, its modification is subject to the terms of
the agreement itself.29 The provision of spousal support in the form
of court-ordered alimony payments has been established by Maryland
19. Id.
20. Id. at 299, 675 A.2d at 542-43.




25. 336 Md, 705, 650 A.2d 295 (1994).
26. See Gordon, 342 Md. at 305-09, 675 A.2d at 545-48 (discussing factors appropriate to
determining cohabitation).
27. See Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md. App. 486, 496, 541 A.2d 1331, 1336 (1988).
28. See id.
29. See id.; MD. CODE ANN., F m. LAw § 8-103(b)-(c) (1991) (discussingjudicial modifi-
cation of separation agreements); see also infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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law for centuries."0 The legitimacy of separation agreements provid-
ing for support, however, has only a relatively recent history.31 None-
theless, the general validity of these agreements is now well
recognized and was first codified in Article 16, section 28 of the Mary-
land Code.32 Title 8 of the Family Law Article presently authorizes
separation agreements, providing, in pertinent part, that "a husband
and wife may make a valid and enforceable settlement of alimony,
support, property rights, or personal rights."3 3
With the validity of separation agreements recognized by Mary-
land statute, it is axiomatic that such agreements are governed by con-
tract principles.' In other words, disputes arising out of the
agreement must be settled according to the specific provisions set
forth in the contract itself.33  When separation agreements are
"merged" into divorce decrees, the decree of the court supersedes the
agreement, and the court may therefore modify its provisions.3 6
When a separation agreement is "incorporated but not merged" into
the divorce decree, however, the separation agreement survives "as a
separate independent contractual arrangement between the par-
ties,"3 7 and "[w] hether the court can modify it is a matter left to the
30. See McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 328, 469 A.2d 1256, 1260 (1984). The court
observed:
By ch. 12, § 14 of the Acts of 1777, which remains virtually unchanged and is now
found in Md. Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.) § 3-603(a) of the Courts andJudicial
Proceedings Article, the General Assembly authorized equity courts to hear and
determine alimony causes in the same manner as they were heard and deter-
mined by English ecclesiastical courts under English law. Nevertheless, the 1777
statute was construed as merely confirming the previously existing inherent au-
thority of Maryland equity courts over alimony.
Id. (footnote omitted).
31. The first Maryland case to recognize the validity of separation agreements provid-
ing for economic maintenance was Melson v. Melson, 115 Md. 196, 205, 134 A. 136, 139
(1926) (valuing agreement as the equivalent of the husband's future maintenance of the
wife). See MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 8-101(a) ("A husband and wife may make a valid
and enforceable deed or agreement that relates to alimony, support, property rights, or
personal rights.")
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 28 (1981) (repealed 1984).
33. MD. CODE ANN., Fma. LAw § 8-101(b).
34. See Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md. App. 486, 501, 541 A.2d 1331, 1338-39 (1988)
(stating that a separation agreement "is subject to the same general rules that govern all
contracts"); Pumphrey v. Pumphrey, 11 Md. App. 287, 290, 273 A.2d 637, 639 (1971)
(same).
35. See Mendeson, 75 Md. App. at 501, 541 A.2d at 1338-39 (stating that "particular
questions related to the agreement must be resolved by reference to the particular lan-
guage of the separation agreement").
36. See id. at 498, 541 A.2d at 1337.
37. Id, at 499, 541 A.2d at 1337.
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agreement itself."3 8  Nevertheless, as a contract, separation agree-
ments are subject to the limitations of public policy."9
a. Alimony and Cohabitation. -In recent years, courts have
witnessed an increase in litigation regarding the relationship between
spousal support and its termination based upon the recipient's cohab-
iting with a third party.4" Traditionally, court-ordered alimony pay-
ments in Maryland could be terminated only if the wife remarried or
if either party died.4" After 1980 and the passage of the new Alimony
Act,4" however, the termination of alimony also became available if
the court found termination necessary to avoid an inequitable
result.
43
When presented with evidence that an alimony recipient is co-
habiting with a third party, the majority ofjurisdictions will only mod-
ify court-ordered payments upon a showing of changed economic
circumstances.' Specifically, these circumstances refer either to a sit-
38. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. Law § 8-103.
39. See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
40. See EvanJ. Langbein, Post-Dissolution Cohabitation: "The Best of Both Worlds?", 57 FLA.
BAR J. 656, 656 (1983) ("Increasingly, the courts are called upon to deal with this social
phenomenom [sic] [of unmarried cohabitation, as] when the spouse paying alimony seeks
termination of his or her obligation because the recipient is cohabitating [sic] with a third
party.").
41. See JOHN F. FADER & RIcHARD J. GILBERT, MARYLAND FAMILY LAW § 4-6(a), at 140
(citing Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 417, 620 A.2d 305, 318 (1993)).
42. Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 575, 1980 Md. Laws § 2057. The New Alimony Act was the
direct result of an alimony reform proposal filed by the Governor's Commission on Do-
mestic Relations Laws. See FADER & GILBERT, supra note 41, § 4-3(a), at 119. The Act ef-
fected a significant change in Maryland's alimony statutes. See id. § 4-3(b), at 120 ("Many
Maryland appellate case decisions hold that rehabilitation and the objective of making an
economically dependent spouse self-supporting are the stated legislative directives of the
New Alimony Act of 1980.").
43. See FADER & GILBERT, supra note 41, § 4-6(a), at 140 (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAm.
Law § 11-108(3) (1991)).
44. See Gayet v. Gayet, 456 A.2d 102, 104 (NJ. 1983) (noting that "the majority ofjuris-
dictions have adopted an economic needs test to determine whether cohabitation requires
modification of an alimony award"); see also Duhl v. Duhl, 507 A.2d 523, 525 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1986) (finding that the statute directed the court to terminate the payment of alimony
upon a showing that the recipient is living with another person such that this change in
circumstances alters the financial needs of the alimony recipient); MacLaren v. MacLaren,
616 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) ("[fln the absence of an agreement... the
court must determine whether the new cohabiting partner is providing some support to
the receiving spouse, thereby lessening the receiving spouse's need; or the receiving
spouse is diverting some of the support alimony to the new cohabiting partner."); In re
Marriage of Caradonna, 553 N.E.2d 1161, 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) ("An important consid-
eration is whether the cohabitation has materially affected the recipient spouse's need for
support because he or she either received support from the coresident or used mainte-
nance monies to support the coresident."); Myers v. Myers, 560 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ind. 1990)
(stating that, upon a finding of cohabitation, "[t]he extent of actual economic depen-
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uation in which the recipient financially supports the cohabitant or
the cohabitant provides for the financial needs of the recipient.4'
Maryland adopted this majority position in Meyer v. Meyer,' holding
that unchaste conduct does not warrant termination of alimony, but
may "be considered where it is relevant to a change in financial condi-
tion."4 7 This focus on economic circumstances logically follows the
determination that "the purpose of alimony is to provide for the sup-
port and maintenance of the wife. It is never of a punitive nature." '
Previously, however, the Court of Appeals had suggested that openly
residing with another man or other "flagrant misconduct" could alone
warrant the termination of alimony.49 Thus, the court's adherence in
Meyer to the economic circumstances test marked a significant clarifi-
cation of Maryland law regarding the purpose of alimony and justifica-
tion for its modification.
b. Spousal Support and Cohabitation.-Although the majority
of jurisdictions hold that cohabitation must result in changed finan-
cial circumstances to justify the termination of alimony,50 these same
jurisdictions disagree substantially as to what type or amount of eco-
nomic change would warrant the termination of support. In some
states, economic considerations receive little or no mention in defin-
dency, not one's conduct as a cohabitant, must determine the duration thereof as well as
its amount"); Roberts v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153, 154 (Okla. 1983) ("The raison d'etre of [the
Oklahoma statute providing for modification of support] is not to regulate morality, but
rather to regulate support maintenance when the need for continued support has dimin-
ished or vanished."); Popp v. Popp, 432 N.W.2d 600, 608 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)
("[M]aintenance payments can be modified only upon a change in the financial circum-
stances of the parties and not solely on the basis of the receiving spouse's cohabitation with
a third party."); Langbein, supra note 40, at 656 ("[T]he court should focus on the eco-
nomic necessities of the parties, not their lifestyle.").
45. See Gayet, 456 A.2d at 104 (explaining that the test used by most states requires
modification "when (1) the third party contributes to the dependent spouse's support, or
(2) the third party resides in the dependent spouse's home without contributing anything
toward the household expenses").
46. 41 Md. App. 13, 394 A.2d 1220 (1978).
47. Id. at 21, 394 A.2d at 1224; see also Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md. App. 486, 494,
541 A.2d 1331, 1335 (1988) ("Meyer flatly held that misconduct alone will notjustify termi-
nation of alimony, only a change in financial circumstances, which may or may not accom-
pany such misconduct, will require termination or modification of alimony.").
48. Meyer, 41 Md. App. at 21, 394 A.2d at 1224.
49. Roberts v. Roberts, 35 Md. App. 497, 505, 371 A.2d 689, 693 (1977) (including
prostitution and gambling as other types of conduct that might justify modification of an
alimony award); but cf Atkinson v. Atkinson, 13 Md. App. 65, 71, 281 A.2d 407, 410 (1971)
("[T]he effect of a wife's 'misconduct' after an [absolute] divorce is not firmly settled.").
50. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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ing cohabitation.5' In others, economic support of either the third
party by the recipient or of the recipient by the third party is consid-
ered significant, but not dispositive, in determining the nature of the
relationship.52 Of those jurisdictions that consider financial condi-
tions indicative of the existence of cohabitation, the weight these
courts give such economic considerations varies.53 In all of these
cases, however, the courts gave little or no consideration to policy con-
cerns that weigh against modifying court-ordered alimony payments
absent a change in financial circumstances.54 Thus, these jurisdic-
tions failed to acknowledge and address the potential for abuse of eco-
nomic power in the context of spousal support, despite their
enlightened discussions of this issue in similar cases concerning ali-
mony modification.
Trying to reconcile these divergent positions, the Oregon Court
of Appeals offered some assistance in the case of In re Mariage of Ed-
wards.55 Finding that a change in the economic circumstances of the
supported spouse is not necessary to justify termination of contractual
spousal support, the court stated:
51. See, e.g., Gertrude L.Q. v. Stephen P.Q., 466 A.2d 1213, 1217 (Del. 1983) ("The
word 'cohabit' is not a term of art, but has a common and accepted meaning as an arrange-
ment existing when two persons live together in a sexual relationship when not legally
married."); Bell v. Bell, 468 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Mass. 1984) ("The plain language of the
agreement cannot properly be ignored. The clause in question does not mention support
or the plaintiffs continuing need for it in the absence of a new source.").
52. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Molloy, 635 P.2d 928, 930 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (using
financial support as evidence of cohabitation); Cook v. Cook, 798 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Ky.
1990) (same); Salas v. Salas, 513 N.Y.S.2d 770, 772 (App. Div. 1987) (listing financial sup-
port as one of several factors); Piscione v. Piscione, 619 N.E.2d 1030, 1031 (Ohio Ct App.
1992) (same); In reMarriage of Desler, 643 P.2d 655, 658 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that
cohabitation clauses are "inherently ambiguous").
53. See supra note 52.
54. Compare Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 492 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 (Mass. 1986) (rejecting the
notion that a divorced spouse has a right to control a former spouse's life and further
warning that "a court may not attempt to create such a right through the alimony provi-
sions of a divorce judgment"), and Duhl v. Duhl, 507 A.2d 523, 525 (Conn. Ct. App. 1986)
(requiring a change in the financial needs of the supported spouse as a result of cohabita-
tion before terminating alimony), with Bell v. Bell, 468 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Mass. 1984) (inter-
preting a separation agreement terminating support upon cohabitation, the court
declined to require a change in economic circumstances before modifying support and
found it "clear that the parties did not intend by the noninterference provision to preclude
the defendant from possibly influencing the plaintiff's choices by terminating alimony pay-
ments in the event she were to remarry or were to live with a man in the manner of a
married couple"), and D'Ascanio v. D'Ascanio, 678 A.2d 469, 472 (Conn. 1996) (enforcing
a separation agreement that provided for reduction of support by $350 upon the recipi-
ent's cohabitation with an unrelated male despite a finding that the living arrangement
actually reduced her need for support by only $100).
55. 698 P.2d 542 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
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Here, the provision for [the] termination of spousal support
[based] on [the] wife's "cohabitation with a member of the
opposite sex" was not imposed by the court, but was a part of
the property settlement agreement of the parties. Although
we might question the wisdom of including such a provision
in a property settlement agreement, we conclude that, under
the facts of this case, the provision is enforceable.56
Thus, the court expressed a willingness to respect the freedom of indi-
viduals to contract among themselves overjudicial policy concerns re-
garding the unfair and improper use of spousal support. Such
deference, however, is not shared by all states.
New Jersey, for instance, applies the same policy rationale to deci-
sions involving alimony as it does to decisions involving contractual
spousal support.57 In that regard, New Jersey has recognized that
whether spousal support results from a judicial decree or a contrac-
tual agreement, its main purpose is an economic one." Specifically,
in Melletz v. Melletz, 59 the court observed that a divorce "cuts the ties
that permit one spouse to control the other's behavior where their
respective economic rights and responsibilities or other matters of
recognized mutual concern are not implicated."6 ° Thus, New Jersey
has interpreted separation agreements providing for the termination
of spousal support upon cohabitation to require a change in the fi-
nancial circumstances of the recipient before termination is triggered.
To the extent that parties have attempted to circumvent this interpre-
tation-for example, by expressly excluding from the agreement all
56. Id. at 545.
57. See Gayet v. Gayet, 456 A.2d 102, 104 (N.J. 1983) (finding that with regard to court-
ordered alimony payments, modification based solely on the change in economic circum-
stances "best balances the interests of personal freedom and economic support"); Pugh v.
Pugh, 524 A.2d 410, 411 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (requiring a separation agree-
ment's provision for termination of support upon the wife's living with an unrelated male
to apply only when such an arrangement results in a change in her financial need). The
Pugh court reasoned that "[w]e are disinclined to apply the contract language in a way
which conflicts with our stated public policy to guarantee individual privacy, autonomy,
and the right to develop personal relationships." Id.; see also Hurley v. Hurley, 553 A.2d
891, 891 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) ("Generally, when analyzing modifiable issues
such as alimony or child support, 'consensual agreements and judicial decrees should be
subject to the same standard of "changed circumstances."'" (quoting Lepis v. Lepis, 416
A.2d 45, 49 (N.J. 1980))); Melletz v. Melletz, 638 A.2d 898, 903 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1994) (stating that courts "are only required to enforce property settlement agreements to
the extent that they are fair, equitable and just"). The Meletz court concluded that
"[c] ohabitation clauses beyond the economic contribution standards of Gayet or other rec-
ognized matters of mutual concern fall short of this standard and will not be enforced." Id.
58. Pugh, 524 A.2d at 412.
59. 638 A.2d 898 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
60. Id. at 903.
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economic standards from the definition of cohabitation-New Jersey
has held such support clauses unenforceable.
6
'
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Gordon v. Gordon, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the mere establishment of common residence between
a former wife and an unrelated male does not to warrant the termina-
tion of spousal support pursuant to a separation agreement. 62 Fur-
ther, the court held that "the ordinary definition of 'cohabitation,'
describing a relationship of living together 'as man and wife,' con-
notes mutual assumption of the duties and obligations associated with
marriage."6" Although the pertinent support clause at issue in Gordon
did not use the term "cohabitation"-but instead provided for the ter-
mination of support if the wife "reside[d] with any unrelated man
without the benefit of marriage for a period continuing for beyond
sixty (60) consecutive days""-the court found the words used in the
agreement synonymous with the term "cohabitation."65 Having dis-
posed of semantic obstructions, the court's opinion focused on defin-
ing cohabitation in the context of interpreting spousal support
agreements.
Relying on basic principles of contract law, the court stated that,
as a preliminary matter, it would attach common meaning to the
words in the contract, absent any indication that the parties intended
a different meaning.66 Furthermore, the court explained that "[t]he
dictionary definition of 'cohabitation,' together with the factors that
have been developed by the courts to explain the definition, consti-
tute its ordinary meaning." 7 Thus, beginning with a threshold assess-
ment of the dictionary definition of cohabitation, specifically, "'to live
together as husband and wife usually without a legal marriage having
61. Id. (recognizing that additional consideration may have been paid for inclusion of
such a clause).
62. Gordon, 342 Md. at 308, 675 A.2d at 547.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 311, 675 A-2d at 549.
65. Id. ("We shall read this provision so that no part of it is redundant or meaning-
less."). The Gordon court found that "[i]f the clause was intended to encompass all situa-
tions where Mrs. Gordon resided with an unrelated male, including, e.g., roommates and
boarders, the phrase 'without the benefit of marriage' would be redundant with 'unre-
lated.'" Id,
66. Id. at 303-04, 675 A.2d at 545.
67. Id. at 304, 675 A.2d at 545.
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been performed," '68 the court looked to other jurisdictions for addi-
tional characteristics commonly associated with such a relationship.69
Based on a selective sample of case law from states such as Vir-
ginia, Utah, and Illinois, the court offered five factors to guide trial
courts in their determination of the nature of a relationship. These
factors included: "(1) [the] establishment of a common residence;
(2) long-term intimate or romantic involvement; (3) shared assets or
common bank accounts; (4) joint contribution to household ex-
penses; and (5) recognition of the relationship by the community. 70
Emphasizing that no one factor should be dispositive, the Court of
Appeals then directed courts to "review these factors and any other
relevant evidence in determining whether parties have established a
cohabitation relationship.171 Upon mandating a broad scope of in-
quiry, the court posited its interpretation of cohabitation as a default
definition. In other words, the court noted that "[p]arties may alter
the definition of cohabitation if they choose, subject to the limitations
of law and public policy."72 In the Gordons' case, the court found
that the default definition of cohabitation governed, modified only by
the parties insertion of the sixty-day time requirement.
73
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals adopted a balancing test, weigh-
ing the five factors and any other relevant evidence. 74 Thus, the court
declined to adopt either Mrs. Gordon's argument that public policy
required proof of changed economic circumstances prior to the ter-
mination of support 75 or Mr. Gordon's contention that "the language
of the support provision [was] unambiguous" and did not require
proof of changed economic circumstances.7 6 Instead, the court af-
forded significant weight to the financial evidence in the Gordons'
case based on the principles of contract interpretation and the spe-
cific provisions of the parties' separation agreement. 77 In that regard,
68. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 440 (P. Grove ed.,
1963)). The court continued, "Similarly, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines 'cohabitation'
as '[t]o live together as husband and wife. The mutual assumption of those marital rights,
duties and obligations which are usually manifested by married people, including but not
necessarily dependent on sexual relations.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICIONARY 260 (6th ed. 1990)).
69. Id. at 305-07, 675 A.2d at 546-47.
70. Id. at 308-09, 675 A.2d at 547-48 (foomotes omitted).
71. Id. at 309, 675 A.2d at 548.
72. Id. at 310, 675 A.2d at 548.
73. Id. at 312, 675 A.2d at 549.
74. Id. at 308, 675 A.2d at 547.
75. Id. at 300, 675 A.2d at 543.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 313, 675 A.2d at 549-50 ("Our interpretation of the parties' cohabitation pro-
vision is also supported by the principle that we should read the contract as a whole.").
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the court reasoned that, aside from the cohabitation provision, all
other provisions in the separation agreement that would trigger the
termination of spousal support bore "a significant relationship to the
parties' economic circumstances."7 ' Further, the court found the in-
corporation of a "separate lives" clause into the contract-preserving
each party's personal freedom from interference by the other-incon-
sistent with a condition terminating support based upon the former
wife's common residence with another man. That condition, the
court held, inherently conflicted with the separate lives clause "be-
cause it would enable Mr. Gordon to exercise inappropriate control
over Mrs. Gordon's post-divorce relationships and sexual conduct."
71
Thus, rather than adopting a broad public policy rationale, the court
concluded that a mere showing of common residence was insufficient
to constitute cohabitation because "[viiewing the agreement in its en-
tirety.... the parties appear[ed] to have structured the support pay-
ments to respond to changed economic conditions." °
4. Analysis. -Interpreting the spousal support agreement in
Gordon v. Gordon, the Court of Appeals held that cohabitation implies
"mutual assumption of the duties and obligations associated with mar-
riage" and not merely the establishment of a common residence."
The significance of this holding, however, lies not in what the court
did but, rather, in what it set out to do and where it failed. The
court's granting of certiorari on its own motion, prior to review by the
Court of Special Appeals, suggests that the court had a strong desire
to establish clear and instructive precedent in Maryland on the inter-
pretation of spousal support agreements providing for the termina-
tion of alimony. The court's lack of reasoned analysis and deficient
discussion of policy concerns, however, will certainly result in more
confusion than clarity.
a. Failure to Attend to Threshold Considerations.-As a prelimi-
nary matter, the court relied on weak precedent to determine the or-
dinary meaning of the term "cohabitation" as it applied to the parties'
separation agreement. Several of the cases prominently featured in
the opinion did not define cohabitation in the context of spousal sup-
78. Id. at 313-14, 675 A.2d at 550. In addition to "cohabitation" with an unrelated
male, "[t ] he agreement also provide [d] that support [would] terminate in the event of the
death of either party, remarriage of the wife, or the wife's reaching retirement age." Id at
313, 675 A.2d at 550.
79. Id. at 313, 675 A-2d at 550.
80. Id at 314, 675 A.2d at 550.
81. Id at 308, 675 A.2d at 547.
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port. 2 The Supreme Court of Utah has noted that this use of contex-
tually broad case law is problematic:
[T] he term "cohabitation" does not lend itself to a universal
definition that is applicable in all settings. As a legal con-
cept, cohabitation has been the determinative issue in cases
involving validity of marriage, legitimacy of offspring, crimi-
nal prosecution of cohabitants, and statutory and nonstatu-
tory termination of alimony payments, as well as the
enforcement of equitable liens .... To some extent, the
meaning of the term depends upon the context in which it is
used."'
Although many definitions of cohabitation used outside the context
of spousal support agreements are consistent with cases involving post-
marital contracts, the Gordon court's suggestion that these cases are
interchangeable indicates a fundamental lack of understanding of the
various purposes for which the concept of cohabitation is used in the
law. 84
In a rush to provide guidance to lower courts on the definition of
cohabitation, the Court of Appeals failed to ask and answer some
threshold questions that are essential to an instructive interpretation
of the term. First, given that the term is used in the context of a
spousal support clause, what is the purpose of spousal support? Sec-
ond, what limitations do judicial concerns of fairness and efficiency
place on separation agreements providing for spousal support? Had
the court first answered these questions, it would have been better
poised to interpret contractual agreements providing spousal support
and better able to achieve an appropriate balance between freedom of
contract and countervailing public policy considerations.
82. See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 246 So. 2d 420, 428 (Ala. 1971) (determining whether a
common law marriage existed when a former spouse sought to establish that she was the
legal widow of her former husband upon his death); State v. Arroyo, 435 A.2d 967, 970
(Conn. 1980) (interpreting cohabitation as an element of an affirmative defense to statu-
tory sexual assault); State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 1996) (relating to the
interpretation of a domestic assault statute).
83. Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted).
84. The importance of understanding the contextual use of the term "cohabitation"
has been acknowledged in other areas of law. See, e.g., Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d at 516 (observ-
ing that the domestic assault statute did not set out a definition of cohabiting and there-
fore to determine what the legislature meant by the term, "this court must consider both
the evil sought to be remedied and the purpose behind the statute's enactment"). See also,
e.g., People v. Holifield, 252 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733 (Ct. App. 1988) (distinguishing the inter-
pretation of "cohabitation" in a spousal support case from the domestic assault case at bar,
noting the different purposes of the statutes in each case).
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b. Public Policy and Spousal Support Contracts.--Courts have
said that so long as the judiciary supervises settlement agreements to
ensure that fair and informed negotiations take place between parties,
"private settlement of the financial affairs of estranged marital part-
ners is a goal that courts should support rather than undermine."85
Some, however, still dispute the availability of appropriate standards
to ensure fairness in marital contracts.8
6
In general, Maryland courts have refused to interpret or enforce
contracts in such a way that would violate public policy. 7 In addition,
they have recognized "the unique opportunities for fraud and over-
reaching that exist between a husband and wife"88 and that "decisions
about how resources are allocated at the time of divorce profoundly
affect the economic opportunities and material well-being of both this
generation and the next." 9 Thus, Maryland courts should weigh pol-
icy concerns heavily when interpreting separation agreements.
Beginning its contractual interpretation of the term of "cohabita-
tion," the Gordon court noted that "[t]he prevailing view is now that
'separation agreements . . . are generally favored by the courts as a
peaceful means of terminating marital strife and discord so long as
85. Hayes v. Beresford, 440 A.2d 224, 229 (Conn. 1981).
86. See Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Cau-
tion on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399 (1984). Sharp contends "that the exist-
ence of contract standards necessary to ensure creation of the kind of arm's length
agreements deserving 'any other contract' treatment, and of procedures adequate to pro-
vide relief from unconscionable or fraudulently procured contracts, has been too readily
assumed." Id. at 1405. In that regard, she finds that "contract doctrines, even including
unconscionability, have often failed to provide adequate safeguards in the family law set-
ting against either unfair results or unfair procedures." Id.; see also Laura A. Ward, Com-
ment, Duties of Fairness Between Separating Spouses: North Carolina Continues to Find That All Is
Fair in Love and Divorce, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1988, 67 N.C. L. REv.
1397 (1989). Noting significant differences in relationships between the parties of ordi-
nary business contracts and those in the family law context, Ward explains that separation
agreements "are negotiated under conditions of extraordinary stress and deal with issues of
deep personal significance. The parties are uniquely positioned to exploit each other's
psychological dependencies and weaknesses." Id. at 1408. Moreover, of significance to
spousal support clauses is one suggestion "that treating separation agreements as arm's
length transactions ignores the fact that many married women are still financially depen-
dent upon their husbands and thus in need of state protection." Id.
87. See Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire and Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 A.2d
486, 488 (1985) ("An insurance contract, like any other contract, is measured by its terms
unless a statute, a regulation, or public policy is violated thereby."); Shimp v. Huff, 315 Md.
624, 646, 556 A.2d 252, 263 (1989) ("Like the majority of other courts, we have recognized
the well settled principle that contracts which discourage or restrain the right to marry are
void as against public policy.").
88. Sharp, supra note 86, at 1403-04.
89. Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. RE,. 1103, 1103 (1989).
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they are not contrary to public policy."'9 ° Throughout the opinion,
however, the court failed to discuss what these policy concerns might
be. Further, there is no indication of how public policy considera-
tions are consistent with the court's definition of cohabitation 9' or
with the factors it provided as guidance for trial courts.9 2 In the past,
Maryland courts invoked policy concerns to prevent an economically
dominant party from gaining an unfair advantage through a separate
agreement.93 The Gordon court, however, failed to effectively address
such concerns.
It is well established that "[ t] he present social policy behind an award
of alimony is the need to rehabilitate the dependent spouse so she or he may
become economically self-sufficient."94 Thus, despite potential problems of
fairness and economics in the "rehabilitative alimony model,"95 it is
clear that the purpose of alimony payments is a financial one.96
Although Maryland law distinguishes alimony from contractual
90. Gordon, 342 Md. at 300-01, 675 A.2d at 543-44 (alteration in original) (quoting 5
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTs § 11:7, at 396-99 (R. Lord ed.,
4th ed. 1993)).
91. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Schneider v. Schneider, 335 Md. 500, 518, 644 A.2d 510, 519 (1994)
([D]ismissal would be contrary to strong public policy, because dismissal would reward
the perjury of economically superior spouses by neutering their contractual obligations of
support to economically dependent spouses."); Brees v. Cramer, 322 Md. 214, 222, 586
A.2d 1284, 1288 (1991) ("More important is the effect of public policy on whether to
construe covenants as interdependent. Where the welfare of children would be adversely
affected if specific covenants in a separation agreement were held to be interdependent,
we have refused so to construe the agreement."); Groves v. Alexander, 255 Md. 715, 721-
22, 259 A.2d 285, 289 (1969) ("[A] contract made in consideration of the procurement of
a divorce or requiring a divorce or waiving the right to defend against a divorce or requir-
ing collusion, such as the fabrication of evidence, is against public policy and is illegal.").
94. Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Md. App. 575, 591, 565 A.2d 361, 369 (1989) (emphasis
added).
95. See Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 23 NEw
ENG. L. REV. 437, 504 (1988). O'Connell explains:
Unlike reimbursement alimony, which is grounded in the partnership model,
and human capital theory, which draws on both victim and equality images, reha-
bilitative alimony is a purely victim-oriented conceptualization of alimony's role.
It views a woman who compromises her participation in the paid labor force as
damaged, and it asks what sum of money is needed to repair the damage suffi-
ciently to enable the woman to function.
Id.
96. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text; see also Melletz v. Melletz, 638 A.2d
898, 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). The court stated:
"Alimony is neither a punishment for the payor nor a reward for the payee. Nor
should it be a windfall for any party. It is a right arising out of the marriage
relationship to continue to live according to the economic standard established
during the. marriage as far as economic circumstances will allow."
Id. (quoting Aronson v. Aronson, 585 A.2d 956, 960-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)).
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spousal support in modification and other procedural matters,97 the
purpose of each is identical. The New Jersey Supreme Court best ar-
ticulated the policy considerations of spousal support in Lepis v.
Lepi. 98 "The law must be concerned with the economic realities of
contemporary married life, not a model of domestic relations that
provided women with security in exchange for economic dependence
and discrimination."" In other words, courts should not affirm con-
tracts that allow men or women to control the personal interests and
freedom of their former spouses through economic duress. There-
fore, support-agreement provisions that allow for termination of fi-
nancial support upon conditions unrelated to the economic
circumstances should be declared invalid. 00
Conditioning the termination of spousal support to a cohabitat-
ing recipient on a change in the recipient's financial circumstances
would prevent inequities in several ways. First, if the supported spouse
is providing for the cohabitant's financial needs, modification or ter-
mination of spousal support protects the supporting spouse from hav-
ing to subsidize the income of a third party. Further, if the supported
spouse receives financial assistance from the cohabitant, terminating
support would prevent the supported spouse from receiving payments
unnecessary to the purpose of alimony.
Moreover, conditioning the termination of alimony only on co-
habitation that results in changed economic circumstances would
more effectively protect the recipient's right to privacy and her free-
dom to form personal relationships.10' This is especially important
given that the dissolution of a marriage not only affects an individual's
economic standing but also her emotional well-being. A recently di-
vorced individual might seek a cohabitation arrangement solely for
the purpose of companionship until she has regained her emotional
97. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
98. 416 A.2d 45 (N.J. 1980).
99. Id. at 54.
100. See Melletz, 638 A.2d at 903. In Melletz, the court explained that it was "only required
to enforce property settlement agreements to the extent that they are fair and equitable,
and just." Id. Refusing to recognize any substantial distinction between judicially man-
dated and privately contracted support, the court considered the separation agreement in
that case according to the same standard of fairness applied to an award of alimony in
Gayet. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. Consequently, the Meletz court held
that "cohabitation clauses beyond the economic contribution standards of Gayet or other
recognized matters of mutual concern fall short of this standard and will not be enforced."
Melletz, 638 A.2d at 903.
101. See Mellet, 638 A.2d at 903 ("The agreement leaves very little latitude for the de-
fendant to engage in even a casual or social relationship without fear of losing her eco-
nomic support." (internal quotation omitted)).
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strength. The Gordon decision puts these efforts in jeopardy.10 2 Thus,
the recipient may forego opportunities to heal emotional or physical
losses in order to protect against additional economic loss.108
Although there may have been support for such post-marital control
of a former spouse's personal relationships throughout the develop-
ment of alimony law,'" 4 the advent of more equitable legal doctrines
precludes such economic coercion today.
c. Failure to Provide Clear Guidance to Lower Courts.-In its in-
terpretation of the term "cohabitation," the Gordon court touched on
the policy concerns that govern the court's jurisprudence on alimony
modification. It did so, however, with little clarity. Although the
court included financial conditions such as "shared assets or common
bank accounts" and 'Joint contribution to household expenses" in its
list of relevant considerations, it declined to make these factors dispos-
itive."° Yet throughout its opinion, the court gave various reasons
why economic considerations are essential to a spousal-support clause.
Further, although the Gordon court directed trial courts to look at
noneconomic factors, it nonetheless reverted back to financial consid-
erations as justifications for this inclusion. 10 6 In short, an analysis of
the court's opinion evidences significant attention to the financial cir-
cumstances of the spousal-support recipient.
102. See Bell v. Bell, 468 N.E.2d 859, 863 (Mass. 1984) (Abrams, J., dissenting) ("By
interpreting and enforcing the clause at issue here so as to givejudicial sanction to a termi-
nation of support, the court allies itself with alimony payors who exercise their economic
power in a manner that unreasonably interferes with the private, autonomous lives of the
spouse from whom they have been divorced.").
103. See Langbein, supra note 40, at 656. Langbein indicates:
the cruel effect such an inflexible law might have had in one case where the ex-
wife began residing with a male companion because during the marriage she was
severely beaten, causing brain damage and substantial medical expense; she was
afraid she might pass out with no one around to assist her.
Id. (citing Wight v. Wight, 284 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 1981)). Thus, with regard to marriages
characterized by physical or emotional abuse, judicial sanction of separation agreements
that use the personal activities of the recipient as a basis for termination of support may
not only perpetuate such abuse, but legitimize it.
104. See Singer, supra note 89, at 1109-10 (" [A] limony was also used by ex-husbands and
judges as a way of controlling a woman's behavior after the termination of her marriage
.... An ex-wife who gambled or otherwise 'squandered' her alimony payments... risked
forfeiting her right to support."); see also Evan J. Langbein, Post-Dissolution Cohabitation of
Alimony Recipients: A Legal Fact of Life, 12 NOVA L. REv. 787, 788 (1988) ("Alimony was an
outgrowth of the ecclesiastical courts. A husband held a 'duty' to support and maintain his
wife which survived divorce from 'bed to board.' A concomitant 'condition' of this obliga-
tion to support was the notion that the wife maintain her 'chastity.'" (footnote omitted)).
105. Gordon, 342 Md. at 308, 675 A.2d at 547.
106. See id. at 309-10, 675 A.2d at 548 (discussing the fifth factor: recognition by the
community).
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The court's justification for including the community's percep-
tion of the relationship as a factor to be considered in determining
the nature of the relationship is especially problematic. The court
reasoned that if the former spouse and an unrelated partner hold
themselves out as married, the support recipient could use the sup-
port payments to provide for the financial needs of her cohabitant. 1 °7
Conversely, if the cohabitation arrangement financially benefits the
supported spouse, then she is receiving support from two sources.10 8
The court determined: "In either situation, we believe it would be
inequitable to require the spouse paying support to continue payment
despite the cohabiting parties' de facto remarriage."10 9 Clearly, this
presents a legitimate concern.
In Gordon, however, the court presents these financial considera-
tions during its discussion of a factor indicative of the social, rather
than economic, status of the cohabitation relationship. 1 Thus, the
court obscures whether the financial arrangement or the physical liv-
ing arrangement and its perception by the community is the focus of
the inquiry. If the court is attempting to prevent a supported spouse
from collecting income from two sources, it should concern itself with
actual changes in financial circumstances, regardless of whether the
community saw the former spouse as the husband or wife of a third
party.
Perhaps the court feared that the economic nature of a sup-
ported spouse's cohabitation would not be readily ascertainable by
trial courts. This concern may have led it to employ the social appear-
ance of the relationship as a proxy for the cohabitants' financial ar-
rangement. If this in fact was the impetus for the court's failure to
make changed economic circumstances dispositive, then Gordon rep-
resents a judicial decision to settle for circumstantial proof rather
than fact. Courts should not allow the deficiencies and difficulties
that may characterize the fact-finding process to dictate its declara-
tions of legal principles.
Consider also that a supported spouse may receive additional fi-
nancial assistance from a third party regardless of whether they reside
together in the same house. Although "[t] he issue of lifestyle.., and
the issue of reduced economic necessity are often difficult to sepa-
rate,""' the distinction is crucial if appellate courts are to provide ef-
107. Id
108. Id. at 309, 675 A.2d at 548.
109. Id. at 310, 675 A.2d at 548.
110. See supra text accompanying note 70.
111. Langbein, supra note 104, at 792.
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fective guidance to trial courts faced with spousal-support
modification cases. To the extent that it directs Maryland trial courts
to look to the existence of a common residence, sexual intimacy, and
other noneconomic factors in addition to financial circumstances, the
Gordon court fails to recognize the difference between personal and
economic concerns and their relative importance to interpreting sup-
port agreements. Thus, Gordon offers trial courts little guidance for
the future.
Although the court found that the Gordons had not changed the
ordinary meaning of the term "cohabitation" in their separation
agreement, except for adding a time requirement, the court sug-
gested that its application of a broader definition of cohabitation was
also "supported by the principle that [courts] should read the con-
tract as a whole."112 To that effect, the court found it significant that
the other provisions of the Gordons' agreement allowing for termina-
tion of support had a "significant relationship to the parties' eco-
nomic circumstances."' 13 For instance, the court emphasized the
parties' inclusion of a cost-of-living adjustment in the agreement to
provide for anticipated inflation as evidence of their focus on eco-
nomic circumstances.'1 4 The court's economic interpretation of the
agreement's cohabitation clause, however, conflicts with the court's
earlier decision to downplay financial conditions, giving them equal
status with other noneconomic factors." 5 Thus, the court further ob-
scured the extent to which economic considerations should play a
role in the determination of the nature of a cohabiting relationship.
The Gordon decision also suggests reasons why courts should favor
economic circumstances as the exclusive basis for terminating spousal
support based on cohabitation, but falls short of establishing the case
as clear authority for that principle. For example, the "separate lives"
clause of the separation agreement led the court to conclude that de-
fining as cohabitation Mrs. Gordon's common residence with an unre-
lated male would "enable Mr. Gordon to exercise inappropriate
control over Mrs. Gordon's post-divorce relationships and sexual con-
duct.""t6 The court failed to explain, however, whether such post-
marital control would be "inappropriate" only if a "separate lives"
clause is present. If the court meant that a supporting spouse's inter-
ference in the personal life of the support recipient is inappropriate
112. Gordon, 342 Md. at 313, 675 A.2d at 550.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 314, 675 A.2d at 550.
115. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
116. Gordon, 342 Md. at 313, 675 A.2d at 550.
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under any circumstances, then it is unclear why the court included
factors such as sexual intimacy or romantic involvement between the
recipient and a third party as relevant to the modification of spousal
support.
Perhaps, however, Gordon created a broad scope of inquiry re-
garding the establishment of cohabitation in order to allow trial
courts to give some factors more weight than others, depending on
how the specific contract at issue is structured. For example, in the
Gordons' case, their agreement's focus on economic considerations
and its inclusion of the separate lives clause might direct the
factfinder to conclude that factors such as shared assets or expenses
are more significant to a determination of cohabitation than others.
If this is the proper interpretation of Gordon, then the court would
likely find the alimony payor's interference in the personal life of the
recipient through economic coercion as inappropriate only when the
parties structure their separation agreement to preclude such
meddling.
If this latter interpretation of Gordon is accurate, then the logical
inference from the court's decision is that post-marital control over
the supported former spouse may be acceptable depending on the
specifics of the separation agreement at issue. This implication is
problematic:
By giving its imprimatur to an ... agreement that hinges the
plaintiffs entitlement to support on her conformity to life-
style requirements imposed by the defendant, the court en-
courages economically-dominant husbands to meddle arbi-
trarily with the postdivorce lives of their wives, and thereby
sends an unfortunate message to probate judges charged
with scrutinizing such separation agreements to ensure that
the agreements are "fair and reasonable."117
This is especially true in light of the court's notice to practitioners that
"[p]arties may alter the definition of cohabitation if they choose, sub-
ject to the limitations of law and public policy."1 8 Thus, because the
court gives little indication of what limitations might be in conjunc-
tion with its broad definition of cohabitation, Gordon v. Gordon offers
little guidance to trial courts considering both the legitimacy and the
meaning of separation agreements that terminate spousal support
upon cohabitation.
117. Bell v. Bell, 468 N.E.2d 859, 863 (Mass. 1984) (Abrams, J., dissenting).
118. Gordon, 342 Md. at 310, 675 A.2d at 548.
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5. Conclusion.-In Gordon v. Gordon, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the term "cohabitation," as used in a separation agree-
ment to trigger termination of spousal support, encompassed more
than mere common residence or sexual intimacy. The court de-
clined, however, to limit the term's meaning to a financial arrange-
ment that would alter the support recipient's economic
circumstances. In doing so, the court failed to acknowledge the pur-
pose of support payments and the public policy limitations on post-
marital contracts. Mr. and Mrs. Gordon, however, appeared to ad-
dress these concerns in their agreement. Specifically, various provi-
sions of the Gordons' contract focused on the economic
circumstances of the parties. Thus, the specific structure of the Gor-
dons' contract appeared to preclude a definition of cohabitation that
would violate policy concerns regarding the economic subordination
of dependent former spouses and operate contrary to the purpose of
spousal support. Consequently, to the extent that the Gordons' agree-
ment was consistent with public policy, the court's deficient attention
to those concerns will likely effect little harm. The impact of this deci-
sion on future cases, however, is far less certain.
SARA Z. MOGHADAM
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VII. INSURANCE
A. Requiring Security on Rental Vehicles Notwithstanding a Violation of
the Rental Agreement
In Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' the Court of Ap-
peals held that a self-insured lessor of rental vehicles must provide
primary liability coverage to the permittees2 of its lessee, regardless of
whether the lessee violated the terms of the rental agreement by al-
lowing another person to operate the rented vehicle.' In so holding,
the Court of Appeals concluded that restrictions imposed by section
18-106 of Maryland's Transportation Article on a lessee's authority to
permit other drivers to operate a rental vehicle have no effect on the
required security mandated under section 18-102 (b) of that same Arti-
cle.4 In deciding this case, the court, for the first time in Maryland's
judicial history, directly addressed the conflicting relationship be-
tween section 18-102(b) and section 18-106. The court's decision to
extend insurance coverage to drivers authorized to operate rental ve-
hicles in violation of a rental agreement preserves the intent of the
General Assembly to protect innocent victims of automobile accidents
by guaranteeing them a means of financial redress for their injuries.
In addition, the decision serves a greater public good by placing para-
mount interest on these innocent victims.
1. The Case.-On August 8, 1991, Grace Sonde (Ms. Sonde)
rented a car from Enterprise Leasing Company (Enterprise), a self-
insured car rental agency.5 Ms. Sonde specifically declined to add ad-
ditional drivers to the rental agreement, indicating that she would be
1. 341 Md. 541, 671 A.2d 509 (1996).
2. The court stated that the term "permittee" refers to "all persons who operate rental
vehicles with the permission of either the lessor or the lessee." Id. at 543 n.1, 671 A-2d at
510 n.1.
3. Id. at 543, 671 A.2d at 510-11.
4. Id. at 547, 671 A.2d at 513. Unless otherwise indicated, any reference to a statute in
this Note shall refer to the Transportation Article of the Maryland Code.
5. Id. at 545, 671 A.2d at 512. As a self-insurer, Enterprise provided the following
insurance coverage:
BODILY INJURY/PROPERTY DAMAGE RESPONSIBILITY TO THIRD PAR-
TIES: If Renter or other authorized driver is in compliance with all provisions of
this agreement, and is between 25 and 70 years old, Owner's financial responsibil-
ity extends to Renter and other drivers named on this agreement and approved
by Owner for third party claims arising from the use of the car as required by
Motor Vehicle Minimum Financial Responsibility Laws of the state where the car
is operated, unless this agreement requires the Renter to provide such coverage.
Renter is responsible for damage or loss to property transported by or in the car.
Brief of Appellant at 6, Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 341 Md. 541, 671 A.2d
509 (1996) (No. 34).
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the sole operator of the vehicle.6 The rental agreement, signed by Ms.
Sonde, expressly contained provisions prohibiting her from allowing
the vehicle to be driven or operated under certain circumstances.7
Notably, the agreement prohibited any person under the age of
twenty-one and anyone other than Ms. Sonde to operate the vehicle
without Enterprise's written permission.'
Contrary to the terms of the rental agreement, Ms. Sonde permit-
ted her seventeen-year-old son, David Sonde, to operate the rental ve-
hicle on August 11, 1991.' While driving the vehicle, David collided
with another car."° The accident, which occurred as a result of David
Sonde's alleged failure to maintain control of the vehicle,1" resulted
in personal injuries to Stephany Witt (Ms. Witt), a passenger of the
other car. 2 Ms. Witt subsequently brought an action in the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County against both David and Grace Sonde
to recover damages for her injuries."
The Sondes submitted Ms. Witt's claim to their personal insur-
ance carrier, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate).14 Allstate, in
turn, submitted the claim to Enterprise, as self-insurer of the rented
6. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 545, 671 A.2d at 512.
7. Brief of Appellant at 4, Enterprise (No. 34). The rental agreement terms expressly
stated that Ms. Sonde was not allowed to let the vehicle to be used or driven:
(a) In violation of any term or condition of this agreement.
(b) By any person under the age of 21 without Owner's written permission, or by anyone
who has given a fictitious name or false age or address.
(c) For any illegal purpose, in a race, speed contest, to tow a vehicle or trailer.
(d) By any person if there is reasonable evidence they were under the influence
of narcotics, intoxicants or drugs.
(e) By any person other than Renter without written consent of Owner.
(g) Under authority of any license other than his own. Renter warrants that the
license shown to owner at time the car is rented is his own and fully valid.
(j) In a reckless or imprudent manner or if the car is deliberately damaged.
(k) Or if renter misrepresents fact to owner pertaining to rental, use, or opera-
tion of the car.
Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added).




12. Id. at 546, 671 A.2d at 512.
13. Id. at 545-46, 671 A.2d at 512. The circuit court stayed Ms. Witt's lawsuit pending
resolution of the instant case. See id. at 546 n.6, 671 A.2d at 512 n.6.
14. Id. at 546, 671 A.2d at 512. The Sondes' insurance policy with Allstate provided
liability coverage for both Grace and David and had been in effect on the day of the acci-
dent. Id.
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vehicle.15 Both Allstate and Enterprise denied responsibility for pri-
mary insurance coverage for the Witt lawsuit. 6
In response to Ms. Witt's claim against the Sondes, Allstate sought
a declaratory judgment in circuit court 17 that, as a self-insured lessor,
Enterprise assumed responsibility for providing primary liability cover-
age to all persons operating the rental vehicle with Ms. Sonde's per-
mission, even though such permission violated the express terms of
the rental agreement.1 8 The circuit court granted summaryjudgment
in favor of Allstate, basing its decision on section 18-102 of the Trans-
portation Article' 9 and ordered Enterprise to provide primary liability
coverage to Grace and David Sonde to the extent of the mandatory




16. Id. Allstate asserted that, because the operator of a rental vehicle has permission to
operate the vehicle, the lessor must provide the operator with insurance coverage. Id.
Enterprise argued that the security provided in the rental agreement did not extend to
David Sonde because he was not an authorized driver under the terms of the rental agree-
ment. Id.
17. Id. at 544, 671 A.2d at 511.
18. Id. at 544-45, 671 A.2d at 511. Initially, Allstate also sought a declaratory judgment
action against Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers), claiming that, as the insurance
carrier for Enterprise, it should assume responsibility for liability coverage. Id. at 544-45
n.5, 671 A.2d at 511 n.5. Travelers moved for summary judgment, denying that it ever
provided such coverage to Enterprise. Id. Allstate never responded to the motion, and the
court did not rule on it. Id. The Court of Appeals noted that it "appears that all parties
agree that Travelers did not provide insurance coverage for the lessees of automobiles
owned by Enterprise and that the responsibility for providing the security falls upon Enter-
prise, as self-insurer." Id.
19. Section 18-102 of the Transportation Article states:
(a) In generaL-The [Motor Vehicle] Administration may not register any
motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to be rented until the owner of the vehicle
certifies to the satisfaction of the Administration that he has security for the vehi-
cle in the same form and providing for the same minimum benefits as the security
required by Title 17 of this article for motor vehicles.
(b) Persons to be covered by security.-Notwithstanding any provision of the
rental agreement to the contrary, the security required under this section shall
cover the owner of the vehicle and each person driving or using the vehicle with
the permission of the owner or lessee.
(c) Suspension of registration.-If the Administration finds that the vehicle
owner has failed or is unable to maintain the required security, the Administra-
tion shall suspend the registration of the vehicle.
MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. II § 18-102 (1992).
20. Enterprise 341 Md. at 544-45, 671 A.2d at 511. The security required under section
17-103(b) must provide for at least the following:
(1) The payment of claims for bodily injury or death arising from an acci-
dent of up to $20,000 for any one person and up to $40,000 for any two or more
persons, in addition to interest and costs;
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Relying on section 18-106 of the Transportation Article,2 1 which
prohibits a lessee from permitting another person to operate a rented
vehicle without the lessor's permission, Enterprise appealed the deci-
sion to the Court of Special Appeals.2 Before the case could be
heard, however, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its
own motion.23 The Court of Appeals considered whether the legisla-
ture intended to hold a self-insured lessor of a motor vehicle responsi-
ble for providing primary liability coverage to persons operating a
rented vehicle with permission from the lessee, even though the lessee




a. Maryland's Compulsory Insurance Law.-Title 17 of the
Transportation Article sets out the "required security" for motor vehi-
cles in the State of Maryland.2 5  Under this statutory insurance
scheme, all owners of registered motor vehicles must maintain secur-
ity on the vehicle, usually in the form of a vehicle liability insurance
policy.26 Section 17-103(b) of the Transportation Article mandates
that all vehicle owners maintain a minimum required security for per-
(2) The payment of claims for property of others damaged or destroyed in
an accident of up to $10,000, in addition to interest and costs;
(3) Unless waived, the benefits described under Article 48A, § 539 of the
Code as to basic required primary coverage; and
(4) The benefits required under Article 48A, § 541 of the Code as to re-
quired additional coverage.
MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. II § 17-103(b).
21. Section 18-106 of the Transportation Article states:
UNAUTHORIZED USE OF RENTED MOTOR VEHICLE.
(a) Lessees permitting other persons to drive rented motor vehicles.-If a person
rents a motor vehicle under an agreement not to permit another person to drive
the vehicle the person may not permit any other person to drive the rented motor
vehicle.
(b) Rental agreements prohibiting other persons from driving vehicles.-If a person
rents a motor vehicle under an agreement not to permit another person to drive
the vehicle no other person may drive the rented motor vehicle without the con-
sent of the lessor or his agent.
MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. II § 18-106.
22. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 545, 671 A.2d at 511.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 543, 671 A.2d at 510.
25. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. II § 17-103.
26. Section 17-103(a) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Required form; annual assessment.-
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the form of se-
curity required under this subtitle is a vehicle liability insurance policy written by
an insurer authorized to write these policies in this State.
[VOL. 56:656
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
sonal injury of "$20,000 for any one person, $40,000 for any accident,
and $10,000 for property damage."2 7 The legislature enacted Mary-
land's compulsory insurance law to ensure that those who own and
operate motor vehicles registered in the state are "financially able to
pay compensation for damages resulting from motor vehicle acci-
dents."" The public policy behind Maryland's compulsory insurance
law is well settled-"to give innocent third parties a source of private
sector insurance funds from which to obtain compensation for their
injuries."29
Title 18 of the Transportation Article extends the minimum se-
curity requirement to owners of for-rent vehicles. Specifically, section
18-102 requires the owner of a for-rent vehicle to certify that it has
provided the minimum security required under Title 17 before the
Motor Vehicle Administration can register the vehicle with the state.3"
b. The Conflicting Relation Between Section 18-102(b) and Section
18-106-Section 18-102(b) of the Transportation Article sets forth
the persons covered by the required security with respect to for-rent
vehicles. Section 18-102 (b) states: "Notwithstanding any provision of the
rental agreement to the contrary, the security required under this section
shall cover the owner of the vehicle and each person driving or using
the vehicle with the permission of the owner or lessee.""' Thus, section 18-
102(b) appears to say that a lessor of a rental vehicle must provide
(2) The [Motor Vehicle] Administration may accept another form of secur-
ity in place of a vehicle liability insurance policy if it finds that the other form of
security adequately provides the benefits required by subsection (b) of this
section.
MD. CODE ANN., TRANSp. II § 17-103(a).
27. Id. § 17-103(b).
28. See Pennsylvania Nat'l MuL Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 154, 416 A.2d
734, 736 (1980) ("In Maryland, there is an established legislative policy designed to make
certain that those who own and operate motor vehicles in this State are financially
responsible.").
29. See Van Horn v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 334 Md. 669, 680, 641 A.2d 195, 200 (1994)
(noting that significant changes in Maryland law regarding motor vehicle insurance were
designed to ensure "that there would be continuous insurance policy coverage ... applica-
ble to injuries incurred in automobile accidents"); Larimore v. American Ins. Co., 314 Md.
617, 625, 552 A-2d 889, 892 (1989) (refusing to enforce a broad "fellow employee exclu-
sion" because such exclusion is inconsistent with the purpose of compulsory automobile
liability insurance to provide accident victims with a means of financial redress); Jennings
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 357-58, 488 A.2d 166, 168 (1985) (finding
a broad "household exclusion" inconsistent with Maryland's compulsory automobile insur-
ance statute); National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pinkney, 284 Md. 694, 704, 399 A.2d 877,
882 (1979) (noting that "the public policy of this State as enunciated by the General As-
sembly" is to afford every injured person in Maryland the minimum liability coverage).
30. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. II § 18-102.
31. Id. § 18-102(b) (emphasis added).
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primary insurance coverage to persons operating the rental vehicle
without the lessor's permission, so long as the lessee has granted the
driver permission to operate the vehicle. 2 Presumably, this reading
would apply even if the lessee gave the driver permission in direct
violation of the express terms of the rental agreement. This reading
of section 18-102(b), however, conflicts with section 18-106 of that
same Article. Section 18-106 permits lessors to place restrictions on
whom a lessee may authorize to drive a rented vehicle. 3 Moreover, a
violation of section 18-106 constitutes a misdemeanor, subject to a
fine of up to five hundred dollars, imprisonment for up to two
months, or both. 4
Notwithstanding the conflicting language of sections 18-102(b)
and 18-106, no Maryland court had ever addressed the interplay be-
tween the two sections. The contradictory relationship between sec-
tions 18-102(b) and 18-106 has been examined, however, by author
Andrew Janquitto, in his treatise, Maryland Motor Vehicle Insurance.3"
Upon an in-depth review of the legislative history of the two sections,
Janquitto concluded that the General Assembly "did not intend [sec-
tion 18-106] to be used by an insurer or an owner as a means of cir-
cumventing the indemnification obligation inherent in the financial
responsibility provision [of section 18-102]."36 Janquitto argues:
Clearly, the Legislature considered the requirement that the
financial security extend to owners, lessees, and permissive
users to be separate from the prohibition against allowing
persons to use the rented vehicle without permission of the
owner.... In this regard, the language of Section 18-102(b)
cannot be ignored: it requires coverage for "each person
driving or using the vehicle with permission of the owner or
lessee." "Each person" is exactly that-each and every per-
son. The public policy inherent in compulsory insurance de-
mands such a conclusion.
7
According toJanquitto's analysis, the legislature intended the two
sections to operate separately, and despite section 18-106's limitations
on who may operate the rental vehicle, section 18-102(b) 's require-
ment of providing the required security to all persons driving the
32. Id.
33. Id. § 18-106.
34. Id. § 27-101(c).
35. ANDREWJANQUIrro, MARYLAND MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 53 (1992).
36. Id. at 105.
37. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 18-102(b) (1992)).
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rental vehicle with permission of either the owner or the lessee must
be enforced.
c. Exclusions to Maryland's Compulsory Insurance Law.-Mary-
land courts have consistently adhered to the well-established principle
that when the legislature has expressly authorized certain exclusions
to a law, the judiciary may not proclaim its own limitations, exclusions,
or exceptions. 38 For example, in Pennsylvania National Mutual Casu-
alty Insurance Co. v. Gartelman,39 the Court of Appeals declined to en-
force an insurance policy's exclusion for an insured who was injured
while occupying an uninsured motor vehicle owned by the named in-
sured.40 The court stated that "[w]here a statute expressly provides
for certain exclusions, others should not be inserted."4 ' Such an ex-
clusion, the court explained, would frustrate the public policy behind
the compulsory insurance law of ensuring financial compensation to
victims of automobile accidents.4 2 In accordance with the reasoning
in Gartelman, Maryland courts have consistently invalidated insurance
policy exclusion clauses that are found to be inconsistent with the pur-
pose and public policy behind Maryland's compulsory insurance
law. 43
In Jennings v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,' the Court of
Appeals invalidated an exclusion clause in an automobile liability pol-
icy that denied insurance coverage to family members of the insured
living in his household.45 The court reasoned:
The exclusion of a large category of claimants, suffering bod-
ily injury arising from accidents, is not consistent with [the
required security mandated under section 17-103(b) of the
Transportation Article]. Moreover, if any and all exclusions
from this required liability coverage are valid as long as they
are not expressly prohibited by statute, the purpose of com-
38. See, e.g., Van Horn v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 334 Md. 669, 687, 641 A.2d 195, 203
(1994) (holding an exclusion for lessees who made material misrepresentations on rental
agreement invalid as inconsistent with public policy); Larimore v. American Ins. Co., 314
Md. 617, 625, 552 A.2d 889, 892 (1989) (holding a "fellow employee" exclusion invalid as
inconsistent with public policy).
39. 288 Md. 151, 416 A.2d 734 (1980).
40. Id. at 156, 416 A.2d at 737.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
44. 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166 (1985).
45. Id. at 362, 488 A.2d at 171. The household exclusion clause at issue provided:
"Bodily injury to an insured or any family member of an insured residing in the insured's
household is not covered." Id. at 354, 488 A.2d at 167.
19971
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
pulsory automobile liability insurance could be frustrated to
a significant extent.4 6
The court found that because such a household exclusion clause did
not fall under the group of exclusions expressly authorized by the leg-
islature,4 7 it contravened the purpose and public policy behind Mary-
land's compulsory insurance law."
Maryland courts have also repeatedly rejected similar attempts by
insurance companies to avoid the statutory scheme of compulsory in-
surance. In Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.,49 the Court of
Appeals went so far as to hold that Maryland's compulsory insurance
law denies an insurer its common law contract right to void an insur-
ance policy ab initio because of a material misrepresentation made by
the insured in his application.5" In that case, Raymond Van Horn was
involved in an accident in which his automobile collided with a bicy-
clist.5" The police report indicated that Van Horn had taken medica-
tion for his epilepsy just prior to the accident.52 Although Van Horn
had purchased personal injury liability insurance coverage from Atlan-
tic Mutual Insurance Company (Atlantic) before the accident, he
never informed Atlantic of his epileptic condition.5" In fact, Van
Horn specifically denied in his application for insurance having any
"physical impairment[s] ."" The court concluded that, notwithstand-
ing Van Horn's false statement, Maryland's compulsory insurance law
abrogated Atlantic's common law right to void ab initio the insurance
policy.55 Therefore, when the claims of innocent victims are at stake,
Maryland courts have been reluctant to allow an insurer to exclude
coverage, even when policyholders have violated the express terms of
their contracts or have made material misrepresentations to obtain
such contracts.
d. Other Jurisdictions.--Other states have addressed the issue
of whether lessors should have to extend primary liability coverage to
unauthorized permittees of lessees. Different jurisdictions have
reached varying results. In order to further the public policy inherent
46. Id. at 360, 488 A.2d at 170.
47. The General Assembly expressly authorized specified exclusions from the required
liability coverage. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 240C-1; 541 (c) (2); 545 (1994).
48. Jennings, 302 Md. at 357, 488 A.2d at 168.
49. 334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195 (1994).
50. Id at 684-85, 641 A.2d at 202.
51. Id. at 672, 641 A.2d at 196.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 671, 641 A.2d at 196.
55. Id. at 679, 641 A.2d at 199-200.
954 [VOL. 56:656
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
in compulsory insurance laws, a number of courts have held lessors
(or, if the lessors are not self-insured, their insurers) responsible for
providing primary liability coverage, notwithstanding a violation of the
rental agreement. For example, in American Tours, Inc. v. Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co., 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court held a car
rental agency's insurer responsible for providing to the lessee's daugh-
ter the minimum security required under North Carolina law,57 even
though the lessee permitted her daughter to drive the car in violation
of the rental agreement.58 Emphasizing the interests of innocent vic-
tims in having a means of financial redress for their injuries, the court
stated, "The public policy expressed in [North Carolina's compulsory
insurance law for rental vehicles] is that even where automobile rental
agreements are violated it is preferable to provide coverage for inno-
cent motorists rather than to deny such coverage because of the
violation."59
Meanwhile, other courts have relieved lessors of financial respon-
sibility for damages that resulted when persons other than those ex-
pressly authorized in the rental agreements operated their rental
vehicles. These courts focused primarily on the contract rights of les-
56. 338 S.E.2d 92 (N.C. 1986).
57. North Carolina's compulsory insurance law for rental vehicles provides in pertinent
part:
LABruTu INSURANCE PREREQUISITE TO ENGAGING IN BUSINESS; COVERAGE OF POLICY.
[I] t shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to engage in the
business of renting or leasing motor vehicles to the public... unless such person,
firm or corporation has secured insurance for his own liability and that of his
rentee or lessee ... subject to the following minimum limits: twenty-five thou-
sand dollars ($25,000) because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any
one accident, and fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) because of bodily injury to or
death of two or more persons in any one accident, and fifteen thousand dollars
($15,000) because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one
accident.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-281 (1996).
58. American Tours, 338 S.E.2d at 97.
59. Id.; see also Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 416 P.2d 801, 810 (Cal. 1966) (en
banc) (requiring a car rental agency's insurer to extend motor vehicle liability coverage to
a driver who was originally excluded from coverage under the terms of the rental agree-
ment); Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 3, 7 (Fla. 1972) (holding the car rental
agency's insurer primarily liable for damages resulting from the negligent operation of the
rental car by a person who was not authorized to drive under the terms of the rental agree-
ment); American Country Ins. Co. v. Wilcoxon, 537 N.E.2d 284, 291 (Ill. 1989) (holding
that a taxicab company's insurer must extend its required security to a cab driver who was
driving the leased cab in violation of the rental agreement); Motor Vehicle Accident In-
dem. Corp. v. Continental Nat'l Am. Group Co., 319 N.E.2d 182, 185 (N.Y. 1974) (holding
the lessor's insurer responsible for defending and providing primary insurance coverage to
a driver who was not a permitted user under the rental agreement).
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sors to limit their liability by imposing reasonable restrictions on the
use of their vehicles.6 0
In recent years, Louisiana courts have addressed this issue on a
number of occasions.61 In Hearty v. Harris,62 the Louisiana Supreme
Court, in a plurality opinion, upheld a provision in a rental agreement
that canceled and terminated insurance coverage when a person
other than the renter or the additional driver identified in the agree-
ment drove the car.6' The court acknowledged Louisiana's compul-
sory insurance law, which requires owners of motor vehicles to
maintain proof of financial responsibility.' Nevertheless, the court
concluded:
[I]t is not the public policy of this state to protect and pro-
vide compensation to injured persons at all times. Conse-
quently, we believe it is not against public policy for an
automobile rental agency to restrict liability coverage to cer-
tain named drivers. The agency has an interest in protecting
its property and the right, as the owner of the vehicle, to
impose restrictions on the operation and use of the vehicle.
60. See infra notes 61-70.
61. See Dennison v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 645 So. 2d 1227, 1232 (La. Ct. App. 1994)
(enforcing a provision in the rental agreement that limited liability coverage to the lessee
and those drivers specifically named in the agreement); Veillon v. Urban, 614 So. 2d 238,
241 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (enforcing the provisions in the rental agreement that restricted
liability insurance coverage to only those persons authorized to operate the rental vehicle
under the terms of the rental agreement).
62. 574 So. 2d 1234 (La. 1991).
63. Id. at 1242. The rental agreement contained a provision that provided:
USE OF RENTED VEHICLE BY DRIVER OTHER THAN ONE SPECIFICALLY
QUALIFIED AND IDENTIFIED ON THIS CONTRACT WILL CANCEL AND
TERMINATE INSURANCE COVERAGE ....
Id. at 1235.
64. Id. at 1237. Louisiana's Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Security Act requires
owners of motor vehicles to maintain proof of financial responsibility by one of four meth-
ods, depending on lessor's status. The statute provides:
§ 861. Security required
A. (1) Every self-propelled motor vehicle registered in this state ... shall be
covered by an automobile liability policy with liability limits as defined by R.S.
32:900(B) (2), or a binder for same, or by a motor vehicle liability bond as defined
by Subsection B hereof, or by a certificate of the state treasurer stating that cash
or securities have been deposited with said treasurer as provided by Subsection C
hereof, or by a certificate of self insurance as provided by R.S. 32:1042.
(2) It shall be the duty of the registered owner of a motor vehicle to main-
tain the security hereinabove required. Failure to maintain said security shall sub-
ject the registered owner to ... sanctions ....
L&. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-861(A) (West 1987).
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This comports with the freedom to contract and the constitu-
tional protection against the impairment of contracts. 65
In the State of Connecticut, the legislature enacted a statute that
imposes liability on lessors of rental vehicles for damages caused by
operators of the vehicle. 66 That statute provides:
Any person renting or leasing to another any motor vehicle
owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person
or property caused by the operation of such motor vehicle
while so rented or leased, to the same extent as the operator
would have been liable if he had also been the owner.
Unfortunately, the legislature did not clarify in the statutory language
who was to be included in the term "operator." Connecticut courts
have consistently construed that statute, nevertheless, as imposing lia-
bility on the lessor only if the person operating the rented vehicle is in
"'lawful possession of it pursuant to the terms of the contract of rental "68 In
Pedevillano v. Biyon69 the Connecticut Supreme Court relieved a lessor
from financial responsibility for the tortious operation of the rental
vehicle by a person who was not an "authorized driver" within the
terms of the rental agreement.70 The court reconciled its decision
with the statutory language by stating, "The statute does not, in its
terms, preclude a lessor from imposing reasonable restrictions on the
identity of those to whom it is willing to entrust its property and for
whose conduct it is willing to assume risk."71
65. Hearty, 574 So. 2d at 1242 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In its opinion,
the court also acknowledged section 32:900(B) (2) of the Louisiana code, which requires
every "Motor Vehicle Liability Policy" to include an omnibus clause that "'insure[s] the
person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or
motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured.'" Id. at
1238 (alteration in original) (quoting IA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:900(B)(2) (West 1987)).
The court held, however, that the insurance coverage extended to the lessee by the lessor
in the rental agreement does not constitute a "motor vehicle liability policy." Id. at 1239
(internal quotations omitted). Rather, the court concluded, the rental agreement consti-
tutes a "voluntary automobile liability policy" which is not subject to the omnibus require-
ment of section 32:900(B) (2). Id. (internal quotations omitted).
66. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-154(a) (West 1987).
67. Id.
68. Pedevillano v. Bryon, 648 A.2d 873, 874 (Conn. 1994) (alteration in original)
(quoting Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 472 A.2d 306, 308 (Conn. 1984)); see also
Ragalye v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, No. CV 94 65927, 1995 WL 128007, at *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1995) (holding that a lessor is not liable for the tortious operation of a rented vehicle
by someone who is not authorized to drive under the terms of the rental agreement).
69. 648 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1994).
70. Id. at 874.
71. Id. at 875.
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Evidently, different jurisdictions have taken different approaches
to the issue of whether lessors should be held financially responsible
for the negligent operation of their rented vehicles by persons who
were not authorized drivers under the terms of the rental agreement.
For the most part, the results depend on whether the courts choose to
place greater importance on the interests of the injured victims or
those of the lessors.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Enterprise, the court first addressed
the contradictions inherent in the statutory language of sections 18-
102(b) and 18-106 of the Transportation Article.7" On the one hand,
in section 18-106, the legislature provided for the enforceability of
rental agreements that either restrict the lessee from giving permis-
sion to others to operate the rental vehicle or prohibit persons other
than the lessee from operating rented vehicles without the consent of
the lessor.7" On the other hand, section 18-102(b) requires an owner
of a rental vehicle to provide the minimum insurance coverage re-
quired under Title 17 to all persons operating the rented vehicle "with
the permission of the owner or lessee," notwithstanding "any provi-
sion of the rental agreement to the contrary."74 As a result, the court
faced the question of whether the legislature intended75 section 18-
106 to have any effect on the coverage required by section 18-
102(b).76
In a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the deci-
sion of the trial court, holding that a self-insured lessor of rental vehi-
cles must provide primary liability coverage to persons driving rented
vehicles with permission of the lessee, regardless of whether the lessee
gave such permission in violation of the rental agreement. 77 The
Court of Appeals further determined that section 18-106 should not
be viewed as an exclusion from the required security of section 18-
102(b). To do so, the court reasoned, would be inconsistent with the
intent of the General Assembly.78
72. Ente e, 341 Md. at 543-44, 671 A.2d at 511.
73. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 18-106 (1992).
74. Id. § 18-102(b).
75. The Court of Appeals has recognized that "the primary goal of statutory construc-
tion is to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intentions." Department of Pub.
Safety and Correctional Servs. v. Howard, 339 Md. 357, 369, 663 A.2d 74, 79 (1995).
76. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 544, 671 A.2d at 511.
77. Id. at 543, 671 A.2d at 510-11.
78. Id. at 548-49, 671 A.2d at 513.
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a. Statutory Interpretation. -In determining the legislative in-
tent behind sections 18-102(b) and 18-106, the court applied certain
well-established principles of statutory interpretation. 79 The court be-
gan by looking at the plain language of section 18-102(b), specifically
focusing on two significant phrases therein."0 First, the court found
that the initial phrase of section 18-102(b), which reads
"[n]otwithstanding any provision of the rental agreement to the con-
trary,"81 suggests that "no term or condition of a private rental agree-
ment may interfere with the coverage required by § 18-102(b)."8"
Thus, according to the court, even though the rental agreement be-
tween Ms. Sonde and Enterprise contained a provision prohibiting ad-
ditional drivers, the legislature intended, "for purposes of applying
§ 18-102(b), [to] read the rental agreement as if it did not include this
provision." 3
Second, the court found that the final phrase in section 18-
102(b), which reads "with the permission of the owner or lessee," 4
suggests that "the permission of either the owner or lessee is sufficient
to bring a permittee under the coverage of the required security." "
The court reasoned that "[h]ad the Legislature intended to exclude
coverage for unauthorized permittees... it would have used the con-
junctive 'and' rather than the disjunctive 'or.' The use of 'and' as the
connector between the terms 'owner' and 'lessee' would have indi-
cated that the permission of both would be required." 6
Furthermore, the court refused to hold that section 18-106 pro-
vides an exclusion from the coverage requirements of section 18-
102(b), citing to the line of Maryland cases8 7 refusing to create new
exclusions to statutes in which the legislature has mandated insurance
79. Courts have often stated that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is "to deter-
mine and effectuate the Legislature's intention." Howard 339 Md. at 369, 663 A.2d at 79.
To identify the intent of the legislature, courts have generally focused on the plain lan-
guage and purpose of the statute. See Tidewater/Havre de Grace, Inc. v. Mayor of Havre
de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 345, 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995) ("[T]here ordinarily is no need to
look beyond the words of the statute to determine its meaning or scope.").
80. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 547-48, 671 A.2d at 513.
81. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. II § 18-102(b) (1992).
82. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 547, 671 A.2d at 513.
83. Id. at 548, 671 A.2d at 513. Note, however, that the provision in the rental agree-
ment prohibiting additional drivers is not completely void because section 18-106 still en-
forces this provision outside of the required security context. See id.
84. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. II § 18-102(b) (emphasis added).
85. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 548, 671 A.2d at 513 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. See supra note 38 and accompanying text for Maryland cases invalidating insurance
policy exclusions not expressly authorized by the legislature.
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coverage. 8 Had the legislature intended to exclude coverage for un-
authorized permittees, the court concluded, the General Assembly
"would have made such an exclusion an explicit part of the law."89
The court also maintained that "Enterprise could not 'contract away
its statutorily-imposed risk by inserting in its rental agreement restric-
tive clauses that narrow the statutory requirements.' 9° As a result, the
court concluded that the legislature did not intend for section 18-106
to have any effect on the required security mandated under section
18-102(b). 91
b. Public Policy.-To further support its holding, the court
concluded that the required security must be extended to unauthor-
ized permittees in order to uphold both the purpose 92 and the public
policy93 behind the compulsory insurance law. The court found that
excluding unauthorized permittees from insurance coverage would
result in a large class of claimants-the entire public-for whom in-
surance coverage would be unavailable, as well as a large class of unin-
sured motorists-unauthorized permittees."4
Specifically, the court recognized the likelihood that persons
other than the lessee may operate the rented vehicle and get into acci-
dents. Using valet parkers and filling-station personnel as examples,
the court pointed out that such unauthorized permittees may not
maintain liability insurance if they do not own motor vehicles.95 Ac-
cordingly, the court stated, " [i] f they are not covered by the required
security, accidents in which they are involved could result in injured
claimants who would have no recourse to compensation from a pri-
vate insurance fund."96 Thus, in order to uphold the purpose of
Maryland's compulsory insurance laws, the court held Enterprise re-
sponsible for extending coverage to unauthorized permittees.97
88. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 547, 671 A.2d at 513; see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
89. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 549, 671 A.2d at 514.
90. Id., 671 A.2d at 513 (quoting Consolidated Enters. Inc. v. Schwindt, 833 P.2d 706,
710 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc)).
91. Id. at 548, 671 A.2d at 513.
92. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
94. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 551, 671 A.2d at 514.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id., 671 A.2d at 515.
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4. Analysis.-
a. Upholding the Intent of the Legislature. -The holding of the
Court of Appeals-that section 18-102 "covers persons driving leased
vehicles with the permission of the lessee, even when the lessee vio-
lated the terms of the rental agreement"98-is consistent with the in-
tent of the General Assembly in two respects. First, the decision
separates section 18-106 from section 18-102(b). Second, it promotes
the public interest of protecting innocent victims of automobile acci-
dents by providing a means of financial redress for their injuries.
The Enterprise decision is especially significant because the court
interpreted the relationship between sections 18-102(b) and 18-106
for the first time in Maryland's judicial history. In determining the
legislative intent behind these two statutes, the Enterprise court prop-
erly applied well-established canons of statutory interpretation. 9 The
court interpreted the language of section 18-102(b) by focusing pri-
marily on its plain meaning. 10 As the Court of Appeals explained in
Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Gartelman,t01 if
the "statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and expresses a
definite meaning consonant with the statute's purpose, courts must
not insert or delete words to make a statute express an intention dif-
ferent from its clear meaning. " "' The language of section 18-102(b)
is clear. Persons covered by the required security of for-rent vehicles
are those persons operating vehicles "with the permission of the
owner or lessee."'0 3 By using the disjunctive "or," as opposed to the
conjunctive "and," the legislature clearly intended that permission
from the lessee alone is sufficient to trigger the required security man-
dated by section 18-102(b).
More importantly, the legislature specifically included the lan-
guage "[n]otwithstanding any provision of the rental agreement to
the contrary" in section 18-102(b), clearly indicating the legislature's
intent that no provisions in a rental agreement may preclude section
18-102(b)'s mandate of required security. Furthermore, the legisla-
tive history of sections 18-102(b) and 18-106 strongly suggests that the
legislature intended for these two statutes to be interpreted separately
and independently. Section 18-106's original predecessor, Article 27,
98. Id. (citations omitted).
99. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
100. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 547, 671 A.2d at 513.
101. 288 Md. 151, 416 A.2d 734 (1980).
102. Id. at 159, 416 A.2d at 738.
103. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 18-102(b) (1992) (emphasis added).
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section 187-G of the 1927 Maryland Code, prohibited lessees from giv-
ing permission to others to operate the rented vehicle without first
obtaining authorization from the owner.1"4 Under section 187-G, per-
sons giving such unauthorized permission and persons operating
rented vehicles without proper authorization from the vehicle owners
were guilty of a misdemeanor.1 0 5 Over the years, the legislature often
renumbered that statute, but made no major substantive changes to
it.'0 6 In 1977, the legislature repealed the original section 187-G
(which, by that time, had evolved into section 208) and recodified it
into what is now known as section 18-106 of the Transportation Arti-
cle. 10 7 Similar to the original section 187-G, the present section 18-
106 prohibits the unauthorized permission and use of rented motor
vehicles,10 and under section 27-101, a violation of section 18-106
constitutes a misdemeanor.10 9 Overall, the legislative history indicates
that there have been no major substantive changes to section 18-106.
Section 18-102, however, underwent notable substantive changes
throughout its legislative history. Its original predecessor was Article
661/2, section 108 of the 1943 Financial Responsibility Act." 10 Sections
108(a) and (b) of that Act mandated that lessors of motor vehicles
104. Section 187-G provided:
Any person who, after hiring, leasing or renting a motor vehicle under an agree-
ment not to permit another to operate or drive the same, shall permit some other
person to operate or drive such motor vehicle, and any person who shall operate
or drive such motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or his duly author-
ized agent, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall
be subject to a fine of not more than One Hundred ($100) Dollars, or imprison-
ment for not more than six months, or to both fine and imprisonment.
Act of April 26, 1927, ch. 533, 1927 Md. Laws 1100 (repealed).
105. Id.
106. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 222 (1939) (repealed) (renumbering section 187-G
into section 222); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 235 (1957) (repealed) (renumbering section
222 as section 235); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 208 (1957) (repealed) (appearing as section
208).
107. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. II § 18-106 (1992); see supra note 21.
108. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. II § 18-106.
109. Id. § 27-101.
110. Article 66 l/2, section 108 provided:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the business of renting to
others, any motor vehicle without a driver, until such person shall first notify the
Department [of Motor Vehicles] of his intention to engage in the aforesaid
business.
(b) The Department shall not register any motor vehicle to be so rented,
unless and until the person owning such motor vehicle shall give proof of finan-
cial responsibility as provided by this Article, and such proof has been accepted by
the Department, and the Department shall revoke the registration of any such
motor vehicle whenever the Department ascertains that such owner has failed, or
is unable, to maintain such proof of financial responsibility.
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first demonstrate proof of financial responsibility before registering
their vehicles with the Department of Motor Vehicles." 1 In subsec-
tion (c), the legislature provided that the required security shall ex-
tend to "every person .. .operating a motor vehicle under a rental
agreement and . . . the person owning [the] motor vehicle." 2
Though the legislature did not expressly deny such coverage to per-
sons operating the vehicle in violation of the rental agreement, it did
specifically include a provision, in subsection (d), that unambiguously
made it unlawful for a lessee to allow others to operate the rented
vehicle without first obtaining the owner's permission.' 3 The legisla-
ture subsequently renumbered that statute and made other minor
changes.' 14 Thus, for a while, two statutes in different articles of the
Maryland Code had parallel provisions deeming it unlawful for lessees
to allow other drivers to operate the rented vehicles without first ob-
taining consent from the owners.
Then, in 1970, the legislature completely overhauled Article
661/2.11' In doing so, the legislature made the first important substan-
tive change to that statute. In a newly created section, section 8-101,
the legislature deleted the provision that made it unlawful for lessees
to give permission to other drivers to operate the vehicle without the
authorization of the vehicle owner." 6 Meanwhile, the separate statute
in Article 27 that prohibited the unauthorized permission and use of
rented vehicles remained intact. The fact that the legislature omitted
the unauthorized permission and use provision in Article 661/2 while
(c) Proof required under this section shall cover every person using or oper-
ating a motor vehicle under a rental agreement and shall also cover the person
owning such motor vehicle.
(d) Whenever a person rents from another a motor vehicle without a driver,
it shall be unlawful for the person so obtaining the use of said motor vehicle to
permit another person to operate the said motor vehicle without first securing
the permission of the person owning the said motor vehicle.
Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500.00).
Act of June 1, 1943, ch. 1007, 1943 Md. Laws 1870-71 (repealed).
111. Id. § 108(a), (b) (repealed).
112. Id. § 108(c) (repealed).
113. Id. § 108(d) (repealed).
114. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 115 (1951) (repealed) (renumbering section 108 into
section 115); Act of June 1, 1955, ch. 434, 1955 Md. Laws 726-27 (repealed) (making a
minor change to include "trailers" and "semi-trailers" as applicable rental vehicles); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 661/2 , § 117 (1957) (repealed) (making the last paragraph of subsection
(d) into a separate subsection (e)).




maintaining it in Article 27 strongly suggests that the legislature in-
tended to keep the two statutes separate and independent.
In 1977, the legislature repealed Article 661/2 and recodified that
Article's statutes into the Transportation Article. 1 7 The present lan-
guage in section 18-102 replaced Article 661/2, section 8-101. Here,
the legislature made a second important substantive change to the
language of this statute. Whereas the original 1943 predecessor to
section 18-102 (section 108) simply extended the required security to
those "operating a motor vehicle under a rental agreement and [the
owners of the vehicles],"11 8 the newly created section 18-102 specifi-
cally included the language: "Notwithstanding any provision of the rental
agreement to the contrary, the security required under this section shall
cover the owner of the vehicle and each person driving or using the
vehicle with the permission of the owner or lessee."' 9 Thus, this new
language also suggests that the legislature did consider whether the
required security should extend to persons operating the vehicle with
only permission from the lessee, in violation of the rental agreement,
and decided that it should.
Moreover, the Enterprise decision upholds the important public
policy of protecting innocent victims of automobile accidents with a
means of financial redress for their injuries. The legislature imple-
mented its compulsory insurance law to promote this public policy by
ensuring that those who own and operate motor vehicles registered in
Maryland are financially able to pay compensation for damages result-
ing from these vehicles. In holding that Enterprise, a self-insured les-
sor, must assume responsibility for providing primary liability
coverage to unauthorized permittees,1 20 the Court of Appeals protects
innocent claimants like Ms. Witt.
Such protection is not only consistent with legislative intent, but
it is also fair. In any automobile accident, there exists the issue of who
should bear the financial burden. As the Enterprise court recognized,
there is a high probability that someone other than the lessee or the
additional driver(s) specifically listed in the rental agreement will
have to operate the rented vehicle.1 21 One can imagine a number of
other scenarios in which public policy would accept, if not encourage,
117. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. II § 18-102 (1992).
118. Act of June 1, 1943, ch. 1007, 1943 Md. Laws 1871 (repealed).
119. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. II § 18-102 (emphasis added).
120. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 543, 671 A.2d at 511.
121. Id. at 551, 671 A.2d at 514 (using the examples of valet parking attendants and
filling station personnel to demonstrate the likelihood that persons other than those au-
thorized in the rental agreement may operate the vehicle).
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a lessee's permission to allow someone who is not specifically author-
ized under the terms of the rental agreement to operate the vehicle.
For example, if a lessee were to feel tired or sick while driving, al-
lowing someone else to drive may prevent a dangerous situation. The
Court of Appeals of New York commented, "one could postulate many
factual situations in which the [lessee's] decision to allow another to
drive would be totally consistent with the exercise of due care and
would possibly even have diminished the chance of an accident."1 22
Yet often such permittees will not have the protection of their
own personal liability insurance coverage because, according to Mary-
land's compulsory insurance law, only those persons who own motor
vehicles are required to maintain the minimum security. 123 In such a
situation, a court has the option of placing that burden on either the
owner of the vehicle (or its insurance company) or the innocent vic-
tim. Clearly, it would be unjust to punish innocent victims like Ms.
Witt by denying them a source of insurance funds for their injuries.
Thus, the Enterprise court justly decided to extend the owner's re-
quired security under section 18-102(b) to persons driving the rental
vehicle with the permission of the lessee alone, notwithstanding a vio-
lation of the rental agreement.
b. Competing Interests.-In Enterprise, the court weighed vari-
ous competing interests before ultimately deciding that the interest of
the innocent victim should be paramount. Although the court ren-
dered the appropriate decision in this case, it also disregarded other
important interests in the process. For instance, this court did not
determine what rights, if any, the owner may have against the lessee
for the alleged violation of the rental agreement. Presumably, the
owner will have a cause of action against the lessee for breach of con-
tract. A lessee's breach of the contract terms may give the owner a
cause of action, and even a judgment, against the lessee. For most
people, however, judgments are only good to the extent that they are
collectible. A lessee is not required to maintain minimum insurance
coverage unless she personally owns a motor vehicle. As a result,
many lessees may be, in practical terms, judgment-proof. The lessor,
who may decide that it is not worth the time, money, and effort to sue
the lessee, may still be the one who ends up bearing the financial
122. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (App. Div. 1975) (re-
quiring the insurer of a lessor to insure and defend a business associate of the lessee who
was operating the rented vehicle with permission of the lessee, but in violation of the terms
of the rental agreement), modied on other grounds, 350 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 1976).
123. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (setting out Maryland's compulsory insur-
ance requirements under section 17-103 of the Transportation Article).
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burden. Thus, by extending primary liability coverage to persons who
operate rented vehicles in violation of rental agreements, the Enter-
prise decision may unjustly afford wrongdoers valuable benefits. The
lessee who breaches the rental agreement and the negligent driver
may walk away scott-free because they do not have personal insurance
coverage. Meanwhile, the lessor must ultimately bear the financial
burden simply because it has deeper pockets.
The decision to place the burden on the self-insured rental
agency to provide primary liability coverage to anyone operating the
rental car, without regard to whether the lessee violated the terms of
the rental agreement, may seem unfair to the lessor. If, as the court
held, the terms of the rental agreement have no effect on section 18-
102(b), the insurance company has no means to protect itself from
having to insure everyone. Judge McAuliffe raised this issue in his
dissenting opinion in Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 1 2 4 a
case in which the Court of Appeals required an insurance company to
provide coverage to its insured even though the insured applicant lied
on his application about his epileptic condition. 121 Judge McAuliffe
stated: "Prohibiting rescission is not fair, however, to the innocent
insurer who has been induced to enter into the contract of insurance
by fraud or material misrepresentation of an insured." 126
In the wake of Enterprise, self-insured rental car agencies will likely
raise their rental charges. Similarly, the insurance companies of
rental car agencies that are not self-insured will likely raise their pre-
miums, which in turn will cause the rental companies to shift the costs
to consumers in the form of higher car rental fees. At first glance, this
seems appropriate because the persons who initially caused the prob-
lem by allowing unauthorized drivers to operate rental vehicles will
bear the costs. Unfortunately, the Enterprise decision also detrimen-
tally affects renters who do comply with the terms of their rental
agreements.
In addition, the Enterprise decision may harm the individual's con-
stitutional right to contract.1 2 7 As the Van Horn court stated: "Com-
pulsory insurance statutory provisions, at the very least, would seem to
abrogate any contract right.11 2  In certain situations, requiring the
124. 334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195 (1994).
125. Id. at 679, 641 A.2d at 199-200.
126. Id. at 704, 641 A.2d at 212 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
127. The United States Constitution affords each individual the right to contract. The
Constitution states, in pertinent part: "No State shall ... pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
128. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 684-85, 841 A.2d at 202.
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lessor to provide minimum security on the rental vehicle regardless of
a breach in the terms of the rental agreement may effectively render
those terms meaningless. Following the decision in Enterprise, the fi-
nancial responsibility first falls on the lessor (or if applicable, the les-
sor's insurer). Then, the lessor may choose to seek redress by
bringing suit against the lessee for breach of contract. If it appears,
however, that the lessee may not have enough assets to cover a judg-
ment against her, the lessor will probably refrain from expending the
resources to sue the lessee. Without any negative consequences to the
lessee who breaches the contract, any provisions in the rental agree-
ment restricting the use of the rental vehicle becomes irrelevant.
5. Conclusion.-The decision in Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Allstate
Insurance Co. is significant because the court, for the first time, inter-
preted the interplay between sections 18-102(b) and 18-106 of Mary-
land's Transportation Article. Reconciling the two sections was a
difficult task. The court's decision to view section 18-102(b) in-
dependent from section 18-106, in effect, resulted in a requirement
that lessors of rental vehicles or, if not self-insured, their insurance
companies extend primary insurance coverage to all persons operat-
ing the vehicle with permission from the lessee-even if the lessee
gave such permission in violation of the terms of the rental agree-
ment. The court's decision is grounded in a sound interpretation of
the legislative history of Maryland's compulsory insurance law and up-
holds important public policy in this state intended to protect victims
of motor vehicle accidents.
KAY K. LEE
B. Negligent Misrepresentation Can Constitute an 'Accident" Under a
Liability Insurance Policy
In Sheets v. Brethren Mutual Insurance Co.,1 the Court of Appeals
held that an insurer had a duty to defend its insured against a tort suit
alleging negligent misrepresentation because the insurance policy po-
tentially covered the suit.2 In this case of first impression,3 the court
treated negligent misrepresentation as a form of negligence and con-
cluded that if a negligent act caused damage not expected or foreseen
1. 342 Md. 634, 679 A.2d 540 (1996).
2. Id. at 658, 679 A.2d at 551.
3. Id. at 654, 679 A.2d at 550 ("Whether negligent misrepresentation can constitute
an accident is a question that has not yet been decided in Maryland .... ").
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by the insured, then that negligent act constituted an "accident."4 Be-
cause the policy potentially covered negligent misrepresentation, the
court determined that the insurer had a duty to defend its insured in
a suit alleging, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation.5 In so ruling,
the court upheld Maryland's traditional distinction between fraud and
negligent misrepresentation.6
1. The Case.-In 1991, Robert and Joyce Sheets (the Sheetses)
sold their farm in Frederick County to Frits and Helene Christensen
(the Christensens).' Approximately three weeks after the Christen-
sens moved into the farmhouse, the septic system began to leak, and
its contents flowed onto the walkway.8 The Frederick County Health
Department condemned the septic system, forcing the Christensens to
purchase a new septic system at a cost in excess of twelve thousand
dollars.9 The Christensens filed suit against the Sheetses in the Cir-
cuit Court for Frederick County, alleging that the Sheetses had inten-
tionally and negligently misrepresented the condition of the septic
system before selling the farm to the Christensens.10 The Christen-
sens further alleged that the Sheetses knew or should have known that
the septic system would not support the Christensens' large family.1
Finally, the Christensens alleged that, but for the Sheetses' statement
that the septic system was in "good working condition," the Christen-
sens would not have bought the property. 2
When the Sheetses made the alleged misrepresentation, they pos-
sessed a farm owner's general liability policy issued by the Brethren
Mutual Insurance Company (Brethren)." The Sheetses therefore re-
4. Id. at 657, 679 A.2d at 551.
5. Id. at 658, 679 A.2d at 551.
6. Id. at 656, 679 A.2d at 550-51 ("[W]e have 'repeatedly refused to expand the tort
[of fraud] to encompass liability for negligent or grossly negligent representations.'" (al-
teration in original) (quoting Ellerin v. Fairfax Sav., F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 238-39, 652 A.2d
1117, 1128 (1995))).




11. Id. The Christensens had nine children. Id.
12. Joint Record Extract at E104-05, Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 342 Md. 634, 679
A.2d 540 (1996) (No. 47).
13. Sheets, 342 Md. at 638, 679 A.2d at 541-42. The policy provided, in pertinent part,
that Brethren would "pay those sums that the 'insured' becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' ... caused by an 'occurrence.'"
Joint Record Extract at E88, Sheets (No. 47). The policy defined property damage as:
a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that
property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the physical
injury that caused it; or
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quested that Brethren defend and indemnify them in the lawsuit
brought by the Christensens.14 Brethren refused the request, claim-
ing that the Sheetses' policy did not cover intentional or negligent
misrepresentation."5
The Sheetses then filed suit in the Circuit Court for Frederick
County and sought a declaratory judgment to compel Brethren to de-
fend and indemnify them in the tort suit. 6 Brethren filed a motion
for summary judgment, and the Sheetses responded by filing a cross-
motion for summaryjudgment. At the hearing on the motions, Breth-
ren argued that (1) negligent misrepresentation did not constitute an
occurrence or accident under the policy, (2) no causal connection
existed between the alleged misrepresentation and the damage to the
septic system, and (3) the Christensens suffered mere economic injury
and not property damage under the policy. 7 Judge Stepler granted
Brethren's motion and denied the Sheetses' motion.1 8 The Sheetses
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. 9 The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari on its own motion 2' before the appeal could be
heard by the Court of Special Appeals.21
2. Legal Background.-
a. When Negligent Acts Are Accidents. -Among the states,
there is a split of authority as to whether liability policies covering
accidents also cover acts of negligence.22 Some states have held that
the natural and probable consequences of the insured's negligence
are not covered under these policies,23 while other states have held
b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of
use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the 'occurrence' that caused it.
Id. at E93. The policy defined the term "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous
or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." Id. (emphasis
added). The policy did not define the term "accident."
14. Sheets, 342 Md. at 638, 679 A.2d at 541-42.
15. Id., 679 A.2d at 542.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 642, 679 A.2d at 544; see alsoJoint Record Extract at El0-11, Sheets (No. 47).
18. Sheets, 342 Md. at 642, 679 A.2d at 544; see alsoJoint Record Extract at E31-33, Sheets
(No. 47).
19. Sheets, 342 Md. at 638, 679 A.2d at 542.
20. Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 339 Md. 39, 660 A.2d 431 (1995).
21. Sheets, 342 Md. at 638, 679 A.2d at 542. The Christensens settled the suit against
the Sheetses while the case was still pending in the Court of Appeals. Id.
22. SeeJ.P. Ludington, Annotation, Liability Insurance: "Accident" or "Accidental" As In-
cluding Loss Resulting from Ordinary Negligence of Insured or His Agent, 7 A.L.R.3d 1264 (1966
& Supp. 1996).
23. See, e.g., City of Aurora v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 905, 906 (10th Cir.
1964) ("[A] loss which is the natural and probable consequence of a negligent act is not
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that damage or injury caused by the insured's negligence is covered,
so long as the damage or injury was not intentional.24
The jurisdictions which hold that the natural and probable conse-
quences of negligence cannot be an "accident" follow a "constructive
intent" theory of negligence. Specifically, this theory provides that
"everyone is constructively held to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his acts."2" Thus, only the unforeseeable conse-
quences of an insured's act of negligence can constitute an accident
under a liability policy.26 This is an objective test;27 these courts do
not ask whether the insured did, in fact, foresee or expect the damage
or injury, but only whether it was reasonably foreseeable. 21
There is a logical inconsistency with the natural and probable
consequences test in the liability insurance context.2 9 If the damage
was foreseeable, then the policy would not cover the damage because
'caused by accident,' within the meaning of policies of this kind."); Hutchinson Water Co.
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 250 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1957) ("[T]he natural
and probable consequences of the negligent act did not constitute an accident . . .");
Midland Constr. Co. v. United States Cas. Co., 214 F.2d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 1954) (defining
accident as an "unexpected, unusual, or unanticipated" event); Neale Constr. Co. v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 199 F.2d 591, 593 (10th Cir. 1952) ("'An "accident" is simply an
undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event....'" (quoting Gilliland v. Ash Grove Lime &
Portland Cement Co., 180 P. 793, 794 (Kan. 1919))).
24. See, e.g., Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 298 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1962)
(finding "unforeseen, unexpected and unintended" damage was "caused by accident");
Employers Ins. Co. v. Alabama Roofing & Siding Co., 124 So. 2d 261, 263 (Ala. 1960)
("[T]he term 'accident' did not necessarily exclude human fault called negligence."); At-
kins v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 151 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967)
("'The fact that the claims here involved ... negligence did not remove them from the
category of accident.'" (quoting Bundy Tubing Co., 298 F.2d at 153)); Rex Roofing Co. v.
Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 116 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (App. Div. 1952) ("[N]egligence would
be the predicate of any likely liability insured against ... [therefore the insured's act of
negligence is] an 'accident' in the common conception of that word.").
25. Hutchinson, 250 F.2d at 894.
26. See, e.g., id. (holding that property damage caused by water company's negligent
failure to provide adequate water pressure was not an accident because the damage was the
natural and probable consequence of the insured's negligence); City of Aurora, 326 F.2d at
906 (holding that damage caused by negligent operation of a sewage pump was not an
accident because the damage was the natural and probable consequence of the insured's
negligence); Midland, 214 F.2d at 667 (holding that damage caused by negligent roof con-
struction was not an accident because water leakage during an ordinary rainstorm was not
an unusual or unexpected consequence); Neale, 199 F.2d at 593 (holding that damage
caused by negligent wire spinning was not an accident because the damage was the "usual,
ordinary, and expected result of such negligent construction").
27. See City of Aurora, 326 F.2d at 907 (observing that if negligently caused damage is
"foreseeable by a prudent person," then it is not an accident).
28. See Neale, 199 F.2d at 593 ("When the means used and intended to be used produce
results which are their natural and probable consequences, there has been no accident
although such results may not have been intended or anticipated.").
29. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 250 F.2d at 894. The Tenth Circuit noted:
[VOL. 56:656
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
no accident took place."0 If the damage was an unforeseeable conse-
quence of the insured's negligence (an accident), then the insured
will most likely not be liable for the damage under traditional tort
principles."1 Thus, the insurance policy would only provide coverage
when the insured is not liable and, therefore, does not need the
coverage.s2
Taking an alternate approach, some jurisdictions have held that
an act of negligence is an accident under a liability insurance policy if
the insured did not actually intend the resulting damage.33 These
courts employ two rationales for this rule. First, if liability insurance
policies did not cover any results of negligence, then the policies
would provide no coverage.'M Second, the rule of "reasonable expec-
Apparently we did not contemplate whither this logic would lead us. For, if
the policy did not cover the loss because the natural and probable consequences
of the negligent act did not constitute an accident, then by that same logic, there
would be no liability where the damage was the unexpected, hence unforeseen
result of the negligent act. In the first instance, the damage would be foreseeable
and therefore not accidental; in the latter instance, the damage would not be
foreseeable and hence no liability upon the insured for his negligent acts. In




31. Id.; see also Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 334, 503 A.2d 1333,
1340 (1986) (observing that defendant is not liable for unforeseeable results of his
negligence).
32. Hutchinson, 250 F.2d at 894. Despite acknowledging this practical problem, the
Tenth Circuit continues to use a restrictive definition of accident in liability insurance
cases. In Albuquerque Gravel Products Co. v. American Employers Insurance Co., 282 F.2d 218
(10th Cir. 1960), the court stated:
We said in [Neae]-"the natural and ordinary consequences of a negligent act do
not constitute an accident." As we pointed out in [Hutchinson], if this rule were
followed to its logical conclusion in cases such as we have here, "the insurer would
be free of coverage and the policy would be rendered meaningless." We are satis-
fied that the rule of [Neale and Midland] was not intended to bring about this
unhappy result.... If the results are the normal consequences of a negligent act,
it is not accidental.
Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
33. See, e.g., Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 298 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1962)
(holding that because the damage was "unforeseen, unexpected and unintended... [the
damage] was therefore caused by accident").
34. See, e.g., id. ("If the liability policy were construed so as to cover only accidents not
involving.., negligence, then no protection would be given to the insured. The insured
would not need liability insurance which did not cover the only claims for which it could
be held liable."); Employers Ins. Co. v. Alabama Roofing & Siding Co., 124 So. 2d 261, 263
(Ala. 1960) ("'[N] egligence would be the predicate of any likely liability insured against.'"
(quoting Rex Roofing Co. v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 116 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (App. Div.
1952))); Atkins v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 151 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Mich. Ct. App.
1967) ("The insured would not need liability insurance which did not cover the only claims
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tations" provides that words and phrases in the policy will be inter-
preted as they would be understood by the average policyholder.3 5
The average policyholder expects that any unintentional acts, includ-
ing her own acts of negligence, will be covered under a liability
policy.3 6
Maryland courts have had several opportunities to determine
whether liability insurance policies cover negligent acts. In Haynes v.
American Casualty Co., 37 the Court of Appeals found that the unfore-
seen result of the insured's negligence was an accident under a liabil-
ity policy. 38 The court limited its analysis, however, to the particular
policy and incident at issue and recommended a case-by-case ap-
proach for future cases.39
In Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc.,4" the
Court of Appeals adopted the definition of accident from Webster's
Twentieth Century Dictionary, which defines the term as "'a happening;
an event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; an
event which proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect
for which it could be held liable." (quoting Bundy Tubing Co., 298 F.2d at 153)). See also
supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 607 F.2d 1052, 1056 (8th Cir.
1979) ("[A] contract of insurance should not be construed through the magnifying eye of
the technical lawyer but rather from the standpoint of what an ordinary man would believe
it to mean."); Rex Roofing Co., 116 N.Y.S.2d at 878 ("[I]n construing a contract of this kind
words should not be given a technical meaning but should be taken as they would be
understood by an average man."); Penley v. Gulf Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 305, 309 (Okla. 1966)
("[T]he words, 'accident' and 'accidental' have never acquired any technical meaning in
law, and when used in an insurance contract, they are to be construed and considered
according to common speech and common usage of people generally.").
36. See Rex Roofing Co., 116 N.Y.S.2d at 878 ("We have no doubt that the average man
would consider the occurrence in question as an 'accident' in the common conception of
that word."); Penley, 414 P.2d at 309-10 (holding that the unintended damage caused by the
defendant's negligence would be considered an accident).
37. 228 Md. 394, 179 A.2d 900 (1962).
38. Id. at 398-400, 179 A.2d at 903-04. The insured had instructed his work crew to cut
down trees on his employer's property. Id. at 395, 179 A.2d at 901. While the insured was
away from the work site, the crew "encroached on adjacent property and cut down 48
trees." Id. The insurer argued that the work crew intended to cut the trees, and, there-
fore, the resulting damage was not an accident. Id. at 396, 179 A.2d at 902. The court held
that limiting recovery "to those situations where not only the result was unintended, but
also where the means used were accidental, would place too narrow an interpretation
upon that phrase." Id. at 400, 179 A.2d at 904. However, the court carefully limited its
holding by noting- "We do not intend to descend into the 'Serbonian bog' mentioned by
Justice Cardozo by attempting a sweeping determination as to whether or not a valid dis-
tinction exists between 'accidental means' and 'accidental result' in all cases." Id. at 399-
400, 179 A.2d at 904 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 399, 179 A.2d at 904.
40. 248 Md. 148, 235 A.2d 556 (1967).
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of a known cause, and therefore not expected."'4 1 The Harleysville
court distinguished the facts of that case from those of Haynes and
held that the damage in Harleysville did not result from an accident
because the insured "should be charged with the responsibility of
foreseeing" the results of its actions.42 At first glance, it appears that
the court concluded that the reasonably foreseeable consequences of
an action could not constitute an accident. The court's next state-
ment, however-that the resulting damage was not the "'injury to
property . .. caused by accident"' covered by the policy-indicated
that the court has merely applied the case-by-case approach suggested
in Haynes.
43
In State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Treas,44 the Court of
Appeals again relied on the dictionary definition of accident and held
that "[u]nder the circumstances of this case the possibility of injury
... could not be said to be unforeseen, unusual, or unexpected."45
Because the court used "unforeseen" instead of "unforeseeable," the
Treas holding did not specify whether the resulting damage was un-
foreseeable or actually unforeseen by the insured. Thus, the court did
not clarify whether Maryland followed the subjective or objective
standard.
Thirteen years later, in Ed. Winkler & Son, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty
Insurance Co.,' the Court of Special Appeals adopted the view that
"'an accident . . . does not mean the natural and ordinary conse-
quence of a negligent act.'"4 7 The court stated that there was no
41. Id. at 151, 235 A.2d at 557 (quoting WEBSTER'S TWENTETH CENTURY DICTIoNARY
(1950)).
42. Id. at 154, 235 A.2d at 559. In Harleysville, the insured was a contractor hired to
"'clear, bum and smooth up'" a wooded area. Id. at 149, 235 A.2d at 556. The contrac-
tor's employee placed the cleared trees in piles 10 to 12 feet high, added fuel oil and
rubber tires to the piles, and set them on fire. Id. at 154, 235 A.2d at 559. The contractor
allowed the piles to burn for 36 hours. Id. The court held that the contractor "should be
charged with the responsibility of foreseeing that a pall of smoke and soot will result, which
may damage adjacent properties." Id.
43. Id. at 154, 235 A.2d at 559.
44. 254 Md. 615, 255 A.2d 296 (1969).
45. Id. at 620, 255 A.2d at 299.
46. 51 Md. App. 190, 441 A.2d 1129 (1982).
47. Id. at 194-95, 441 A.2d at 1132 (quoting 7AJOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw
AND PRACTICE § 4492, at 17 (Walter F. Berdal ed., 1979)). In Ed. Winkler, Ed. Winkler &
Son, Inc. claimed that its insurer had a duty to defend its insured in a suit alleging mali-
cious prosecution of a customer in the insured's jewelry store. Id. at 191, 441 A.2d at 1130.
Judge Wilner found that the insurer did not have a duty to defend because the insured's




longer a need "to consider the [insured's] subjective state of mind" as
to the foreseeability of the resulting damage. 8
In IA Construction Corp. v. T & T Surveying, Inc.," the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland relied on Ed. Winkler
in holding that the "'natural and ordinary consequences of a negli-
gent act"' were not accidents under Maryland law.5" In so ruling, the
District Court failed to cite earlier cases decided by the Maryland
Court of Appeals.5 '
b. Negligent Misrepresentation. -Most states classify negligent
misrepresentation as a form of negligence.52 In those states, courts
may follow the same rule for negligent misrepresentation that they
follow for negligence.5 3 However, a few states statutorily define negli-
gent misrepresentation as a type of fraud.5 4 In these states, negligent
48. Id. at 195, 441 A.2d at 1132.
49. 822 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Md. 1993).
50. Id. at 1215 (quoting Ed. Winkler, 254 Md. at 195, 255 A.2d at 1132 (quoting Ap-
PLEMAN, supra note 47, at 17)). In IA Construction, general contractor IA Construction
Corp. sued T & T Surveying, Inc. because T & T allegedly used erroneous data in its survey-
ing work. Id. at 1214. T & T filed a third-party complaint against its insurer, claiming that
any defective work was covered by its general liability policy. Id. Judge Motz dismissed the
third-party complaint, finding that T & T's surveying error was not an "accident." Id. at
1215.
51. See id. at 1214-15.
52. See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Youngblood, 549 So. 2d 76, 78-79 (Ala.
1989) ("'[A]ccident' does not exclude events that occur through negligence.... Actions
for innocent and reckless misrepresentation have been held to be covered under policy
provisions [covering accidents]." (citation omitted)); First Newton Nat'l Bank v. General
Cas. Co. of Wis., 426 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Iowa 1988) ("The very definition of 'negligent
misrepresentation' connotes negligent rather than intentional conduct.... ."); Florenzano
v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Minn. 1986) ("Fraud is distinguished from negligence by
the element of scienter required."); SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607
A.2d 1266, 1276 (N.J. 1992) ("[T]he insurer must defend an insured who is accused of
reckless, negligent, or innocent misrepresentations ... ."); Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882,
890 (Pa. 1994) ("[Nlegligent misrepresentation differs from intentional misrepresentation
.... "(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1965))); Green Spring Farms v.
Kersten, 401 N.W.2d 816, 822 (Wis. 1987) ("[A] claim for negligent misrepresentation...
is based upon a failure of the speaker to exercise reasonable care in making the
representation.").
53. See supra note 52.
54. See, for example, a provision in the California Civil Code stating:
Actual fraud.., consists in any of the following acts, committed by a party to the
contract, or with his connivance, with intent to deceive another party thereto, or
to induce him to enter into the contract:
2. The positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information
of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1572 (West 1997); see aLso MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-405 (1997); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-03-08 (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 58 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
[VOL. 56:656
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
misrepresentation is an intentional tort and cannot be an accident
under a liability policy.5 5 Still other states do not recognize any cause
of action for negligent misrepresentation.56
In Maryland, the common law provided no cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation 57 until 1938, when the Court of Appeals
first recognized the tort in Virginia Dare Stores, Inc. v. Schuman.58 At
first, Maryland courts limited the scope of recovery under the new tort
action. Until 1982, Maryland permitted recovery for negligent mis-
representation only if there existed "some business or personal rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and the defendant which cause [d] the
plaintiff to rely upon the defendant's statement, and which by its na-
ture, create[d] a duty on the part of the defendant to speak truth-
fully."59 In Delmarva Drilling Co. v. Tuckahoe Shopping Center,60 it
appeared as though the Court of Appeals may have even decided to
eliminate the cause of action altogether.61 However, in 1982, the
§ 53-4-5 (1996). These statutes are virtually identical and all were enacted between 1872
and 1910. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1572; MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-405; N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-
03-08; OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 58; S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 53-4-5.
Maryland does not define negligent misrepresentation as a form of fraud. See infra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 915 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
damage caused by negligent misrepresentation is "outside the scope of the policy"); All-
state Ins. Co. v. Miller, 743 F. Supp. 723, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that "the claim for
negligent misrepresentation is a claim for fraud controlled by the [statutory] damage pro-
vision regarding those actions"); Tschimperle v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 529 N.W.2d 421,
424 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that "[n]egligent misrepresentations cannot be 'acci-
dents' because the insured intends to induce reliance on the statement" (citing First Wyo.
Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1094 (Wyo. 1993))); First Wyo., 860 P.2d at 1100
(relying on California law to hold that "'negligent misrepresentation.., is a subspecies or
variety of fraud which is excluded from policy coverage'" (quoting Dykstra v. Foremost Ins.
Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543, 545 (Ct. App. 1993))).
56. See, e.g., Bentley v. Legent Corp., 849 F. Supp. 429, 434 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("Virginia
does not recognize any tort of negligent misrepresentation."), af'd, 50 F.3d 6 (4th Cir.
1995); South County, Inc. v. First W. Loan Co., 871 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Ark. 1994) ("We
decline to recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation."); Short v. Haywood Printing
Co., 667 N.E.2d 209, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ("Indiana does not recognize the tort of
negligent misrepresentation.").
57. See Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 333, 439 A.2d 534, 537 (1982)
("[I]nitially under the common law there existed no separate tort of negligent misrepre-
sentation."); see also Comment, Deceit and Negligent Misrepresentation in Maryland, 35 MD. L.
REv. 651 (1976) (tracing the history of the negligent misrepresentation tort in Maryland).
58. 175 Md. 287, 1 A.2d 897 (1938); see Comment, supra note 57, at 661.
59. Comment, supra note 57, at 668.
60. 268 Md. 417, 302 A.2d 37 (1973), overrued in part by Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Seney, 292 Md. 328, 439 A.2d 534 (1982).
61. Id. at 427, 302 A.2d at 42 ("Our predecessors held, in accordance with what contin-
ues to be the prevailing weight of authority, that there can be no recovery in an action for
deceit on the ground of negligent misrepresentation."). In Tuckahoe, the shopping center
sued Delmarva Drilling Co. for negligently misrepresenting that it could and would drill
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Court of Appeals reaffirmed the existence of the tort of negligent mis-
representation, in Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney,62 and extended its
scope to arm's length commercial transactions.
63
Several cases since Martens Chevrolet have relied on the existence
of negligent misrepresentation as a tort separate from fraud.' The
Court of Appeals recently distinguished the two torts in Ellerin v.
Fairfax Savings, F.S.B.65 Thus, Maryland courts recognized negligent
wells to produce usable water. Id. The court held that an action for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation must be based on representations of facts, not on statements which are "promis-
sory in nature." Id., 302 A.2d at 41-42. See Comment, supra note 57, at 671-73 (discussing
Tuckahoe's refusal to acknowledge the tort of negligent misrepresentation).
62. 292 Md. 328, 336, 439 A.2d 534, 539 (1982) ("[T]o the extent that Tuckahoe...
casts any doubts on the existence of negligent misrepresentation as an avenue for tort
recovery in Maryland, we hereby overrule it."). In Martens Chevrolet, the Martenses
purchased an automobile dealership from the defendants. Id. at 331, 439 A.2d at 536. The
defendants neglected to inform the Martenses of a financial statement and an audit that
showed heavy losses prior to the sale. Id. at 332, 439 A.2d at 537. The Martenses filed suit
against the defendants, alleging negligent misrepresentation. Id.
63. See Susan F. Martielli, Martens Chevrolet v. Seney-Extending the Tort of Negligent
Misrepresentation, 42 MD. L. REv. 596, 604-09 (1983) (arguing that the Martens Chevrolet
court should not have extended the tort of negligent misrepresentation to cases other than
those involving "the sale of information itself, or to relationships which impose a duty to
use care in supplying information"). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 311, 552
(1965) (stating that in arm's length transactions, recovery is more restricted when damage
is limited to "pecuniary loss" than when damage includes "physical harm").
The Martens Chevrolet court enumerated the elements of the negligent misrepresenta-
tion tort as:
(1) the defendant, owing a duty of care to the plaintiff, negligently asserts a false
statement;
(2) the defendant intends that his statement will be acted upon by the plaintiff;
(3) the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on the state-
ment, which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury;
(4) the plaintiff, justifiably, takes action in reliance on the statement; and
(5) the plaintiff suffers damage proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence.
Martens Chevrolet, 292 Md. at 337, 439 A.2d at 539.
64. See, e.g., Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 259-60, 630 A.2d 1156, 1162 (1993)
("Fraud and negligent misrepresentation share common elements. There is a critical dif-
ference between the two torts, however." (citations omitted)); Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v.
United States Gypsum Co., 315 Md. 741, 756, 556 A.2d 1126, 1133 (1989) ("[L]iability for
negligent misrepresentation is more restricted than that for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion."); Weisman v. Connors, 312 Md. 428, 450, 540 A.2d 783, 794 (1988) (following Mar-
tens Chevrolet to hold that parties in an arm's length transaction may be liable for negligent
misrepresentation).
65. 337 Md. 216, 238-39, 652 A.2d 1117, 1128 (1995) ("This Court has repeatedly re-
fused to expand the tort [of fraud] to encompass liability for negligent or grossly negligent
representations."). See Mark W. Carmean, Toughening the Standard for Recovering Punitive
Damages, 55 MD. L. REv. 789, 789 (1996) (criticizing the Ellerin court for "[extending] the
standard for awarding punitive damages in non-intentional tort cases to an intentional tort
case").
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misrepresentation as a tort requiring less intent than fraud, 66 but had
not made clear exactly how much less.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Sheets, the Court of Appeals held
that an insurer had a duty to defend its insured against a tort suit
alleging negligent misrepresentation.6 7 Under Maryland law, an in-
surer is obligated to defend its insured in a tort suit if the plaintiffs
"allege a claim against an insured that is potentially covered by the insur-
ance policy."68 The Court of Appeals considered the following two
factors to determine whether the claim was potentially covered: (1)
what coverage and defenses the terms and requirements of the insur-
ance policy provide; and (2) whether the plaintiff's tort allegations
potentially brought the claim within the policy's coverage.69
Using this formula, the court determined that Brethren's policy
covered "property damage caused by an occurrence."7" Accordingly,
Brethren would only have a duty to defend if the Christensens' com-
plaint alleged three independent elements: "(1) that there was 'prop-
erty damage' as defined in the policy; (2) that the property damage
was 'caused' by the negligent misrepresentation; and (3) that negli-
gent misrepresentation is an 'occurrence' as that term is defined by
the policy."71
With respect to the first element, the court determined that the
alleged damages to the septic system did constitute property damage
under the policy. 72 Although the policy did not cover mere "eco-
nomic loss," the court found that the Christensens also alleged a loss
of the use of the septic system.73 As the court noted, "[1] oss of use of
tangible property that is not physically injured" is included in the pol-
66. See Gross, 332 Md. at 260, 630 A-2d at 1162. The court observed that fraud requires
"intent to deceive the other party," but negligent misrepresentation "only requires conduct
which falls below the standard of care which the maker of the statement owes to the person
to whom it is made." Id.
67. Sheets, 342 Md. at 658, 679 A.2d at 551.
68. Id. at 639, 679 A.2d at 542.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 641, 679 A.2d at 543.
71. Id. (foomote omitted). The court concluded that negligent misrepresentation was
the only occurrence that was potentially covered by the Brethren policy because "[a]ny
other potential causes of the septic system's failure happened after the transfer of title in
the property and are thus not covered by the Brethren policy." Id. at 641 n.3, 679 A.2d at
543 n.3.




icy's definition of property damage.7 4 Therefore, the complaint al-
leged property damage potentially covered under the policy.75
With respect to the second element, the court examined the
"causal nexus" between the negligent misrepresentation and the prop-
erty damage. 71 In a duty-to-defend case, courts apply the standard
that the "underlying tort suit need only allege action that is potentially
covered by the policy. ' 77 Following that standard, the court found that
the Christensens properly alleged that the Sheetses' breach of duty
caused the Christensens' injury.78 The court held that once a proper
allegation has been made the insurer has a duty to defend, "no matter
how attenuated, frivolous, or illogical that allegation may be."79 If
Brethren believed that no causal nexus between the negligent misrep-
resentation and the damage to the septic tank in fact existed, then
Brethren should have filed a motion to dismiss against the Christen-
sens on the ground of lack of causal nexus.8"
As to the third element, the court examined whether negligent
misrepresentation constituted an "occurrence" under the policy.81
Because the policy defined occurrence as "an accident," the court
posed the question as "whether the Sheetses' alleged negligent mis-
representation concerning the working condition of the septic system
was an 'accident.' 8 2 The court proceeded first, however, from a
much broader inquiry-whether negligence, in general, can consti-
tute an accident.
The court first discussed the split of authority in other jurisdic-
tions over the issue of whether "any form of negligence can be consid-
ered an accident under a liability insurance policy." 5 The minority
view, exemplified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, holds that liability insurance policies "do not cover damages
74. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 643-45, 679 A.2d at 544-45.
77. Id. at 643, 679 A.2d at 544.
78. Id. at 643-44, 679 A.2d at 544.
79. Id. at 643, 679 A.2d at 544.
80. Id. The court reasoned that because the insurer "'promised to relieve the insured
of the burden of satisfying the tribunal where the suit is tried, that the claim as pleaded is
"groundless,"'" it is the insurer's duty, and not the insured's, to provide a defense. Id. at
645, 679 A.2d at 545 (quoting Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 408, 347
A.2d 842, 850 (1975) (quoting Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750, 751-52 (2d Cir.
1949))).
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which are the natural and probable consequences of negligent acts."84
The Sheets court, however, noted that the Tenth Circuit expressed hes-
itation about this restrictive definition of the term "accident."85
An alternative line of authority rejects the restrictive interpreta-
tion of accident and, instead, holds that acts of negligence may be
covered under such policies, so long as the damage is not inten-
tional.86 This line of authority recognized that if insurance companies
could deny coverage for all acts of negligence, then the liability policy
would be useless to the insured.8 7
Having examined these two lines of authority, the Court of Ap-
peals next looked to Maryland law.88 Reviewing the reasoning behind
Haynes v. American Casualty Co.,89 the Court of Appeals noted that
Haynes had relied on cases which held that unintended damage could
be "caused by accident."90 The court noted, however, that Maryland's
more recent cases "are somewhat ambiguous as to the standard used
to determine whether the negligent act constituted an 'accident.'
91
Specifically, the Sheets court could not determine whether previous
cases had considered "whether the damage caused by the negligence
should have been foreseen or expected by the insured" or "whether the
damage was actually expected or intended by the insured." 92
In the final analysis, the Court of Appeals rejected the construc-
tive intent theory of negligence espoused by the Tenth Circuit and
chose instead to follow those courts that apply a less restrictive inter-
pretation of the term "accident."" The court reasoned that the con-
structive intent theory of negligence conflicted with the "reasonable
expectations of the average purchaser of general liability insurance."94
Moreover, the court thought that adopting an objective standard-
84. Id. at 647, 679 A.2d at 546 (citing City of Aurora v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 326
F.2d 905, 906 (10th Cir. 1964)); see supra note 23.
85. Sheets, 342 Md. at 648, 679 A.2d at 546-47 (citing Hutchinson Water Co. v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 250 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1957)); see supra note 26.
86. See Sheets, 342 Md. at 649-50, 679 A.2d at 547 (citing Bundy Tubing Co. v. Royal
Indem. Co., 298 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1962); Employers Ins. Co. v. Alabama Roofing &
Siding Co., 124 So. 2d 261, 262 (Ala. 1960); Atkins v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 151
N.W.2d 846, 848 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967); Rex Roofing Co. v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 116
N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (App. Div. 1952); Penley v. Gulf Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 305, 309-10 (Okla.
1966); Boggs v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 252 S.E.2d 565, 567 (S.C. 1979)).
87. See id. at 649, 679 A.2d at 547.
88. See id. at 650, 679 A.2d at 547-48.
89. 228 Md. 394, 179 A.2d 900 (1962).
90. Sheets, 342 Md. at 650, 679 A.2d at 548.
91. Id. at 651, 679 A.2d at 548.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 647-53, 679 A.2d at 546-49.
94. Id. at 652, 679 A.2d at 549.
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excluding coverage for damage the insured should have foreseen or
expected-would render liability insurance policies "all but meaning-
less."95 The court agreed with the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit:
"Under [the insurer's] construction of the policy language if
the damage was foreseeable then the insured is liable, but
there is no coverage, and if the damage is not foreseeable,
there is coverage, but the insured is not liable. This is not
the law. The function of an insurance company is more than
that of a premium receiver."96
Therefore, the court chose a new standard: "[A]n act of negligence
constitutes an 'accident' under a liability insurance policy when the
resulting damage was 'an event that takes place without [the in-
sured's] foresight or expectation."'97
The court then considered the narrower inquiry of whether an
act of negligent misrepresentation could constitute an accident under
the liability insurance policy.98 The court noted that courts in other
jurisdictions have also split on this issue,99 with some courts holding
that insurers have a duty to defend in cases that allege negligent mis-
representation. 00 These courts rely on the proposition that negligent
misrepresentation constitutes a form of negligence and thus is not
intentional.10 1
Other courts have held, however, that negligent misrepresenta-
tion cannot constitute an accident. The Court of Appeals cited to the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Safeco Insurance Co. v. Andrews1"' as the "leading case" holding that
95. Id. at 653, 679 A.2d at 549.
96. Id. at 653-54, 679 A.2d at 549 (quoting City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
604 F.2d 1052, 1058 (8th Cir. 1979)).
97. Id. at 652, 679 A.2d at 548 (quoting Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harris & Brooks,
Inc., 248 Md. 148, 154, 235 A.2d 556, 559 (1967)). In so doing, the court "disapproved"
Ed. Winkler & Son, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 51 Md. App. 190, 441 A.2d 1129
(1982), in which the Court of Special Appeals followed the Tenth Circuit's rule that an
accident is not "'the natural and ordinary consequences of a negligent act.'" Sheets, 342
Md. at 654, 679 A.2d at 549-50 (quoting Ed. Winkler, 51 Md. App. at 195, 441 A-2d at 1132).
The Court of Appeals also noted that one case in the United States District Court had
relied on Ed. Winkler for this point of law. Id. at 654 n.4, 679 A.2d at 550 n.4 (citing IA
Constr. Corp. v. T & T Surveying, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1213, 1215 (D. Md. 1993)).
98. Sheets, 342 Md. at 654, 679 A.2d at 550.
99. Id. at 654-55, 679 A.2d at 550.
100. See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Youngblood, 549 So. 2d 76, 78-79 (Ala.
1989); First Newton Nat'l Bank v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 426 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Iowa
1988); SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1276 (NJ. 1992). For
a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
102. 915 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying California law).
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negligent misrepresentation is not an accident. °3 The Maryland
Court of Appeals criticized the Safeco court, however, for "not ex-
plain [ing] its reasoning or cit[ing] any authority" for its conclusion.1 0 4
Cases following Safeco hold that because negligent misrepresentation
more closely resembles fraud than ordinary negligence, negligent mis-
representation cannot be considered an "accidental, unintended oc-
currence."' 0 The Court of Appeals observed that this rationale might
not apply in Maryland because Maryland courts have "'repeatedly re-
fused to expand the tort [of fraud] to encompass liability for negli-
gent or grossly negligent representations.""10
6
Alternatively, some jurisdictions which hold that negligent mis-
representation is not an accident follow the "insured's intent to in-
duce reliance on the false statement" rationale." 7 Maryland's criteria
for negligent misrepresentation also include the intent to induce reli-
ance.'0 8 The Court of Appeals emphasized, however, that "the falsity
in the statement and the resulting injury or damage may be acciden-
tal."'0 9 Therefore, the Sheets court chose to treat negligent misrepre-
sentation like other forms of negligence.1'0 Thus, the "ultimate
inquiry" is "whether the resulting damage is 'an event that takes place
without one's foresight or expectation."""
Applying these standards to the facts in Sheets, the court found
that, according to the allegations of the Christensens' complaint, "it is
possible that the Sheetses did not foresee or expect the damage result-
ing from their alleged negligent or careless assertion that the septic
system worked properly."" 2 Therefore, because the damage may have
taken place without the Sheetses' foresight or expectation, the court
found that the damage "fits within our definition of accident.""' Fur-
103. Sheets, 342 Md. at 655, 679 A.2d at 550.
104. Id. at 656, 679 A.2d at 550.
105. Id. (citing American States Ins. Co. v. Canyon Creek, 786 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D.
Cal. 1991)).
106. Id., 679 A.2d at 550-51 (alteration in original) (quoting Ellerin v. Fairfax Sav.,
F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 238-39, 652 A.2d 1117, 1128 (1995)).
107. Id., 679 A.2d at 551 (citing Tschimperle v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 529 N.W.2d 421,
424 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)); see also First Wyo. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co. 860 P.2d 1094,
1100 (Wyo. 1993) ("'[N] egligent misrepresentation requires intent to induce reliance.'"
(quoting Dykstra v. Foremost Ins. Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543, 545 (CL App. 1993))).
108. Sheets, 342 Md. at 657, 679 A.2d at 551; see also supra note 63 and accompanying
text.
109. Sheets, 342 Md. at 657, 679 A-2d at 551.
110. See id.
111. Id. (quoting Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harris & Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 154,
234 A.2d 556, 559 (1967)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 658, 679 A.2d at 551.
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thermore, the court noted that "any doubt as to whether the allega-
tions in the complaint state a potentially covered cause of action is
ordinarily resolved in favor of the insured." '114 Thus, with all three
elements of the test satisfied, the court held that Brethren had a duty
to defend the Sheetses.115
Judge Karwacki, joined by Judge Murphy, dissented from the
court's opinion in Sheets." 6 The dissent argued that negligent misrep-
resentation could not constitute an "occurrence."' 17 Examining the
elements of negligent misrepresentation, Judge Karwacki reasoned
that "[n]egligent misrepresentation clearly has elements sounding
both in intentional tort and in negligence."1 8 Judge Karwacki ob-
served that the defendant must have "asserted" a false statement to be
liable for negligent misrepresentation and that such an assertion "re-
quires a degree of intentionality inconsistent with the term acci-
dent." '119 Similarly, Judge Karwacki pointed out that the second
element of negligent misrepresentation requires that the defendant
"intend" the plaintiffs reliance on his false statement. 120 Therefore,
Judge Karwacki concluded, "the limited intentionality necessary for
negligent misrepresentation is of a sufficient quality to not qualify as
an accident."12 1
The dissent further bolstered its conclusion by relying on the
"reasonable expectations of the insured" rule of insurance contract
construction.1 22 Judge Karwacki concluded that "an ordinary layper-
son" would not "consider a negligent misrepresentation to be an
accident."12 1
4. Analysis.--In Sheets v. Brethren Mutual Insurance Co., the Court
of Appeals made an appropriate decision regarding an insurer's duty
to defend its insured in a suit alleging negligent misrepresentation.
By following the approach taken by a majority of jurisdictions, the
Court of Appeals based its decision on basic rules of insurance con-
114. Id.
115. Id., 679 A.2d at 551-52. Therefore, the court held that the trial judge "erred in
granting summary judgment to Brethren and instead should have granted the Sheetses'
cross-motion for summaryjudgment with respect to the duty to defend." Id.
116. Id. at 658-62, 679 A.2d at 552-54 (KarwackiJ., dissenting).
117. See id. at 659, 679 A.2d at 552.
118. Id. at 659-60, 679 A.2d at 552.
119. Id., 679 A.2d at 552-53.
120. Id. at 660-61, 679 A.2d at 553. See supra note 63 for the elements of negligent
misrepresentation.
121. Sheets, 342 Md. at 661-62, 679 A.2d at 553 (KarwackiJ., dissenting).
122. Id. at 662, 679 A.2d at 553.
123. Id.
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tract construction, common sense concerns, and Maryland's tradi-
tional treatment of the tort of negligent misrepresentation. Although
the majority's opinion sufficiently supports its conclusions, additional
arguments and a call for judicial restraint might have allayed the fears
of the dissenting judges.
a. Basic Rules of Insurance Construction. -In reaching its con-
clusion, the Court of Appeals referred to two general rules of insur-
ance contract construction. First, every insurance contract should be
construed according to the reasonable expectations of the average in-
sured.' 24 Second, when in doubt, insurance contracts should be con-
strued against the insurance company and in favor of coverage for the
insured. 12
5
Applying the first rule, both the majority and the dissent applied
the "reasonable expectations" rule, but reached opposite conclusions.
To determine what an average layperson's reasonable understanding
of the term "accident" would be, the majority looked to the word's
definition in Webster's Dictionary. 2 6 In dissent, however, Judge Kar-
wacki asked whether "an ordinary layperson would consider a negli-
gent misrepresentation to be an accident," and responded: "For me,
that answer is clearly no.' 2 7 Unfortunately, Judge Karwacki failed to
explain his answer, beyond suggesting the "common sense under-
standing that a voluntary verbal statement cannot, by definition, con-
stitute an accident, as that term is intended by the policy.' 28
Curiously, though, in searching for the "reasonable expectations" of
the "ordinary layperson," Judge Karwacki used the definition of "as-
sert" from Black's Law Dictionary29 and the definition of "accident"
from a legal reference text on insurance. 130 In contrast, the majority
124. Sheets, 342 Md. at 640, 679 A.2d at 543 ("'A word's ordinary signification is tested by
what meaning a reasonably prudent layperson would attach to the term.'" (quoting Sullins
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 Md. 503, 508, 667 A.2d 617, 619 (1995))).
125. Id. at 658, 679 A.2d at 551 ("[A]ny doubt as to whether the allegations in the com-
plaint state a potentially covered cause of action is ordinarily resolved in favor of the in-
sured." (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cochran, 337 Md. 98, 107, 651 A.2d 859, 863-64
(1995))).
126. Id. at 657, 679 A.2d at 551. "Accident" is defined as "'"an event that takes place
without one's foresight or knowledge."'" Id. (quoting Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Harris &
Brooks, Inc., 248 Md. 148, 154, 235 A.2d 556, 559 (1967) (quoting WEBSTER'S TWENTIETH
CENTURY DIcIoNARY (1950))).
127. Id. at 662, 679 A.2d at 553 (Karwacki, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 660, 679 A.2d at 553.
129. Id., 679 A.2d at 552 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 116 (6th ed. 1990)).
130. Id. (citing Ed. Winkler & Son v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 51 Md. App. 190, 195, 441 A.2d
1129, 1132 (1982) (citing 7AJOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE AW AND PRACrICE § 4492,
at 17 (Walter F. Berdal ed., 1979))).
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relied on Webster's Dictionary, an everyday reference tool.' The dis-
sent's reasoning more likely reflects the reasonable expectations of
the average attorney purchasing insurance. The majority's approach,
however, serves as a good indicator of the expectations of the average
layperson who purchases insurance.
The second rule-that, when in doubt, courts should construe
insurance contracts against the insurance company-takes on great
importance in a duty-to-defend case, perhaps more than in other con-
texts. Understandably, an insurance company will want to hesitate
before defending a case that is entirely against its own interest or
presents a conflict of interest.'3 2 Sheets is not such a case, however. In
Sheets, Brethren and the Sheetses shared identical interests: both
wished to have the underlying tort suit dismissed for failure to state a
claim.' The Court of Appeals correctly admonished Brethren that it
is better to file for summary judgment against the plaintiffs in the un-
derlying tort action than to attack the insured in court.'3 4 Decisions
that encourage insurance companies to resist their duty to defend will
only lead to an increase in litigation. In Maryland, the duty to defend
has traditionally been broader than the duty to indemnify.' 5 There-
fore, insurers must defend some cases that they would not expect to
indemnify. Sheets provides adequate guidance to insurance companies
as to the meaning of the phrase "potentially covered" in the duty-to-
defend context. If a complaint in a tort suit alleges that a negligent
misrepresentation caused property damage, then there is a duty to
defend.
b. Logical and Practical Concerns.-The court properly rejected
the Tenth Circuit's holding that only the unforeseeable results of neg-
ligent acts may constitute accidents under liability insurance poli-
131. Sheets, 342 Md. at 657, 679 A.2d at 551 (citing WEBSTER'S TWENTIETH CENTURY Dic-
TIONARY (1950)).
132. See Deborah M. Neyens, Comment, Expanding the Insurer's Duty to Defend in Iowa:
First Newton National Bank v. General Casualty Company of Wisconsin, 74 IowA L. REv.
969, 978-85 (1989) (arguing that insurance companies should only be required to bear the
defense costs of covered claims).
133. See Appellee's Brief at 6-10, Sheets (No. 47). Brethren argued that no causal link
existed between the alleged occurrence and the alleged property damage, and, therefore,
the policy could not possibly cover the Christensens' allegations. Id.
134. Sheets, 342 Md. at 644, 679 A.2d at 545.
135. See Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 408-09, 347 A.2d 842, 850
(1975) ('[T]he insurer will defend any suit stating a claim within the policy, even though
'the claim asserted against the insured cannot possibly succeed because either in law or in
fact there is no basis for a plaintiff's judgment.'" (quoting Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 267
A.2d 7, 10 (NJ. 1970))).
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cies.136 The Tenth Circuit's own reservations about the faulty logic of
its rule should warn other courts not to follow this precedent. 13 7 Be-
cause Maryland had not followed any variation of the Tenth Circuit's
natural and probable consequences rule, the court enjoyed the free-
dom to consider the illogical consequences of adopting such a rule.1 38
The logical inconsistency inherent in the Tenth Circuit's view is
that the insured would only be covered under circumstances in which
it would not be liable. Applying the "reasonable expectations" doc-
trine to this paradox, one must conclude that the average purchaser
of insurance would expect some coverage as opposed to no coverage
at all. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the Tenth
Circuit's rule. 3 9
c. Negligent Misrepresentation in Maryland: Responding to Legis-
lative Silence. -The court sharply criticized the Ninth Circuit's holding
in Safeco Insurance Co. v. Andrews,1" which held that negligent misrep-
resentation cannot be an accident for the purposes of a liability pol-
icy. 4 Indeed, the Safeco opinion is both brief and lacking copious
citation to authority.1 4 The Safeco court did, however, cite to Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Miller,4' whose facts paralleled those of Safeco.1" The
136. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
137. See Hutchinson Water Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 250 F.2d 892, 894
(10th Cir. 1957) ("Apparently we did not contemplate whither this logic would lead us.");
see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
138. In his dissent,Judge Karwacki implied that the precedent of Ed. Winkler & Son, Inc.
v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 51 Md. App. 190, 195, 441 A.2d 1129, 1132 (1982), bound
Maryland courts, for he cited no other Maryland case on the issue of whether a negligent
act may constitute an accident. See Sheets, 342 Md. at 661, 679 A.2d at 553 (Karwacki, J.,
dissenting). When the Court of Special Appeals decided Ed. Winkler, it cited only one
Court of Appeals decision-Har/es/ille Mutual Casualty Co. v. Harris &Brooks, Inc., 248 Md.
148, 151, 235 A.2d 556 (1967)-in defining "accident" in the context of liability insurance.
SeeEd. Winkler, 51 Md. App. at 194, 441 A.2d at 1132. However, instead of using the defini-
tion articulated in Harleysville, the Court of Special Appeals adopted a new rule formulated
from a textbook byJohn Appleman-Insurance Law and Practice. Id. at 194-95, 441 A.2d at
1132 (citing 7AJOHN AAN APPL'MAN, INSURANCE LAw ANn P.ACTICE § 4492, at 17 (Walter
F. Berdal ed., 1979)). This new rule was not, however, consistent with Maryland law. See
Sheets, 342 Md. at 654, 679 A.2d at 549 ("For the reasons we have explained.... we decline
to adopt this restrictive interpretation of the term accident.").
139. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
140. "The [Safeco] court.., did not explain its reasoning or cite any authority for [its]
... proposition." Sheets, 342 Md. at 656, 679 A.2d at 550 (criticizing Safeco Ins. Co. v.
Andrews, 915 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1990)).
141. Safeco, 915 F.2d at 502.
142. See id. at 501-02. The entire opinion is less than two pages.
143. 743 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
144. Both cases involved an insurer's duty to defend cases that allege damage caused by
negligent misrepresentations made by the respective insureds in the course of selling real
property. See Safeco, 915 F.2d at 501; Miller, 743 F. Supp. at 724.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Miller court provided detailed reasoning and citations to buttress its
conclusion that, under California law, a liability policy covering acci-
dents does not cover the tort of negligent misrepresentation.145 The
California Civil Code provides that negligent misrepresentation is a
form of fraud14 and provides an exclusive remedy for one who is de-
frauded in the purchase of real estate.1 47 Therefore, as the Miller
court averred, a negligent misrepresentation made in the course of a
sale of real estate could not possibly be covered by a liability insurance
policy. 148
The facts of both Safeco and Millerare strikingly similar to those of
Sheets. However, California law is immediately distinguishable from
Maryland law because the Maryland legislature has not yet spoken on
the definition of negligent misrepresentation. Until the Maryland leg-
islature announces that negligent misrepresentation is a form of
fraud, there is no reason for Maryland courts to follow the California
court's rationale.'
49
5. Conclusion.-In Sheets v. Brethren Mutual Insurance Co., the
Court of Appeals correctly held that an insurer has a duty to defend its
insured in a suit alleging negligent misrepresentation. The court
could have more clearly distinguished Maryland's law of negligent
misrepresentation from California law. Nevertheless, the opinion suf-
ficiently supports its conclusions and is in harmony with Maryland's
rules of insurance contract construction. It also prudently addresses
important logical and practical concerns. Moreover, the court prop-
erly exercised judicial restraint in the absence of legislative action on
this issue. Sheets provides purchasers of home owner's liability insur-
ance with the protection they reasonably expect, and it guarantees
that insurers will be more than premium receivers.
JENNIFER ROHR
145. See Miller, 743 F. Supp. at 726-27.
146. See supra note 54.
147. Section 3343 of the California Civil Code states in pertinent part:
One defrauded in the purchase, sale or exchange of property is entitled to re-
cover the difference between the actual value of that with which the defrauded
person parted and the actual value of that which he received, together with any
additional damage arising from the particular transaction ....
CAL. Crv. CODE § 3343 (West 1997).
148. See Miller, 743 F. Supp. at 726-27.
149. It is telling that Judge Karwacki did not cite Safeco or its progeny in arguing that
negligent misrepresentation has "intentionality" sufficient to distinguish it from an acci-
dent. See Sheets, 342 Md. at 659-62, 679 A.2d at 552-53 (Karwacki, J., dissenting).
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VIII. PROCEDURE
A. Repressed Memory and the Discovery Rule
Memory repression has been described as "a protective device
used by the brain to fend off the emotional ravages of experiences
that are simply too overwhelming to be borne by the conscious
mind."1 Arguments that a plaintiff's repressed memory of childhood
sexual abuse should toll the statute of limitations in a suit against her
alleged abuser have become increasingly prevalent since claims of re-
pressed memory first entered the civil courts in 1986.2
In Doe v. Maskell,3 two plaintiffs asked the Court of Appeals to
hold that their repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse could
trigger the application of Maryland's discovery rule4 and toll the stat-
ute of limitations.5 The court considered the scientific arguments for
and against the existence of repressed memories under its strict stan-
dard for assessing scientific evidence.6 In a unanimous decision, the
1. DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY- THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND THE PAST
255 (1996).
2. Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986) (en banc), was the first such case. See
infra note 57 and accompanying text. Numerous recent books, law review articles, and
television broadcasts have addressed the subject of repressed memory and childhood sex-
ual abuse. See generally RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN WATrERS, MAKING MONSTERS: FALSE MEM-
OPsES, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SEXUAL HYSTERIA (1994); MARK PENDERGRAST, VICTIMS OF
MEMORY. INCEST ACCUSATIONS AND SHATTERED LIvES (1995); SCHACTER, supra note 1; RE-
PRESSION AND DISSOCIATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONALITY THEORY, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY,
AND HEALTH (Jerome L. Singer ed., 1990) [hereinafter REPRESSION AND DISSOCIATION];
Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution About
Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84J. CruM. L & CRIMINOLOGY
129 (1993); Susan J. Hall, Adult Repression of Childhood Sexual Assault: From Psychology to the
Media and into the Courtroom, 22 N.C. CENT. L.J. 31 (1996); Sheila Taub, The Legal Treatment
of Recovered Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 17J. LEGAL MED. 183 (1996); Christina Bannon,
Comment, Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Should the Courts Get Involved When
Mental Health Professionals Disagree? 26 Auz. ST. LJ. 835 (1994); Gregory G. Gordon, Com-
ment, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and the Statute of Limitations: The Need for
Consistent Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 20 PEPP. L Rxv. 1359 (1993); Julie
Schwartz Silberg, Comment, Memory Repression: Should It Toll the Statutory Limitations Period
in Child Sexual Abuse Cases? 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1589 (1993); Frontline: Divided Memories (PBS
television broadcast, Apr. 4, 1995); MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour (PBS television broadcast, Feb.
2, 1995).
3. 342 Md. 684, 679 A-2d 1087 (1996), cert. denied sub nom. Roe v. Maskell, 117 S. CL
770 (1997).
4. The discovery rule states that "the statute [of limitations] must be construed as not
intended to start to run until the plaintiff has in fact discovered the fact that he has suf-
fered injury or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. e (1979). For a discussion of the development of the
discovery rule in Maryland, see infra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
5. Maskell, 342 Md. at 686, 679 A.2d at 1088.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 74-78.
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court refused to apply the discovery rule to cases in which plaintiffs
claim to have recovered repressed memories. 7
Based on the court's adherence to its own standard for evaluating
scientific evidence, its decision not to apply the discovery rule in Mas-
kell was logical and correct. The court's decision strictly enforces the
requirement that a plaintiff must verifiably lack actual knowledge of
an alleged injury to trigger the discovery rule. The court's reasoning
also indicates its determination not to base decisions on scientific the-
ories that do not enjoy clear support in the scientific community.
Nevertheless, under the court's decision, a plaintiff who claims to have
recovered repressed memories of abuse is left without a civil remedy
in Maryland. Such plaintiffs must now look to the legislature for a
civil remedy against their alleged abusers.
1. The Case.-Plaintiffs Jane Doe and Jane Roe attended Seton
Keough High School in Baltimore City, where Father A. Joseph Mas-
kell served as school chaplain and counselor for both girls.' Both girls
alleged in their complaints that Father Maskell repeatedly abused
them by subjecting them to "vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse,
cunnilingus, fellatio, vaginal penetration with a vibrator, administra-
tion of enemas, . . .hypnosis, threats of physical violence, coerced
prostitution and other lewd acts."9 They also alleged that Father Mas-
kell physically struck them, forced them to "perform sexual acts with a
police officer," and threatened to punish them if they revealed the
abuse."0 The abuse allegedly continued until the plaintiffs graduated
from Keough in 1971 and 1972.11
Although the record does not clearly indicate when the plaintiffs
"ceased to recall the attacks,"' 2 the plaintiffs alleged that they began
to recover their memories of the mistreatment in 1992.1" On August
24, 1994, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
against Father Maskell, the School Sisters of Notre Dame, Seton
Keough High School, the Archdiocese of Baltimore, and Archbishop
7. Maskell 342 Md. at 695, 679 A.2d at 1092.
8. Id. at 686, 679 A.2d at 1088. The girls attended Keough between the ages of 11 and
15. Id. at 698, 679 A.2d at 1094.
9. Id. at 686-87, 679 A.2d at 1088.
10. Id. Doe's complaint also alleged that Father Maskell put a gun in her mouth. Id. at
687 n.2, 679 A.2d at 1088 n.2. Roe alleged that Father Maskell subjected her to douches
and pelvic examinations. Id
11. Id. at 687, 679 A.2d at 1088.
12. Id. at 687 n.3, 679 A.2d at 1088 n.3.
13. Id, at 688, 679 A.2d at 1089.
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William Keeler in his official capacity.14 The complaints alleged bat-
tery, negligent supervision, negligent misrepresentation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and fraud.' 5 The two cases were con-
solidated and assigned to Judge Hilary D. Caplan for trial.'6
The defendants argued that the suits were time-barred and
moved for summaryjudgment. 7 At a hearing on the defendants' mo-
tions, the plaintiffs argued that their repressed memories of the al-
leged abuse should toll the statute of limitations under Maryland's
discovery rule.' 8 They advanced two theories to support their argu-
ment. First, the plaintiffs argued that memory repression differs from
mere forgetting. The plaintiffs reasoned that while the discovery rule
does not toll the statute of limitations for memories that a plaintiff
simply "remembers," it should toll the statute of limitations until a
plaintiff "recovers" memories that have been repressed.' 9 Second, the
plaintiffs argued that repressed memory is a disability, which tolls the
statute pursuant to section 5-201 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article of the Maryland Code.2 ' The defendants countered
that the scientific community has not validated the theory of re-
pressed memory.21 Both sides presented expert testimony and scien-
tific articles to support their positions.2 After the hearing, Judge
Caplan entered summary judgment for the defendants. 23 The plain-
tiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and also petitioned the
Court of Appeals for certiorari. 24 Because of the importance of the
issue raised in this case, the Court of Appeals agreed to hear the ap-
peal directly.25
14. Id. Jane Roe's suit also included Christian Richter, M.D., as a defendant. I& at 688
n.5, 679 A.2d at 1089 n.5.
15. I& at 688, 679 A.2d at 1089. Jane Doe and her husband also alleged loss of consor-
tium. Id at 688 n.6, 679 A.2d at 1089 n.6.
16. Id. at 688, 679 A.2d at 1089.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 692, 679 A.2d at 1091; see supra note 4.
19. Maske/4 342 Md. at 692, 679 A.2d at 1091 ("Plaintiffs in this case... claim that in
order to avoid the pain associated with recalling the abuse they suffered, their memories
were 'repressed,' not merely 'forgotten,' and later 'recovered,' rather than
remembered.'").
20. Id. at 696, 679 A.2d at 1092. Section 5-201(a) states: "When a cause of action sub-
ject to a limitation under Subtitle 1 of this title accrues in favor of a minor or mental
incompetent, that person shall file his action within the lesser of three years or the applica-
ble period of limitations after the date the disability is removed." MD. CoDE ANN., Ors. &
JUD. PROC. § 5-201(a) (1995).
21. Mask/l, 342 Md. at 693, 679 A.2d at 1091.
22. Id. at 692-93, 679 A.2d at 1091-92.
23. Id at 688, 679 A.2d at 1089.
24. Id. at 688-89, 679 A.2d at 1089.
25. Id. at 689, 679 A.2d at 1089.
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2. Legal Background.--Statutes of limitations provide a period
within which a plaintiff must initiate a lawsuit or lose her cause of
action.6 The time provided in a statute of limitations derives from a
legislative policy decision that balances the interests of plaintiffs, de-
fendants, and society:27
[A] lthough affording plaintiffs what the legislature deems a
reasonable time to present their claims, [statutes of limita-
tions] protect defendants and the courts from having to deal
with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously im-
paired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disap-
pearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of
documents, or otherwise.28
Plaintiffs have an interest in having adequate time to investigate a po-
tential cause of action and to file a complaint. 9 Defendants have an
interest in having the opportunity to mount an adequate defense with-
out problems of lost evidence and to "plan for the future without the
indefinite threat of potential liability."" ° Finally, the public has an in-
terest in fostering judicial economy-the efficient use of judicial
resources.
3 1
a. The Statute of Limitations in Maryland.--Section 5-101 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code
states that a "civil action at law shall be filed within three years from
the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a
different period of time within which an action shall be com-
menced. ' 2 The statute does not define the term "accrues," 3 thus
leaving to judicial interpretation the question of when the statute of
limitations begins to run.3 4 Generally, Maryland courts have held that
the statute of limitations begins to run from the time the alleged
wrong occurs, not when it is discovered. 3 Strict application of the
26. Id.
27. Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 550 A-2d 1155, 1158 (1988); see also Charles
C. Callahan, Statutes of Limitation-Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130,138 (1955) (discussing
the policy considerations underlying statutes of limitations).
28. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (determining when the statute
of limitations begins under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
29. Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 332, 635 A.2d 394, 398-99 (1994).
30. Id. at 333, 635 A.2d at 399.
31. Pierce v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1983).
32. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 5-101 (1995).
33. Id.; see Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 75, 394 A.2d 299, 302
(1978).
34. Hanig, 284 Md. at 75, 394 A.2d at 302 ("Absent [a] statutory definition, the question
of when a cause of action accrues is left to judicial determination.").
35. Killen v. George Wash. Cemetery, Inc., 231 Md. 337, 343, 190 A.2d 247, 250 (1963).
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statute of limitations, however, does not distinguish between a plain-
tiff who failed to pursue her cause of action diligently and one who
was unable to perceive the harm before the statute of limitations had
run. The judicially created discovery rule responds to this inherent
inequity.3
6
b. Marland's Discovery Rule.-In one common formulation,
the discovery rule states that "the statute [of limitations] must be con-
strued as not intended to start to run until the plaintiff has in fact
discovered the fact that he has suffered injury or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered it."' 7 In Maryland, the
discovery rule is an exception to "the principle that where the legisla-
ture has not expressly provided for an exception in a statute of limita-
tions, the court will not allow any implied or equitable exception to be
engrafted upon it."3 8
The Court of Appeals first articulated Maryland's discovery rule
in Hahn v. Claybrook 9 In that case, Ms. Hahn brought a medical mal-
practice suit against Dr. Claybrook, alleging that he treated her indi-
gestion with such large doses of argentum oxide that she developed
argyria (silver poisoning), which discolored her skin.' She filed her
claim seven years after she noticed the discoloration.41 Dr. Claybrook
defended on the ground that the statute of limitations had run.4 2 The
trial court directed a verdict for Dr. Claybrook.4" Ms. Hahn appealed,
and the Court of Appeals responded by enunciating the discovery
rule:
The ground of the cause of action in this case was the discol-
oration of the plaintiffs skin by the use of the drug called
argentum oxide, and the statute began to run from the time
36. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. e (1979).
38. Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615, 623, 500 A.2d 641, 645 (1985).
The General Assembly has created exceptions in favor of the State. See, e.g., MD. CODE
ANN., CTs. &JuD. PROC. § 5-104(b) (1995) ("The State may sue on a public officer's bond,
for its own use, at any time."); id. § 5-102 (imposing a 12-year statute of limitations on
certain specialties, but exempting from the statute a specialty taken for the use of the
State).
39. 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917), superseded by MD. CODE ANN., Cis. &JuD. PROC. § 5-
109(a)(1); see infra note 46. Maryland may have been the first state in the country to for-
mulate the discovery rule. SeeJohn E. Stanfield, Note, The Statute of Limitations in Actions for
Undiscovered Malpractice, 12 WYOMING LJ. 30, 34 (1957) (surveying applications of the dis-
covery rule in medical malpractice cases).
40. Hahn, 130 Md. at 180, 100 A. at 84.
41. Id,




of the discovery of the alleged injury therefrom. As stated by
the court below, when she began to be discolored that
showed an injury, and that was the injury of which she had a
right to complain. Then was her cause of action, and that
was the time when the alleged injury was apparent .... "
Applying the newly pronounced rule, the court barred Ms. Hahn's
suit, reasoning that had she "exercised ordinary care and diligence"
45
she could have discovered that the argentum oxide caused her injury.
The Court of Appeals made it clear that the cause of action accrues
upon discovery of the injury, not the discovery of the injury's cause.46
The court subsequently extended the discovery rule's application
from medical malpractice to all suits for professional malpractice.47
In 1978, the court also extended the rule to cover tort actions for the
development of latent diseases, reasoning that "[1like the victim of
undiscoverable malpractice a person incurring disease years after ex-
posure cannot have known of the existence of the tort until some in-
jury manifests itself."48
Finally, in Poffenberger v. Risser,49 the Court of Appeals held that a
court could apply the discovery rule in any type of civil action:
Having already broken the barrier confining the discovery
principle to professional malpractice, and sensing no valid
reason why that rule's sweep should not be applied to pre-
44. Id. at 187, 100 A. at 86.
45. Id. at 186, 100 A. at 86.
46. Id. A statute now provides that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice
cases is five years or three years after discovery, whichever is less. MD. CODE ANN., Crs. &
JUD. PROC. § 5-109(a) (1995). The five-year period begins with a health care provider's
negligent act and runs whether or not the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have
discovered the injury. See Hill v. Fitzgerald, 304 Md. 689, 700, 501 A.2d 27, 32 (1985)
(stating that the statute "contains no room for any implied exceptions"). The General
Assembly enacted section 5-109(a) to reduce the "long-tail" effect, which leaves medical
malpractice insurers uncertain as to what claims might eventually be filed, "'by restricting,
in absolute terms, the amount of time which could lapse between the allegedly negligent
treatment of a patient and the filing of a malpractice claim related to that treatment.'"
Edmonds v. Cytology Servs. of Md., Inc., 111 Md. App. 233, 245, 681 A.2d 546, 552 (1996)
(quoting Hil 304 Md. at 699-700, 501 A.2d at 32).
47. See, e.g., Steelworkers Holding Co. v. Menefee, 255 Md. 440, 443, 258 A.2d 177, 179
(1969) (ruling that a building owner's cause of action against an architect accrued when
the owner discovered that the building was defective); Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price,
254 Md. 697, 704, 255 A.2d 359, 362 (1969) (holding that a professional malpractice claim
against an attorney accrued when the client discovered the attorney's negligence); Mat-
tingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 92-94, 253 A.2d 904, 907 (1969) (holding that a landowner's
malpractice action against a civil engineer accrued when the landowner discovered the
misplacement of boundary markers).
48. Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 80, 394 A.2d 299, 305 (1978).
49. 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981).
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vent an injustice in other types of cases, we now hold the
discovery rule to be applicable generally in all actions and
the cause of action accrues when the claimant in fact knew
or reasonably should have known of the wrong.5"
The Poffenberger court then focused on the sort of knowledge a
plaintiff must possess to trigger the statute of limitations under the
discovery rule. 1 The court reasoned that constructive knowledge of
an injury's cause would be insufficient to activate the limitations pe-
riod, because that requirement would not avert the unfairness to the
plaintiff that the discovery rule seeks to prevent.52 Rather, the court
held, the discovery rule tolls the limitations period until the plaintiff
acquires actual knowledge of the wrong or of the circumstances sur-
rounding an injury that should lead her to investigate the injury's
cause.53 From that point, the statutory limitations period of three
years provides sufficient time for a diligent plaintiff to make an in-
quiry and decide whether to pursue a potential cause of action.'
Although in theory Poffenberger extended the discovery rule's
reach to all civil actions, the rule does not apply automatically. Courts
must determine whether the discovery rule applies on a case-by-case
basis.55
c. Childhood Sexual Abuse and the Discovery Rule.-Many vic-
tims of childhood sexual abuse who have filed civil lawsuits against
their alleged abusers have argued that their repressed memories
50. Id. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680.
51. Id. at 636-38, 431 A.2d at 680-81.
52. Id
53. Id. at 637-38, 431 A.2d at 681.
54. O'Hara v. Kovens, 305 Md. 280, 289, 503 A.2d 1313, 1317 (1986).
55. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 452, 550 A.2d 1155, 1165 (1988) ("It is
... clear that this Court is empowered to define the operation of the discovery rule to
further its purposes under varying factual circumstances."); Poffenberger, 290 Md. at 634,
431 A.2d at 679 ("Depending upon the nature of the assertions being made with respect to
the limitations plea, this determination may be solely one of law, solely one of fact or one
of law and fact."); see also O'Hara, 305 Md. at 298, 503 A.2d at 1322 ("[H]ow the discovery
rule operates in different types of cases is for the court to determine.").
After Poffenberger, the Court of Appeals applied the discovery rule in a variety of civil
actions. See, e.g., Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 335, 635 A.2d 394, 400
(1994) (action against the directors of insolvent savings and loan association); PennwalA
314 Md. at 452, 550 A.2d at 1165 (products liability action); O'Hara, 305 Md. at 280, 503
A.2d at 1313 (securities fraud action). On the other hand, the court has not applied the
discovery rule to wrongful death actions, because to do so would "violat[e] the legislatively
imposed time limitation on [a] legislatively created right of action." Trimper v. Porter-
Hayden, 305 Md. 31, 36, 501 A.2d 446, 449 (1985).
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should toll the statute of limitations.56 In a number of jurisdictions,
plaintiffs have tried to overcome a statute of limitations defense by
arguing that their lack of actual knowledge of the alleged abuse pre-
cluded their filing suit within the applicable limitations period.57
Courts have resolved the question of whether repressed memory
should trigger the discovery rule in several ways. Courts in some juris-
dictions have held that the discovery rule applies in cases in which the
plaintiffs repression of the alleged abuse is total.5 Other courts have
applied the discovery rule when the plaintiff has independent cor-
roborating evidence of the abuse.59 On the other hand, a number of
courts have refused to toll the statute of limitations for claims of re-
56. See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Emotional or Psychological "Blocking" or
Repression As Tolling Running of Statute of Limitations, 11 A.L.R.5th 588 (1993) (reviewing
cases in which plaintiffs claim that memory repression should toll the statute of
limitations).
57. The first of these suits was Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986) (en banc). In
Tyson, a twenty-six-year-old woman filed a complaint against her father alleging that he
sexually abused her from the time she was three years old until the age of eleven. Id. at
227. She alleged that she repressed all memory of the abuse until she entered therapy at
age twenty-four. Id Tyson's father moved for summary judgment, arguing that the statute
of limitations barred his daughter's claim. Id. Concerned with the lack of objective evi-
dence that the abuse had actually occurred, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
Tyson's claim was time-barred and that Tyson could not invoke the discovery rule to toll
the statute of limitations. Id. at 230. A statute has since superseded Tyson. See WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.16.310 (West Supp. 1996) (permitting the discovery rule to toll the statute
of limitations in cases of childhood sexual abuse); see also infra note 60.
58. See, e.g., Hoult v. Hoult, 792 F. Supp. 143, 145 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding that the
discovery rule applies where the plaintiff had repressed memory of sexual abuse until after
the limitations period had run); Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (applying the discovery rule and tolling the statute of limitations for an adult incest
survivor with no conscious memory of the events during the limitations period); Evans v.
Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605, 610 (Ct App. 1990) ("[A]ccrual of a cause of action for
child sexual abuse [is] delayed until the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the
cause of action."); Ault v.Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870, 873 (Ohio 1994) ("[T]he discovery rule
applies in Ohio to toll the statute of limitations where a victim of childhood sexual abuse
represses memories of that abuse until a later time."); Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 59
(D.C. 1994) ("[W] here a plaintiff has alleged total repression of any recollection of sexual
abuse which allegedly occurred during her childhood, her claim does not accrue until the
date that she recovered her memory to the extent that she knows, or reasonably should
know, of some injury, its cause, and related wrongdoing." (internal quotations omitted)).
59. See, e.g., Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 24-25 (Nev. 1990) ("[N]o existing statute of
limitations applies to bar the action of an adult survivor of [childhood sexual abuse] when
it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff has in fact been sexually
abused during minority by the named defendant." (footnote omitted)); Olsen v. Hooley,
865 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Utah 1993) ("[Wie think it necessary to require that a plaintiff who
alleges repression of memory as a basis for tolling the statute of limitations produce cor-
roborating evidence in support of the allegations of abuse."). Utah now has a statute al-
lowing memory repression in cases such as Olsen to toll the statute of limitations, but the
plaintiff in Olsen filed her action before the statute's enactment See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
12-25.1 (1996); see also infra note 61.
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pressed memory altogether, although statutes have superseded some
of these decisions.6 °
Many states have passed legislation specifically applying the dis-
covery rule to cases of alleged childhood sexual abuse.6" Still other
60. Compare Lemmerman v. Fealk, 534 N.W.2d 695, 696 (Mich. 1995) ("[N]either the
discovery rule nor the insanity disability statute addresses the exception claimed to extend
the time allowable for bringing suit in ... cases [of repressed memory]."), and Seto v.
Willits, 638 A.2d 258, 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that the statute of limitations in
Pennsylvania is not tolled "solely because a plaintiff is under a disability"), and Hunter v.
Brown, No. 03A01-9504-CV-00127, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 95, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb.
13, 1996) (refusing to apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations for claims of
repressed memory), appeal granted, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 458 (Tenn.July 1, 1996), and S.V. v.
R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 25 (Tex. 1996) (holding that the discovery rule does not apply to cases
of repressed memory of childhood sexual abuse), with Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d
1117, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) ("[U]nder any conventional application
of the statute of limitations, the appellant's cause of action accrued, and the statutory clock
began running, no later than [when the appellant reached majority]."), cause dismissed &y
560 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1990), and superseded by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11.7 (West 1996) (requir-
ing that plaintiff bring her action within four years of discovering both the abuse and its
causal relation to the injury), and Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 230 (Wash. 1986) (en
banc) ("[T]he discovery rule does not apply to an intentional tort claim where plaintiff has
blocked the incident from her conscious memory during the period of the statute of limi-
tations."), superseded by WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1996) (requiring that
plaintiff bring her action within three years of the date when plaintiff discovered or reason-
ably should have discovered the injury).
61. Typically, these statutes provide a limitations period within which a plaintiff must
bring suit after she discovers or reasonably should have discovered the abuse and a causal
relationship between the abuse and an injury. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 9.10.140(b) (1)-(2)
(Michie 1994) (three years); ARi. CODE ANN. § 16-56-130 (Michie Supp. 1995) (three
years); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1996) (eight years); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 5/13-202.2 (West Supp. 1996) (two years); IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.8A (West Supp.
1996) (four years); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-523 (1994) (three years); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 260, § 4C (West Supp. 1996) (three years); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West
Supp. 1995) (six years); MiN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West Supp. 1996) (six years); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 537.046 (West Supp. 1996) (three years); Morr. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216(l)(b)
(1995) (three years); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.215 (Michie Supp. 1995) (ten years); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30 (Michie Supp. 1996) (three years); OR. REv. STAT. § 12.117 (Supp.
1996) (three years); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-51 (Supp. 1995) (seven years); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 26-10-25 (Michie 1992) (three years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.1 (Supp. 1996)
(four years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522 (Supp. 1995) (six years); WASH. RE,. CODE ANN.
§ 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1996) (three years). Several statutes apply the discovery rule to all
personal actions, including those alleging childhood sexual abuse. See, e.g., N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 508-4 (Supp. 1995) (three years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1995) (six years).
Plaintiffs have begun to invoke these statutes in repressed memory cases. See, e.g.,
Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that CAL. Civ. PROc.
CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1996) tolls the statute of limitations "when the child victim of
alleged sexual abuse psychologically represses all memory of the acts of abuse while she is
still a minor and does not remember those acts until a date after attaining majority"),
superseded, 788 P.2d 1155 (Cal. 1990); Doe v. LaBrosse, 625 A.2d 222, 222 (R.I. 1993) (pro-
viding that R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-51 (Supp. 1995) applies in a case of delayed discovery of
injury resulting from childhood sexual abuse); Doe v. RD., 417 S.E.2d 541, 542 (S.C. 1992)
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states have enacted statutes providing for extended periods of time in
which to file suit against an alleged child sexual abuser, rather than
specifically applying a discovery rule.62 Periodically, state legislators
introduce bills that would toll the statute of limitations in cases of
childhood sexual abuse.63
Maryland has no statute permitting the discovery rule to toll the
statute of limitations for plaintiffs alleging recovered memories of
childhood sexual abuse.64 Maskell presented the Court of Appeals
with its first opportunity to decide whether a claim of repressed mem-
ory of childhood sexual abuse can trigger Maryland's discovery rule.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Maskell, the Court of Appeals held
that the discovery rule does not apply to a claim of repressed memory
of past sexual abuse.6" The court first reviewed the history of the dis-
covery rule and its purpose,66 emphasizing the need to apply the dis-
covery rule flexibly in determining whether it applies in a particular
context. 67 The court went on to state that application of the discovery
rule to a repressed memory case turned on "whether there is a differ-
ence between forgetting and repression."' Therefore, as an initial
matter, the court tried to "understand what repression is." 69 Although
(interpreting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) and refusing to apply
the discovery rule in a case of alleged sexual abuse because such an exception must come
from the legislature).
62. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-103.7 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring that
plaintiff must bring action within six years of the date cause of action accrues); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-577d (West 1991) (providing that plaintiff must bring suit within 17 years
of attaining majority); IDAHO CODE § 6-1704 (1990) (requiring plaintiff to bring action by
age 23); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (Supp. 1995) (mandating that plaintiff must file action
within 10 years after childhood sexual abuse occurred); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249 (Michie
1992) (requiring plaintiff to file action within 10 years of first communicating the abuse
and its resulting injury to a licensed medical or mental health professional).
63. Several such bills are currently pending. See, e.g., S.B. 344, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Minn. 1997) (providing that a civil action for injury caused by sexual abuse must be insti-
tuted within six years of either the last act of abuse or the time plaintiff knew or had reason
to know an injury was caused by the abuse); H.B. 744, 89th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 1997) (providing that a suit for damages due to childhood sexual abuse must be filed
within ten years after reaching majority or within three years from the time the victim
reasonably discovers an injury caused by the abuse).
64. Maryland H.B. 326 would have allowed a plaintiff to file suit up to 12 years after
discovering the abuse. See Md. H.B. 326, 1994 Sess. The bill failed in the House Judiciary
Committee. See Maskel, 342 Md. at 695 n.10, 679 A.2d at 1092 n.10. Although it is possible
that the bill's failure influenced the court's reasoning, the opinion does not suggest that
the bill played any role in the court's decision.
65. Maskel4 342 Md. at 695, 679 A.2d at 1092.
66. Id. at 689-91, 679 A.2d at 1089-90.
67. Id, at 691, 679 A.2d at 1090.
68. Id. at 691-92, 679 A.2d at 1090.
69. Id. at 692, 679 A.2d at 1091.
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the court noted that "[e]ven defining the term [repression] is not
easy," 70 the court appeared to adopt the following definition:
"[I] n its general use the concept of repression has three ele-
ments: (1) repression is the selective forgetting of materials
that cause the individual pain; (2) repression is not under
voluntary control; and (3) repressed material is not lost but
instead stored in the unconscious and can be returned to
consciousness if the anxiety that is associated with the mem-
ory is removed. The assertion that repression is not under
voluntary control differentiates repression from suppression
and denial, with which it is sometimes confused .... 71
Next, the court considered journal articles and expert testimony
offered by the plaintiffs to demonstrate that repressed memory is a
scientifically valid and accepted phenomenon and considered the
materials offered by the defendants to counter this argument.72 The
court placed great emphasis on the defendants' scientific arguments
and made little reference to those offered by the plaintiffs.73 The
court then applied the standard adopted in Reed v. State7 4 -the Frye-
Reed standard-for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence
as the basis for its inquiry:
While the existence of consensus (or lack thereof) in the sci-
entific community is a more familiar inquiry within the con-
text of determining the admissibility of scientific evidence
under the test enunciated in Reed v. State, it is also a useful
measure for this Court to evaluate the acceptance, and ac-
ceptability of a scientific theory.75
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting David S. Holmes, The Evidence for Repression: An Examination of Sixty
Years of Research, in REPRESSION AND DissocIATION, supra note 2, at 85-86).
72. Id. at 693, 679 A.2d at 1091.
73. Id. at 693-95, 679 A.2d at 1091-92.
74. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
75. Maskel4 342 Md. at 694, 679 A.2d at 1092. In Reed, the court examined the admissi-
bility of voiceprint identification in a criminal prosecution. Reed, 283 Md. at 375, 391 A.2d
at 365. At the time, voiceprint identification was a relatively recent technique. See id. at
377, 391 A.2d at 366. The court expressly rejected the position advanced by the State that
"'[any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be
received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.'" Id. at 386, 391 A.2d at 370 (altera-
tion in original) (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (2d ed. 1972)). Under
this view, "disagreement in the scientific community regarding the reliability of a scientific
process should go to weight rather than the admissibility of scientific evidence." Id. at 387,
391 A.2d at 371. Rather, the court opined that "[w]hen the positions of the contending
factions are fixed in the scientific community, it is evident that controversies will be re-
solved only by further scientific analysis, studies and experiments .... Thus, courts should
be properly reluctant to resolve the disputes of science." Id The court then accepted the
"general acceptance" rule for admissibility of scientific evidence. Id. at 389, 391 A.2d at
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The court found the defendants' scientific arguments persuasive,
stating that "there is so far no empirical validation for the theory of
repression"76 and no consensus in the mental health community
about the existence of repressed memory' 7 The court found uncon-
vincing the studies presented by the plaintiffs, which asserted that "re-
pression exists as a phenomenon separate and apart from the normal
process of forgetting." 8 The court concluded that "[b] ecause we find
these two processes to be indistinguishable scientifically, it follows that
they should be treated the same legally."79 Therefore, the court held
that the plaintiffs' claims of repressed memories could not activate the
discovery rule.8" The court placed responsibility for rewriting the law
with the General Assembly.81
Next, the court analyzed the plaintiffs' second theory: that re-
pressed memory is a form of mental incompetence sufficient to in-
voke the protections of section 5-201 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.82 The court considered the history and language
of that statute and the legislative intent behind the 1973 codification
of the Maryland Code, which created the Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Article.83 The court concluded that the 1973 revision did not
broaden the reach of section 5-201, which has been limited to "plain-
tiffs who are insane and 'unable to manage [their] business affairs or
estate, or to comprehend [their] legal rights or liabilities."' 84 Because
the plaintiffs in MaskeUi presented no evidence of inability to manage
their affairs, the court concluded, they could not invoke the protec-
tion of section 5-201.85
372. The general acceptance rule, enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923), states that a scientific principle or discovery about which expert testimony is offered
"must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
76. Maskel4 342 Md. at 694, 679 A.2d at 1092.
77. Id.




82. Id. at 696, 679 A.2d at 1092. See supra note 16 for the text of MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
&JUD. PROC. § 5-201.
83. Maskel4 342 Md. at 697-98, 679 A.2d at 1093.
84. Id. at 698, 679 A.2d at 1094 (alteration in original) (quoting Decker v. Fink, 47 Md.
App. 202, 207, 422 A.2d 389, 392 (1980)).
85. Id. Plaintiffs in other jurisdictions have had some success arguing that the defini-
tion of "insanity" includes repressed memory of childhood sexual abuse. See, e.g., Meiers-
Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the statute of
limitations can be tolled under the insanity clause if the plaintiff suffered from repressed
memory and has corroborating evidence of the abuse); Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316, 321
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) ("[M]ental trauma resulting from a pattern of incestuous
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Having rejected all of the plaintiffs' arguments to lift the statute
of limitations bar, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs'
claims of repressed memories did not toll the statute of limitations.86
4. Analysis.-In Maskell, the court refused to apply the discovery
rule and toll the statute of limitations for plaintiffs who claimed recov-
ered memories of childhood sexual abuse. Although many plaintiffs
and legislators have made compelling arguments in favor of the dis-
covery rule's application in cases of this sort,87 the Maskell court's deci-
Sion not to apply the discovery rule is not without precedent.88 The
extent of the court's inquiry into the validity of repressed memory
theory, however, is unusual.89
The Maskell court reviewed a decision on the defendants' motion
for summary judgment.9" Both plaintiffs and defendants presented
expert testimony about repressed memory theory and "numerous sci-
entific journals" containing articles and studies about this phenome-
non.91 The court was therefore able to make its own judicial inquiry
into the validity of repressed memory theory. It did so by reviewing
the expert testimony and the journal articles under the same Frye-Reed
standard it uses to evaluate the admissibility of such material as evi-
dence.92 The court concluded that the psychological community had
not reached sufficient consensus on the validity of repressed memory
theory for the phenomenon to be "generally accepted" under the
court's test for admitting scientific information as evidence. 9 There-
fore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could not use the theory
sexual abuse may constitute insanity... so as to toll the statute of limitations."). But see
Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying New York law and holding that
daughter's repression of father's conceded sexual abuse did not constitute insanity so as to
toll the statute of limitations); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512, 1524 (S.D.
Ind. 1990) (applying Indiana law and ruling that plaintiff's post-traumatic stress disorder
did not constitute a disability); Travis v. Ziter, 681 So. 2d 1348, 1355 (Ala. 1996) (holding
that repressed memory may not be considered insanity for purposes of tolling the statute
of limitations); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624, 629 (Okla. 1992) (ruling that legal
disability did not include plaintiff's multiple personality disorder).
86. Maskel4 342 Md. at 698, 679 A.2d at 1094.
87. See supra notes 56, 58, and 60.
88. See supra notes 56 and 57.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 68-78.
90. Maskell 342 Md. at 686, 679 A.2d at 1088.
91. Id. at 692, 679 A.2d at 1091.
92. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 76 and 77.
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of repressed memory to demonstrate the lack of actual knowledge re-
quired to trigger the discovery rule.94
The Court of Appeals's approach to deciding whether the discov-
ery rule should toll the statute of limitations when a plaintiff claims to
have recovered repressed memories of an alleged wrong is unique.
Most other courts, regardless of whether they decided to apply the
discovery rule in similar cases, have approached their decisions largely
by reviewing the relevant case law of other jurisdictions, rather than
deciding first whether repressed memory theory itself was scientifically
valid.9 5 In some cases, courts took this approach because they were
reviewing motions to dismiss and could not look outside the plead-
ings.96 The courts that did review motions for summary judgment did
not appear to have had available to them the amount of scientific in-
formation the Court of Appeals had in Maskell.9 7
The court's focus on the lack of scientific proof of repressed
memory indicates that the court intends to apply strict criteria to the
sort of knowledge a plaintiff must lack in order to apply Maryland's
discovery rule. This emphasis on requiring a scientifically reliable lack
of knowledge before triggering the discovery rule favors the interests
of potential defendants and judicial economy over the interests of
plaintiffs who claim to have retrieved memories of childhood sexual
abuse. The court clearly wished to guard the interests of defendants
and of society, which the statute of limitations seeks to protect.98 The
94. Maskel4 342 Md. at 695, 679 A.2d at 1092.
95. See, e.g., Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 57 (D.C. 1994) (reviewing a motion to
dismiss and stating "we express no opinion at this stage of the litigation as to the validity or
lack thereof of the theories regarding repression and recovered memories").
96. See, e.g., Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1117-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(per curiam) (reviewing the trial court's dismissal of appellant's amended complaint and
holding that the discovery rule does not apply), dismissed, 560 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1990); Ault
v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870, 873 (Ohio 1994) (reviewing the trial court's dismissal of the
action and holding that the discovery rule applies in cases of repressed memory).
97. See, e.g., Hoult v. Hoult, 792 F. Supp. 143, 145 (D. Mass. 1992) (considering deposi-
tion testimony of the plaintiff and her therapist and holding that the discovery rule ap-
plies); Lemmerman v. Fealk, 534 N.W.2d 695, 699-700, 703 (Mich. 1995) (reviewing case
law and affirming the trial court's grant of summaryjudgment because the statute of limita-
tions had run). The Texas Supreme Court conducted an extensive review of the scientific
literature on repressed memory in S.V v. RIV., 933 S.W.2d 1, 15-20, 26-28 (Tex. 1996). A
concurring opinion in that case discussed the admissibility of expert evidence regarding
repressed memory, id. at 40-42 (Cornyn, J., concurring), although the majority opinion
"intimate[d] no view on whether the evidence... was or was not admissible." S.V., 933
S.W.2d at 25. Although the majority did not frame its inquiry into the literature of re-
pressed memory in terms of its standards for admitting scientific evidence, it nonetheless
decided that repressed memory theory was not sufficiently verifiable to justify extending
the discovery rule. Id. at 19-20.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 23-31.
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interests of plaintiffs, who may have legitimate claims against former
abusers, seemed less important to the court.99
Although the Maskell decision was logical and consistent with the
Frye-Reed standard, the Maskell court did not need to approach its deci-
sion in this particular way. The court could have assumed, arguendo,
that repressed memories exist and then allowed a jury to decide
whether these particular plaintiffs had repressed memories of the al-
leged abuse. After all, judges are not necessarily more capable than
juries in assessing scientific theories. 10 Alternatively, the court could
have required corroborating evidence of abuse in order for plaintiffs
to claim the benefit of the discovery rule.10 1
The court's motivation for its particular approach is not clear
from its opinion. The court may have seen this case as an opportunity
to take a stand against unreliable scientific theories. The opinion's
cursory treatment of the plaintiffs' arguments supporting the exist-
ence of repressed memories and its emphasis on defendants' argu-
ments against the validity of these memories is consistent with this
interpretation.10 2
Conclusions drawn on the basis of unsubstantiated scientific theo-
ries have recently plagued tort litigation.1l ' For example, news stories
in the early 1990s suggested that silicone gel breast implants might
cause connective tissue disease. 0 4 Only anecdotal evidence sup-
99. Courts that have applied the discovery rule to repressed memory cases typically
express sympathy for the plaintiffs position and the difficulty of proving that the child-
hood sexual abuse occurred. See, e.g., Ault 637 N.E.2d at 873 ("Plaintiffs with valid claims
should not be denied the opportunity to prove that repression of memory precluded them
from bringing their claims within the statute of limitations period.").
100. But see Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake ofDaubert: A New Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEx. L. REv. 715, 788 (1994) (arguing thatjudges are more qualified
than juries to decide questions of scientific reliability because "over time, most judges will
probably develop at least some facility for understanding science beyond the typical juror's
level of understanding").
101. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
102. See supra text accompanying note 73. The court spent one paragraph listing the
studies the plaintiffs provided "purporting to validate the diagnosis of repression." Maskell
342 Md. 693, 679 A.2d 1091. The court devoted two full pages of text to describing the
defendants' arguments "tending to discredit the concept of repression and its application
in this setting." Id.; see id. at 693-95, 679 A.2d at 1091-92.
103. See, e.g., Joseph M. Price & Gretchen Gates Kelly, Junk Science in the Courtroom:
Causes, Effects and Controls, 19 HAMLINE L. REv. 395, 396-400 (1996) (discussing the increas-
ing introduction of questionable scientific and medical evidence in products liability
trials).
104. See, e.g., Mona Charen, Junk Science and Women's Health, BALT. SUN, Mar. 11, 1997, at
1 IA (discussing the public concern over silicone breast implants).
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ported this possibility. °5 Because the manufacturers had not col-
lected data addressing a possible connection between connective
tissue disease and silicone breast implants, the Food and Drug Admin-
istration removed the implants from the market.'0 6 Without reliable
scientific studies to support their claims, plaintiffs filed 16,000 lawsuits
against the implant manufacturers, finally resulting in a $4.25 billion
settlement 10 7 and the bankruptcy of one implant manufacturer. 1 8
In 1994, the first scientific study was published examining the risk
of connective tissue disease in women with silicone breast implants."0 9
The study found no increased risk for these women." 0 Subsequent
studies have confirmed this result."' Had other courts taken the
Court of Appeals's approach in Maske/! and insisted upon rigorous sci-
entific documentation of a connection between silicone breast im-
plants and the plaintiffs' diseases, they could have conserved both
judicial and private resources.' 12
The court's decision has the effect not only of reinforcing a strict
standard for the discovery rule's application, but also of guarding
Maryland courts against the dangers of 'Junk science."' 13 By invoking
the strict Frye-Reed standard for evaluating scientific information as evi-
dence, the court was able to prevent the plaintiffs from establishing a
claim based on a theory that has not yet been generally accepted in
105. See Marcia Angell, Do Breast Implants Cause Systemic Disease? Science in the Courtroom,
330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1748, 1748 (1994) (pointing out the lack of reliable evidence that
silicone breast implants cause connective tissue disease and questioning "the way scientific
facts are established in the courtroom").
106. See David A. Kessler, The Basis of the FDA's Decision on Breast Implants, 326 NEW ENG.J.
MED. 1713, 1713 (1992).
107. See Charen, supra note 104.
108. As a result of the pending lawsuits, Dow Coming Corporation filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11 on May 15, 1995. See Dow Files Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Blames Number of
Breast Implant Suits, BNA PRODUCr LaAixrv DAILY, May 16, 1995.
109. See Sherine E. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Other Disorders After
Breast Implantation, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1697 (1994).
110. See id. at 1702.
111. See Charen, supra note 104.
112. See supra note 108.
113. See Suzanne E. Riley, The End of an Era: Junk Science Departs Products Liability, 63 DEF.
COUNS. J. 502, 502 (1996) ("'Junk science' is the label courts, counsel and expert witnesses
have given to novel scientific theories that are not based on sound foundation."). Without
necessarily labeling repressed memory theory as junk science, the theory is based on evi-
dence that is subject to widely varying interpretations. See supra note 2. Further, because it
would be unethical to instill traumatic memories in patients deliberately, the theory has
little chance of empirical verification. See Taub, supra note 2, at 187 (noting that it would
be unethical to conduct experiments involving the deliberate implantation of a false trau-
matic memory).
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the psychiatric community and which could have the potential for
working a grave injustice on many potential defendants.
If the court in Maskell sought to protect the Maryland judiciary
against junk science, its decision was a good one. Unfortunately, if the
court is wrong about the validity of repressed memory theory, Maskell
will result in an injustice for plaintiffs who have legitimate claims of
past sexual abuse. The court's decision precludes access to the civil
courts for plaintiffs who claim to have retrieved memories of child-
hood sexual abuse after the limitations period has run. Victims who
claim to have repressed memories of nonsexual physical abuse, too, will
now have no access to a civil court. Furthermore, because the applica-
tion of the discovery rule is a matter of substantive law and not proce-
dure, 1 4 under the Erie doctrine,"1 the Maskell court's decision binds
a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction.116
Because Maryland has no statute of limitations for felony prosecu-
tions, 17 the state may be able to prosecute an accused abuser. As a
practical matter, however, convictions are difficult to obtain." 8 Fur-
ther, a plaintiff may not find a criminal conviction as satisfactory as a
civil judgment against her abusers. While many plaintiffs file suits as
part of their healing process, damage awards are often needed to
cover the costs of the extensive psychological therapy these plaintiffs
often require.' 19
Plaintiffs claiming recovery of repressed memories of childhood
sexual abuse may appeal to the legislature to apply the discovery rule
to these cases. Although such legislation would erode statute of limi-
114. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
115. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (stating that a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state law).
116. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) ("[I]f a plea of the statute of
limitations would bar recovery in a State court, a federal court ought not to afford recov-
ery."). Analysis of the tension between state and federal law were a federal court to decide
whether to apply the discovery rule in a repressed memory case is beyond the scope of this
Note. I am grateful to Professors Alan D. Hornstein and Gordon G. Young, University of
Maryland School of Law, and the Hon. Frederick N. Smalkin, United States District Court,
Maryland, for interesting and helpful discussions on this point.
117. See, e.g., Smallwood v. State, 51 Md. App. 463, 467, 443 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982)
(noting that under Maryland common law the State may commence a felony prosecution
at any time during the accused's lifetime). Sexual abuse of a child is a felony in Maryland.
See MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 35C(b) (1996).
118. See Hall, supra note 2, at 43 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining a criminal convic-
tion in childhood sexual abuse cases where "[t]here is generally little or no evidence ex-
cept for the prosecuting wimess' testimony").
119. SeeJocelyn B. Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Victims: Toward an
Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule 100 YALE L.J. 2189, 2195 (1991) (discussing
reasons why abuse survivors file actions against their abusers).
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tations protection for defendants, 120 the legislature could include pro-
cedural safeguards to protect defendants' interests.1 2 ' For example,
New Mexico's statute requires plaintiffs to show corroborating evi-
dence "by competent medical or psychological testimony."12 2 A stat-
ute could also include other safeguards, such as fictitious names for all
parties, limitations on evidence of the defendant's "prior bad acts,"
model jury instructions, and admission of expert testimony regarding
repressed memory. 23 While such legislation would guarantee no
plaintiff a victory, it would at least provide her with the possibility of a
trial.
5. Conclusion.-In Maskell the Court of Appeals evaluated the
validity of repressed memory theory under the strict Frye-Reed eviden-
tiary standard. The court concluded that the phenomenon of re-
pressed memory is not generally accepted in the relevant scientific
community and should be treated as the legal equivalent of forgetting.
This conclusion left the court no choice but to prohibit application of
the discovery rule to claims of repressed memory. The court's deci-
sion reinforces its requirement that a plaintiff cannot enjoy the bene-
fit of the discovery rule unless she verifiably lacks knowledge of the
injury or circumstances surrounding it. The decision also protects the
courts from claims based on scientific theories that are not presently
verifiable. The court's decision in Maskell has limited the options for a
plaintiff who claims to have recalled a repressed memory after the stat-
ute of limitations for civil actions has run. The court appears to have
decided that "'preclusion of a legal remedy alone is not enough to
justify a judicial exception to the statute [of limitations]."124
LISA M. HEMMENDINGER
120. See supra text accompanying notes 24 and 30.
121. See, e.g., Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 2, at 167-74 (proposing procedural protec-
tions for defendants); Joy Lazo, Comment, True or False: Expert Testimony on Repressed Mem-
ory, 28 Loy. LA L. REv. 1345, 1402-11 (1995) (discussing procedural protections for
defendants).
122. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30 (Michie Supp. 1996).
123. See Lazo, supra note 121, at 1411-12 (proposing judicial controls on expert testi-
mony regarding repressed memory).
124. S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 15 (Tex. 1996) (quoting Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d
18, 20 (Tex. 1977)) (refusing to apply the discovery rule to cases of repressed memory of
childhood sexual abuse).
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IX. TORTS
A. Clarifying Maryland's Exception to the Economic Loss Rule
In Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving,1 the Court of Appeals clarified
the exception to the economic loss rule.2 The court provided a two-
step approach, requiring courts to weigh both the probability of risk
and the severity of potential harm resulting from a defective product,
to determine whether a plaintiff can circumvent the economic loss
rule.3 By emphasizing the serious nature of the risk required to fall
within this exception, the Court of Appeals properly maintained the
high standard that is needed to serve the polar interests underlying
the doctrine. In upholding the exception, the court stressed the need
to preserve a clear distinction between recovery in product liability
and contract law while still providing a remedy in tort to plaintiffs that
are exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm.4 In the final analysis,
the Court of Appeals held that only through the strict application of
this exception will the law serve both of these interests.
5
1. The Case.-The plaintiffs, Patty Morris, Richard Mills, Michael
Karbeling, and Laura Herlihy, each alleged that they had purchased
townhomes with roofs that were constructed with defective fire retard-
ant treated plywood (FRT plywood).6 According to the plaintiffs,
when the FRT plywood is exposed to high temperatures, an acidic re-
action occurs, which is designed to prevent the spread of fire.7
Although "roofs can reach temperatures of 180 degrees fahrenheit
without the presence of fire,"8 the plaintiffs claimed that this chemical
reaction occurred "at temperatures as low as 130 degrees fahrenheit"
in the plywood manufactured and distributed by the defendants.9
The chemical reaction, the plaintiffs maintained, "weakens the wood
and destroys the bonding between the plywood laminates, thereby
causing the wood, among other things, to bow, darken, spot, warp,
fracture and otherwise deteriorate and lose strength capacity."1"
The deteriorating FRT plywood, the plaintiffs contended, created
"an immediate threat of injury from walking on the roofs" as well as
1. 340 Md. 519, 667 A.2d 624 (1995).
2. l& at 526, 667 A.2d at 628.
3. Id. at 533-34, 667 A.2d at 631-32.
4. Id. at 532, 667 A.2d at 631.
5. Id. at 535, 667 A.2d at 632.
6. Id. at 526, 667 A.2d at 628.






"the threat of the roofs collapsing and injuring the occupants
within." 1 To illustrate the gravity of the danger, the plaintiffs argued
that the roofs of their townhomes could no longer support "any
weight, even a heavy snowfall."12 Consequently, the plaintiffs filed a
class action suit to recover the cost of replacing roofs that contained
the FRT plywood manufactured and distributed by the defendants,
Osmose Wood Preserving, Hoover Universal, Inc., and Hoover
Treated Wood Products. 3 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that each
of the defendants inappropriately marketed its products as suitable
for roof construction.1 4
In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs included counts for
strict liability, negligence, breach of implied warranties, negligent mis-
representation, and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection
Act.15 Following a hearing, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
dismissed the complaint in its entirety,'6 having determined that the
economic loss rule barred plaintiffs' strict liability and negligence
claims.17 This rule precludes recovery "in tort for purely economic
losses-losses that involve neither a clear danger of physical injury or
death, nor damage to property other than the product itself."'" In
addition, the circuit court ruled that the plaintiffs' claim did not fit
within Maryland's limited exception to the rule, which permits plain-
tiffs to maintain a claim in tort solely for economic losses when the
product is so defective that it presents a clear and present danger to
the purchaser.' 9
11. Id., 667 A.2d at 629.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 526, 667 A.2d at 628. The complaint described the class as:
[a]ll present owners of roofs or buildings, including townhouses, in the State of
Maryland and in the United States, where the roofs were at any time constructed
with fire retardant treated plywood, manufactured, treated, produced, tested, in-
spected, marketed and/or sold by Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc, [sic] Hoover
Universal, Inc. or Hoover Treated Wood Products, Inc., and prior owners of said
buildings who have paid for the inspection, replacement or repair of said build-
ings' roofs.
&L at n.1 (alteration in original).
14. Id. at 528, 667 A.2d at 629.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 528-29, 667 A.2d at 629.
17. Id. at 529, 667 A.2d at 630.
18. Id.
19. Id. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' implied warranty count on the
ground that the statute of limitations had run and also dismissed the plaintiffs' negligent
misrepresentation count because, according to the court, the plaintiffs failed to show that
they had relied on specific statements made by the defendants. Id. After having found no
reliance, the circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' Consumer Protection Act count as well.
Id. at 529-30, 667 A.2d at 630.
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The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court's dismis-
sal of the breach of implied warranty claim2" and affirmed the dismis-
sals of all other counts.2 1 A unanimous three-judge panel of the Court
of Special Appeals, upholding the dismissal of the plaintiffs' tort
claims, 22 concluded that the tort claims did not fall within the limited
exception to the economic loss rule.2 1 While the Court of Special Ap-
peals recognized that a tort claim may be asserted for purely eco-
nomic losses where "the risk is of death or personal injury," it found
that the plaintiffs' claims in the instant case stemmed from damage
"occurring through gradual deterioration of the plywood" rather than
a threat of "serious physical injury or death."24 The court concluded
that the plaintiffs' claims that an individual could sustain injuries by
walking on the roof or that the roof could collapse due to heavy snow-
fall were "[m]ere possibilities ... [that] do not meet the threshold of
establishing a clear danger of death or personal injury."25 The Court
of Appeals granted certiorari primarily to determine whether the
Court of Special Appeals correctly applied the Whiting-Turner2a excep-
tion to the economic loss rule.27
2. Legal Background.-Economic loss has been defined as "'the
diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality
20. Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 99 Md. App. 646, 663-64, 639 A.2d 147, 156
(1994), af/'d in part, rev'd in part, 340 Md. 519, 667 A.2d 624 (1995).
21. Id. at 656, 658, 639 A-2d at 152, 153. In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
count alleging violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAw 1I §§ 13-101 to -501 (1990), the Court of Special Appeals held that "[b]ecause the
matters about which appellants complained did not involve 'consumers' or 'consumer
goods,' we are convinced that the dismissal of the ... count was proper." Morris, 99 Md.
App. at 658, 639 A.2d at 153.
The Court of Special Appeals, however, reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' im-
plied warranty claims. Id at 663-64, 639 A.2d at 156. The court determined that, contrary
to the findings of the circuit court, plaintiffs Morris and Mills had filed their claims prior to
the statute of limitations and that plaintiffs Herlihy and Karbeling had alleged facts suffi-
cient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Id
22. Morris, 99 Md. App. at 656, 639 A.2d at 152.
23. Id. at 655-56, 639 A.2d at 152. The Court of Appeals first announced this exception
in Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md.
18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986). See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Whiting-Turner exception to the economic loss rule.
24. Morris, 99 Md. App. at 655, 639 A.2d at 152. The Court of Special Appeals found
persuasive the fact that "[tihe four named appellants have owned their townhouses from
six to ten years" and "not one of the four has replaced the roof from fear of personal
injury." Id.
25. Id. at 655-56, 639 A.2d at 152.
26. See Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Con-
tracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 35, 517 A.2d 336, 345 (1986).
27. Morris, 340 Md. at 526, 667 A.2d at 628.
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and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufac-
tured and sold.'""8 In general, claims "brought to recover damages
for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective
product, or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal
injury or damage to other property"-fall within this definition.29
The economic loss rule dictates that damages to the product itself are
not recoverable under tort theories of negligence and strict products
liability, but rather are only recoverable under contract law.3 °
Adopted by a majority of American courts, 1 this doctrine developed
in order to "keep products liability and contract law in separate
spheres." 2 In East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,a
the Supreme Court had occasion to address the economic loss rule
and noted that "[t] he intriguing question whether injury to a product
itself may be brought in tort has spawned a variety of answers."34 In its
analysis, the Supreme Court observed that three primary approaches
have developed to find a satisfactory answer to this problem. 3
Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court outlined
the first approach in Seely v. White Motor Co.36 In this seminal case,
Chief Justice Traynor readily conceded that if a defect in a product
leads to personal injury or damage to property, tort law should ap-
ply.3 7 He maintained that consumers should certainly not bear the
risk of physical injuries resulting from products purchased on the
market.38 By the same token, if a product simply does not meet eco-
nomic expectations, the law should restrict consumers to the remedies
available for breach of contract.39 Explaining his position, Chief Jus-
tice Traynor emphasized the following:
28. Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino and Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d
1244, 1246 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for
"Economic Loss"Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 541 (1966)).
29. Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918
(1966).
30. See James L. Connaughton, Comment, Recovery for Risk Comes of Age: Asbestos in
Schools and the Duty to Abate a Latent Environmental Hazard, 83 Nw. U. L. R-v. 512, 518
(1989) (stating the economic loss rule as applied in Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp.,
311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981)).
31. See William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Con-
tract over Tort, 44 U. MtAmI L. REv. 731, 799-806 (1990) (listing cases that have applied the
economic loss doctrine in commercial sales transactions).
32. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986).
33. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
34. Id. at 868.
35. Id. at 868-70.
36. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
37. Id. at 149.
38. Id. at 151.
39. Id.
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The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery
for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss
is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one plain-
tiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The dis-
tinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of
the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distrib-
uting his products. He can appropriately be held liable for
physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to
match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions
that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held
for the level of performance of his products . . . unless he
agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's
demands.4 °
Thus, consumers that are affected by dangerous products should find
protection through tort law.4 1 An individual that merely seeks redress
for economic losses, as a result of a product that does not perform up
to the individual's expectations, must find a remedy in the law of con-
tracts.42 The Supreme Court, in adopting the reasoning of Seely,
stated that to hold otherwise would allow contract law to "drown in a
sea of tort."4"
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, took an entirely dif-
ferent approach. In Santor v. A and M Karagheusian, Inc.,44 New
Jersey's highest court found no good reason to distinguish products
liability claims brought as a result of personal injury from claims stem-
ming solely from economic losses.45 The court noted that although
products liability claims have "been applied principally in connection
with personal injuries sustained by expected users from products
which are dangerous when defective, we reiterate ... that the respon-
sibility of the maker should be no different where damage to the arti-
cle sold . .. is involved."46 Jurisdictions adopting the Santor rationale
reject Seely "because they find it arbitrary [to say] that economic losses
are recoverable if a plaintiff suffers bodily injury or property damage,




43. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986).
44. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965).
45. Id. at 312.
46. Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of NewJersey subsequently rejected the
application of Santor in a commercial context. See Spring Motors Distrib. Inc. v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 (N.J. 1985) (dismissing tort claims brought by truck dealer
against Ford Motor Company for defective transmissions).
47. East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 869.
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irrelevant because the conduct of the defendant caused the injury or
damage in either case.'
In East River Steamship Corp., the Supreme Court noted that "be-
tween [these] two poles fall a number of cases that would permit a
products-liability action under certain circumstances when a product
injures only itself."4 9 Within this middle ground, courts have allowed
plaintiffs to recover in tort for damages solely to the product itself,
"but only when the damage results from an occurrence posing an un-
reasonable risk of harm to people or other property."5" Jurisdictions
adopting this intermediate approach have attempted to differentiate
between merely "'disappointed"' consumers and "'endangered
ones,"' allowing only the latter to sue in tort.
5 1
In Maryland, without the requisite elevated risk of harm, a buyer
of a defective product cannot recover in tort from a manufacturer for
damage resulting only to the product itself.52 The Court of Appeals, in
Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Con-
tracting Co.," recognized that "[i]n products cases, liability in negli-
gence for economic loss alone, unaccompanied by physical injury, is
often denied regardless of privity."54 Writing for the court, Judge Mc-
Auliffe rejected the bright line test of denying recovery for economic
losses where there is no proof of personal injury or property dam-
age.55 Instead, the court concluded:
[T]he determination of whether a duty will be imposed in
this type of case should depend upon the risk generated by
the negligent conduct, rather than upon the fortuitous cir-
cumstance of the nature of the resultant damage. Where the
risk is of death or personal injury the action will lie for recov-




50. Connaughton, supra note 30, at 522.
51. East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 869 (quoting Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d
1383, 1387 (Or. 1978)).
52. United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 156, 647 A.2d 405,
410 (1994).
53. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986).
54. Id. at 33, 517 A.2d at 344.
55. Id. at 35, 517 A.2d at 345.
56. 1& In arriving at this conclusion, the Court of Appeals found persuasive the rea-
soning of the Indiana Supreme Court in Barnes v. Mac Brown and Co., 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind.
1976). See Whiting-Turner, 308 Md. at 34, 517 A.2d at 345. In Barnes, the Indiana Supreme
Court asked rhetorically, "If there is a defect in a stairway and the purchaser repairs the
defect and suffers an economic loss, should he fail to recover because he did not wait until
he or some member of his family fell down the stairs and broke his neck?" Barnes, 342
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Thus, in Whiting-Turner, the Court of Appeals established a significant
exception to the economic loss rule in products liability cases.5 7 The
court shifted the analysis from injuries that had actually occurred to
the risk of potential injury.58 The court, however, cautioned against
an overly broad application of its holding, noting:
It is the serious nature of the risk that persuades us to recog-
nize the cause of action in the absence of actual injury. Ac-
cordingly, conditions that present a risk to general health,
welfare, or comfort but fall short of presenting a clear dan-
ger of death or personal injury will not suffice. A claim that
defective design or construction has produced a drafty con-
dition that may lead to a cold or pneumonia would not be
sufficient.59
As recently as 1994, the Court of Appeals held that "[e]ven where
a recovery, based on a defective product, is considered to be for eco-
nomic loss, a plaintiff may still recover in tort if the defect creates a
substantial and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury."6" In
United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore,61 the plaintiffs sued for
the significant costs of removing and rectifying the effects of asbestos
contamination in numerous municipal properties.62 In allowing the
plaintiffs to seek purely economic damages, the court stated that
N.E.2d at 621. Likewise, in Whiting-Turner, the Court of Appeals quoted a Florida court
that asked, "'Why should a buyer have to wait for a personal tragedy to occur in order to
recover damages to remedy or repair defects?'" Whiting-Turner, 308 Md. at 35, 517 A.2d at
345 (quoting Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So. 2d
515, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
57. Whiting-Turner, 308 Md. at 35, 517 A.2d at 345.
58. Id.
59. Id. at n.5. Interestingly, Judge McAuliffe's reasoning in Whiting-Turner is in accord
with a decision he authored only a month earlier-Jacques v. First National Bank of Maryland,
307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986). In deciding whether a bank owes a duty of care to a
customer in processing a loan application, theJacques court held that the determination of
whether a tort duty exists in a particular context is based on two major considerations. Id.
at 534-35, 515 A.2d at 759-60. First, a court must consider "the nature of the harm likely to
result from a failure to exercise due care." Id. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759. Second, the court
must examine "the relationship that exists between the parties." Id. The court held that
"where the risk created is one of personal injury, no ... direct relationship [between the
parties] need be shown, and the principal determinant of duty becomes foreseeability." Id.
at 535, 515 A.2d at 760. Therefore, in tort cases involving only economic loss, courts may
only permit recovery in those cases in which the risk of such harm is foreseeable.
60. United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 156-57, 647 A.2d
405, 410 (1994); see also A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 251,
634 A.2d 1330, 1333 (1994) (holding that "the determination of whether a duty should be
imposed... depend[s] upon the risk generated by the negligent conduct rather than the
nature of the resultant damage").
61. 336 Md. 145, 647 A.2d 405 (1994).
62. Id. at 152, 647 A.2d at 408.
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"'[r]ather than waiting for an occupant or user of the building to de-
velop an asbestos-related injury, we believe building owners should be
encouraged to abate the hazard to protect the public.' 6  Thus, the
plaintiffs were able to sue in tort under the exception to the economic
loss rule due to the high probability of injury or death resulting from
exposure to asbestos.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving,64
the Court of Appeals applied the same principles articulated in United
States Gypsum, but came to the opposite result, holding that the Morris
plaintiffs failed to fit within Maryland's limited exception to the eco-
nomic loss rule.65 Thus, the court ruled that the trial judge had prop-
erly dismissed the tort claims brought by the plaintiffs against the
manufacturers of FRT plywood. 6 While the court acknowledged the
general rule that plaintiffs cannot recover for purely economic
losses, 67 it went on to observe that " [s]uch losses are often the result of
some breach of contract and ordinarily should be recovered in con-
tract actions, including actions based on breach of implied or express
warranties."6" Under the Whiting-Turner exception, however, the Mor-
63. Id. at 158, 647 A.2d at 411 (quoting 80 S. Eighth St. Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-
Canada, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn.), amended by 492 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1992)).
64. 340 Md. 519, 667 A.2d 624 (1995).
65. Id. at 536, 667 A-2d at 633. This Note primarily addresses the tort claims brought
by the plaintiffs and the application of the economic loss rule in Maryland. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the claims brought under the Consumer Protection Act
on the ground that "the allegedly deceptive practices occurred entirely during the market-
ing of the plywood to the builders." Id. at 541, 667 A.2d at 636. The majority further
noted:
The only effect the alleged misrepresentations had on the sale of the townhouses
was the creation of a possibly erroneous belief on the part of the builders which
caused them to include allegedly inferior products in the townhouse. This re-
mote effect on the sale of consumer realty is not sufficient for us to conclude that
the deceptive trade practice actually occurred in that sale.
Id. at 542, 667 A.2d at 636.
The Court of Appeals also dismissed the plaintiffs' warranty claims on the ground that
"[t] he only contracts for the sale of goods occurred between defendants and the builders."
Id. at 545, 667 A.2d at 637. The court held that the plaintiffs could not bring a contract
action unless they could "circumvent the so-called 'horizontal' privity requirement." Id.
Because the plaintiffs had not been "injured in person," as required by section 2-318 of the
Maryland Commercial Law Article to abrogate the horizontal privity requirement, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs could not bring a contract action. Id., 667 A.2d at 638;
see MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-318 (1992) (allowing a third party beneficiary of an
express or implied warranty to bring a cause of action "if it is reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty").
66. Morris, 340 Md. at 545, 667 A.2d at 638.
67. Id. at 531, 667 A.2d at 631.
68. Id.
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ris court recognized that claims for purely economic losses would not
be barred if there was the requisite risk of death or personal injury
from a defective product.6 9
In presenting their case to the Court of Appeals, the parties fo-
cused on whether the facts alleged in the complaint fell within the
Whiting-Turner exception to the economic loss rule.70 The plaintiffs
argued that the roofs could not support significant amounts of weight
and thereby created a danger of injury to anyone who walked on the
roofs or to anyone below the roof during a heavy snowfall.7" The de-
fendants countered that "the risk is not clear enough to bring the
claim within the Whiting-Turner exception." 72 In addressing this issue,
the court further refined the exception to the economic loss rule by
promulgating a two-part test "to determine the degree of risk required
to circumvent the economic loss rule."7 The court declared: "We
examine both the nature of the damage threatened and the
probability of damage occurring to determine whether the two,
viewed together, exhibit a clear, serious, and unreasonable risk of
death or personal injury." 74 To provide guidance on the application
of this test, the Court of Appeals stated:
[I]f the possible injury is extraordinarily severe, i.e., multiple
deaths, we do not require the probability of the injury occur-
ring to be as high as we would require if the injury
threatened were less severe, i.e. a broken leg or damage to
property. Likewise, if the probability of the injury occurring
is extraordinarily high, we do not require the injury to be as
severe as we would if the probability of injury were lower.75
69. Id. at 532, 667 A.2d at 631.




74. Id., 667 A-2d at 631-32.
75. 1d., 667 A.2d at 632. The two-part test presented by the Morris court combines
reasoning found in Whiting-Turner and United States Gypsum. Id., 667 A.2d at 631. The
.severity component" stems from Whiting-Turner, in which the court found that the con-
struction of a twenty-one story condominium, with ten vertical utility shafts that lacked a
sufficient fire-resistance rating, put residents at risk of death or severe personal injury.
Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308
Md. 18, 22, 517 A.2d 336, 338 (1986). The Morris court, in construing Whiting-Turner,
stated that "[e]ven though no fire had actually occurred and the probability that the defect
would cause the fire was not extraordinarily high, we allowed the plaintiffs to maintain a
tort action because the nature of the possible damage was very serious-multiple deaths
and personal injuries." Morris, 340 Md. at 533-34, 667 A.2d at 632.
The Morris court derived the "probability element" from United States Gypsum. Id. at
534, 667 A.2d at 632. As the Morris court recounted, in United States Gypsum, "[t]he possible
injury-inhalation of asbestos fibers causing serious diseases-was coupled with a high
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The Court of Appeals recognized that using the two-part ap-
proach to analyze whether a tort claim for purely economic losses is
actionable creates a prudent balance between two competing policy
interests.7 6 The court emphasized that this narrow exception ade-
quately addressed concerns announced in East River Steamship Corp.
and in Seely over "'keep [ing] products liability and contract law in sep-
arate spheres."'77 The Court of Appeals maintained that this consid-
eration, however, must be tempered by the necessity "of en-couraging
people to correct dangerous conditions before a tragedy results."
78
Applying the test to the facts of Morris, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the plaintiffs failed to "meet the required legal threshold
of pleading the existence of a clear and extreme danger of death or
serious personal injury."79 The majority noted that none of the plain-
tiffs had alleged that a single individual had actually suffered injury
since the installation of the roofs," nor had the plaintiffs alleged that
a single roof had collapsed under the weight of a heavy snowfall.8"
The court stressed that in order to properly invoke the exception to
the economic loss rule, a "substantial risk of death or serious physical
injury" must exist.8 2 The court ultimately warned that "[t] o lower the
threshold to encompass mere 'possibilities' of injury . . . is to
probability that personal injuries thereby would result because everyone who used the
building could have been exposed to asbestos fibers in the air." Id.; see United States Gyp-
sum Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 336 Md. at 145, 157-58, 647 A.2d 405, 411 (1994).
76. Morris, 340 Md. at 534, 667 A.2d at 632.
77. Id. (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870-
71 (1986)).
78. Id. at 534, 667 A.2d at 632. The Morris court rejected Supreme Court criticism of
approaches "based on the degree of risk as 'too indeterminate to enable manufacturers
easily to structure their business behavior.'" Id. at 535, 667 A.2d at 632 (quoting East River
S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 870). The court observed that tort liability requires manufacturing
enterprises to modify their business behavior in two areas and that Maryland's risk-of-harm
rule does not cause major disruptions in either area. Id. The court explained:
The first area is the actual manufacturing and marketing of the product, in which
manufacturers, regardless of the extent of tort liability, should always attempt to
mitigate risks of death or personal injury. The second area is the allocation of
funds to cover potential tort liability. In this area, our rule, because of the ex-
treme nature of the risk required to trigger it, limits liability to, predominantly,
those situations in which either liability would inevitably be created by actual
physical injury or the manufacturer's exposure to liability is so great that it cannot
be ignored.
Id., 667 A.2d at 632-33. With this statement, the court emphasized the narrow scope of the
exception to the economic loss rule, by implying that the exception's application is appro-
priate only in the most extreme and foreseeable circumstances. Id.
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'cheapen' the legitimacy of the exception to the economic loss rule
and thereby invite an avalanche of such tort claims in future cases. 8a3
Judge Eldridge dissented from the court's decision to affirm the
dismissal of the plaintiffs' tort claims.8 4 He found that "the plaintiffs
have alleged in their complaint that there is an immediate threat of
personal injury if weight is applied to their roofs which are con-
structed with FRT plywood."8" He noted that the complaint had suffi-
ciently alleged potential injuries stemming from either snow or
someone walking on the roof.86 Judge Eldridge criticized the majority
for not "accepting these assertions on their face and drawing reason-
able inferences from the assertions favorable to the plaintiffs, which is
the correct approach in reviewing the dismissal of a complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim."
87
4. Analysis.-The approach adopted by the Morris court deli-
cately balances policy issues on both sides of the spectrum by requir-
ing plaintiffs to allege facts showing that a defective product presents
a serious risk of danger before falling outside the pale of the eco-
nomic loss rule. 88 This decision keeps products liability and contract
law within their respective spheres while properly holding manufac-
turers liable in tort, not only for the harm they cause but also for the
unreasonable risk that they create. 9
The test applied by the Morris court can only serve these polar
interests if employed with discretion. To allow superficial allegations
of risks for potential injury in order to find shelter within the excep-
tion would "'cheapen' the legitimacy" of the economic loss rule.9 ° Ac-
cordingly, the Court of Appeals reiterated the necessity of
maintaining a high threshold for circumventing the economic loss
83. Id.
84. Id. at 547, 667 A.2d at 638 (EldridgeJ., dissenting). Judge Eldridge also dissented
from the majority's dismissal of the plaintiffs' Consumer Protection Act claim. Id. at 552,
667 A-2d at 641. He maintained that "[t]he distinction drawn by the majority between a
manufacturer's advertising aimed directly at the ultimate consumers and a manufacturer's
advertising aimed at intermediate sellers such as builders or building supply stores, is
largely a distinction without a difference." Id. at 553, 667 A.2d at 641. Judges Bell and
Raker concurred with Judge Eldridge's dissent. Id. at 555, 667 A.2d at 642.
85. Id. at 548, 667 A-2d at 639.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Morris, 340 Md. at 536, 667 A.2d at 633.
89. See Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Con-
tracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 35, 517 A.2d 336, 345 (1986).
90. Mornis, 340 Md. at 536, 667 A.2d at 633.
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rule such that only the "extreme nature of the risk" can trigger the
availability of the exception.91
Unfortunately, though, the Morris court also left itself open to
criticism. In holding that the plaintiffs did not have a cognizable tort
claim under the exception to the economic loss rule, the majority
pointed to the absence of allegations that actual injuries had resulted
from people walking on the roofs or from collapsed roofs.9 2 Judge
Eldridge, in dissent, appropriately countered: "This clearly is not the
law."9" In so concluding, Judge Eldridge pointed to language in Whit-
ing-Turner that provides: "'where the dangerous condition is discov-
ered before it results in injury, an action in negligence will lie for the
recovery of the reasonable cost of correcting the condition."' 94 He
further stressed that the entire premise behind Maryland's exception
to the economic loss rule is that plaintiffs should not have to wait for
an injury to occur before they can bring an action to recover the rea-
sonable cost to repair the defect.95
Under Whiting-Turner and its progeny, Judge Eldridge appropri-
ately admonished the majority for referring to actual injury as a pre-
requisite to recovery under the exception to the economic loss rule.
That requirement clearly contradicts the policy interests behind the
exception. This did not detract significantly, however, from the cen-
tral focus of the majority's holding. For the exception to apply, the
onus fell on the plaintiffs to plead facts that constituted a serious and
real risk of injury.96 With the burden of balancing the competing in-
terests under the exception to the economic loss rule, the court sim-
ply made a determination that the facts alleged by the plaintiffs failed
to meet the strict standard that it had set forth. A lenient policy to-
ward adjudicating such claims would transform the exception into the
norm and precipitate a flood of tort claims in the future.97 Plaintiffs
that do not allege the requisite risk of harm would be allowed to insti-
tute pure economic loss tort actions, which should properly be re-
served for the realm of contract law. 98
91. Id. at 535, 667 A.2d at 633.
92. Id. at 536, 667 A.2d at 633.
93. Id. at 549, 667 A.2d at 639 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Whiting-Turner, 308 Md. at 22, 517 A.2d at 338).
95. Id.
96. Morris, 340 Md. at 536, 667 A.2d at 633.
97. Id.
98. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872 (1986)
("The maintenance of product value and quality is precisely the purpose of express and
implied warranties.").
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Judge Eldridge also attacked the majority for failing to accept the
factual pleadings on their face and "drawing reasonable inferences
from the assertions favorable to the plaintiffs."99 Judge Eldridge char-
acterized the majority's holding that the plaintiffs had failed to meet
the "legal threshold of pleading" as drawing "inferences in the light
most. favorable to the defendants."1"' Judge Eldridge failed to ac-
knowledge, however, that the strict legal standard established by the
majority's position is the natural result of balancing the competing
policy interests surrounding the exception to the economic loss
rule.' O' Deference to a plaintiffs claims is certainly mandated when
considering a motion to dismiss. 112 In setting forth the exception to
the economic loss rule, however, the majority was acutely aware of the
need to differentiate contract and tort law while still protecting con-
sumers from those products that pose a serious risk of injury.' In
order to serve both of these goals, the court set a high legal standard
that the plaintiffs simply failed to satisfy when alleging the potential
for harm resulting from the defective roofs.'0 4 By emphasizing the
"serious" nature of the risk involved, the court has put subsequent
plaintiffs on notice of the legal requirements necessary to bring an
economic loss action under tort law.
5. Conclusion.-By adopting a definitive two-part approach for
determining exceptions to the economic loss rule-requiring analysis
of both the magnitude and potential for risk from a defective prod-
uct-the Court of Appeals successfully balanced two competing socie-
tal interests. l'0 The court heeded the necessity of distinguishing
products liability from contract law and imposed a rigorous standard
that a plaintiff must meet to succeed on a tort claim for purely eco-
nomic losses.'06 Only if the risk of harm presents a serious danger of
death or personal injury can a plaintiff avoid the harshness of the eco-
nomic loss doctrine. 107 In these situations, the degree of risk justifies
99. Morris, 340 Md. at 548, 667 A.2d at 639 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Morris, 340 Md. at 534-35, 667 A.2d at 632.
102. See A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 249, 634 A.2d 1330,
1332 (1994) (stating that it is necessary to "assume the truth of all well-pleaded relevant
and material facts as well as all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom" in
reviewing a trial court's decision to dismiss for failing to state a claim).
103. Morris, 340 Md. at 534-35, 667 A.2d at 632.
104. Id. at 536, 667 A.2d at 633.
105. See Connaughton, supra note 30, at 522.
106. Morris, 340 Md. at 534, 667 A.2d at 632.
107. Id. at 535, 667 A.2d at 632.
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the "imposition of a duty in favor of a large class of persons." ' 8 Thus,
through this exception, manufacturers are charged with addressing
defects in their products before a tragedy occurs.109
JAMES H. WEST
108. Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., 307 Md. 527, 537, 515 A.2d 756, 761 (1986).
109. Morris, 340 Md. at 534, 667 A.2d at 632.
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X. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Failing to Construe the Workers' Compensation Act Liberally
In Waskiewicz v. General Motors Corp.,' a case of first impression, 2
the Court of Appeals held that an employee could not base a new
claim for workers' compensation benefits on a new injurious exposure
to the hazards of an occupational disease if the employee had already
received benefits for a prior exposure and the new exposure merely
caused the already existing disability to worsen.3 More specifically,
the court held that because the plaintiff, Robert Waskiewicz (Was-
kiewicz), who suffered from a severe case of carpal tunnel syndrome,
failed to demonstrate that his recent exposure to hazardous work-
place duties caused him to develop a new occupational disease, rather
than exacerbating a pre-existing condition for which he had been
compensated sixteen years earlier, Waskiewicz could not establish the
basis for a new claim.4 Moreover, because Maryland's Workers' Com-
pensation Act imposes a five-year statute of limitations period on the
modification of an award of benefits, the court held that the Act pre-
cluded Waskiewicz from all further recovery.5
The decision, which even the court's majority acknowledged as
having created "some seeming unfairness,"6 has generated considera-
ble controversy.7 The provisions of the Act pertaining to occupational
disease do not precisely address the particular facts of Waskiewicz's
case. In such cases, where uncertainty exists, the legislature requires
courts to construe the Act liberally in favor of employees.' The
court's narrow reading of the Act dealt a harsh and unfair blow to
plaintiffs and provided employers with unnecessary and undeserved
immunity.
1. 342 Md. 699, 679 A.2d 1094 (1996).
2. Id. at 704, 679 A.2d at 1096.
3. Id. at 700, 679 A.2d at 1095.
4. Id. at 704, 679 A.2d at 1096.
5. Id. at 709-13, 679 A.2d at 1099-1101.
6. Id. at 712, 679 A.2d at 1101.
7. See id. at 715-23, 679 A.2d at 1102-06 (Chasanow,J., dissenting) (maintaining that
the majority's holding runs contrary to the legislature's intent); Gregory C. Baumann, Bur-
den on Workers to Tend Comp Claims, WARFiEm's Bus. REc., Aug. 5, 1996, at 3, available in
1996 WL 8797993 (describing the court's narrow reading of the workers' compensation
statute); Gregory C. Baumann, High Court Takes Hard Line in Workers' Comp Decision, DAiLY
REc.,July 30, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 8558955 (noting that the court's four-to-three
ruling "threatens to deny workers' compensation to injured employees who fail to protect
their claims as their conditions worsen").
8. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-102 (1991).
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1. The Case.-General Motors (GM) hired Waskiewicz as an as-
sembly line worker in the early 1970s. In 1973, shortly after he began
his employment, Waskiewicz developed bilateral carpal tunnel syn-
drome.1" This condition, which resulted from the repetitive labor
that Waskiewicz performed on GM's assembly line, caused Waskiewicz
to experience inflammation, pain, and numbness in the muscles of his
wrists and hands.11 At the time the disease first developed, Waskiewicz
underwent surgery and filed a workers' compensation claim for disa-
bility resulting from occupational disease. 2 In April 1976, the Work-
ers' Compensation Commission (Commission) awarded Waskiewicz
benefits for "temporary total and permanent partial disability" a" be-
cause of Waskiewicz's fifteen percent loss of the use of both of his
hands. 1
4
Between 1976 and 1989, Waskiewicz continued to receive treat-
ment for his condition, including several surgical procedures. 15 More-
over, in 1987, GM placed Waskiewicz on "light duty" because of his
continuing condition.16 This light duty effectively restricted Was-
kiewicz from performing job duties involving heavy lifting or the use
of power tools.17 In 1991, Waskiewicz's surgeon recommended to GM
that Waskiewicz no longer engage in lifting, repetitive motion, or the
use of air guns. 8 GM disregarded this recommendation, however,
and placed Waskiewicz back on its assembly line, requiring Waskiewicz
to use "hand tools in a repetitive manner."1 9 Not surprisingly, Was-
kiewicz's condition subsequently worsened.2" Finally, in March 1992,
Waskiewicz's surgeon recommended that Waskiewicz cease working.2'
Waskiewicz underwent another surgery in September 1992 that
9. Waskiwicz, 342 Md. at 700-01, 679 A.2d at 1095.
10. Id. at 701, 679 A.2d at 1095. Carpal tunnel syndrome is defined as:
A condition resulting from pressure on the median nerve as it traverses the carpal
tunnel .... usually by fibers of the transverse carpal ligament. The condition is
characterized by pain, tingling, burning, numbness, etc. in the areas supplied by
the nerve, i.e., in the skin of the palm, fingers, wrist, etc. There may also be
swelling of the fingers and atrophy of some of the muscles of the hand, especially
those at the base of the thumb.
1J.E. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYs' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WoRD FINDER C-61 (Supp. 1991).
11. Waskiewica 342 Md. at 701 n.2, 679 A.2d at 1095 n.2.
12. Id. at 701, 679 A.2d at 1095.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 701-02, 679 A.2d at 1095.
16. Id. at 702, 679 A.2d at 1095.
17. Id.
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proved unsuccessful. 22 As a result of the repetitive work activities that
required the use of power tools, Waskiewicz suffered a one hundred
percent loss in the use of both of his hands and could no longer con-
tinue working.23
In August 1992, Waskiewicz filed a second claim for workers'
compensation for injuries resulting from carpal tunnel syndrome.24
In his application for benefits, Waskiewicz claimed that his disability
began on March 3, 1992.25 The Workers' Compensation Commission
refused to provide benefits for Waskiewicz's second claim, however,
on the ground that he "did not sustain an occupational disease of
carpal tunnel syndrome arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment as alleged to have occurred on [March 3, 1992] ."26 The Com-
mission's one-sentence order suggested that it "did not regard Mr.
Waskiewicz's condition in 1992 as a new occupational disease."27
Waskiewicz appealed the Commission's decision to the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City, which reversed. 28 The Circuit Court held
that Waskiewicz's most recent exposure to the hazards of carpal tun-
nel syndrome, which resulted in total disability, constituted a new
compensable event that gave rise to an entirely new claim.29 The Cir-
cuit Court judge concluded that to relate Waskiewicz's most recent
injurious exposure back to his first exposure in 1973 would "unneces-
sarily create a hardship and would result in an unreasonable interpre-
tation of [Maryland's Workers' Compensation] statute."3 °
The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that Waskiewicz
had not suffered a new disability, but had instead exacerbated an ex-
isting condition that first developed in 1973.31 The court concluded
that Waskiewicz's continued exposure to the causes of carpal tunnel
syndrome could not form the basis of a new claim under the provi-
sions of the Act pertaining to occupational disease.3 2 In dicta, the
court noted that Waskiewicz could only recover additional benefits by





26. Joint Record Extract at 97, Waskiewicz v. General Motors Corp., 342 Md. 699, 679
A.2d 1094 (1996) (No. 105).
27. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 703, 679 A.2d at 1096.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Joint Record Extract at 76, Waskiewicz (No. 105).
31. Waskiewicz v. General Motors Corp., No. 1625 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.June 19, 1995),
aff'd, 342 Md. 699, 679 A.2d 1094 (1996).
32. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 703, 679 A.2d at 1096.
1997] 1021
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tions for the modification of claims would prevent him from doing
SO.
33
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari34 to resolve the question
of "whether a new workers' compensation claim, rather than a request
for modification of an existing award, can be based on an additional
injurious exposure to hazards aggravating an existing disability resulting
from an occupational disease."3 5
2. Legal Background.-
a. Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act.-Prior to the enact-
ment of Maryland's workers' compensation statute in 1914, an em-
ployee's sole remedy against an employer for a workplace injury was a
common law tort action.3 6 Employees, more often than not, found
such actions difficult to win.3 7 When they did win, though, employers
faced high monetary verdicts.3 8 Maryland adopted its first workers'
compensation statute as a means to relieve the burdens of tort litiga-
tion on both parties.3 9 The legislature created the Workers' Compen-
sation Act in order to provide "sure and certain" compensation to
employees for disabilities resulting from workplace injuries "regard-
less of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other rem-
edy."4" Employees, therefore, were more likely to recover for
workplace injuries, and employers could avoid costly litigation and ex-
cessive damages awards.
b. Compensation for Occupational Disease.--Section 9-502 of
Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act allows employees to receive
compensation for disability resulting from occupational disease.41
The definition of disablement does not require that an employee be
incapacitated from working in any occupation, but only in the occupa-
33. Id. at 703-04, 679 A.2d at 1096.
34. Waskiewicz v. General Motors Corp., 340 Md. 650, 667 A.2d 897 (1995).
35. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 704, 679 A.2d at 1096.
36. See MAURICE J. PRESSMAN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN MARYLAND § 1-1 (2d ed.
1977) (describing the history and purpose of Maryland's workers' compensation laws).
37. See id. (discussing the difficulties in establishing employer liability and the availabil-




40. Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 800, Md. Laws 1430 (Preamble).
41. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-502 (1991). Section 9-502 states in pertinent
part:
(a) "Disablement" defined.-In this section, "disablement" means the event of a cov-
ered employee becoming partially or totally incapacitated:
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tion through which the employee was exposed to the disease.42 If the
claimant can "perform reasonably analogous work within the same oc-
cupational classification at the same or higher wages," the claimant is
not regarded as being incapacitated from performing the work in
which the claimant was last occupied.43
The Act holds liable for the employee's disability the employer
for whom the employee was working when she was last injuriously ex-
posed to the hazards of the occupational disease.44 Prior to the devel-
opment of the last injurious exposure rule, courts apportioned
liability among employers, both past and present, by determining
what percentage of the claimant's disability arose at each workplace. 45
Under this system, courts faced the difficult problem of "prorating
(1) because of an occupational disease; and
(2) from performing the work of the covered employee in the last occupa-
tion in which the covered employee was injuriously exposed to the hazards of the
occupational disease.
(b) Scope of application to eployer... .- Subsection (c) of this section applies only
to:
(1) the employer in whose employment the covered employee was last injuri-
ously exposed to the hazards of the occupational disease; ....
(c) Liability of employer... .- Subject to subsection (d) of this section and except
as otherwise provided, an employer . . .to whom this subsection applies shall
provide compensation in accordance with this title to:
(1) a covered employee of the employer for disability of the covered em-
ployee resulting from an occupational disease.....
Id. The Act defines occupational disease as "a disease contracted by a covered employee:
(1) as the result of and in the course of employment; and (2) that causes the covered
employee to become temporarily or permanently, partially or totally incapacitated." Id.
§ 9-101(g). Maryland courts have, in turn, defined occupational disease as an "ailment,
disorder, or illness which is the expectable result of working under conditions naturally
inherent in the employment and inseparable therefrom, and is ordinarily slow and insidi-
ous in its approach." Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 486, 6 A.2d 48, 53 (1939). The Court
of Special Appeals has made clear that carpal tunnel syndrome qualifies as an occupational
disease under the Act. See CES Card Establishment Servs., Inc. v. Doub, 104 Md. App. 301,
656 A.2d 332 (1995).
42. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-502 (a) (2).
43. Adams v. Western Elec. Co., 63 Md. App. 587, 593, 493 A.2d 392, 395 (1985). In
Adams, the Court of Special Appeals interpreted Article 101, section 22 (a) of the Maryland
Code, section 9-502's predecessor. See id. at 589, 493 A-2d at 393. The relevant language in
the two statutes is substantially similar. See id.
In order to show partial incapacitation, an employee must demonstrate that she is
"less capable of working than she had been previously." Miller v. Western Elec. Co., 310
Md. 173, 193, 528 A.2d 486, 496 (1987). Courts must consider a number of factors when
deciding whether an employee is partially incapacitated. See id. These factors include
whether the employee has suffered wage loss or has experienced a decrease in production
and whether the employer has become dissatisfied with the employee's work or decreased
the employee's work assignments. See id.; CES Card, 104 Md. App. at 318, 656 A.2d at 340.
44. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-502(b) (1).
45. See Edward M. Vokoun, Using the Last Exposure Rule in the Determination of Liability of
Employers and Insurers for Occupational Diseases, 20 FORUM 102, 104 (1984) (discussing the
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disability" and using complex "medical evidence identifying manifes-
tation of symptoms, their origin, and the disabling event."4 6 Courts
developed the "last injurious exposure rule" to eliminate difficulties
that arose in cases involving employees exposed to occupational dis-
ease at multiple worksites.47 Eventually, the Maryland General Assem-
bly codified the rule in Article 101, section 23 (b), section 9-502's
predecessor.48
The last injurious exposure rule requires courts to locate the date
of disability and then search backward to the last instance the em-
ployee was exposed to the disease-causing hazard.49 The employer for
whom the employee worked at that time and its insurer are then liable
to the employee for compensation benefits.5" If an employee has al-
ready been compensated for an occupational disease, any subsequent
disability "occurring under a different carrier will be chargeable to the
first carrier if it is a recurrence of the first disability."51
Recently, in CES Card Establishment Services, Inc. v. Doub,5 2 the
Court of Special Appeals further examined the "relationship between
the date of disablement and date of last injurious exposure to the
hazards of an occupational disease.""5 In CES Card, the court had to
determine which of two employers should be held liable for an em-
ployee's disability due to carpal tunnel syndrome.54 The employee
had been exposed to the hazards of the disease while working for both
problem of establishing employer liability for longstanding, insidious occupational
diseases).
46. Id. at 106.
47. See, e.g., Enyard v. Consolidated Underwriters, 390 S.W.2d 417, 429-30 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1965) (noting that application of the last injurious exposure rule eliminates the diffi-
culties of allocating liability among a number of employers and identifying a precise time
when an injury took place); Osteen v. A.C. & S., Inc., 307 N.W.2d 514, 518-19 (Neb. 1981)
(stating that application of the last injurious exposure rule eliminates the "guess work"
involved in apportioning liability and pinpointing the inception of the disease); Rutedge
v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 301 S.E.2d 359, 362-63 (N.C. 1983) (holding that the last inju-
rious exposure rule does not require an employee to prove that the most recent exposure
caused or significantly contributed to the disease).
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 23(b) (1979 & Supp. 1983) (recodified in section 9-502).
49. See 4 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 95.25(a) (Supp.
1996).
50. See id.
51. Id. § 95.27.
52. 104 Md. App. 301, 656 A.2d 332 (1995).
53. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 707 n.6, 679 A.2d at 1095 n.6 (discussing CES Card).
54. CES Card, 104 Md. App. at 304, 656 A.2d at 333. Originally, the plaintiff worked at
Citicorp from January 1986 to July 1, 1992. Id. at 305, 656 A.2d at 334. On July 1, 1992, a
change in ownership occurred, and the plaintiff became an employee of CES Card. Id.
The plaintiff named CES Card and its insurers as defendants. Id. at 305-06, 656 A.2d at
334. CES Card, in turn, impleaded Citicorp. Id. at 306, 656 A.2d at 334.
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employers. 55 The court determined that the employer for whom the
employee was working when she was last injuriously exposed should
assume liability. 56 Significantly, the court defined an injurious expo-
sure as an exposure that "contributed to the onset of disability-not
one that may have exacerbated an existing disability."5 7 Thus, the
court held, "in occupational disease cases the date of last injurious
exposure can never come after the date of disability." 58
c. " Distinguishing Between Occupational Disease and Accidental
Injuy. -Disablement due to accidental personal injury differs in some
respects from disablement due to occupational disease. 59 For exam-
ple, the dependents of a covered employee may only recover benefits
for her death from accidental personal injury if the death occurs
within seven years of the accident 6 No such limitation exists in occu-
pational disease cases. Nevertheless, in Shifflett v. Powhattan Mining
Co.,6" the Court of Appeals reasoned that disablement from occupa-
tional disease should be "statutorily treated much like an injury
caused by an accident,"62 although "[s]ome special provisions are re-
quired which depart from a strict application of the analogy." 5 Other
jurisdictions are leaning toward the more modem approach of treat-
55. Id. at 305-06, 656 A.2d at 334.
56. Id. at 314, 656 A.2d at 338. The court emphasized that it is the date of disability and
not the date of diagnosis that is relevant in determining when the employee was last injuri-
ously exposed. Id. at 310, 656 A.2d at 336. The date of disability is "'"the moment at which
in most instances the claimant ought to know he has a compensable claim."'" Id. at 311-12,
656 A.2d at 337 (quoting Lowery v. McCormick Asbestos Co., 300 Md. 28, 40, 475 A.2d
1168, 1174 (1984) (quoting 4 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 95.21
(1981))).
57. Id. at 314, 656 A.2d at 338.
58. Id.
59. Compare section 9-502 of the Act, see supra note 41, with section 9-501. Section 9-
501 states in pertinent part:
(a) In general-Except as otherwise provided, each employer of a covered em-
ployee shall provide compensation in accordance with this title to:
(1) the covered employee for an accidental personal injury sustained by the
covered employee; or
(2) the dependents of the covered employee for death of the covered
employee:
(i) resulting from an accidental personal injury sustained by the covered
employee; and
(ii) occurring within 7 years after the date of the accidental personal
injury.
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-501(a) (1991).
60. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-501(a) (2)(ii).
61. 293 Md. 198, 442 A.2d 980 (1982).
62. Id. at 202, 442 A.2d at 983.
63. Id. at 203, 442 A.2d at 983.
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ing disability from occupational disease and disability from accidental
injury the same.'
d. Preexisting Conditions.--Section 9-656 of the Act permits
an employee to receive compensation when the employee becomes
disabled in part because of a "preexisting disease or infirmity" and in
part because of a subsequent accidental personal injury or occupa-
tional disease.65 When this situation occurs, the Commission must de-
termine "the proportion of the disability that is reasonably
attributable solely to the accidental personal injury or occupational
disease" and "the proportion of the disability that is reasonably attrib-
utable to the preexisting disease or infirmity."66 The employer must
then compensate the employee for the part of the disability that is
attributable solely to the subsequent personal injury or occupational
disease. 7
Section 9-656 applies in cases in which the resulting disability
does not exceed fifty percent of the body as a whole.68 If the resulting
disability exceeds fifty percent of the body as a whole, section 9-802
applies.69 Section 9-802 provides in pertinent part:
64. See, e.g., Fry's Food Stores v. Industrial Comm'n, 866 P.2d 1350, 1353 (Ariz. 1994)
(en banc) ("[W]hile some distinct provisions for occupational diseases remain, the mod-
em approach is to treat diseases and injuries the same.").
In the past, finding that a disability resulted from disease as opposed to an injury was
simply another way of holding that the disability was "noncompensable." B LARsON, supra
note 49, § 41.31. Because many states have expanded occupational disease legislation,
however, the contrast between the two types of disabilities has lost much of its importance.
See id. Often, awards are made "without specifying which category the injury falls in." Id.
65. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-656. Section 9-656 provides:
(a) Determination by Commission.-If it appears that a permanent disability of a
covered employee following an accidental personal injury or occupational disease
is due partly to the accidental personal injury or occupational disease and partly
to a preexisting disease or infirmity, the Commission shall determine:
(1) the proportion of the disability that is reasonably attributable to the acci-
dental personal injury or occupational disease; and
(2) the proportion of the disability that is reasonably attributable to the pre-
existing disease or infirmity.
(b) Payment ofcompensation.-The covered employee:
(1) is entitled to compensation for the portion of the disability of the cov-
ered employee that is reasonably attributable solely to the accidental personal
injury or occupational disease; and
(2) is not entitled to compensation for the portion of the disability that is




68. See Subsequent Injury Fund v. Rinehart, 12 Md. App. 649, 654, 280 A.2d 298, 301
(1971).
69. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-802(a).
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(a) Limitation on liability of employer and insurer.-If a cov-
ered employee has a permanent impairment and suffers a
subsequent accidental personal injury, occupational disease,
or compensable hernia resulting in permanent partial or
permanent total disability that is substantially greater due to
the combined effects of the previous impairment and the
subsequent occurrence than it would have been from the
subsequent compensable event alone, the employer or its in-
surer is liable only for the compensation payable under this
title for the subsequent accidental personal injury, occupa-
tional disease, or compensable hernia.7 °
If this is the case, the employee, in addition to her recovery from the
employer, may recover from the Subsequent Injury Fund under sec-
tion 9-802(b), if certain requirements are met.7 A majority of states
have passed similar apportionment provisions.72 The general goal of
these provisions is to "encourage employers to hire previously-injured
workers and to discourage discrimination against handicapped indi-
viduals"7 3 by reassuring employers that they must only compensate for
that part of the disability that is attributable to the accident or disease
caused by employment.74
e. Liberal Construction of the Act.-The legislature intended
courts to construe Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act liberally in
favor of employees. The statute itself states that the Act should be
"construed to carry out its general purpose" and should not be
"strictly construed."75 The general purpose of the Act is the "benevo-
70. Id. § 9-802.
71. See id. § 9-802(b). The Subsequent Injury Fund is funded by "a 6 1/2 percent as-
sessment against employer/insurers on all permanent disability and death benefit awards."
THEODORE B. CORNBLAT-r ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION MANuAL § 4.1, at 4-2 (7th ed.
1993).
72. See Ellen P. Peirce & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Workers' Compensation and Occupa-
tional Disease: A Return to Original Inten, 67 OR. L REv. 649, 667-68 (1988).
73. Id. at 668; see also Weaver v. Tyson Foods, 790 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990)
(en banc) (observing that Arkansas's Subsequent Injury Fund was established to prevent
an employer from being held liable for impairment that occurred outside of the worker's
employment); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. Walter, 812 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Colo. 1991) (en
banc) (noting that the purpose of Colorado's Subsequent Injury Fund is to provide em-
ployment opportunities for partially disabled persons by relieving employers from full re-
sponsibility when such persons suffer permanent disability resulting from a subsequent
injury).
74. See Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 72, at 667-68.
75. MD. CODE ANN., LA.B. & EMPL. § 9-102. This section reads: "(a) In general-This
title shall be construed to carry out its general purpose. (b) Rule for strict construction inap-
plicable.-The rule that a statute in derogation of the common law is to be strictly con-
strued does not apply to this title." Id.
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lent" one of "remedial social legislation."76 Maryland courts have fol-
lowed the general rule that the "Workers' Compensation Act as a
whole 'should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees
as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent pur-
poses.'"7 Moreover, the Court of Appeals has held that "[a] ny uncer-
tainty in the meaning of the statute should be resolved in favor of the
claimant" 8 and that courts should "'seek to avoid [statutory] con-
structions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with com-
mon sense."' 79 Statutory language, the court has reasoned, should
not be read in isolation, but with an eye toward the general purpose of
the statute.80 The duty to construe the Act liberally, however, is not
without its limitations. Maryland courts have clearly held that "neither
statutory language nor legislative intent can be stretched beyond the
fair implication of the statute's words or its purpose."81
f Reopening and Modifying Claims.-The General Assembly
created a provision by which the Workers' Compensation Commission
can reopen and modify claims.8 2 The Act empowers the Commission
to readjust or terminate compensation payments if there is an "aggra-
vation, diminution, or termination of disability."" The Act imposes a
statute of limitations period, however, with respect to reopening
claims.8 4 An employee must file an application for modification
"within 5 years after the last compensation payment. "85
Although the Act calls for a liberal construction, Maryland courts
have made clear that this mandate does not apply to the statute of
limitations provisions for the reopening and modification of claims.8 6
76. Lovellette v. Mayor of Baltimore, 297 Md. 271, 282, 465 A.2d 1141, 1147 (1983).
77. Para v. Richards Group, 339 Md. 241, 251, 661 A.2d 737, 742 (1995) (quoting How-
ard County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210,
1213 (1980)); see Lovetlette, 297 Md. at 282, 465 A.2d at 1147; Ewing v. Koppers Co., 69 Md.
App. 722, 731, 519 A.2d 790, 794 (1987); Coats & Clark's Sales Corp. v. Stewart, 39 Md.
App. 10, 16, 383 A.2d 67, 72 (1978); Keene v. Insley, 26 Md. App. 1, 10, 337 A.2d 168, 174
(1975).
78. Lovellette, 297 Md. at 282, 465 A.2d at 1147; see also Walls, 288 Md. at 530, 418 A.2d
at 1213 ("Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant.").
79. Board of Trustees v. Hughes, 340 Md. 1, 7, 664 A.2d 1250, 1253 (1995) (quoting
Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994)).
80. See id.
81. Soper v. Montgomery County, 294 Md. 331, 335, 449 A.2d 1158, 1160 (1982).
82. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-736 (1991).
83. Id. § 9-736(a).
84. Id. § 9-736(b) (3).
85. Id.
86. See Montgomery County v. McDonad, 317 Md. 466, 564 A.2d 797 (1989), a case in-
volving an attempt to reopen an occupational disease claim barred by the Act's limitations
provisions. Id. The Court of Appeals held that, although the legislature clearly intended
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The Court of Appeals justified its strict adherence to the statute of
limitations for modifying claims in Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc.17 The
Vest court reasoned that allowing claims to be reopened based on inju-
ries from many years prior would "'necessarily encounter awkward
problems of proof " and would impose hardships on insurance com-
panies that would have "'difficulty in computing appropriate
reserves'" because of the uncertainty of potential future liabilities."8
Further, the court held that, even if the Commission expressed an
intention to reserve continuing jurisdiction over the case at the time
the original award was granted, it could not do so because the statute
plainly limits the jurisdiction of the Commission to within five years of
the last compensation payment.
89
Professor Larson, in his well-known and highly regarded treatise
on workers' compensation law, drew a clear distinction between cir-
cumstances in which the aggravation of disability requires use of re-
opening provisions and circumstances in which the aggravation of
disability constitutes a new compensable injury.9" Professor Larson
stated that "when complications develop directly from the original in-
jury ... the reopening statute applies, and the limitation period can-
not be escaped by calling the condition a new disability."91 Moreover,
he stated, if there is "no causal relation between the first injury and
the subsequent condition, reopening is obviously not the appropriate
remedy."9" Professor Larson offers a list of the types of changes in
condition that would ordinarily come under the re-opening statute:
"progression, deterioration, or aggravation of the compensable condi-
tion, achievement of disabling character by a previously asymptomatic
complaint, appearance of new and more serious features.., failure to
recover within the time originally predicted, and superimposition or
worsening of a neurotic condition."9" One of the principal advan-
tages of the reopening statute, he states, is that it "permits a commis-
sion to make the best estimate of disability it can at the time of the
the court to interpret the Act liberally, this was not meant to imply that specific provisions
should be disregarded. Id. at 472, 564 A.2d at 800.
87. 329 Md. 461, 620 A.2d 340 (1993).
88. Id. at 471, 620 A.2d at 344 (quoting 2 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 81.10 (Desk ed. 1976)).
89. Id. at 475-76, 620 A.2d at 346-47.
90. See 3 LARSON, supra note 49, § 81.31(b).
91. Id. (foomote omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id. § 81.31(a) (foomotes omitted).
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original award, although at that moment it may be impossible to pre-
dict the extent of future disability."
94
3. The Court's Reasoning. -Waskiewicz argued to the Court of
Appeals that his most recent exposure to carpal tunnel syndrome in
1992, which rendered him totally disabled, should have served as a
sufficient basis for an entirely new workers' compensation claim.95 In
support of this argument, Waskiewicz interpreted section 9-502 of the
Act to mean that any time "an employee is exposed to the hazards of
an occupational disease and he thereby becomes 'precluded from per-
forming his work in the last occupation in which he was injuriously
exposed,' he 'shall be entitled to compensation."' 96 In other words,
Waskiewicz argued that his last injurious exposure constituted a com-
pensable event under the Act.
In a four-to-three decision, however, the Court of Appeals re-
jected Waskiewicz's argument, holding that an employee may not file
a new workers' compensation claim based on additional injurious ex-
posure to the causes of occupational disease if that exposure results in
the aggravation of a preexisting condition for which the employee has
already been compensated.97 In so ruling, the court held that Was-
kiewicz had misinterpreted the meaning of section 9-502 of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act when he argued that an employee's last
injurious exposure to an occupational disease constituted the "compen-
sable event" for the purpose of awarding benefits.98 Rather, the court
held, the "event of disablement," which occurs as a result of exposure
to occupational disease, "is the only event entitling [an employee] to
compensation."99
The court reasoned that the language of the statute clearly de-
fines the term "disablement" as a "singular 'event' of becoming par-
tially or totally incapacitated because of an occupational disease, not
as a series of exposures to the hazards of the same disease."100 The
court concluded that Waskiewicz incorrectly interpreted the language
94. Id.
95. Waskiewica, 342 Md. at 704, 679 A.2d at 1097.
96. Id. at 705-06, 679 A.2d at 1097 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-502
(1991)).
97. Id. at 700, 679 A.2d at 1095.
98. Id. at 706, 679 A.2d at 1097-98. The court first pointed out that Waskiewicz had
misquoted the statute when he used the phrase "precluded from performing his work" in
defining disability. Id., 679 A.2d at 1097. The statute's definition of disablement includes
partial incapacitation, which hinders but does not "preclude" an employee from perform-
ing his work. Id.
99. Id., 679 A.2d at 1098.
100. Id.
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of section 9-502(a) (2) when he argued that injurious exposure to the
hazards of a disease constitutes the compensable event.' 10 The court
maintained that the legislature merely intended the phrase "from per-
forming the work of the covered employee in the last occupation in
which the covered employee was injuriously exposed"10 2 to clarify
that, "in order to be found 'disabled,' an employee does not have be[sic] precluded by virtue of his disability from doing anything, but
rather must be incapacitated only from the last type of occupation
which exposed him to the disease." 10
The court noted that allowing a new claim for each exposure af-
ter the date of disablement would render subsection 9-502(c) mean-
ingless.104 This subsection states that an employer shall provide
compensation to "a covered employee of the employer for disability of
the covered employee resulting from an occupational disease."1"5
The majority reasoned that if the courts allowed a new claim for each
exposure after the date of disablement, there would be no way to
"pinpoint the compensable event of disability."'0 6 In addition, subsec-
tion (b) assesses liability against the employer "in whose employment
the covered employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of
the occupational disease."'0 7 The court stated that the injurious expo-
sure referred to in that subsection is used "only to determine where
the employee was working on the date of disablement" and, therefore,
which employer should be liable under subsection (c).1°8 If the injuri-
ous exposure itself served as the trigger for compensation, "a liable
employer could never be ascertained and subsection (b) would also
be meaningless."' 0 9
The court cited CES Card in support of its conclusion that there
can be only one date of disablement and one recovery." 0 The Court
of Appeals noted that because Waskiewicz's most recent injurious ex-
posure to carpal tunnel syndrome did not "cause" his condition but
"aggravated" it, this exposure could not be the basis for a new work-
ers' compensation claim.111
101. Id.
102. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-502(a) (2) (1991).
103. Waskiewic, 342 Md. at 707, 679 A.2d at 1098.
104. Id., 679 A.2d at 1098.
105. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-502(c)(1).
106. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 707, 679 A.2d at 1098 (internal quotations omitted).
107. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-502(b).
108. Waskiewia 342 Md. at 707, 679 A.2d at 1098.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 707-08, 679 A.2d at 1098-99; see supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
111. Waskiewi 342 Md. at 707 n.6, 679 A.2d at 1098 n.6.
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The court expressed concern over the consequences of allowing
Waskiewicz to recover on the "theory [that] exposure to the hazards
of an occupational disease [is] a compensable event in itself."1 2 Such
reasoning, the court noted, might lead to employees bringing a new
workers' compensation claim each day, based on a slight worsening of
a condition."' 3 The court also reasoned that the legislature would not
have included a provision for reopening existing claims if it intended
employees in Waskiewicz's circumstances to establish a brand new
claim." 4 In fact, the court held, the legislature intended the reopen-
ing provision to cover cases precisely like this one, in which an aggra-
vation of an existing disability took place after the rate of
compensation had been established."' Unfortunately for Waskiewicz,
the court held that the five-year statute of limitations period for modi-
fying claims barred Waskiewicz from any further recovery." 16
The court pointed to Vest" 7 for a review of the history and pur-
poses behind the limitations rule" 8 and emphasized problems that
the Vest court had identified as inherent in the reopening of old
cases-"'awkward problems of proof"' and the difficulty insurance
companies would have estimating future liabilities and "'computing
appropriate reserves."'119
The court speculated that Waskiewicz only attempted to file a
new claim because he knew he could not circumvent the plain mean-
ing of the Act's limitations period.1 20 Knowing that a request for mod-
ification would fail, Waskiewicz attempted "to distinguish his
particular situation from a simple reopening of an existing claim," ar-
guing that his return to the assembly line and additional exposure to
the risks of carpal tunnel syndrome were "more analogous to a new
accidental personal injury than an aggravation of an existing disabil-
ity."121 The court found Waskiewicz's analogy unpersuasive, how-
112. Id. at 708, 679 A.2d at 1099.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 712-13, 679 A.2d at 1101. The court cited Stevens v. Rite-Aid Corp., 340 Md.
555, 667 A.2d 642 (1995), in which the Court of Appeals had explained that "the reopen-
ing provision typically exists 'for situations in which a claimant's condition degenerates,
entitling the claimant to increased benefits.'" Id. at 565 n.ll, 667 A.2d at 647 n.l1).
116. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 712-13, 679 A.2d at 1101.
117. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
118. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 709, 679 A.2d at 1099.
119. Id. at 710, 679 A.2d at 1100 (quoting Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 329 Md. 461,
471, 620 A.2d 340, 344 (1993) (quoting 2 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, §
81.10 (Desk ed. 1976))).
120. Id. at 711, 679 A.2d at 1100.
121. Id. The court assumed that Waskiewicz's theory of recovery was based on the fact
that GM was at fault for reassigning him to the assembly line where he faced the repetitive
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ever. 22 In so ruling, the court noted that Waskiewicz had stipulated
that his present condition was the same disease that he had acquired
in 1973.12 The court held that "this stipulated fact alone" precluded
Waskiewicz from filing a new claim based on this disease. 1
24
The court also rejected Waskiewicz's argument that the five-year
limitations period for reopening claims was not intended to bar the
claim of an employee whose increased disability resulted from an em-
ployer subjecting an employee to hazardous employment conditions a
second time.125 In this situation, Waskiewicz argued, the employee
should be permitted to file a new claim for increased disability, much
like an employee who suffers an accidental injury that worsened a pre-
existing disability.1 26 In dismissing this argument, the court noted
that Waskiewicz did not base this theory on any legislative history of
the reopening provision.
12 7
The court acknowledged that the legislature intended courts to
construe the Workers' Compensation Act liberally, but cited past
Maryland cases holding that courts may not ignore specific terms of
the Act for the purpose of aiding injured employees. 128 Acknowledg-
ing "some seeming unfairness" in the outcome of the case,' 29 the
court intimated that had the issue been a question of equity, it would
have ruled in Waskiewicz's favor.130 The court stated that it could not
make use of its equitable power, however, because "the workers' com-
pensation statutory scheme specifically addresses [Waskiewicz's] situa-
tion." ' Therefore, the court reasoned, to allow Waskiewicz to file a
new claim would be "in essence writing new legislation."13 2
work that had brought about his condition in the first place. Id. This assumption was
based on the court's belief that it was clear that had Waskiewicz "stayed on the assembly
line without interruption, and his carpal tunnel syndrome continued to worsen over that
time, his only opportunity for increased benefits would be under the reopening provision."
Id. Because workers' compensation is a no-fault system, the court found Waskiewicz's the-
ory "quite shaky." Id. at 711-12, 679 A.2d at 1100.
122. Id. at 712, 679 A.2d at 1101.
123. Id. at 713, 679 A.2d at 1101.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 712, 679 A.2d at 1100-01.
126. Id.
127. Id., 679 A.2d at 1101.
128. Id. (citing Montgomery County v. McDonad, 317 Md. 466, 472, 564 A.2d 797, 800
(1989), for the proposition that a liberal construction does not allow courts to overlook
specific provisions of a statute).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 713, 679 A.2d at 1101 ("Were the issue before us a question of equity
rather than statutory law, GM would surely not fare so well.").
131. Id.
132. Id. at 715, 679 A.2d at 1102.
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4. Analysis.-In Waskiewicz, the Court of Appeals placed unnec-
essarily severe limitations on employees disabled by occupational dis-
ease. According to the Waskiewicz decision, unless increased disability
from an occupational disease occurs within five years of the em-
ployee's last compensation payment-the statute of limitations period
for reopening an earlier claim-the employee cannot receive further
compensation. In so holding, the court narrowly construed the provi-
sions of Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act, ignoring the legisla-
tive mandate that courts construe the Act liberally. This ruling is
certain to lead to unfair outcomes that the legislature surely did not
intend.
a. Waskiewicz Suffered a "New Injury. "-The court extensively
discussed how the Act's provision for reopening claims should be in-
terpreted so as to preclude Waskiewicz from filing a new claim for
disability.s' The court reasoned that the reopening provision cov-
ered Waskiewicz's exact situation-an aggravated condition for which
he had already been compensated.13 4 Nevertheless, the court's char-
acterization of Waskiewicz's condition is flawed. As Judge Chasanow
pointed out in his dissent, Waskiewicz's disability was not "aggravated"
by a natural recurrence of the disease, but, rather, developed as a re-
sult of "subsequent injurious exposure to workplace hazards" that oc-
curred more than fifteen years after Waskiewicz initially received
compensation for the disease.13 5
Other jurisdictions faced with similar facts have arrived at conclu-
sions contrary to Waskiewicz, holding that increased disability resulting
from additional exposure to occupational disease amounts to a "new
injury." In Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation Co.,' 36 for example, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut allowed a claimant to recover for as-
bestosis even though he had previously been disabled by and compen-
sated for the same disease.' 3 7 The employee had been exposed to
asbestos while working a number of different jobs between 1947 and
1974 and had received workers' compensation benefits for asbestosis
from several former employers in 1977.131 At the time the employee
received this award, he signed a stipulation stating that the award was
to be his only compensation relating to the "occupational disease oc-
133. See id. at 700-15, 679 A.2d at 1094-1102.
134. Id. at 713, 679 A.2d at 1101.
135. Id. at 717, 679 A.2d at 1103 (Chasanow,J., dissenting).
136. 650 A.2d 1240 (Conn. 1994).
137. See id. at 1240.
138. Id. at 1241.
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cutring between 1947 and 1974."'l 9 After he received compensation,
and until 1984, the employee continued to work in an environment
that exposed him to asbestos, resulting in a significant worsening of
his condition. 4 ° The court found that this "substantial increase" in
the employee's disability constituted a "new injury" because it resulted
from additional exposure to the hazards of the disease and did not
"directly flow from the original injury."141 The stipulation that the
employee had signed prevented him only from filing a new claim
based on his exposure to asbestos between 1947 and 1974.142 Thus,
the court held, the employee could file a new claim for benefits
against his employers through 1984.'
Similarly, in General Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission,"M the
Supreme Court of Illinois allowed a claimant to file a new claim for
workers' compensation benefits against her employer for disability re-
sulting from carpal tunnel syndrome, even though she had been dis-
abled by and compensated for this disease while working for another
employer ten years earlier. 45 The new employer argued that the em-
ployee had not established the basis for a new claim because she had
merely suffered a natural recurrence of a prior disability."4 The
court held, however, that the employee's repetitive work duties, which
involved inserting and removing coils from a processing machine, did
not cause a recurrence of carpal tunnel syndrome but, rather, re-
sulted in a "new, work-related injury. '
Finally, in Mikitka v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,148 the employee
had received benefits in 1967 for a seven-and-a-half percent partial
permanent disability from asbestosis. 49 After she received her com-
pensation award, the employee continued to work at Johns-Manville
until her retirement in October 1970.150 In February 1973, she filed a
new compensation claim alleging that her continued exposure to haz-
ardous conditions of employment caused her permanent disability to
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1241-42.
141. Id. at 1244-45. The court sustained the commission's finding that the increased
disability did not arise out of the original disability but was caused by increased exposure to
the cause of the disease. See id. at 1243.
142. Id. at 1245.
143. Id.
144. 433 N.E.2d 671 (Ill. 1982).
145. Id. at 671.
146. Id. at 672.
147. Id.
148. 352 A.2d 591 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (per curiam).




increase to thirty-two-and-a-half percent. 5 Johns-Manville argued
that a provision in the New Jersey workers' compensation statute that
established a two year statute of limitations for the reopening of old
claims barred her new claim.'5 2 The court held, however, that the
employee had not attempted to reopen her old claim but had filed a
completely new one based on additional injurious exposures. 5 Gen-
eral Electric, Muldoon, and Mikitka, like Waskiewicz, all dealt with situa-
tions in which an employee suffered increased- disability from
additional injurious exposure to an occupational disease from which
the employee had already become disabled.
b. The Court's Misplaced Reliance on CES Card.-The court re-
lied heavily on the reasoning in CES Card in barring Waskiewicz's
claim. In CES Card, the Court of Special Appeals held that an "injuri-
ous exposure" is one that causes the "onset" of disability, not the exac-
erbation of it. Therefore, the "last injurious exposure can never come
after the date of disability."' 54 In Waskiewicz, however, the Court of
Appeals's reliance on CES Card is misplaced.
In CES Card, the Court of Special Appeals specifically addressed
"[w] hether, for purposes of assigning liability to a particular employer in an
occupational disease case .... the date of last injurious exposure may
follow the date upon which the claimant became disabled from the
disease."' 55 This precise issue was not before the Court of Appeals in
Waskiewicz. Waskiewicz clearly worked for the same employer-GM-
during each of his injurious exposures to occupational disease.' 56
Further, the CES Card court made clear that it had confined its deci-
sion to the facts before it.'5 7 Therefore, the reasoning in CES Card
does not apply in Waskiewicz"' 8
151. Id.
152. Id. at 593. The NewJersey statute stated: "A formal award, determination and rule
for judgment or order approving settlement may be reviewed within 2 years from the date
when the injured person last received a payment upon the application of either party on
the ground that the incapacity of the injured employee has subsequently increased." NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 34:27 (West 1988). This statute is substantially similar to Maryland's limita-
tions provision. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
153. See Mikitka, 352 A.2d at 593.
154. CES Card Establishment Servs., Inc. v. Doub, 104 Md. App. 301, 314, 656 A.2d 332,
338 (1995).
155. Id. at 304, 656 A.2d at 333 (emphasis added).
156. Waskiewia, 342 Md. at 700-02, 679 A.2d at 1095-96.
157. See CES Card, 104 Md. App. at 314, 656 A.2d at 338 (stating that the court's holding
applied "for the purposes of assigning liability as among several employers").
158. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 8, Waskiewicz v. General Motors Corp., 342 Md. 699,
679 A.2d 1094 (1996) (No. 105).
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Contrary to the Waskiewicz court's reading of CES Card, Professor
Larson suggests that it is possible to have a compensable injurious ex-
posure after the initial date of disablement. Take, for instance, the
application of the last injurious exposure rule "when disability has
once resulted from occupational disease."'59 According to Larson,
the employer or insurer that first assumed liability when the employee
initially became disabled will remain liable if there is a natural recur-
rence of the disease-even while a second employer or insurer is "on
the risk."160 If, however, the employee's disability increases due to ad-
ditional injurious exposure to the disease, as opposed to the condi-
tion's natural progress, that takes place while the second employer or
insurer is "on the risk," the second employer or insurer may become
liable.161 Therefore, contrary to the Waskiewicz court's reading of CES
Card, Larson correctly observes that it is appropriate in some circum-
stances to recognize a compensable injurious exposure after the date
of initial disablement. The last injurious exposure rule was developed
to avoid the difficulties of apportioning liability among a number of
different employers.' 62 It should not be misapplied to defeat the legit-
imate claim of an employee such as Waskiewicz.
c. Inapplicability of the Modification Provision.-The court
inappropriately applied the Act's reopening provision to the Was-
kiewicz case. With respect to this issue, Professor Larson provides some
instructive guidance. Larson states that reopening provisions apply
when increased disability arises as a direct result of the original injury
and does not apply when there is "no causal relation between the first
injury and the subsequent condition."16 Applying Larson's reason-
ing, the Waskiewicz court appropriately cited Vest v. Giant Food Stores,
Inc. as illustrative of circumstances clearly covered by the modification
statute. In Vest, the claimant alleged that he had sustained an increase
in disability after he underwent two operations to correct a work-re-
lated back injury that had occurred seven years earlier and for which
he had been compensated. 1" In Vest, the Court of Appeals correctly
held that the modification provision's statute of limitations period
barred the employee's second claim.
1 65
159. 4 LARSON, supra note 49, § 95.27.
160. Id.; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
161. See 4 LARSON, supra note 49, § 95.27.
162. See Vokoun, supra note 45, at 106.
163. 3 LARSON, supra note 49, § 81.31(b).
164. Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 329 Md. 461, 464-65, 620 A.2d 340, 341 (1993).
165. See id. at 477-78, 620 A.2d at 343.
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Unlike Vest, however, Waskiewicz did not allege that his increased
disability resulted from a natural progression or worsening of the condi-
tion originally suffered in 1974. Rather, Waskiewicz alleged that addi-
tional injurious exposure to occupational disease hazards caused his
increased disability. 6 In other words, Waskiewicz's increased disabil-
ity did not stem from his original disability, but, rather, from addi-
tional injurious exposure to hazardous work conditions after GM
placed him back on the assembly line in 1991.167 Waskiewicz presents a
situation similar to those in General Electric, Muldoon, and Mikitka.'"
In Mikitka, the New Jersey court correctly reasoned that the modifica-
tion provision is invoked only when the claim is based upon "in-
creased disability stemming from the same exposure as was the basis
of the original award."' 69 Thus, the Mikitka court held, the employee
could bring a new claim so long as she filed the claim within two years
of the date that she knew or should have known of the existence of
the increased disability. 7 Especially in light of the Act's mandate
that courts construe the statute liberally, the Court of Appeals should
have adopted reasoning similar to that of the New Jersey Superior
Court in Mikitka.
Further, Professor Larson discusses some of the problems that
legislatures intended to address through limitations periods in modifi-
cation statutes.171 These problems included "the difficulty of deter-
mining the relationship between some ancient injury and a present
aggravated disability" and the difficulty that insurance companies
would have in estimating future reserves.'77 Although these problems
surely may arise in cases involving the natural recurrence of a disabil-
ity in which the modification statute properly comes into play, they
would not arise in a case such as Waskiewicz. These issues do not arise
because Waskiewicz did not attempt to establish a relationship be-
tween his fifteen percent disability in 1976 and his present disabil-
ity. 17' Rather, he attempted to file a new claim that was completely
independent of the injurious exposure that led to his initial disabil-
166. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 702-03, 679 A.2d at 1096.
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 136-147 and accompanying text.
169. Mikitka v.Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 352 A.2d 591, 593 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976) (per curiam). The court dealt with this issue rather summarily. In a footnote, the
court stated that the reopening provision only applied in cases in which the employee
based her claim on the exposure that led to the first award, even if the disease later natu-
rally progressed to a point where serious disability resulted. Id. at 593 n. 1.
170. See id. at 594-95.
171. See 2 ARTHUR LARSON, WORIMEN'S COMPENSATION § 81.10 (Desk ed. Supp. 1996).
172. Id.
173. See Waskieuie 342 Md. at 702-03, 679 A.2d at 1096.
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ity. 1 7 4 Moreover, GM should have had no difficulty "estimating
reserves" in this situation because Waskiewicz's increased disability re-
sulted from current, not past, exposure to the hazards of an occupa-
tional disease. Because the problems that the statute of limitations
provision seeks to address do not arise in this situation, it follows that
it should not have been applied.
Applying the Act's modification provisions to the facts of this case
violates the fundamental principal that courts should avoid construing
statutes in illogical and unreasonable ways. 171 Waskiewicz did not suf-
fer the injurious exposure that resulted in his total disability until
more than fifteen years after he had been previously compensated for
the disease.1 76 Allowing the limitations period in the reopening stat-
ute to bar Waskiewicz's claim, therefore, has the effect of holding that
his claim had expired ten years before he suffered the injurious expo-
sure that resulted in his total disability.' 7 7 When the legislature cre-
ated the modification statute and its limitations provision, it surely did
not intend to produce "the absurd result of possibly barring claims
before they even existed." 78 Holding that Waskiewicz's claim was
barred before it had arisen was an unfair result, as well as an incorrect
one.
d. Unfair Distinction Between Occupational Disease and Acciden-
tal Injury.-Waskiewicz argued that 'Just as employees who are re-in-
jured on the job because of another accident are entitled to file a new
workers' compensation claim . . . , so should he be entitled to file a
new claim because of another 'injurious exposure' to occupational
disease.' 79 The court recognized "reassignment to a hazardous set of
duties" as "somewhat analogous to a new accidental injury causing a
new disability," but nevertheless found the analogy unpersuasive.1s0
Yet this holding flies in the face of the court's holding in Shifflett, 18'
case law in other jurisdictions,' 2 and the informed view of Professor
Larson18 3 that the two types of disability should statutorily be treated
the same. As Judge Chasanow stated in his dissent:
174. Id.
175. See Board of Trustees v. Hughes, 340 Md. 1, 7, 664 A.2d 1250, 1253 (1995).
176. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 702, 679 A.2d at 1096.
177. Id. at 717, 679 A.2d at 1103 (Chasanow,J., dissenting).
178. Mikitka v.Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 352 A.2d 591, 594 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976) (per curiam).
179. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 711, 679 A.2d at 1100.
180. Id. at 714, 679 A-2d at 1101.
181. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 64.
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There is no reason to treat employees whose disabilities are
exacerbated because of an additional accidental injury on
the job differently from employees whose occupational dis-
ease is exacerbated because of an additional injurious expo-
sure on the job. Nothing in § 9-501 or § 9-502, or any other
provision in the Act, requires such unfair and disparate treat-
ment of employees with occupational diseases.' 4
The court failed to explain why it found the analogy between in-
creased disability from accidental injury and from occupational dis-
ease unconvincing, although it seemed to take issue with what it
viewed as the "underlying assumptions" in Waskiewicz's analogy-that
Waskiewicz based his claim in part on the fault of General Motors in
returning him to assembly line work despite his condition.1 8 5 The
court noted that because workers' compensation is a "no-fault" system,
the "very foundation of Mr. Waskiewicz's argument [is] quite
shaky."" 6 The "fault" of GM, however, was not essential to Was-
kiewicz's claim. Although there is little doubt that Waskiewicz does
imply that he blamed GM for exposing him to the hazards of carpal
tunnel syndrome a second time,' 87 the key to his claim was simply that
he suffered additional injurious exposure to the disease while working
for GM, which rendered him totally disabled.188
e. Unfair Requirement of a "Subsequent and Different" Occupa-
tional Disease.-The Court of Appeals found that Waskiewicz had not
"suffer[ed] a subsequent occupational disease," which would have al-
lowed him to recover under sections 9-656 and 9-802 of the Act.' 8 9 As
Judge Chasanow stated in dissent, the majority effectively held that an
employee must suffer from a "subsequent and different occupational
disease" in order to recover. 90 In other words, Waskiewicz could not
recover under those sections because both his preexisting condition
and subsequent occupational disease were the same-carpal tunnel
syndrome. A requirement that the plaintiff suffer from a different oc-
184. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 717-18, 679 A.2d at 1103 (Chasanow,J., dissenting).
185. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 711, 679 A.2d at 1100; see also supra notes 121-122 and accom-
panying text.
186. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 711-12, 679 A.2d at 1100.
187. See Brief of Appellant at 8, Waskiewicz (No. 105) (discussing an employer's ability to
knowingly assign a previously injured employee to hazardous work duties without facing
any further liability).
188. See id. at 1. The court, in fact, acknowledges that Waskiewicz did not explicitly
allege bad faith on the part of GM. See Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 711, 679 A.2d at 1100. The
court states only that GM's fault "impliedly" underlies his claim. Id.
189. Waskiewic., 342 Md. at 711, 679 A.2d at 1100 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 720, 679 A.2d at 1104 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
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cupational disease does not appear on the face of the statute, and it is
unclear why the court would read this into the statute. The statute
requires only that the "employee be permanently disabled due partly
to a preexisting disease and partly to a subsequent occupational dis-
ease."' Waskiewicz suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome when he
returned to the assembly line in 1991, and subsequently suffered addi-
tional injurious exposure to the hazards of the disease. According to
the plain language of the two statutes, Waskiewicz should be able to
recover.
As the dissent pointed out, the majority's holding that an em-
ployee is only permitted "a single claim for a single type of occupational
disease" ignores subsection (e) of the occupational disease statute,
which "clearly envisions more than one claim for the same occupa-
tional disease."192 This provision "would have been totally superfluous
if the legislature intended to limit a worker to one claim for each type
of occupational disease."1 9 3 Subsection (e) bars compensation for an
occupational disease if the employee had falsely represented that she
had not been previously disabled by or compensated for that occupa-
tional disease.194 This provision would have been unnecessary if the
Act barred second claims for the same occupational disease in all
situations.195
f Unjust and Impractical Consequences.-The court's ruling in
Waskiewicz promises to lead to unjust and impractical results. Poten-
tially, the court's holding may deter employees exposed to occupa-
tional disease from filing initial claims for partial disability for fear
that any attempt to recover for later exposure and increased disability
will be barred.196 Thus, employees may "wait until they [are] perma-
nently totally disabled before filing any claim for compensation." 197
This scenario should raise both ethical and financial concerns. Em-
191. Id., 679 A.2d at 1105.
192. Id. at 721, 679 A.2d at 1105. Section 9-502 (e) provides:
False representation - Compensation prohibited. - A covered employee or a
dependent of the covered employee is not entitled to compensation for a disabil-
ity or death that results from an occupational disease if, when the covered em-
ployee began employment with the employer, the covered employee falsely
• represented in writing that the covered employee had not been disabled, laid off,
or compensated in damages or otherwise, due to the occupational disease for
which the covered employee or dependent is seeking compensation.
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-502(e) (1991).
193. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 721-22, 679 A.2d at 1105.
194. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-502(e).
195. Waskiewicz, 342 Md. at 721-22, 679 A-2d at 1105-06 (Chasanow,J., dissenting).




ployees and their families should not be forced to suffer the physical,
financial, and emotional strain that accompanies a severe case of oc-
cupational disease. Rather, Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act
should be construed so as to encourage early intervention. Not only
would early intervention prevent needless suffering, but it would also
save employers and insurers the high costs of compensating victims
for total disability.
Further, as a matter of public policy, Maryland's Workers' Com-
pensation Act should not create incentives for employers to abuse
their employees. Recall that in Waskiewicz, GM reassigned Waskiewicz
to the assembly line despite its knowledge of his condition and that
this type of work would likely cause him to suffer additional injury.'98
The court's holding leaves employees in Waskiewicz's position "at the
mercy of their employers," because an employer could essentially ex-
pose them to the hazardous effects of occupational disease after the
limitations period had expired, "knowing that there would be no lia-
bility for any increased disablement the employee might sustain as a
result."' 99
In addition, the court's holding "should result in a great increase
in trivial motions to modify permanent partial disability awards" by
employees who do not want to lose their right to recover for later
injuries.2 °0 This would have the effect of overburdening this state's
Workers' Compensation Commission and subjecting employers to the
unnecessary expense of defending and paying such claims.
5. Conclusion.-As Judge Chasanow noted in his dissent, the
Waskiewicz majority construed "all ambiguous provisions [of Mary-
land's Workers' Compensation Act] against the worker,"20 1 directly
contravening the statute's mandate that courts interpret the Act liber-
ally. The statute itself provides that the Act should not be strictly con-
strued and, as Maryland courts have held, "'should be construed...
liberally in favor of injured employees . . . in order to effectuate its
benevolent purposes.'"2' By holding that Waskiewicz's claim was
barred ten years before it arose, the Court of Appeals ignored the
198. Waskiewic 342 Md. at 702, 679 A.2d at 1095-96.
199. Brief of Appellant at 8, Waskiewi (No. 105).
200. Waskiwi 342 Md. at 717, 679 A.2d at 1103 (Chasanow,J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 716, 679 A.2d at 1103.
202. Para v. Richards Group, 339 Md. 241, 251, 661 A.2d 737, 742 (1995) (quoting How-
ard County Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210, 1213
(1980)).
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statute, Maryland case law, and the court's own mandate that statutes
should not be construed so as to produce "absurd" results.2 03
Waskiewicz promises to create hardship for future workers' com-
pensation claimants suffering from occupational diseases, and it will
place additional burdens on Maryland's workers' compensation sys-
tem as a whole. Such results are unreasonable and wholly unneces-
sary. For this reason, the General Assembly should undo the damage
done by the Waskiewicz holding.
MICHAEL K. HOURIGAN
203. Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Lutter, 342 Md. 334, 346, 676 A.2d 51, 57 (1996).
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Recent Decisions
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Unequal Protection in the Military
In Thomasson v. Peny,1 the United States government scored a pyr-
rhic victory in the courtroom struggle over the constitutionality of the
military's four-year-old policy on homosexuals, called "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell." The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, upheld the Navy's dismissal of Lieutenant Paul G.
Thomasson for his statement "I am gay."2 In so holding, the court
reduces equal protection analysis to a facial acceptance of the federal
government's explanation for its discriminatory classification.
The court accepted the military's and Congress's pretextualjusti-
fication for Don't Ask, Don't Tell-that homosexual conduct affects
military troop "morale" or "unit cohesion"-but chose to remain
blind to the invidious nature of the justification and its constitutional
implications. By ignoring the policy's internal contradictions and the
military's own experience with homosexuals, the court found that the
policy works to promote its purported goal. Despite the court's hold-
ing, ten of the thirteen judges wrote concurring and dissenting opin-
ions rebuffing the government's basic defense of the policy-that it
prohibits only homosexual conduct, not homosexual orientation or
status.' In truth, the policy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is nothing more
than discrimination based on homosexual status in violation of core
equal protection guarantees.
1. The Case.--On January 29, 1993, after just over one week in
office, President Clinton announced his intention to fulfill his cam-
paign promise of "ending discrimination [in the military] on the basis
1. 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996).
2. Id. at 920.
3. Judge Luttig would have held the regulations issued by the military invalid because
Congress intended to prohibit homosexual status and notjust homosexual conduct. Id. at
935-41 (Luttig, J., concurring). Judge Hall's dissent concluded that "[c] onduct cannot be
the cause of [Lt. Thomasson's] discharge." Id. at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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of sexual orientation."4 Later that year, Congress passed the National
Defense Authorization Act of 1994,1 which contained what is now
commonly referred to as the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Congress
declared the policy necessary for "exclud[ing] persons whose pres-
ence in the armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to the
armed forces' high standards of morale, good order and discipline,
and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability."6
On their face, the Defense Authorization Act of 1994 and the De-
partment of Defense's (DOD) implementing directive7 do not pro-
hibit an individual with homosexual orientation from serving in the
armed forces.' The Act requires the discharge of a service member
who demonstrates that he or she (1) "has engaged in, attempted to
engage in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act,"9 (2)
"has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual," 10 or (3) "has
married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same
biological sex.""1
A service member threatened with separation for his or her state-
ment of homosexuality can avoid discharge only by proving "that he
4. Memorandum on Ending Discrimination in the Armed Forces, I PUB. PAPERS 23
(Jan. 29, 1993).
5. Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571(a)(1), 107 Stat. 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654
(1994)).
6. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(14).
7. 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A (1996) [hereinafter DOD Directive].
8. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (13) ("The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a long-
standing element of military law that continues to be necessary." (emphasis added)); 32
C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A ("A statement by a member that demonstrates a propensity or intent
to engage in homosexual acts is grounds for separation not because it reflects the member's
sexual orientation, but because the statement indicates a likelihood that the member en-
gages in or will engage in homosexual acts." (emphasis added)). In passing the Act, Con-
gress deferred to President Clinton's desire that the military discontinue its recently
adopted policy of not questioning individuals about homosexuality during accession to
military service. See Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Armed Serus., 103d Cong. 2-3 (1993) (statement of Sen. Nunn) (discussing
cooperation between the Clinton Administration and Congress) [hereinafter S. Hrg. 103-
845]. Hence, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." In an uncodified "Sense of Congress," however,
Congress stated that "the Secretary of Defense may reinstate that questioning with such
questions or such revised questions as he considers appropriate." Pub. L. No. 103-160,
§ 571(d), 107 Stat. 1670. Don't Ask, Don't Tell was the first law passed by Congress relat-
ing to military service by homosexuals. Prior to enactment, the military's own directives
governed military service by homosexuals.
9. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1). The statute defines a "homosexual act" as "(A) any bodily
contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for
the purpose of satisfying sexual desires; and (B) any bodily contact which a reasonable
person would understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act de-
scribed in subparagraph (A)." Id. § 654 (e) (3).
10. Id. § 654(b) (2).
11. Id. § 654(b) (3).
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or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a
propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts." 2
Although the statute does not define the term "propensity," the DOD
Directive defines "propensity" as "more than an abstract preference or
desire to engage in homosexual acts; it indicates a likelihood that a
person engages in or will engage in homosexual acts,"13 and it defines
a declaration of homosexuality as "homosexual conduct."14
The case against Lt. Paul G. Thomasson arose in March 1994,
when after reading the Navy's directive implementing the Defense Au-
thorization Act of 1994 and the DOD Directive, Lt. Thomasson deliv-
ered a letter to his naval commandeers stating that he could "remain
silent no longer .... I am gay."15 On the basis of his letter, a three-
member Board of Inquiry initiated a hearing on his discharge. 16 At
the hearing, Lt. Thomasson presented evidence regarding his service
record, written and oral testimony from his coworkers, and expert tes-
timony on homosexuality and the military's policy relating to homo-
sexuals.17 Lt. Thomasson refused to present evidence refuting that he
was gay or had a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, stating
that he would "not go further in degrading [himself] by disproving a
12. Id. § 654(b)(2) (emphasis added). Members who have engaged in, attempted to
engage in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act may also be excused from
separation if they demonstrate:
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary behav-
ior; (B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur; (C) such
conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimidation; (D)
under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's continued presence
in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of the armed forces in proper
discipline, good order, and morale; and (E) the member does not have a propen-
sity or intent to engage in homosexual acts.
Id. § 654(b)(1).
The statute defines a "homosexual" as "a person, regardless of sex, who engages in,
attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual
acts, and includes the terms 'gay' and 'lesbian."' Id. § 654(f)(1).
13. DOD Directive, supra note 7.
14. Cf id. ("Homosexual conduct includes ... a statement by a member that demon-
strates a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts."). The prior regulation de-
fined "homosexual" as "a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires to engage in, or
intends to engage in homosexual acts." DOD Directive (Enlisted Administrative Separa-
tions), 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, (1981). For the definition of the term "homosexual" in the new
regulation, see supra note 12; see also Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1286 (2d Cir.
1996) ("A comparison of the former policy with the Act and the new Directives... reveals
that the grounds for separation under the two are virtually identical.").
15. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 920. Lt. Thomasson had been in the Navy for ten years, and
the Navy admitted that he had attained an "enviable service record." Thomasson v. Perry,
895 F. Supp. 820, 823 (E.D. Va. 1995), aft'd, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 358 (1996).
16. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 920.
17. Id. at 921.
1046 [VOL. 56:1044
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS104
charge about sexual conduct that no one has made."18 Based on the
evidence presented, the Board of Inquiry recommended that Lt.
Thomasson be honorably discharged.19
A three-member Board of Review unanimously concurred in the
Board of Inquiry's conclusion that Thomasson "failed to demonstrate
acceptable qualities of Leadership... as evidenced by statements that he
made which are conduct within the meaning of [the policy] and the
presumption of homosexual conduct thereby raised is not rebut-
ted." ° The Board of Review upheld the Board of Inquiry's recom-
mendation to honorably discharge Lt. Thomasson. The Chief of
Navy Personnel officially signed Lt. Thomasson's discharge orders.22
In February 1995, Lt. Thomasson sued the federal government,
challenging the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy on the grounds that (1)
it violates the equal protection laws23 by discriminating based on sta-
tus and by presuming conduct from status, (2) it violates the First
Amendment by restricting speech based on its content, (3) it is over-
broad in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and (4) his dismissal was not supported by substantial evidence as re-
quired by the Administrative Procedure Act.24
Although Lt. Thomasson initially won a temporary restraining or-
der enjoining his dismissal,25 the district court eventually granted the
government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Lt.
Thomasson's statement constituted evidence of homosexual con-
duct.26 The district court arrived at its conclusion even though the
government had conceded that Lt. Thomasson's service record was
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Brief for Appellant at 10, Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (No. 95-2185) (alteration in original).
21. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921.
22. Id.
23. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the federal
government by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954).
24. Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820, 821, 824, 826, 830-31 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd,
80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996). Thomasson empha-
sized his claims under the First Amendment and the equal protection guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment. See id. at 824-30. This Note focuses on Lt. Thomasson's equal protec-
tion claims. The Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy also raises significant questions concerning
separation of powers and judicial deference to military considerations. Because of the dif-
ferences of opinion among the judges of the Fourth Circuit, the decision raises further
questions of administrative law and judicial process. See infra note 95 and accompanying
text.
25. Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 823.
26. Id. at 825, 831.
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"enviable"27 and had acknowledged "that there was no evidence that
Lt. Thomasson had engaged in any 'homosexual act."' 28 Without ad-
dressing the evidentiary record amassed by Thomasson,29 the district
court denied Lt. Thomasson's First Amendment claim, accepting the
government's argument that the policy placed a permissible burden
on speech because the military used speech merely as evidence of
conduct.
3 o
The district court denied Lt. Thomasson's other claims as well.31
In ruling on his equal protection claim, the district court applied ra-
tional basis scrutiny to find that the policy was based on the govern-
ment's "concrete, articulated concerns about privacy and sexual
tension and the resulting impact on unit cohesion,"32 and that the
regulation "is, at bottom, a regulation governing employment in a
profession with somewhat unique criteria."33
The Navy subsequently discharged Lt. Thomasson. 34 Lt. Thomas-
son appealed the district court's ruling, alleging errors under the First
Amendment, the Due Process Clause and the equal protection guar-
antee of the Fifth Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure
Act.3 '5 After hearing oral argument, the Fourth Circuit voted, sua
sponte, to rehear the case en banc. 36
2. Legal Background.-Thomasson v. Perry is one of a series of
challenges to the military's policy on homosexuals.3 7 Like other chal-
lenges, Lt. Thomasson's challenge to the policy of Don't Ask, Don't
Tell and the Fourth Circuit's opinion relating to that challenge raise
several important legal issues, ranging from questions of equal protec-
27. Id. at 823. Lt. Thomasson worked directly for the former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and other high-ranking military officials. Brief for
Appellant at 6 n.5, Thomasson (No. 95-2185). A number of high-ranking military officials,
as well as men serving under Thomasson, attested to Thomasson's outstanding career. See
id. at 6-8. On the day Thomasson was officially discharged, an Admiral described Thomas-
son's performance as "absolutely outstanding" and recommended that he be promoted to
the rank of Lieutenant Commander. Id. at 7-8.
28. Thomasson, 895 F. Supp. at 823.
29. See id. The district court noted that Lt. Thomasson had presented extensive evi-
dence demonstrating his successful military career and that the "Navy did not introduce
any rebuttal evidence or dispute the substance of any of LL Thomasson's evidence." Id.
30. Id. at 825.
31. See id. at 831.
32. Id. at 829.
33. Id. at 830.
34. Id. at 921.
35. Id. at 927-34.
36. Id. at 921.
37. See infra note 77.
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tion and due process to judicial deference to military decisionmaking
and administrative processes. This Note considers only one of those
constitutional challenges-Lt. Thomasson's allegation that the policy
of Don't Ask, Don't Tell violates the equal protection guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 8 A complete un-
derstanding of the equal protection issues at stake in Thomasson re-
quires consideration, first, of the scope of judicial review afforded
equal protection challenges and, second, of how judicial review has
been applied in previous cases concerning the military's policy on
homosexuals.
a. Standard of Review.--Supreme Court equal protection ju-
risprudence consists of three standards of review: strict scrutiny, inter-
mediate scrutiny, and rational basis scrutiny.39 Under strict scrutiny,
the most demanding scope of review for classifications based on race,
alienage, or national origin, the government's classification must be
"suitably tailored to serve a compelling [government] interest."4 ° In-
termediate scrutiny applies to classifications based on gender and ille-
gitimacy.4" A classification subject to intermediate scrutiny must be
"substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental inter-
est." Other classifications are scrutinized under the more lenient
rational basis test, under which the "legislation is presumed to be valid
and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is ration-
ally related to a legitimate [government] interest."43
A court's decision to apply rational basis review' does not neces-
sarily predetermine the outcome of its decision; rather, the presump-
tion of rationality has been accorded varying weight by the different
38. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as applied to the federal government by way of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, forbids the federal government from "deny[ing] to any person.., the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
39. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985).
40. Id. at 440.
41. Id. at 441.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 440.
44. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928. Although this Note focuses on the application of ra-
tional basis scrutiny to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, a strong argument can be made
that the policy should be analyzed using heightened or strict scrutiny. See generaly Note,
The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality As a Suspect Classification, 98
HRv. L. REv. 1285, 1287 (1985) ("[C]ourts should recognize homosexuality as a suspect
classification under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and there-
fore subject laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual preference to heightened scrutiny,
beyond the 'rational basis' test currently applied." (footnotes omitted)); Note, An Argument
for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexual-
ity, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 797-98 (1984) ("[Clourts should apply equal protection height-
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opinions. In Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,45 an early case
applying the rational basis test, the Supreme Court upheld an
Oklahoma law that forbade an optician from fitting or duplicating
lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist. 4 In rejecting
the optician's due process challenge, the Court concluded that "the
law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be
constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correc-
tion, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative mea-
sure was a rational way to correct it."4 7
The deferential analysis applied in Lee Optical sharply contrasts
with an earlier case, FS. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,48 in which the
Court invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment a state tax that required corporations doing busi-
ness in Virginia to pay taxes for income derived from out-of-state
operations.49 Other companies incorporated under Virginia laws, but
not deriving income from in-state activities, were exempt from the
tax." The Court noted that although Virginia had a "wide range of
discretion " " to resort to classifications, a classification "cannot be sus-
tained .. .if the classification appear[s] to be altogether illusory."52
Moreover, the Court observed that "the classification must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."53
In some of its more recent cases, the Supreme Court has contin-
ued to shift back and forth from the deferential to the more rigorous
ened scrutiny to classifications based on homosexuality on the premise that it is wrong for
government to discriminate against gays solely because they are gay." (footnote omitted)).
45. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
46. Id. at 488-89.
47. Id. at 487-88. The Court further stated:
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctri-
naire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and pro-
portions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the
reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem
which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one
phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The prohibi-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious
discrimination.
Id. at 489 (citations omitted).
48. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
49. Id. at 417.
50. Id. at 414.
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form of the rational basis test. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.,54 the Court applied rational basis review to a zoning re-
quirement for a special use permit for the operation of a group home
for individuals with mental retardation.55 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that individuals with mental retar-
dation constituted a "suspect" class entitled to a heightened level of
scrutiny.- 6
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's use of strict scru-
tiny "[b] ecause mental retardation is a characteristic that the govern-
ment may legitimately take into account in a wide range of
decisions."5 ' Nonetheless, the Court invalidated the zoning regula-
tion because it could find no rational relation between the state's cho-
sen means-the regulation-and its purported interest.58 Although it
applied the rational basis test, the Court undertook an extensive ex-
amination of the state's reasons for requiring a special permit for a
home for mentally retarded individuals, comparing those reasons to
the absence of a permit requirement for boarding houses, nursing
homes, and other dwellings.59 The Court found that the different
treatment of individuals with mental retardation was based on "nega-
tive attitudes, or fear,"60 which the Court concluded were not "permis-
sible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently
from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like."61
In cases subsequent to Cleburne, including FCC v. Beach Communi-
cations, Inc.6 2 and Heller v. Doe,6" the Court applied the more deferen-
tial form of rational basis review. In Beach Communications, the Court
upheld a provision of the Cable Communications Act of 1984 that ex-
empted certain facilities from franchise requirements, concluding
that "a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or em-
pirical data."6 4 In Heller, the Court held constitutional a Kentucky law
applying different procedures and evidentiary standards for involun-
54. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
55. Id. at 435, 442-47.
56. Id. at 437.
57. Id. at 446.
58. Id. at 449-50.
59. Id. at 447-50.
60. Id. at 448.
61. Id.
62. 508 U.S. 307 (1993).
63. 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
64. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 315.
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tary commitment of individuals with mental retardation and individu-
als with mental illness.65
In 1996, however, the Court returned to the more rigorous form
of the rational basis test. In Romer v. Evans,6 6 the Court invalidated
"Amendment 2" to the Colorado Constitution on the ground that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Amendment 2 barred state and lo-
cal jurisdictions from enacting laws and regulations specifically
designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination in certain trans-
actions and activities.67 The Court disagreed with the Colorado
Supreme Court's decision to apply strict scrutiny to the classification,
but eventually found Amendment 2 unconstitutional under the ra-
tional basis test.6"
Finding that the amendment was "at once too narrow and too
broad,"69 Justice Kennedy stated for the majority that Amendment 2
"identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection
across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons
from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprece-
dented in our jurisprudence."7" Justice Kennedy continued:
A second and related point is that laws of the kind now
before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons af-
fected. "[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protec-
tion of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."71
The Court's decision in Romer affects the policy of Don't Ask,
Don't Tell in three ways. First, it represents a shift away from the
65. Heller, 509 U.S. at 314-15. The Court found a number of differences between
mental retardation and mental illness that justified the different treatment, including the
fact that mental retardation is easier to diagnose and may be treated through less intrusive
methods. Id. at 322-28.
66. 116 S. CL 1620 (1996).
67. Id. at 1623. Many of the ordinances sought to protect homosexuals from discrimi-
nation in "housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and wel-
fare services." Id.
68. Id. at 1627. The Colorado Supreme Court had held that Amendment 2 was subject
to strict scrutiny review "because it infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to
participate in the political process." Id. at 1622.
69. Id. at 1628.
70. Id.
71. Id. (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Department ofAgric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). Although Romer involved discrimination against homosexuals as
a class and bears this resemblance to Thomasson, the Court also emphasized that the law
sought to deprive political recourse to a particular class of citizens. See id.
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more deferential form of rational basis review epitomized by Heller to-
ward the Cleburne application of the more rigorous rational basis re-
view. Second, as Justice Scalia's dissent observes, the Court's decision
"places the prestige of this institution behind the proposition that op-
position to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious
bias." 2 Third, like Cleburne and Palmore v. Sidoti,7" Romer suggests that
when evidence indicates that government action is motivated by preju-
dice, public or private, the Court is more willing to take a harder look
at what the government professes as its legitimate interest, even
though the classification is subject to mere rational basis scrutiny.7 4
The Court's vacillation between the rigorous and deferential ver-
sions of the rational basis test leaves much uncertainty over the proper
meaning of rational basis review.75 The trend represented by Sidoti,
Cleburne, and Romer further entangles the analysis. As Justice Stevens
observed in 1995, "substantial agreement on the [equal protection]
standard to be applied in deciding difficult cases does not necessarily
lead to agreement on how those cases actually should or will be
resolved."76
b. Constitutional Challenges to the Military's Policy on Homosexu-
als.-The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the policy of Don't
Ask, Don't Tell in the military, but the ambiguity in the Court's ra-
tional basis review standards has left its mark on lower court decisions
that have addressed challenges to the policy.77 While the factual and
72. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Romer also leaves in question the continuing
precedential value of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which provides support for
the government's right to prohibit certain forms of sexual conduct. Id. at 192. In Bowers,
the Court upheld a Georgia sodomy statute against a Fourteenth Amendment due process
challenge. Id. at 196. Although Romer and Bowers were decided on different constitutional
theories,Justice Scalia believed that Romer upset the Court's holding in Bowers: "In holding
that homosexuality cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the Court contradicts
a decision, unchallenged here, pronounced only 10 years ago." Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but
the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."); see infra notes 141-148.
74. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text; infra notes 141-149 and accompany-
ing text.
75. Compare Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341-50 (Colo. 1994) (applying strict scru-
tiny and holding that an amendment to the Colorado Constitution which prohibits legisla-
tive, judicial, or executive action to protect homosexuals violates the Equal Protection
Clause), with Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (applying rational basis review and
reaching the same result).
76. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. CL 2097, 2120 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
77. Compare Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 920 F. Supp. 1510, 1531-32 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (applying rational basis scrutiny and holding the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy
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procedural differences of each challenge make it difficult to genera-
lize about their outcomes, the ultimate result often depends on
whether the court believes the military separated the challenger as a
result of his homosexual conduct or homosexual status.78 The deci-
sions of courts faced with challenges to the Don't Ask, Don't Tell pol-
icy tend to fall into three general holdings: (1) the policy is based on
status and is therefore unconstitutional; 79 (2) the policy is either di-
rected at conduct only or the challenger has engaged (or will engage)
in conduct, either of which is held constitutional; 0 or (3) the policy
can be construed as requiring conduct, but as applied to the individ-
ual challenger is unconstitutional because the dismissal was based on
status.8
An excellent example of the courts' emphasis on the conduct-
status distinction is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Meinhold v. United
States Department of Defense."2 This case is similar to Thomasson, but falls
into the third category of holdings. Like Lt. Thomasson, the Navy
unconstitutional), and Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 914-26 (W.D. Wash.
1994) (same), appeal dismissed and remanded by 97 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1996), and Dahl v.
Secretary of the U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1335 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (same), and Thomas-
son v. Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820, 830 (E.D. Va. 1995) (same), affd, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 358 (1996), with Philips v. Perry, 883 F. Supp. 539, 545-46
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (applying rational basis scrutiny and holding the Don't Ask, Don't Tell
policy constitutional as applied to a service member who engaged in homosexual acts), and
Selland v. Perry, 905 F. Supp. 260, 266 (D. Md. 1995) (applying rational basis scrutiny and
holding Don't Ask, Don't Tell constitutional as applied to a service member working in the
confines of a nuclear attack submarine, but observing that the rationality of the policy
would be "more dubious if the statement occurred on a base on the mainland"), aff'd, 100
F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996).
78. See, e.g., Holmes, 920 F. Supp. at 1527-31 (identifying as the "threshold issue"
whether the policy discriminates based on conduct or status); Thorne v. United States
Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1372 (E.D. Va. 1996) (examining the status-conduct
distinction for analysis under the First Amendment and finding that the policy discrimi-
nates based on status); Selland, 905 F. Supp. at 265 (analyzing the conduct-status distinction
as a claim separate from the challenger's equal protection and free speech claims).
79. See, e.g., Holmes, 920 F. Supp. at 1527-31 (finding that the policy is unconstitutional
because it discriminates on the basis of status); Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 976
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that under the First Amendment, a mere statement of orienta-
tion is "not sufficient proof of intent to commit acts as to justify the initiation of discharge
proceedings"), vacated and remanded, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996). Judge Luttig's concur-
ring opinion in Thomasson, concluding that the policy is directed at status but is still consti-
tutional, appears to be an exception to this category. See infra notes 102-107 and
accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Philips, 883 F. Supp. at 541 (upholding discharge based on a finding that
the service member who challenged the policy "has engaged in homosexual acts and says
he will continue doing so"). Both the district court's and Fourth Circuit's majority's deci-
sions in Thomasson, which found that the policy prohibited only homosexual conduct, fall
into this category.
81. See, e.g., Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
82. 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
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dismissed Petty Officer Meinhold solely for his statement "I am in fact
gay." 3 The court in Meinhold found that "[c]onstruing the regulation
to apply to the 'classification of being homosexual' clearly implicates
equal protection,"8 4 but the court decided that the policy might "rea-
sonably be construed to reach only statements that show a concrete,
fixed, or expressed desire to commit homosexual acts despite their
being prohibited." 5 Applying its analysis to Petty Officer Meinhold,
however, the court found his statement that he was "gay" insufficient
to demonstrate a concrete desire to commit homosexual acts and con-
cluded that the Navy's dismissal violated Meinhold's equal protection
rights.
86
The distinction between status and conduct also determined the
outcome in Able v. United States.87 This case represented another chal-
lenge to the codified version of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy and
eventually generated a circuit court decision. In analyzing a First
Amendment claim, the district court found that the policy was pre-
mised on status and not conduct, a distinction which it found uncon-
stitutional.88 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit disagreed that the policy was status-based and reversed
the lower court's First Amendment holding.89 The court then re-
manded the case to the trial court for consideration of Able's equal
protection claim. 90
83. Id. at 1472. Meinhold made this statement on ABC's World News Tonight.
84. Id. at 1477.
85. Id. at 1479. As in Thomasson, the military in Meinhold had no evidence of homosex-
ual conduct. See id. at 1479-80.
86. Id. at 1479-80 ("The Navy's presumption that Meinhold desires or intends to en-
gage in prohibited conduct on the basis of his statement alone therefore arbitrarily goes
beyond what DOD's policy seeks to prevent. Accordingly, Meinhold's discharge on that
basis cannot stand."). Interestingly, the district court rendered its decision in Meinhold
only one day before President Clinton's news conference announcing his plans to change
the military's policy on homosexuals. President Clinton referred to the Meinhold opinion
and embraced the court's distinction between orientation and conduct as consistent with
his own views. See The President's News Conference, I PUn. PAPERS 20 (Jan. 29, 1993); see
also Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 935 (Luttig, J., concurring) (describing President Clinton's an-
nouncement and the Meinhold decision).
87. 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated and remanded, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir.
1996).
88. Id. at 975-76, 980 (finding that the policy is unconstitutional because it discrimi-
nates based on sexual orientation).
89. Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1298 (2d Cir. 1996).
90. Id. (holding that "the Act does not bar those who have a homosexual orientation
but are not likely to engage in homosexual acts" and remanding the case back to district
court for further proceedings).
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In cases arising under the policy prior to the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1994,91 various appellate courts held that the mil-
itary may discharge members who engage in homosexual acts.9 2 Able
and Thomasson involve challenges to the statutory enactment of the
Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy that have generated federal circuit court
decisions. Both cases arrived in the wake of numerous challenges to
the military's policy on homosexuals, yet were decided before signifi-
cant developments occurred in Supreme Court equal protection
jurisprudence.9"
3. The Court's Reasoning.--Sitting en banc, a majority of the
Fourth Circuit rejected Lt. Thomasson's equal protection claims, 94
but the judges could not agree on a clear rationale for doing so. Only
two judges sat squarely behind the majority opinion, and no rationale
for the decision captured a majority.95 ChiefJudge Wilkinson's major-
ity opinion noted that the challenged policy was a "carefully crafted
national political compromise" 96 and emphasized judicial deference
on military matters to the Executive branch, Congress, and the mili-
tary itself.97 The opinion then rejected Lt. Thomasson's attempt to
91. See supra notes 8, 14 (discussing the military's policy before 1994).
92. See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Meinhold v.
United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1477 (9th Cir. 1994); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,
881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989).
93. Both Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), see supra notes 66-74 and accompany-
ing text, and United States v. Virginia, 116 S. CL 2264 (1996), see infta note 176, hold impor-
tant implications for the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy.
94. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931.
95. Of the eight judges who joined ChiefJudge Wilkinson's majority opinion, five also
joined Judge Luttig's concurring opinion (UJ. Russell, Widener, Wilkins, Hamilton, and
Williams). See id. at 916; id. at 949 (Luttig, J., concurring). Judge Murnaghan, who also
joined the majority opinion, authored a separate one paragraph concurrence stating that
he would uphold Lt. Thomasson's dismissal on the simple grounds that Lt. Thomasson
failed to rebut the presumption of homosexual conduct and that the presumption is ra-
tional without the discussion of judicial deference to the military. See id. at 934
(Murnaghan, J., concurring). Judge Niemeyer was, therefore, the only judge who signed
Chief Judge Wilkinson's opinion without signing a separate concurring opinion.
96. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921.
97. Id. at 921-27. Following his extensive analysis, Judge Wilkinson conceded that
"C[n]one of this means, of course, that the statute before us may escape constitutional scru-
tiny." Id. at 927. Because of the split of opinions, ChiefJudge Wilkinson's emphasis on
deference to other branches on military affairs won the full support of only Judge
Niemeyer. See supra note 95; cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67, 83 (1981) (stating
that judicial deference to Congress and the Executive Branch on military affairs does not
require abdication of the "ultimate responsibility to decide the constitutional question" but
holding all-male draft registration constitutional); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166
(9th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging that "military decisions by the Army are not lightly to be
overruled by the judiciary," especially when "judging whether the reasons put forth on the
record for the Army's discrimination against [the soldier] are rationally related to any of
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invoke a higher level of scrutiny because the "statutory classification
here is not suspect, nor does it burden any fundamental right."98 Cit-
ing prior applications of rational basis review, including Heller and
Cleburne,99 Chief Judge Wilkinson concluded that he need not go any
further in assessing the first equal protection prong-the govern-
ment's interest in the policy on homosexuals-than to recite the statu-
tory findings of the National Defense Reauthorization Act of 1994 and
the congressional testimony of military officials. 100 Applying the sec-
ond prong of the rational basis test-the fit between the policy and
the government's objective-the majority opinion concluded that
"the legislature was certainly entitled to presume that a service mem-
ber who declares that he is gay has a propensity to engage in homo-
sexual acts." I1
Six of the nine judges who signed the majority opinion also en-
dorsed Judge Luttig's concurring opinion. Although the majority
opinion accepted, and even emphasized, the conduct-status distinc-
tion urged by the government, the concurrence rejected this distinc-
tion, finding that Congress intended to prohibit homosexuals from
service in the military.' 0 2 Based on an extensive analysis of the con-
gressional record and a comparison of the statute and the regulation,
Judge Luttig contended that the "statute requires the discharge of ho-
mosexual service members who merely say that they are homosexual
or otherwise evidence their homosexuality, regardless of whether they
have actually engaged in homosexual conduct or are likely to engage
in any such conduct."10 3 Judge Luttig argued that the DOD's imple-
menting directive departs from the statutory requirement by substitut-
the Army's permissible goals"); Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 915 (W.D. Wash.
1994) (stating that although thejudiciary generally should defer to Congress and the Exec-
utive Branch on military matters, "there is not and must never be a 'military exception' to
the Constitution"). But see infra notes 113-114 and accompanying text (noting that, while
Judge Wilkinson insists that the rational basis test must still be applied, he quickly assumes
without discussion that unit cohesion is a "legitimate state interest").
98. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928.
99. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
100. Cf. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928-30. For example, Judge Wilkinson refers to General
H. Norman Schwarzkopf s statement that in his "'years of military service, I have exper-
ienced the fact that the introduction of an open homosexual into a small unit immediately
polarizes that unit and destroys the very bonding that is so important for the unit's survival
in time of war.'" Id. at 929 (quoting S. REP. No. 103-112, at 280 (1993) (statement of Gen.
H. Norman Schwarzkopf)).
101. Id. at 930. But see infra notes 179-183 and accompanying text (questioning the ra-
tionality of the presumption that a soldier will commit an act which will result in his expul-
sion, especially after inviting closer observation by publicly describing his or her
orientation).
102. 80 F.3d at 937-39 (Luttig, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 934.
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ing the word "likelihood" for "propensity"-thus weakening the
congressional goal of removing from the military anyone with a "pro-
pensity" toward homosexual conduct. 1 4  The opinion then distin-
guishes between "propensity" and "status" in order to sidestep
constitutional problems associated with legislation that discriminates
based on status. 10 Judge Luttig (perhaps disingenuously) claimed
that in this analysis he created a new "hybrid" classification, but he still
conceded that the hybrid is closer to "status" than "conduct."1 6 Fi-
nally, Judge Luttig concluded that in contravening Congress's intent
to prohibit all service members having a homosexual orientation from
serving in the Armed Forces, the DOD has "created what is in effect a
sanctuary for known homosexuals whom the military determines are
not likely to engage in homosexual acts."107
The four-judge dissent authored by Judge Hall shared common
ground with the concurrence-both opinions rejected the govern-
ment's contention that the policy is directed at conduct.10 8 In con-
trast to Judge Luttig's concurring opinion, finding a prohibition on
orientation to be constitutional, Judge Hall concluded that the policy
operates unconstitutionally. 0 9 He based his conclusion on three fac-
104. Id. at 939.
105. See id.
106. Id. Judge Luttig writes:
Such a policy is, as between pure status and pure conduct, a status-based policy,
because it merely recognizes certain conduct as evidence of homosexuality; it
does not exclude on the basis of that conduct itself.... [It] is not... status-based
in the same way that an exclusion on the basis of an immutable characteristic
would be. Rather, it is to say that the policy is based upon what is in fact a hybrid
of status and conduct, namely 'propensity.' . . . It is, as commonly understood,
merely an inclination ... and it is that inclination, that propensity, not any likeli-
hood ofconduct, at which this particular policy is directed.
Id. (emphasis added).
Later in his opinion, however, Judge Luttig states that the statute is directed at homo-
sexual orientation: "I do not know what homosexual orientation is, if it is not the propen-
sity to commit homosexual acts; indeed, I do not understand how one even knows that he
has a homosexual orientation except by realizing that he has a propensity toward the com-
mission of homosexual acts." Id. at 942 n.8. But see Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968,
975 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (characterizing as "Orwellian" the attempted distinction between
"propensity" and "orientation"), vacated and remanded 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996). Judge
Luttig never explained the difference he perceived, if any, between "orientation" and
"status."
107. Thomatson, 80 F.3d at 941 (Luttig, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("Conduct cannot be the cause of his discharge.").
Because the four dissenters and the nine judges agreeing with Judge Luttig's concurrence
all agreed that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy is based on homosexual status, the Fourth
Circuit apparendy had the votes to reverse the district court's holding on administrative
law grounds that the military regulations, which emphasized conduct, were unauthorized
under the statute.
109. Id. at 953.
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tors: (1) "a great deal of evidence [exists] that the statute was moti-
vated by a desire to accommodate prejudice against homosexuals"; " '
(2) the policy operates unconstitutionally by presuming that "everyone
will fail to comply with rules of conduct";' and (3) by defining
speech as conduct, the policy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell creates "a classi-
fication among homosexuals based solely on speech."' 12
4. Analysis.-The policy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell fails both
prongs of the equal protection rational basis test. The government's
purported interests of unit cohesion and the prevention of homosex-
ual conduct are pretextual justifications for invidious discrimination
against homosexuals. The government invoked these interests as a
smokescreen for its unconstitutional response to the private
prejudices of service members against homosexuals. The majority
opinion in Thomasson refused to lift the veil to see the government's
real purpose of discriminating against homosexual status. Even so, its
refusal should not have affected the outcome. Even if one grants the
military the benefit of a legitimate government interest, Don't Ask
Don't Tell fails the second prong of the rational basis test in that the
policy is not rationally related to preventing homosexual conduct. By
hiding behind the language of deference, the majority opinion fails to
apply any level of constitutional scrutiny to the policy. The court
skirts the numerous inconsistencies which reveal that the policy does
not operate to achieve the government's goal of preventing homosex-
ual conduct.
a. The Government's llegitimate Interest.--Chief Judge Wilkin-
son, writing for a deeply divided majority, avoids direct inquiry into
the first requirement of meeting rational basis review-that the chal-
lenged classification serve a legitimate interest-by accepting at face
value the government's justification for the Don't Ask, Don't Tell pol-
icy." 3 By alluding to various military personnel opinions and empty
110. Id. at 951. The majority and concurring opinions do not address the possibility
that the policy may be derived out of prejudice. This factor may be particularly significant
in the wake of Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), which emphasized that Colorado's
constitutional amendment directed at homosexuals was "born of animosity toward the class
of persons affected." Id. at 1628; see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
111. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 953 (Hall, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 954.
113. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927-30. Chief Judge Wilkinson's discussion of the govern-
ment's legitimate interest in prohibiting homosexual conduct occupies slightly more than
one page. See id. at 928-30. Yet his discussion ofjudicial deference to the Administration,




statutory declarations, he finds that "homosexual acts impair military
readiness."1 14 Nevertheless, ten out of thirteen judges on the bench
believed that the policy is not directed at homosexual acts.' 15 These
ten judges argued in their concurring and dissenting opinions that
the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy is intended to discharge from service
all homosexuals, regardless of their conduct. 1 6 Indeed, even a super-
ficial review reveals that the policy's concern over homosexual con-
duct is illusory 17 because the government's real concern is with
homosexual status. As a result of the government's concern, the pol-
icy operates on the basis of status.' 1 8
Judge Luttig's and Judge Hall's rejections of the conduct distinc-
tion are supported by an examination of the legislative history and the
military's implementation of the policy."1 9 As one lower court ex-
plained, "once Congress decided to try to get all known homosexuals
out of the Services, the chief concern was to draft legislation to insure
that the enactment would survive judicial review."' 20 Congress's (and
subsequently the administration's) effort to survive constitutional re-
view focused on characterizing sexual orientation as conduct. 121 Ja-
mie Gorelick, general counsel for the DOD, acknowledged this in her
congressional testimony by stating that "the reason that we do not now
discharge people because we believe them to have a homosexual ori-
114. Id. at 929.
115. See supra note 95.
116. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 939 (Luttig, J., concurring) (asserting that the government
"fully understands that the policy enacted by Congress is not conduct-based in the sense
that it is targeted at homosexual acts and the likelihood that one will commit such acts");
id. at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("Conduct cannot be the cause of his discharge.").
The majority opinion rested its holding at least in part on the conduct-status distinc-
tion. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 929 ("Given that it is legitimate for Congress to proscribe
homosexual acts, it is also legitimate for the government to seek to forestall these same
dangers by trying to prevent the commission of such acts."). Six of the nine judges signing
the majority opinion joined the concurrence, which found that the policy does not stop at
precluding homosexual conduct, but also prohibits status. As a result, it appears that they
join in an opinion with which they do not agree in order to form a majority to uphold Lt.
Thomasson's dismissal.
117. Cf United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2277 (1996) ("[A] tenable justification
must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently
grounded."); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975) (observing that
courts are not required to "accept at face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an
examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted pur-
pose could not have been a goal of the legislation").
118. See infra notes 119-137 and accompanying text.
119. Lt. Thomasson's own experience confirms this, since the Navy acknowledged it had
no evidence of any conduct. See supra text accompanying note 28.
120. Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 976-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated and re-
manded, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996).
121. Id.
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entation is because in 1981 it was recognized that if we did have a
status-based as opposed to a conduct-based rule, that it would be vul-
nerable in the courts." 12 2 The government's problem, then, was how
to achieve the practical result of banning homosexual status while at
the same time declaring as its goal the prohibition of homosexual
conduct. The government tried to evade this problem by defining a
statement of homosexuality as the equivalent of conduct, thereby cre-
ating a presumption of conduct based on a service member's state-
ment of homosexuality. 12  Thus, a service member is subject to
discharge if "the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or
bisexual, or words to that effect."124 Form has thus been elevated over
substance to avoid constitutional problems.
Nevertheless, the government recognized that basing a presump-
tion of wrongful conduct on a statement of status posed its own consti-
tutional problems. The government attempted to overcome this
constitutional problem by purportedly allowing a service member to
rebut the presumption of homosexual conduct. 2 5 In practice, how-
ever, the opportunity to rebut the presumption is nothing but a mi-
rage because the presumption cannot be rebutted. This further
evidences that the ban is directed at homosexual status, rather than
homosexual conduct.1
26
The statutory scheme operates as follows: A service member who
states that he or she is homosexual triggers the statutory presumption
that one has a propensity for homosexual conduct.1 7 To avoid dis-
charge, the individual must rebut the presumption "that he or she is
not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity
to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts." 128 Thus, in
theory, the service member can escape separation by showing that he
or she has a homosexual "orientation," but not a "propensity" toward
homosexual conduct. 129 In practice, however, the sole method of re-
butting the presumption is for the service member to deny his or her
homosexual orientation, because by statutory definition, a homosex-
122. S. Hrg. 103-845, supra note 8, at 777 (statement of Jamie Gorelick, Gen. Counsel,
United States Dep't of Defense).
123. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1994).
124. Id. § 654(b) (2).
125. See Able, 880 F. Supp. at 975 (observing that the government "recognized that a
policy mandating discharge of homosexuals merely because they have a homosexual orien-
tation or status could not withstand judicial scrutiny").
126. See infra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
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ual is a person who "has a propensity to engage in, or intends to en-
gage in homosexual acts."' A commitment to remain celibate is
insufficient to rebut the presumption if the service member does not
dispute his or her homosexual status.1 3 1 The DOD Directive attempts
to circumvent these constitutional problems by severing all ties be-
tween "orientation" and "propensity" in its regulation and by defining
"propensity" as "likelihood."1 2 District Court Judge Nickerson aptly
described this attempt to draw a distinction between orientation and
propensity in Able as "Orwellian.' 3 3 Judge Nickerson concluded:
Neither the Act nor the Directives explain how to differ-
entiate an "orientation" from a "propensity," although the
Act's avowed policy to insure that "homosexual orientation"
not be treated as a "bar" to service would seem to make such
differentiation crucial....
These facts seem to the court to be powerful evidence
that despite their semantic gymnastics, defendants them-
130. Id. § 654(f) (1). Further support that the statute intends to preclude those claiming
homosexual orientation may be found in the "Sense of Congress," which states that the
military could continue its new policy of not questioning individuals about homosexuality
during accession, "but [that] the Secretary of Defense may reinstate that questioning with
such questions or such revised questions as he considers appropriate." Pub. L. No. 103-
160, § 571(d), 107 Stat. 1670 (1993).
131. See Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated and re-
manded, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996). The court observed:
Congress' specific intent was that "a member cannot rebut the presumption sim-
ply through a promise to adhere to military standards of conduct in the future,
nor can the member rebut the presumption by a statement to the effect that he
or she has a propensity towards homosexuality but has not acted on it."
Id. (quoting S. RlP. No. 103-112, Ex. Jx-15, at 294 (1993)).
132. See DOD Directive, supra note 7 ("A statement by a member that demonstrates a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts is grounds for separation not because it
reflects the member's sexual orientation, but because the statement indicates a likelihood that the
member engages in or will engage in homosexual acts." (emphasis added)); see also Thomas-
son, 80 F.3d at 939 (Luttig, J., concurring) (asserting that the government "fully under-
stands that the policy enacted by Congress is not conduct-based in the sense that it is
targeted at homosexual acts and the likelihood that one will commit such acts"). Judge
Luttig analyzed the government's quotations from the congressional record and
concluded:
On virtually every occasion when the Administration references either a statutory
provision or a passage from testimony wherein Congress or a witness observed
that the presence of open homosexuals would be detrimental to combat capabil-
ity or unit cohesion, it substitutes its regulatory definition of "propensity" (i.e., a
likelihood that one will engage in homosexual acts) for the words actually en-
acted or spoken.
Id. at 939-40.
133. Able, 880 F. Supp. at 975 ("Although the Act and the Directives are written in such a
manner as to give the impression that there is a principled distinction between the two
characteristics, only a brief critique will demonstrate that in practice no such distinction
exists.").
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selves did not perceive a difference between the two [terms].
Plainly they intended that the articulation of a mere "orien-
tation" be sufficient to initiate a discharge proceeding.
Thus, one who does no more than express an "orientation" is
faced with the prospect of somehow showing that he or she
does not have a "propensity" to engage in prohibited acts in
order to avoid discharge.'" 4
Indeed, in her testimony on the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, Jamie
Gorelick, general counsel for the DOD, acknowledged that the pre-
sumption based on the service member's statement places "a very high
burden"'35 on the service member and that any distinction between
orientation and propensity is merely "hypothetical.""3 6 If the situation
was not one in which "someone made the statement knowingly and
was not drunk or had not lost his or her mind," she testified, it would
be "very unlikely" that the burden could be overcome by asserting that
the individual has no "propensity" to engage in homosexual
conduct. 
3 7
The strong evidence showing that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell pol-
icy is based on status leaves the government's unit cohesion theory as
the only plausible justification for the policy. The unit cohesion the-
ory has little, if anything, to do with homosexual conduct; it can only
be explained as resulting from homophobia by some members of the
military. As one district judge concluded:
134. Id. (citations omitted). But see id. at 976 (observing that, in at least three cases,
service members have rebutted the presumption of conduct, but concluding that these
results were "aberrations").
In one convoluted attempt to overcome the constitutional problems with the statute, a
district court in Watson v. Peny, 918 F. Supp. 1403 (W.D. Wash. 1996), attempted to explain
that the statement "I have a homosexual orientation" would not raise a presumption of
homosexual conduct, reasoning that, where possible, a court must construe a statute to
meet constitutional concerns. Id. at 1414. The court proceeded to explain that whether a
statement identifying oneself as a "homosexual" constitutes grounds for separation
would depend on whether the speaker is acknowledging that he or she is "homo-
sexual" as that term is defined by the statute or rather merely expressing his or
her orientation. A reasonable constitutional construction of the statute would
not permit the presumption to be created by the statement, "I am homosexual"
alone unless it was clear that the speaker was defining himself or herself in ac-
cordance with the statutory definition.
Id. at 1414 n.5.
135. S. Hrg. 103-845, supra note 8, at 772 (testimony ofJamie Gorelick, Gen. Counsel,
Dep't of Defense).
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Thorne v. United States Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1364-65
(E.D. Va. 1996) ('Closely read, the statute is a tautology and hence the rebuttable pre-
sumption it purports to express is illusory, for it cannot be rebutted short of the declarant
recanting the original statement declaring his or her homosexuality.").
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Even assuming that homosexuals threaten "unit cohesion,"
... such threats can only conceivably arise from: (1) hetero-
sexual dislike of homosexuals for moral or other reasons; (2)
heterosexuals' apparent fear that they will be victimized,
threatened or harassed by homosexuals; and/or (3) the no-
tion that homosexuals are uniquely incapable of controlling
their sexual desires.' 38
The unit cohesion justification raises "the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected."
3 9
Romer v. Evans-like Thomasson, an equal protection case con-
cerning sexual orientation-is a recent Supreme Court case holding
unconstitutional a classification premised on people's fears and
prejudices. Supporting precedent, however, runs even deeper. In the
context of racial discrimination, the Court held in 1917 that
"promot[ing] the public peace by preventing race conflicts," though a
desirable objective, "cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances
which deny rights created or protected by the Federal
Constitution.""4
In Palmore v. Sidoti,"l the Court held that "private biases" against
interracial marriages are not "permissible considerations" in deter-
mining whether a state could remove a child from her mother be-
cause of the mother's interracial marriage. 142 The Court agreed that
protecting the welfare of a child is the "controlling factor,"' 43 but con-
cluded that "[t]he Constitution cannot control . ..prejudices but
neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect."" 4
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.'4- makes clear that
the constitutional restrictions on government action motivated by pri-
vate biases are not confined to racial distinctions reviewed under strict
scrutiny.'1 4  In striking down the state law, the Court found it signifi-
138. Dahl v. Secretary of the U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1332 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
139. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996); see also supra notes 66-71 and accom-
panying text.
140. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917) (holding unconstitutional a city ordi-
nance forbidding "colored persons" from occupying houses in areas where a large propor-
tion of houses are occupied by whites).
141. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
142. Id. at 433.
143. Id. at 432.
144. Id. at 433.
145. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
146. Id.; see supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
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cant that homes for people with mental retardation were subject to
special zoning ordinances that did not apply to similarly situated mul-
tiple dwelling units. 14 7 Citing Palmore, the Court noted that "mere
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are prop-
erly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for
treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment
houses, multiple dwellings, and the like."1 48
Romer, Cleburne, and Palmore all stand for the proposition that
even when government's ultimate interest is legitimate, the classifica-
tion will be held unconstitutional if it springs from prejudice. Thus,
although the government's ultimate interest of maintaining effective
unit cohesion is legitimate, this interest cannot be attained by giving
homophobic prejudice the force of law. As Judge Hall's dissent in
Thomasson observes: "There is a great deal of evidence that the statute
was motivated by a desire to accommodate prejudice againsthomosexuals."'149
In announcing the policy, President Clinton observed that "those
who oppose lifting the ban are clearly focused not on the conduct of
individual gay service members, but on how nongay service members
feel about gays in general and, in particular, those in the military ser-
vice." 50 One district court judge, hearing a challenge to the policy,
concluded that, based on the policy's failure to reach undeclared
homosexuals, he could not "conceive how the policy cannot be moti-
vated by prejudice." 51 Moreover, the military has drawn the same
conclusion, as evidenced by military reports, studies, and statements
by military leaders. '52 Assistant Secretary of Defense Edwin Dorn testi-
fied that "'much of the resistance to gays is grounded in fear and prej-
udice."'153 Similarly, a 1988 report by the Defense Personnel Security
147. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447.
148. Id. at 448.
149. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 951 (Hall,J., dissenting). In Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (en banc), Judge Wald made a similar dissenting argument:
Palmore, Cleburne and the fundamental constitutional principle that they embody
compel us to reject the government's argument that individuals of homosexual
orientation may be excluded from the military because others may be offended or
angered by their mere presence. The Constitution does not allow government to
subordinate a class of persons simply because others may not like them.
Id. at 719 (Wald, J., dissenting).
150. Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Homosexuals in the Military, I PUB. PA-
PERS 1111 (July 19, 1993) [hereinafter President's Remarks].
151. Dahl v. Secretary of the U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1333 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
152. See infta notes 173-178 and accompanying text.
153. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 951 (Hall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also S. Hrg.
103-845, supra note 8, at 630-31 (statement of Maj. Bergeron) (expressing concern about
the effect on military life of allowing homosexuals to openly serve and having children of
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Research and Education Center (PERSEREC) described "'the existence
of a deep-seated prejudice against homosexuals [which] ... may be of the
same order as the prejudice against blacks in 1948, when the military
was ordered to integrate.'
154
Any doubts as to the policy's origins in prejudice is resolved by
reviewing the military's historical treatment of homosexuals. Over
time, the military's policy has been justified by perceptions that homo-
sexuality constitutes a personality disorder or mental illness or that
homosexuals posed a security risk.'55 Because Congress explicitly re-
jected previous justifications of the policy as untenable,'56 the military
is now forced to grasp at new straws. No longer permitted to invoke
the illness, disorder, and security risk rationales, the military now at-
tempts to justify the policy based on the need for "unit cohesion."
This justification is just shorthand for the proposition that homosexu-
als cannot serve in the military because some service persons do not
feel comfortable around them.
In sum, both logic and evidence overwhelmingly suggest that the
Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy authorizes the discharge of homosexuals
based on their status in response to the animosity and prejudice har-
bored by some heterosexuals. Yet even though most of the judges on
the Fourth Circuit in Thomasson unveiled the pretext behind the gov-
ernment's conduct argument, the court nevertheless chose to remain
blind to the homophobic prejudice driving the military's policy.
Judge Luttig's concurrence fails to come to the logical conclusion that
a prohibition on status is unconstitutional-a conclusion the military
service members "exposed to that lifestyle"); id. at 595-96 (statement of Gen. H. Norman
Schwarzkopf) (stating "the introduction of an open homosexual into a small unit immedi-
ately polarizes that unit" and that the military is "divided into a majority who oppose [al-
lowing homosexuals to serve], a small minority who approve, and other groups who either
do not care or just wish the problem would go away").
154. Dahl 830 F. Supp. at 1330 (quoting DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH AND
EDUCATION CENTER, NONCONFORMING SEXUAL ORIENTATIONS AND MILITARY SUITABILITY 8
(1988)).
155. See S. Hrg. 103-845, supra note 8, at 13-14 (statement of David F. Burrelli, Analyst in
National Defense, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress) (describing the military's historical treatment of homosexu-
als); see also Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968,978-79 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (describing the
military's prior justifications for removing homosexuals), vacated and remanded, 88 F.3d
1280 (2d Cir. 1996).
156. See C. Dixon Osburn, A Policy in Desperate Search of a Rationale: The Militay's Policy on
Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals, 64 U. Mo.-KAN. CITY L. REv. 199, 203-13 (1995) (describing
how the military has changed its justifications for its policy on homosexuality from mental
illness, to security risk, to unfitness, to sexual misconduct and unit cohesion); RAND NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL
POLICY OPrIONS AND ASSESSMENT 189 (1993) [hereinafter RAND REPORT] (reviewing the
unit cohesion rationale, its policy implications, and issues regarding its implementation).
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itself admits the policy was designed to avoid. Nevertheless, even if
the policy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell could pass the legitimate govern-
ment interest prong, it is doomed under the second prong of equal
protection analysis.
b. No Rational Relation Between the Government's Objective and
Don't Ask, Don't Tell.-The majority and concurring opinions in Thom-
asson overlook the internal and external inconsistencies that cause the
policy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell to fail the test of whether the policy is
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. This oversight
is made possible in part by a misapplication of the second prong of
the rational basis test. It is possible to selectively quote from Supreme
Court decisions to elicit support for practically insurmountable defer-
ence to government classifications,' 57 but such efforts ignore the level
of examination the Court has actually undertaken.
In Romer v. Evans, the Court made clear that "even in the ordinary
equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist
on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the
object to be attained." 58 This effort, the Court said, "gives substance
to the Equal Protection Clause." '59 Chief Judge Wilkinson, 6 ° for the
majority, and Judge Luttig,161 in concurrence, cite to Heller v. Doe162
for the proposition that a statute must be sustained "if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification."16' Heller, however, hardly stands for the propo-
sition that courts should accept atface value that the asserted means to
achieve the state interest is rational. Even in Heller, in which the Court
applied the more deferential version of the rational basis test, the
Court inquired into whether the government policy was rationally
based."5  The Heller Court examined at length the differences be-
157. See supra notes 46-65 and accompanying text.
158. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996) (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928.
161. Id. at 947 (Luttig, J., concurring).
162. 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
163. Id. at 320 ("[T]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to
negative every conceivable basis which might support it." (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parks Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973))).
164. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct.
2264, 2277 (1996) (noting in the Virginia Military Institute's gender-based discrimination
case that "a tenable justification must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations
for actions in fact differently grounded"); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir.
1991) (noting that under rational basis scrutiny the court must actively review the record
"to see whether the government ha[s] established on the record a rational basis for the challenged
discrimination"); Dahi v. Secretary of the U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1327 (E.D. Cal.
10671997]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tween mental illness and mental retardation to determine whether the
application of different standards for involuntary commitment
"find[s] some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the
legislation. "165
The majority's further reliance on FCC v. Beach Communications,
Inc.166 is similarly misplaced. In Beach Communications, the Supreme
Court upheld an economic regulation only after an examination that
found two possible bases for the challenged classification. 67
In stark contrast to these cases, the majority and concurring opin-
ions in Thomasson lack any real examination of the "relation between
the classification adopted and the object to be attained." 68 For the
most part, the opinions fail to explore the rationale behind the gov-
ernment's decision to differentiate between homosexual misconduct
and heterosexual misconduct and between declared and undeclared
homosexuals. Having already accepted the government's conduct-sta-
tus distinction, the majority opinion simply concludes that the pre-
sumption of conduct from a declaration of homosexuality "certainly
has a rational basis"" 9 and that the "presumption is a reasonable
means of allocating the burden of proof."17° Similarly, the majority
found the distinction between declared and undeclared homosexuals
rational by recharacterizing a statement-pure speech-as conduct
that provides affirmative evidence of a propensity to engage in con-
duct."' Judge Luttig, on the other hand, having determined that
Congress intended to ban the "mere presence" of homosexuals to pro-
mote unit cohesion, concludes that such a ban is not only rationally
based, but is also narrowly tailored. 7
Both opinions ignore the inconsistencies and evidence that un-
dermine the policy's rationale. First, and perhaps most obvious, are
1993) ("[T]here is no support for [the Secretary's] argument that the court must accept
without question defendant's proffered bases for the homosexual exclusion policy without
analyzing the relevant evidence and determining whether the policy is motivated by preju-
dice against homosexuals.").
165. Heller, 509 U.S. at 321. Heler is replete with citations to books and journal articles
on mental retardation and mental illness. See id. at 321-29. Ultimately, the Heller Court
found "plausible rationales" for the difference in treatment. Id. at 321-30. Justice Souter
vigorously dissented, arguing that one of the two statutory provisions was not rationally
related to the government's interest. Id. at 348 (Souter, J., dissenting).
166. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
167. 508 U.S. 307, 317 (1993).
168. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996).
169. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 930.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 948 (Luttig, J., concurring).
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the considerable contributions that homosexuals have made to the
armed services.1 73 No evidence supports the proposition that a ban
on open homosexuality will enhance unit cohesion.174 As Judge Rich-
ard A. Posner has observed, "[t] he most important reason for doubt-
ing that dropping the ban on homosexuals in the military would cause
serious morale problems is simply that a large number of homosexu-
als already serve without significant difficulties."1 75 Indeed, the exten-
sive evidence points to the conclusion that open homosexuality does
not destroy unit cohesion or morale.1 76 As the military-commissioned
study by the Rand Corporation concluded, "there is no scientific evi-
dence regarding the effects of acknowledged homosexuals on a unit's
cohesion and combat effectiveness .... [A] ny attempt to predict the
173. See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 883 F. Supp. 539, 545 (W.D. Wash. 1995)
("[H]omosexuals-including many who were not celibate-have served in the armed
forces ably, devotedly, and often with valor.").
174. The sole support for the military's "unit cohesion" justification for its policy con-
sists of the opinions of military personnel. See Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 924
(W.D. Wash. 1994) (noting Assistant Secretary of Defense Dorn's admission in a deposition
that DOD has "no facts" supporting its rationale), appeal dismissed and remanded, 97 F.3d
1235 (9th Cir. 1996).
175. RicHARD A- POSNER, SEX AND REASON 319 (1992); see also S. Hrg. 103-845, supra note
8, at 702 (statement of Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense) (observing that "homosexuals have
served with distinction in the Armed Forces of the United States"); id. at 612 (statement of
Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf) ("[H]omosexuals have served in the past and have done a
great job serving their country.").
176. The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996), is
instructive in this respect. In rejecting the State's justifications for denying women access
to the all-male Virginia Military Institute (VMI), the Court ruled that Virginia's previously
male-only Virginia Military Institute violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating
against women. Id. at 2291. Although arguably the case is distinguishable because it in-
volves a gender-based equal protection challenge, in the VMI case the Court had no histori-
cal evidence to contradict Virginia's assertion that VMI's method of training could not be
made available to women without modification. In contrast, the military itself has admitted
that homosexuals have served admirably. See President's Remarks, supra note 150, at 1110
("[T]here have been and are homosexuals in the military service who serve with distinc-
tion."). This admission on the part of the military flady contradicts the speculative nature
of the military's justification that unit cohesion will suffer and military objectives will be
undermined should open homosexuals be permitted to remain in the service. In the VMI
case, no historical facts based on VMI's own experience undermined the State's justifica-
tion for excluding women; in Thomasson, the record serves to discredit the "unit cohesion"
justification without any need for speculation about the future. Lt. Thomasson's own rec-
ord provides adequate evidence to refute the "unit cohesion" justification. Almost one
year after Lt. Thomasson first stated that he was gay, Rear Admiral Konetzni stated in
Thomasson's annual fitness report that Lt. Thomasson
is one of the finest junior officers I have ever had the pleasure to serve with.
Clearly ready now for positions of increased responsibility. His contributions to
the Navy ... have been exceptional. He should be a first choice for Lieutenant
Commandel ... [H]e has earned my strongest possible recommendation for com-
mand ahead of his peers.
Brief for Appellant at 7, Thomasson (No. 95-2185) (alteration in original).
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consequences of allowing them to serve is necessarily speculative."1 77
Another study prepared for Congress reported that the experience of
other Western countries that have allowed homosexuals to serve show
that "the inclusion of homosexuals in the military is not a problem
and has not adversely affected unit readiness, effectiveness, cohesion,
or morale."
178
The second problem is the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy's distinc-
tion between declared homosexuals and undeclared homosexuals. 1 79
While a declared homosexual faces automatic dismissal, undeclared
homosexuals face no consequences." ° In urging that a declaration of
homosexuality is merely used for evidentiary purposes, 81 the majority
fails to confront the question of whether one who is a declared homo-
sexual is more likely to engage in homosexual conduct. In fact, "the
opposite speculation seems far more accurate":1 82 a service member
177. RAND REPORT, supra note 156, at 1165.
178. NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, UNITED STATES GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILrrARY. PoLIcms AND PRACTICES OF FOREIGN
COUNrTRIES 4 (1993).
179. See Dahl v. Secretary of the U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1334 (E.D. Cal. 1993)
(describing as "untenable" the government's assertion that "an undetected homosexual
has no propensity to engage in homosexual acts and presents no risk of undermining the
military mission by engaging in prohibited homosexual conduct, while a declared homo-
sexual does have such a propensity and does present such a risk"). This problem overlaps
with the first prong of the rational basis test-it provides further evidence that the policy is
meant to address the fears and prejudices of heterosexuals. See id. at 1332-33. The court
observed:
The only inference to be drawn from the instruction's failure to reach undeclared
homosexuals is that the threats to military effectiveness posed by homosexuals,
assuming such threats actually exist, arise solely from heterosexuals' adverse reac-
tions to the presence of known homosexuals in the Navy, and not from the behav-
ior of homosexuals themselves.
Id.; see also supra notes 139-156 and accompanying text.
180. Undeclared homosexuals are free to criticize the military's policy, attend marches
in support of homosexual rights, and read gay or lesbian magazines-so long as they do
not openly state that they are gay or lesbian. See DOD Directive, supra note 7 (describing
bases for conducting inquiries); Samuel A. Marcosson, A Price Too High: Enforcing the Ban
on Gays and Lesbians in the Military and the Inevitability of Intrusiveness, 64 U. Mo.-KAN. CrTY L.
REv. 59, 86 n.147 (1995) ("The difficulty with [the government's "evidentiary use" of
speech argument] is that it does not comport with the actual language of the policy it-
self.... [The court] rewrote the policy to treat a statement of homosexual orientation as
evidence of homosexual conduct, rather than as a form of homosexual conduct.").
181. There are additional problems with the argument that a declaration of homosexu-
ality is only used as evidence. For example, it runs counter to the policy itself, which de-
fines speech not as evidence, but as "conduct." See DOD Directive, supra note 7.
182. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 954 (Hall,J, dissenting). The problem is that conduct can be
controlled, while status or orientation is a matter of identity. See Note, Constitutional Law-
Equal Protection-D.C. Circuit Upholds Military Discharge Based on a Statement of Homosexual
Orientation.--Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1994), 108 HAv. L. REv. 1779, 1782
(1995) ("Although the sexual desires of each group may be equally strong, the desire of
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desiring to stay in the armed forces would have more reason not to
engage in homosexual conduct after making a statement than before,
since a declared homosexual is more likely to be watched closely. 183
Even if declared homosexuals were more likely to engage in homosex-
ual conduct, the presumption of homosexual conduct from a state-
ment or acknowledgement of homosexual status raises its own
constitutional problems.'1 4  As the Supreme Court has observed,
"most people obey the law even when they disapprove of it. This obe-
dience may reflect a generalized respect for legality or the fear of
prosecution, but for whatever reason, the law's prohibitions are mat-
ters of consequence." 8 5 This holds true even when the sanction does
not involve criminal penalties.1 86
Third, the policy operates irrationally by excusing homosexual
conduct by persons claiming to be heterosexuals. The statute excuses
a person who has engaged in a homosexual act from discharge if he
or she demonstrates that "such conduct is a departure from the mem-
homosexuals for sex is not necessarily greater than their desire to retain their positions in
the military."). As Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold of the Eighth Circuit stated in a case
similar to Thomasson:
This presumption appears to me to be at best questionable. If I am a heterosex-
ual and not married, do I have a propensity to commit fornication? If I am covet-
ous, do I have a propensity to steal? If I am angry, do I have a propensity to strike
someone or to kill? I think not. The distinction between disposition and action is
clear. The presumption contained in the current policy ignores this distinction.
Many people, homosexual and heterosexual, are celibate. The current policy en-
tirely overlooks this aspect of human conduct.
Richenberg v. Perry, 73 F.3d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1995) (Arnold, CJ., dissenting). Cf Presi-
dent's Remarks, supra note 150, at 1110 ("[T]here is no study showing [homosexuals] to be
less capable or more prone to misconduct than heterosexual soldiers.").
183. Interestingly, the statute provides that a service member will not be discharged if
the statement or conduct is for the purpose of being discharged. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(e)(1)
(1994).
184. SeeJacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1992) (observing in a child
pornography case that a predisposition to do what was once lawful does not indicate a
propensity to take the same action after it is illegal); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
191 (1952) ("Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an
assertion of arbitrary power."); cf Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 953 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("[The
policy's] bedrock is a presumption that everyone will fail to comply with rules of conduct-a
declared homosexual is bound to misbehave . . . ."). Moreover, the majority opinion in
Thomasson suggests that ChiefJudge Wilkinson andJudge Niemeyer-the only two judges
in the majority who did not sign a concurring opinion-believe that a ban on status is
unconstitutional, because the opinion accepts the government's conduct argument. See
supra note 116.
185. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 551.
186. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509-14 (1964) (holding travel




ber's usual and customary behavior" s7 and "the member does not
have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts."1 8 8 This
paradox is particularly acute for Lt. Thomasson because he was dis-
charged for making a statement, even though over the course of al-
most ten years of service the military had no evidence that he had ever
engaged in prohibited conduct. 89 On the other hand, a service mem-
ber who is caught engaging in homosexual conduct can be excused
from discharge by simply declaring that the conduct is anomalous and
denying homosexual status.
Fourth, it is difficult to rationalize how a "Don't Tell" prohibition
on statements of sexual orientation will damage unit cohesion, while
the presence of undeclared homosexuals does not affect unit cohe-
sion.190 A policy promoting secrecy would seem logically to prevent the
military from addressing the "problem" posed by those with a propen-
sity for homosexual conduct. As one district court judge concluded:
"[E]ven granting that sexual tension is destructive of unit cohesive-
ness, it is hard to see how the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' plan further
minimiz[es] sexual tension in the military.... [I]t may plausibly be
argued[ ] that the opposite is true."191 Moreover, the policy of Don't
Ask, Don't Tell provides a powerful inducement for homosexuals to
lie. 92 Government-endorsed secrecy and deception can hardly pro-
mote unit cohesion. 193
Finally, simple historical observations raise troubling conclusions
about the policy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell. The same "unit cohesion"
theory was used to support racial segregation and gender discrimina-
tion in the armed forces and opposition to an all volunteer army.
19 4
187. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1) (A).
188. Id. § 654(b)(1)(E).
189. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
190. Because the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy permits undeclared homosexuals to re-
main in the Armed Services, one can only presume that unannounced homosexuality does
not affect unit cohesion.
191. Thorne v. United States Dep't of Defense, 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1372 (E.D. Va. 1996).
192. See Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated and re-
manded, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996).
193. Id.
194. See S. Hrg. 103-845, supra note 8, at 259-60 (statement of LawrenceJ. Korb, Director
of the Center for Public Policy Education and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies
Program at the Brookings Institution). In his Senate testimony, Korb noted the parallels
between military policy on gays and prior policies concerning race, gender, and volunteers.
He concluded that there was
no convincing evidence that changing the current policy [on homosexuals]
would undermine unit cohesion any more than the other social changes that soci-
ety has asked the Armed Forces to make over the past 50 years. In fact, this
change is likely to have less short-term impact on cohesion.
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In each case, experience proved that the unit cohesion theory is
flawed. 195 For example, the military's opposition in the 1940s to racial
desegregation bears remarkable semblance to the opposition to
homosexuals in the military.196 The military should have learned a
lesson from the fact that desegregation of the armed forces proved
more successful than anyone anticipated. 9 7 The military might real-
ize just as much success if it accepts homosexuals into the military.
Each of these factors indicates that the prohibition on homosex-
ual conduct is not rationally related to the government's interest of
unit cohesion. The military's own experience with homosexuals, wo-
men, and blacks, and the experiences of other westem countries that
have allowed homosexuals into military service provide firsthand ex-
perience that unit cohesion does not require protecting the irrational
sensitivities of other service members. Moreover, if one accepts the
government's view that the policy is based on homosexual conduct, its
internal inconsistencies-such as unequal treatment of declared and
undeclared homosexuals-fail any test of rationality. Unfortunately,
the majority opinion and Judge Luttig's concurring opinion ignore
each of these obvious difficulties.
Id. at 260-61.
AsJudge Hall's dissent observed, "'Unit cohesion' is a facile way for the ins to put a patina
of rationality on their efforts to exclude the outs." Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 952 (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
195. See S. Hrg. 103-845, supra note 8, at 259-60 (statement of LawrenceJ. Korb, Director
of the Center for Public Policy Education and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies
Program at the Brookings Institution).
196. One military committee that studied the issue of desegregation concluded:
"Men on board ship live in particularly close association; in their messes, one man
sits beside another; their hammocks or bunks are close together; in their com-
mon tasks they work side by side; and in particular tasks such as those of a gun's
crew, they form a closely knit, highly coordinated team. How many white men
would choose, of their own accord, that their closest associates in sleeping
quarters, at mess, and in a gun's crew should be of another race? How many
would accept such conditions, if required to do so, without resentment and just as
a matter of course? The General Board believes that the answer is 'Few, if any,'
and further believes that if the issue were forced, there would be a lowering of
contentment, teamwork and discipline in the service."
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 952 (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting a committee that studied military
integration of the Navy in the 1940s).
197. See Dahl v. Secretary of the U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1330 (E.D. Cal. 1993)
(observing that none of the dire consequences of desegregation of the military has come
true); S. Hrg. 103-845, supra note 8, at 260 (statement of LawrenceJ. Korb, Director of the
Center for Public Policy Education and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Pro-
gram at the Brookings Institution) (observing that, while in 1943 roughly 80% of whites in
the military opposed desegregation, when the policy changed three years later in 1951, the
number had dropped to 44%).
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5. Conclusion.-The Fourth Circuit in Thomasson turned a blind
eye to the reality of the military's policy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell. In
disregarding the logical consequences of the statutory language, the
court upheld the dismissal of Lt. Thomasson because of the
homophobia of other service members. The government conceded
that Lt. Thomasson had an outstanding career and that he had taken
no action beyond a mere statement that was not conducive to the de-
mands of military life-thus providing real-life evidence that the pol-
icy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell has nothing to do with conduct, but
rather seeks to purge the military of those identifying themselves as
homosexuals. Judge Luttig's concurring opinion, on the other hand,
incisively dismantles the military's status-conduct argument, but then
fails to reach the logical conclusion that "unit cohesion" is a euphe-
mism for prejudice. Both opinions fail to address the internal incon-
sistencies and external evidence that undermine the government's
argument that the policy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell fits the means it
intends to promote. Hopefully, in the near future, today's policy of
Don't Ask, Don't Tell will seem just as distasteful to the nation's lead-
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II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Trial Court Deference in Conducting Voir Dire Takes Precedence over
the Right to Impartial Juiy
In United States v. Lancaster,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that a trial court's refusal to ask potential
jurors about their views concerning the credibility of law enforcement
officers does not constitute an abuse of discretion per se.2 In so rul-
ing, the Fourth Circuit overruled its own precedent' and reinstated a
more deferential review of trial court discretion in conducting voir
dire.4 The court explained that the proper method of review, and the
one that complies with the traditional notion of deference to the trial
court, is to examine voir dire as a whole rather than the omission of a
particular line of questioning.5
This Note first examines the constitutional goals that voir dire
serves in criminal cases. It then questions whether the Fourth Cir-
cuit's reinstatement of trial court deference supports or undermines
those constitutional principles. This Note concludes that the Lancas-
ter court improperly overruled precedent and undermined the consti-
tutional right to an impartial jury.
1. The Case. -Bert Lancaster (Lancaster) and Derrick Vanlierop
(Vanlierop) were convicted in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia for assault resulting in serious bodily in-
jury6 and prisoner possession of a shank7 in connection with an attack
on another inmate at the Lorton Reformatory in Lorton, Virginia, on
May 14, 1994.8 At trial, the parties presented conflicting accounts of
the facts.9 According to the Government's theory of the case,
1. 96 F.3d 734 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 967 (1997).
2. Id. at 742.
3. Id., overruling United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1990).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 742-43.
6. "The jury convicted [both] Appellants of assault by striking, beating, or wounding;
assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and prisoner possession of a shank." Id. at 738. In
addition, Vanlierop was convicted of simple assault on a correctional officer. Id. The dis-
trict court dismissed the convictions for assault resulting by striking, beating, or wounding,
maintaining that those convictions were subsumed within the convictions for assault result-
ing in serious bodily injury. Id.
7. A shank is defined as "a straight, narrow part between other parts, as... the part of
a tool or instrument between the handle and the working part; shaft," WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 1308 (2d ed. 1980), or "an often homemade knife," MERRIAM-WEB-
STER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1076 (10th ed. 1996).
8. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 736.
9. See id. at 736-37.
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presented primarily through the testimony of Corporal Lloyd R.
Staggs, III (Corporal Staggs), Lancaster attacked another inmate,
Aaron Davis (Davis), stabbing him repeatedly with a shank.1" Further
testimony revealed that Vanlierop, in cooperation with Lancaster, pre-
vented correctional officers from coming to Davis's aid.11 In contrast
to the Government's version of events, the defendants argued that Da-
vis attacked Lancaster, Lancaster acted in self-defense, and Vanlierop
attempted to assist Lancaster.12
Based on the conflicting stories presented at trial, the defendants
maintained that the case turned on a credibility dispute between Cor-
poral Staggs and Vanlierop."3 According to the defendants, the deter-
mination of guilt or innocence depended entirely on the jury's belief
of either Vanlierop's story of self-defense or of Corporal Staggs's story
that Lancaster attacked Davis with the aid of Vanlierop.14 Accord-
ingly, during jury selection, the defendants requested that the district
court pose the following question to the venire: "Do any of you be-
lieve that a guard at Lorton, a police officer or a member of the F.B.I.
is more worthy of belief than any other citizen of our community?" 15
The district court refused the request. 6
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted both defend-
ants." The district court judge sentenced Lancaster and Vanlierop to
100 and 115 months of imprisonment, respectively."8 Because the de-
fendants believed the trial amounted to a "swearing contest" between
Vanlierop and Corporal Staggs,19 they appealed, asserting that the dis-
trict court's refusal to query the jury as to law enforcement bias consti-
tuted reversible error.20
A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court erred in refusing to ask the proposed voir dire question, but
found the error harmless and affirmed the convictions.2' One month
10. Id.
11. Id. at 737.
12. Id. at 737-38.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 738.
16. Id. For a detailed account of the voir dire see infra note 85 and accompanying text.




21. United States v. Lancaster, 78 F.3d 888, 895-96 (4th Cir.), vacated and reh'g granted
en banc (Apr. 15, 1996), aft'd, 96 F.3d 734 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 967 (1997).
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later, a majority of judges of the Fourth Circuit vacated the panel
opinion and voted to rehear the case en banc. 22
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Clear and Uncontroversial Right to a Jury Trial.--The
United States Constitution guarantees the right to trial by impartial
jury in criminal cases." Indeed,jury trials are central to the American
scheme of justice.24 The Founding Fathers regarded the right to a
jury trial as essential to our newly formed republic.25 John Adams, the
primary colonial exponent of the power of juries, described jury trials
as one of the two key elements, together with popular elections, of the
British system.2 6 Alexander Hamilton observed that both the propo-
nents and the opponents of the new Constitution agreed upon the
importance of a trial by jury.Y Nevertheless, although the Constitu-
tion guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury,28 the assemblage
22. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 736.
23. Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 reads in pertinent part:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been com-
mitted; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place
or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution further states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
24. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 1 (1983) (regarding the jury trial as "the
central element in the American conception of justice... [and] as one of the oldest and
least controversial guarantees in the Constitution"). For an overview of the right to trial by
jury, see David A. Huberman, Note, Right to Jury Tria, 83 GEo. L.J. 1106 (1995).
25. See ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SixTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
185 (1992) (stating that "[tihe Founding Fathers valued the right to a jury trial as an
instrument of the democratic process").
26. See SHANNON C. STrMSON, THE AMERCAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW. ANGLO-AMERI-
CAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 71 (1990).
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). Nevertheless, while the oppo-
nents to the new constitution regarded the jury trial as a "valuable safeguard to liberty," the
proponents saw the right to trial by jury as the "very palladium of free government." Id. at
257-58 (Roy P. Fairfeild ed., 1981).
28. See GARCIA, supra note 25, at 185.
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of an impartial jury is not as clear2 9 as its express constitutional
guarantee. 0
b. The Nebulous and Controversial Process of Voir Dire.31 -The
United States Supreme Court has held that in both capital cases3 2 and
cases in which racial issues are inextricably bound to the conduct of
the trial such that a heightened risk of racial bias and ethnic prejudice
is present,13 the Constitution requires that the trial court voir dire the
venire pool regarding prospective juror bias or prejudice.3 4 For in-
stance, in Ham v. South Carolina,3 5 an African-American civil rights
29. "Although the jury trial played a key role in our historical development as a nation,
its history is shrouded in ambiguity and confusion." Id.
30. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 24, at 2 (stating that the Constitution guarantees the
right to ajury trial without any reference to the selection procedure). Many rules of proce-
dure provide discretion to trial judges in administering voir dire. For example, Rule 24(a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
The court may permit the defendant or the defendant's attorney and the attorney
for the government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself
conduct the examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the defend-
ant or the defendant's attorney and the attorney for the government to supple-
ment the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself
submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or their
attorneys as it deems proper.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(a).
31. Voir dire means to speak the truth. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed.
1990). Voir dire denotes the preliminary examination of prospective jurors to determine
their qualification and suitability to serve as jurors. See id. Peremptory challenges or chal-
lenges for cause may result from such examination. See id.
Federal law and all state laws provide lawyers with two ways to remove prospective
jurors from the venirepanel. See Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptoiy
Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227 (1986). Lawyers may challenge
"for cause" or may challenge "peremptorily." Id. Challenges for cause allow attorneys to
remove prospective jurors for "narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable" rea-
sons. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
As opposed to "for cause" challenges, attorneys may employ peremptory challenges
without stating a reason and without judicial approval. See id. For a detailed examination
of peremptory challenges and an argument for their abolition, see Gurney, supra.
32. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (holding that the Constitution re-
quires voir dire in a capital case and, if requested, requires questions regarding whether
prospective jurors would automatically vote for imposing the death penalty).
33. See Rosalez-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981) (noting that the Con-
stitution requires inquiry into racial prejudice on voir dire when "racial issues [are] 'inex-
tricably bound up with the conduct of the trial'" (citations omitted)).
34. See generally Laura A. Giantris, Note, The Necessity of Inquiry into Racial Bias in Voir
Dire, 55 MD. L. REv. 615, 618-22 (1996) (discussing federal constitutional and nonconstitu-
tional requirements for voir dire examination on race in federal criminal trials); Beverly
Peters, Note, Trial Court Discretion in Conducting the Voir Dire Subjected to More Stringent Scru-
tiny: Cordero v. United States, 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 1121, 1126-29 (1984) (discussing the
evolution of stricter voir dire standards).
35. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
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worker was convicted by the state trial court of a drug offense.36 On
appeal, he argued that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial had
been violated because the trial court had failed to inquire into the
racial biases of the potential jurors.3 7 The Supreme Court agreed and
held that the trial judge's refusal to examine potential jurors about
racial prejudice violated Ham's Sixth Amendment rights and consti-
tuted reversible error.3 8 The Court explained that, although broad
discretion is given to the trial court in conducting voir dire, the trial
court must make some minimal inquiry into racial prejudice when
conducting voir dire. °
Three years later, the Supreme Court sharply limited Ham. In
Ristaino v. Ross,4" a jury convicted an African-American defendant of
armed robbery, assault, battery, and attempted murder of a white se-
curity guard.4" Although the trial judge questioned the prospective
jurors generally about bias and prejudice, the trial judge did not pose
a question directed specifically at racial prejudice.4" The Supreme
Court restricted Ham to its facts4 3 and noted that although Ham re-
quired inquiry into racial prejudice in particular circumstances, it did
not "announce a requirement of universal applicability."' Thus, ac-
cording to Ristaino, the constitutional right to a fair trial and impartial
jury does not mandate particular questions during voir dire.45
Although the Supreme Court has been active in describing the
constitutional parameters of voir dire in racial, ethnic, and capital
crime cases, it has declined to broaden the constitutional require-
ments beyond these limited circumstances.46 Accordingly, federal cir-
cuit courts of appeals have been inconsistent in their development of
trial court voir dire requirements outside the scope of Supreme Court
precedent.
c. Voir Dire As to the Credibility of Law Enforcement Officers.-
The federal circuits have split over cases involving juror bias in favor
of law enforcement. The First, Second, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and
36. Id. at 524.
37. Id. at 525.
38. Id. at 529.
39. Id. at 527-28.
40. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
41. Id. at 590-93.
42. Id. at 592. More specifically, the court refused to ask the venire whether "a white
person is more likely to be telling the truth than a black person[.]" Id. at 590 n.1.
43. Id. at 595-96.
44. Id. at 596.
45. Id. at 595-97.
46. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 739.
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D.C. Circuits have held that, in certain factual circumstances, refusal
to ask prospective jurors whether they would be biased in favor of law
enforcement witnesses constitutes error per se.4 7 In contrast, the
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court
need not pursue a specific line of questioning, provided that the voir
dire as a whole is "reasonably sufficient" to uncover law enforcement
bias or partiality in the venire.48
(i) The Per Se Test.-The Fourth Circuit, prior to Lancaster,
followed those circuits which held that, under certain circumstances,
refusal to ask prospective jurors whether they would be biased in favor
of law enforcement witnesses constitutes error. The Fourth Circuit
implemented this rationale in United States v. Evans.4 9 In Evans, the
defendants were convicted of distributing cocaine and aiding and
abetting such distribution.5" The critical factual issue primarily in-
volved law enforcement testimony.5" Nevertheless, the district court
refused the defense's request to inquire into whether members of the
venire would be biased in favor of testimony from a law enforcement
agent." The Fourth Circuit reasoned that ferreting out bias in favor
47. United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that the
court should have posed the question, but this was not reversible error), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 932 (1991); United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1164-65 (2d Cir.) (applying the
Baldwin standard, finding error in not asking the proposed law enforcement question),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 994 (1989); Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that when important testimony of law enforcement officer is made, the inquiry
must be made); United States v. Martin, 507 F.2d 428, 432-33 (7th Cir. 1974) (determining
that the question should have been asked directly and this was error); Brown v. United
States, 338 F.2d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (stating that the inquiry should be given if re-
quested, but this error does not mandate reversal); Chavez v. United States, 258 F.2d 816,
819 (10th Cir. 1958) (holding that it is a proper subject to inquire into whether a juror
who would be included to give heightened credence to an officer because of that officer's
status as an officer), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 916 (1959).
48. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 739-40 (rejecting the per se test and opting for a reasonably
sufficient inquiry into prejudice); United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749, 753 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that so long as voir dire questioning as a whole gave the parties reasonable assur-
ance that prejudice would be discovered, the court will find no abuse of discretion);
United States v. Spaar, 748 F.2d 1249, 1253 (8th Cir. 1984) (determining that a trial court
is not required to perform exacting inquiry and that the central inquiry is the overall exam-
ination of the venire); United States v. Gassaway, 456 F.2d 624, 625-26 (5th Cir. 1972)
(distinguishing Brown and holding that the numerous questions posed by the trial court
ensured a fair and impartial jury).
49. 917 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled 6y United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734
(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 967 (1997).
50. Id. at 802.
51. Id. at 806.
52. Id. During voir dire, the trial court asked eight questions:
1. I would ask if any member of this panel knows anything about the facts and the
circumstances of this case?
1080 [VOL. 56:1044
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
of law enforcement testimony was essential because "[i]f a juror was
prepared to find [the government's witness] believable simply be-
cause of his position as [a law enforcement officer], the defendants
[could] not receive a fair trial."" Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
held that when the Government's case depends solely on the testi-
mony of law enforcement officers, the refusal of the voir dire request
as to law enforcement bias would be an abuse of discretion.54
Such abuse of discretion, however, does not necessarily constitute
reversible error.55 The error might well be harmless, as stated in United
States v. Baldwin:56
All circuits appear to be in agreement that the refusal to ask
the question of whether the prospective jurors would be un-
duly influenced by the testimony of a law enforcement of-
ficer does not always constitute reversible error; that
question hinges upon such factors as the importance of the
government agent's testimony to the case as a whole; the ex-
tent to which the question concerning the venireperson's at-
titude toward government agents is covered in other
questions on voir dire and on the charge to the jury; the ex-
tent to which the credibility of the government agent-witness
is put into issue; and the extent to which the testimony of the
government agent is corroborated by non-agent witnesses.57
2. Are any of you close personal friends or relatives of, have any kind of business
relationship, including an attorney/client relationship, with either of these de-
fendants or any of the lawyers in the case?
3. Is there any member of this jury panel that is employed or works with or in any
law enforcement capacity?
4. Has any member of this jury panel received any kind of legal training?
5. Now obviously this case involves a drug charge. And I would ask, is there any
member of this jury panel that holds any opinions or beliefs in regard to drugs,
illegal drugs, that would prevent you from rendering a fair and impartial verdict
in this case?
6. Have any members of this panel ever either personally or had a member of
their immediate family who has been the victim of drug abuse?
7. Is there any member of this panel that has any particular difficulty or disability
that would prevent you from sitting on this jury today?
8. Now considering all of the questions I have already asked you, is there any
reason why any one of you could not sit on the jury and render a fair and impar-
tial verdict based upon the evidence presented here in the courtroom and the
instructions on the law as will be given you by the court?
Id. at 805-06.
53. Id. at 806.
54. Id. at 807.
55. United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1979); see supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
56. 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979).
57. Id. at 1298.
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(ii) The Totality of the Circumstances Test.--Other circuits have
held that the district court need not pursue a specific line of question-
ing, provided that the voir dire as a whole is reasonably sufficient to
uncover bias or partiality in the venire.5 a In United States v. Nash,59 the
defendant was convicted of conspiring and attempting to import co-
caine.6° Nash appealed his convictions based on the trial court's re-
fusal to ask whether the members of the venire would tend to believe
a law enforcement officer's testimony merely because of his position
as a police officer.6 The Nash court held that the trial court need not
pursue a specific line of questioning so long as the questioning as a
whole complied with "'the essential demands of fairness."' 6 2 Applying
this ethereal analysis, the Eleventh Circuit found the trial court's ques-
tioning and jury charge to be sufficient.6"
The standard adopted by the Eleventh Circuit is now, following
Lancaster, the controlling standard in the Fourth Circuit as well. This
new standard conflicts with Evans's per se analysis, but such tension is
not unique to the Fourth Circuit. The circuits are split, with at least
four circuits applying the per se rule and three following the less strict
totality test.64
As evinced by the lack of uniformity among the circuits, in cases
involving the potential for law enforcement bias, courts have devel-
oped varying views on the assemblage of an impartial jury. The total-
ity of the circumstances rule affords the trial judge wide latitude in
conducting voir dire, provided that the voir dire as a whole is reason-
ably sufficient to uncover potential bias.65 The per se rule, in contrast,
restrains trial court leeway by providing an additional measure for as-
suring that reasonable steps will be taken to assemble an impartial jury
when the trial hinges on law enforcement testimony.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In discarding the per se test in favor
of the totality of the circumstances test, the Lancaster court down-
played and rejected the same rationale that it accepted in Evans only
six years earlier. In reaching its conclusion, the court first surveyed
58. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
59. 910 F.2d 749 (11th Cir. 1990).
60. Id. at 752.
61. Id. at 753.
62. Id. (quoting United States v. Tegzes, 715 F.2d 505, 507 (11th Cir. 1983)).
63. Id. at 756.
64. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 748 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting); see supra notes 47-48 and ac-
companying text.
65. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 741 (noting that this approach "restor[es] discretion in the
handling of voir dire to the trial judge-where it rightfully belongs").
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the principles governing the review of challenges to sufficiency of voir
dire.66 Next, the court examined Evans, found that it did not fall in
accordance with the traditional principles of review, and overruled
it.6 7 Finally, the court reviewed the voir dire as a whole and found it
sufficient to ensure an impartial jury.'s
a. Traditional Review of Sufficiency of Voir Dire.-In exploring
the standard of review for evaluating the sufficiency of trial court voir
dire, the Fourth Circuit examined opinions of both the United States
Supreme Court and other circuits.6 9 The court noted that because
assessing a prospective juror's impartiality requires observation of the
juror's demeanor, voir dire must lie within the trial court's
discretion:7
0
"Despite its importance, the adequacy of voir dire is not eas-
ily subject to appellate review. The trial judge's function at
this point in the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later on
in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality
and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of de-
meanor evidence and of responses to questions. In neither
instance can an appellate court easily second-guess the con-
clusions of the decisionmaker who heard and observed the
witnesses."71
The Fourth Circuit further noted that, except in cases in which
the Constitution requires certain inquiries, 72 the district court need
not follow a specific line of questioning, so long as the voir dire, as a
whole, is reasonably sufficient to uncover any bias or partiality.73 Nev-
ertheless, "a district court abuses its discretion.., if the voir dire does
not provide "'a reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discov-
ered if present.""' 74
66. Id. at 738.
67. Id. at 740-42.
68. Id. at 742-44.
69. Id. at 738-41.
70. Id. at 738.
71. Id. at 739 (quoting Rosalez-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981)).
72. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (describing voir dire requirements in
cases involving capital punishment or heightened risk of ethnic or racial bias).
73. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 739-40.
74. Id. at 740 (quoting United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1353 (5th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied sub nom. Garza v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 87 (1996) (quoting United States v.
Quiroz-Hernandez, 48 F.3d 858, 868 (5th Cir. 1995))).
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b. Overruling Evans.-In adopting the totality of the circum-
stances test, the Lancaster court overruled Evans and its progeny.75
The court determined that the Evans per se rule offended "the defer-
ence traditionally accorded the trial court's conduct of voir dire and is
virtually unlimited in its application. 76
(i) Offensive to Traditional Deference. -Evans held that in cer-
tain situations every refusal to ask prospective jurors whether they
would be biased in favor of law enforcement witnesses constitutes er-
ror.77 After finding such error, a court would then determine
whether the error was harmless.78 In Lancaster, the court found that
this per se rule stripped the trial court of traditional discretion in eval-
uating voir dire.79
(ii) Boundless Application.-Besides offending notions of
traditional deference, the Lancaster court feared that the Evans rule
could have virtually unlimited application.8" The Evans rule required
a district court to inquire into bias in favor of law enforcement testi-
mony whenever the Government's case depended "completely" on
such testimony.81 As the court noted:
If the district court must, on pain of reversal, ask the venire
whether they would give heightened credibility to the testi-
mony of a police officer when the Government's case de-
pends on law enforcement testimony, logic compels that a
similar question be asked whenever the Government's case
depends on the testimony of any identifiable class of wit-
nesses that might conceivably be thought by jurors to be in-
herently credible, be they firefighters, priests, physicians,
attorneys, butchers, bakers, or candlestick makers. Indeed,
during oral argument counsel was unable to offer a persua-
sive reason why this should not be the case.8"
Based on fears of unlimited applicability and the desire to main-
tain deference to trial courts, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Evans
75. Id. at 742.
76. Id.
77. See United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800, 806 (4th Cir. 1990).
78. Id. at 807.
79. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 741.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 740. The court also made note of the inherent difficulty of determining how
.complete" dependence is to be defined. Id.
82. Id. at 741.
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should be overruled."3 The court determined that a totality of the
circumstances test would give proper deference to trial courts and
would prevent needless inquiries into, for instance, whether a pro-
spective juror thought physicians more credible than other wit-
nesses.84 Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the court
held that the Lancaster trial court's voir dire, when viewed as a whole, 5
was sufficient to ferret out any bias and allowed the impaneling of an
impartial jury.86
The dissent, on the other hand, did not believe that the Lancaster
trial court's voir dire was adequate.87 Judge Murnaghan dissented, ar-
guing not only that Evans was necessary to secure the constitutional
right to an impartial jury, but that the district court should be over-
turned even under the majority's new, lower standard. 8 He found
little merit to the majority's contention that the Evans rule violated
notions of trial court deference,89 and he took issue with the major-
83. 1d. at 742. The court relied on United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995),
which observed that the appellate court's role "is not to decide what voir dire procedure is
best, but to determine whether the procedure chosen by the district court is sufficient," id.
at 1353, and United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749 (1lth Cir. 1990), which held that refusal to
ask a voir dire question regarding whether prospective jurors would give heightened credi-
bility to law enforcement testimony did not constitute an abuse of discretion, even though
the Government's case "depended heavily" on such testimony. Id. at 756.
84. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 742.
85. In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the Fourth Circuit examined the
entire voir dire. See id. at 742-43. The court found the following voir dire sufficient: (1)
"Do you think that the fact that you have so many family members in law enforcement
would make it difficult for you to be impartial in this case?", id.; (2) "Would [your employ-
ment with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms] make it difficult for you to be
impartial in this case?", id. (alteration in original); (3) "[W ] ould you feel that you would be
somewhat predisposed towards favoring the prosecution?"; id. (alteration in original).
"[W]ould [your employment as a parol officer] make it difficult for you to be completely
impartial in this case?", id. (alteration in original); (4) "Do you feel that those relationships
would make it difficult for you to be impartial in this case? ... I notice a little hesitation.
Do you sort of think that you might be tilted in favor of law-enforcement witnesses in this
case?" Id. at 743 (alteration in original).
The Fourth Circuit also examined the transcript and found adequate the district
court's instruction before voir dire that:
[I]t's very important that as ajuror you not come into the courtroom with ... any
preconceived ideas, prejudices, biases, or anything like that .... In other words,
the purpose of voir dire is to try to get as impartial ajury as possible .... [Ifyou
have any doubt about the answer to [a] question, if there is any possibility that
your answer would be yes, raise your hand; and I would rather have you give me
too much information than too little.
Id. (alteration in original).
86. Id. at 744.
87. See id. at 745 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
88. See id.
89. See id. at 749.
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ity's "flippant tone"9" toward legal precedent.91 Moreover, Judge
Murnaghan disagreed with the majority's finding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion under the totality test because
"[q]uestions concerning law enforcement employment and general
biases . . . [are] wholly inadequate to ensure that jurors will not be
predisposed to believe the testimony of a law enforcement official."92
Judge Motz agreed with Judge Murnaghan's dissent, but wrote sepa-
rately to emphasize that, even if the Constitution did not require a
rule such as that adopted in Evans, the Fourth Circuit should adopt
one in its supervisory capacity. 93
4. Analysis.--In overruling Evans and the per se test, the Fourth
Circuit undermined the constitutional right to an impartial jury.
While the Lancaster court eliminated one problem-a rule that
"straightjacket[ed] the district court's discretion" 94
-it created an-
other. Instead of the bright line per se rule, the Fourth Circuit now
has an amorphous gestalt of factors that provide courts with little
guidance.
a. The Purpose and Nature of Voir Dire.--" Voir dire plays a criti-
cal function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amend-
ment right to an impartial jury will be honored."95 Without adequate
voir dire, the trial judge cannot fulfill her responsibility to remove
prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court's
instructions and fairly evaluate the evidence.96 Impartiality allows the
jury to analyze the evidence and to make a fair and reliable determina-
tion of the facts.9 7 Accordingly, time and time again, the Supreme
Court has held that justice requires an impartial jury.9 8
90. Id. at 751.
91. Id. at 753.
92. Id. at 752.
93. Id. at 753-54 (Motz, J., dissenting).
94. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 742.
95. Rosalez-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981).
96. See Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895) (noting that the voir dire is
conducted under the supervision of the court and that this necessarily means that "a great
deal" must be left to the sound discretion of the court).
97. SeeJeffery M. Gaba, Voir Dire ofJurors: Constitutional Limits to the Right of Inquiiy into
Prejudice, 48 U. COLO. L. Rv. 525, 526-27 (1977).
98. "[T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel
of impartial, 'indifferent'jurors." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). The Supreme
Court has also commented:
"[O]ur common-law heritage, our Constitution, and our experience in applying
that Constitution have committed us irrevocably to the position that the criminal
trial has one well-defined purpose-to provide a fair and reliable determination
of guilt." That purpose simply cannot be achieved if the jury's deliberations are
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The right to an impartial jury carries with it the concomitant
right to take reasonable steps designed to ensure an unbiased jury.99
This right to an impartial jury is meaningless unless the court takes
sound steps to ensure that it will be unbiased. As Judge Murnaghan
argued in his dissent: "The Constitution is a real document provid-
ing-when properly construed-real assurances." 100
b. Potential for Abuse. -It necessarily follows from the exami-
nation of the purpose and nature of voir dire that the defendant's
right to an impartial jury demands the real assurance of lack of bias.
In United States v. Lancaster, however, the Fourth Circuit dismantled
the available assurance by overruling Evans and opening the door to
potential abuses with its adoption of the nebulous "totality" test. 0 l
In cases such as Lancaster and Evans, the determination of guilt or
innocence hinges directly on the testimony of persons in authority.
10 2
Evans set forth a framework for these situations that guaranteed de-
fendants that an inquiry would be made into whether law enforce-
ment bias was present in the venire10
In cases in which the evidence overwhelmingly supports the pros-
ecution, trial courts may be tempted to speed through the trial to
reach the seemingly inevitable guilty verdict. In pursuit of a speedier
trial, judges might refrain from asking proposed questions to the ve-
nire and thus might miss partial jurors. Evans, however, required
judges to take additional time-although only a moment-to query
tainted by bias or prejudice. Fairness and reliability are assumed only if the ver-
dict is based on calm, reasoned evaluation of the evidence presented at trial.
Thus, time and time again, in a broad variety of contexts, the Court has adopted
strong measures to protect the right to trial by an impartial jury.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 225 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 565 (1965) (Warren, CJ., concurring)).
99. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 532 (1973).
100. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 752 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
101. See generally id. (suggesting that the constitutional right to an impartial jury is not
adequately protected by the majority's decision in Lancaster).
102. See, e.g., Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 736 (prison officer); United States v. Victoria-Peguero,
920 F.2d 77, 84 (1st Cir. 1990) (government agent); United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800,
806 (4th Cir. 1990) (DEA Agent), overruled by United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734 (4th
Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 967 (1997); United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749,
753 (11th Cir. 1990) (police officer); United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1165-66 (2d Cir.
1989) (Postal Service Inspector and Internal Revenue Service Agent); United States v.
Spaar, 748 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1984) (Secret Service Agents); United States v. Martin,
507 F.2d 428, 432-33 (7th Cir. 1974) (government agent); United States v. Gassaway, 456
F.2d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 1972) (federal agents); Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543, 544
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (military police); Chavez v. United States, 258 F.2d 816, 818 (10th Cir.
1958) (government witness).
103. Evans, 917 F.2d at 807.
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the venire as to whether they would give unduly heightened credence
to law enforcement testimony.1" 4 Thus, Evans, in light of the defend-
ant's likely determination of guilt, provided an assurance that the de-
fendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury would not be
usurped. 1 05
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit failed to recognize this poten-
tial for abuse.'016 In its quest not to "straightjacket the district court's
discretion,"'0 7 the court opted for the totality test, which creates pos-
sibilities for abuse at both the trial and appellate levels.' According
to the court, at the trial level,judges must be given broad deference in
conducting voir dire and may not be held to a specific line of ques-
tioning.'0 9 This extremely deferential standard allows judges to ig-
nore the defendant's specific request to query the venire regarding
law enforcement bias and partiality. Considering the overwhelming
caseloads that some judges face, it is not difficult to imagine ajudge-
either consciously or subconsciously-opting for a speedier, rather
than a fairer trial.
The majority in Lancaster, however, would probably argue that re-
view of the trial court's voir dire to determine whether it was "reason-
ably sufficient" is adequate protection. Nonetheless, appellate review
of the sufficiency of trial court voir dire poses more potential for
abuse. Appellate judges are naturally disinclined to order a new trial
of an apparently guilty defendant based merely on a defect in the voir
dire." 0 Furthermore, the reversal would be based on a technicality
that, although constitutionally grounded, could not on its face show
whether the guilty verdict was based on this technical mistake. Thus,
judges might be inclined to gloss over mistakes, finding the voir dire
reasonably sufficient on appeal, even though the voir dire was some-
what less than adequate at the trial level.
By overruling Evans, the Fourth Circuit removed a necessary safe-
guard that ensured that society's interest in punishing the guilty
would not trump a defendant's right to a fair trial. Evans required
104. Id. at 806.
105. Id. at 809.
106. The majority's discussion did not address the potential for abuse by trial judges
when applying the "totality" test. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 736-45.
107. Id. at 742.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Stephen R. Diprima, Note, Selecting aJury in Federal Criminal Trials After Batson
and McCollum, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 888, 894-95 (1995) (stating that a federal circuit court of
appeals will practically never reverse a conviction because a trial judge failed to ask a ques-
tion not governed by Supreme Court precedent).
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courts to ask one more question when the case relied primarily on law
enforcement testimony-a small price to pay considering the poten-
tial for abuse.
c. Application.-Not only did Evans provide a necessary as-
surance of a constitutionally grounded right, but it did so in a manner
that was easy to apply. This simplicity in application allowed appellate
judges to apply bright line criteria to determine whether the trial
court committed error. Evans required the district court to query po-
tential jurors regarding their partiality with regard to law enforcement
officers when the case rested on the credibility of law enforcement
testimony."' In reviewing appeals, judges need only determine
whether the government's case relied on law enforcement testimony
and whether the trial court posed the proposed law enforcement cred-
ibility question. Contrary to the majority's belief in Lancaster, these
criteria are extremely easy to administer. 112 The majority found that
determining whether the government's case "depends completely" on
law enforcement testimony is inherently difficult, presumably because
the language "depends completely" provides no bright line as to how
important the law enforcement testimony must be." 3  As Judge
Murnaghan noted in dissent, however, no cases have reported a prob-
lem with discerning whether a case relies completely on such testi-
mony.1 1 4 Presumably, such cases have not arisen because judges
simply give defendants the benefit of the doubt, and doing so only
requires a few moments delay." 5
Asserting that the Evans threshold was inherently difficult to
grasp, 1 6 the majority strangely adopted an even more difficult stan-
dard. Requiring that the voir dire must be "reasonably sufficient" to
uncover any bias or partiality in the venire," 7 the Fourth Circuit sets
forth no criteria with which appeals can be reviewed, leaving judges in
111. Evans, 917 F.2d at 805-09.
112. See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 741.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 750 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
115. In fact, the simplest and "brightest" bright line test would be to require the judge to
poll the venire about potential biases whenever the testimony relies upon law enforcement
testimony at all. Although the Lancaster majority raises the argument of"unlimited applica-
tion" and predicts that judges will be required to poll the jury about the credibility of even
a butcher, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text, it seems more plausible to rely
upon the good sense and judgment of defense lawyers to exclude absurd questions. In
those rare cases in which the defense abuses its right to frame questions for the voir dire,
then if the judge commits a technical error by refusing to ask such questions, the harmless
error doctrine will prevent such errors from requiring reversal.
116. Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 741.
117. Id. at 750-51 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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an analytical vacuum. Thus, the appellate court will be required to
review the entire record to determine the sufficiency of the voir dire.
The Evans standard established a threshold that allowed courts to fer-
ret out unwarranted appeals. Unlike the standard adopted in Lancas-
ter, a bright line test would promote judicial efficiency.
5. Conclusion.-In United States v. Lancaster, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that there is no per se
rule requiring a trial court to question prospective jurors regarding
the credibility of law enforcement testimony.118 Reasoning that such
a rule conflicts with the traditional deference afforded trial judges in
conducting voir dire, and is virtually unlimited in its application, the
Fourth Circuit sided with those circuits requiring an evaluation of the
voir dire as a whole to determine the sufficiency of the voir dire. 1 9
The court concluded that the totality of the circumstances test is in
full accordance with traditional voir dire principles.1
2 0
In order to preserve a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury, the trial court should be required to question the ve-
nire regarding the credibility of law enforcement testimony.12 1 It is
essential to assemble "a body of unbiased individuals, strangers to a
dispute, who evaluate facts with respect for, but without slavish adher-
ence to, the testimony of those in authority"122 as mandated by the
constitutional right to an impartial jury. Evans required courts simply
to ask one more question-a small price to ensure a fair trial. In re-
jecting Evans's bright line test, the Fourth Circuit has not only en-
couraged unnecessary appeals, but also diluted an important
constitutional right.
JOEL L. PERRELL, JR.
118. Lancaster, 96 F.2d at 742.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 745 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
122. United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749, 760 (1lth Cir. 1990) (Hili, J., dissenting).
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III. EDUCATION
A. Expelling Disabled Students for Reasons Unrelated to Their Disabilities:
What's the Big 1DEA?
In Virginia Department of Education v. Riley,1 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a
policy of terminating the education of disabled children for misbehav-
ior unrelated to their disabilities did not violate the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).2 The court reversed Secretary of
Education Richard Riley's determination that such a policy by the Vir-
ginia Department of Education (Virginia) contravened the spirit of
the IDEA.' In so ruling, the Riley court properly refused to extend
more rights to disabled children than Congress intended to grant
when it enacted the IDEA.4
1. The Case.-In 1994, Secretary of Education Richard Riley de-
termined that the State of Virginia violated the IDEA by maintaining a
policy that permitted the cessation of educational services for disabled
students who misbehave for reasons unrelated to their disabilities.5
The IDEA provides federal education funds to states that adhere to
the statute's policies.6 The statute requires, in pertinent part, that in
order for a state to qualify, the state must have in effect a policy that
"assures all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate
public education."7 Under the Act, the Secretary of Education re-
leases IDEA funds to a state only after the Secretary determines that
the state has complied with the statute's provisions.8
Virginia's disciplinary policy at the root of this controversy stated:
"'If there is no causal connection [between a child's misconduct and
his or her disability] and if the child was appropriately placed at the
time of the misconduct, the child may be disciplined the same as a
1. 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (en banc).
2. Id. at 561; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1417 (1994).
3. Riley, 106 F.3d at 561.
4. See id. at 563 (contrasting Secretary Riley's decision with Congress's intent in enact-
ing the IDEA).
5. See Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 23 F.3d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1994) (granting inter-
locutory relief from the Department of Education's decision to withhold education funds
and ordering an administrative hearing).
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1412.
7. Id. § 1412(1).
8. Id. § 1412(6). Under the IDEA, states must submit detailed plans declaring the
policies and procedures they intend to implement in educating children with disabilities.
See id. § 1413(a). Section 1413 of the IDEA requires the Secretary of Education to "disap-
prove any State plan which does not meet the requirements of [the IDEA's enumerated
provisions]." Id. § 1413(c)(2).
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non-handicapped child." 9 Secretary Riley determined that this policy
violated the IDEA insofar as it denied the disobedient disabled stu-
dents the "free public education" guaranteed by the statute.' 0 As a
result of this finding, the Secretary threatened to withhold Virginia's
entire sixty million dollar annual IDEA grant for fiscal years 1994 and
1995 unless Virginia amended its disciplinary policy."
Virginia refused to acquiesce to the Secretary's pressure to
change its policy and petitioned the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit for interlocutory relief in order to collect funds
under the IDEA.12 The Fourth Circuit held that the Secretary could
not withhold funding without affording Virginia notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing and thus directed the Department of Education to
conduct a hearing to determine whether Virginia's disciplinary policy
was inconsistent with the IDEA."3 After the hearing's completion, a
hearing officer, appointed by the Secretary of Education, concluded
that the Department of Education properly withheld all of Virginia's
IDEA funds.a4
Virginia appealed the hearing decision to the Fourth Circuit,
contesting the decision on several grounds.15 First, Virginia main-
tained that Congress must "clearly demonstrate its intent to override
local authority concerning school disciplinary policies before the fed-
eral government may intrude in such matters, and that no such intent
has been evidenced [in the Act] ."16 Virginia further contended that
Secretary Riley's interpretation of the IDEA was inconsistent with the
statute's policy of "equal access" for disabled and nondisabled stu-
dents. a7 Lastly, Virginia argued that the Secretary of Education's
threat to withhold its IDEA funding amounted to federal government
coercion, violative of the Tenth Amendment.18
9. Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337, 1339-40 (4th Cir. 1996) (alterations
in original) (quoting from Virginia's IDEA-B 1993-95 plan), rev'd, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir.
1997) (per curiam) (en banc).
10. Id. at 1340.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 23 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1994).
14. Riley, 86 F.3d at 1340.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1340-41.
17. Id. at 1341.
18. Id. at 1346. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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A Fourth Circuit Court panel affirmed Secretary Riley's decision
to withhold Virginia's funds.19 Several months after the Fourth Cir-
cuit issued its panel decision, however, the court, sitting en banc, va-
cated the panel decision and heard the Riley case anew.2 °
2. Legal Background. -
a. The IDEA.--Originally passed as the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act,2 1 the IDEA ensures that states provide ed-
ucational services for children with disabilities.22 In 1975, Congress
found that "more than half of the children with disabilities in the
United States do not receive appropriate educational services which
would enable them to have full equality of opportunity."23 The semi-
nal federal court cases, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania24 and Mills v. Board of Education,25 drew Congress's atten-
tion to the inadequacies of state special education services. Both deci-
sions created entitlements to free public education for disabled
children who were effectively excluded from such services before the
lawsuits arose.26 The Mills court, in particular, held that states must
provide equal protection to children with disabilities by providing
them with equal access to education. 27 Following the Mills court, the
drafters of the IDEA sought to rectify the inadequacies of state special
education by conditioning grants of federal funds on state assurances
of free public education for "all children with disabilities."2 8
In addition to this general requirement, the IDEA places several
administrative requirements on states wishing to receive federal edu-
19. Riey, 86 F.3d at 1347.
20. Riley, 106 F.3d at 560-61.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (1975) (amended 1990).
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (3) (1975) (amended 1990).
24. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam).
25. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
26. See Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children, 334 F. Supp. at 1258 (holding that
schools in Pennsylvania must provide "to every retarded person between the ages of six and
twenty-one years... access to a free public program of education and training appropriate
to his learning capacities"); Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878 (holding that "the District of Colum-
bia shall provide each child of school age a free and suitable publicly financed education
regardless of the degree of the child's mental, physical or emotional disability or
impairment").
27. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874.
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1994). The statute cites the Mills court's rationale, stating
that "it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts
to provide programs to meet the educational needs of children with disabilities in order to




cation funds.2 For example, when parents or school officials become
aware of a problem in a disabled child's placement, the IDEA provides
formal mechanisms for changing that child's placement.3 0 These
mechanisms include an opportunity for the child's parents to be
heard at an impartial due process hearing and a review of the local
hearing decision by a state educational agency.3" The statute also con-
tains a "stay put" provision, mandating that students remain in their
current placement until the due process proceedings are com-
pleted. 2 The "stay put" provision and due process guarantees apply
when school systems seek to suspend or expel disabled students for
misconduct.33
b. Federal Court Interpretations. -Every federal court that has
considered disciplinary action under the IDEA has held that the stat-
ute prohibits school systems from terminating educational services for
unruly disabled students when the students' misconduct is related to
their disabilities.' These courts reason that the IDEA's assurance of a
public education for all disabled students limits the disciplinary action
available against such students to changes of placement.33  Many
courts have held, however, that this limitation does not apply when
school systems seek to terminate the educational services of disabled
students whose misbehavior is unrelated to their disabilities.36
Although the language of the IDEA fails to differentiate between the
disciplinary action available against children whose misbehavior arises
from their disabilities and those whose misbehavior is unrelated to
their disabilities, 7 some courts have read a dual standard into the
statute.
38
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (1994).
30. Id. § 1415(b).
31. Id,
32. See id. § 1415(e) (3) (b) ("During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pur-
suant to this section, . . . the child shall remain in the then current educational placement
of such child.").
33. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 328-29 (1988).
34. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he [IDEA] prohib-
its the expulsion of a handicapped student for misbehavior that is a manifestation of his
handicap."), aff'd and modified sub nom Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Kaelin v.
Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 1982) ("A handicapped child may not be expelled,
however, if his disruptive behavior was a manifestation of his handicap."); Doe v. Koger,
480 F. Supp. 225, 228 (N.D. Ind. 1979) ("A school which accepts Handicapped Act funds is
prohibited from expelling students whose handicaps cause them to be disruptive.").
35. See supra note 34.
36. See infra notes 40-43 and 49-52 and accompanying text.
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b).
38. See infra notes 40-43 and 49-52 and accompanying text.
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An Indiana federal district court set a trend in Doe v. Koge 5 9 when
it held that the IDEA does not ensure education to a student whose
misbehavior is unrelated to her disability.' The court reasoned as
follows:
It is the purpose of the [IDEA] and its accompanying regula-
tions to provide handicapped students placement which will
guarantee their education despite the students' handicap. It
is not the purpose of the . . .Act to provide handicapped
students placement which will guarantee their education de-
spite the students' will to cause trouble."
The Koger court stated that the IDEA's change of placement proceed-
ings must include a determination as to whether a child's misconduct
stemmed from her disability.42 Under Koger, a school system can com-
pletely terminate a disabled child's educational services only if the
child's misbehavior is unrelated to her disability.43
In Kaelin v. Grubbs," the Sixth Circuit also found that school sys-
tems retained the power to expel disabled students whose misbehavior
is unrelated to their disabilities.45 The Sixth Circuit, however, differ-
entiated "expulsion" from "'complete cessation of educational serv-
ices."' The court found that the IDEA's guarantee of a public
education for "all children with disabilities" ensures disabled students
some form of education.47 Therefore, the court held that school sys-
tems must provide alternative educational services to disabled chil-
dren expelled from school for any reason.48
39. 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
40. Id. at 229-30. But see Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (D. Conn. 1978)
(stating broadly that "the use of expulsion proceedings as a means of changing the place-
ment of a disruptive handicapped child contravenes the procedures of the [IDEA]").
41. Koger, 480 F. Supp. at 229.
42. Id.
43. Id Cf. S-I v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The parties agree that
a handicapped student may not be expelled for misconduct which results from the handi-
cap itself. It follows that an expulsion must be accompanied by a determination as to
whether the handicapped student's misconduct bears a relationship to his handicap.").
44. 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 600.
46. Id. (quoting Turlington, 635 F.2d at 348).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 602. In an earlier case, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Kaelin court's
decision insofar as it distinguished between "expulsion" and a "complete cessation of edu-
cational services." See School Bd. of Prince William County v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1218
(4th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Circuit stated that expulsion is an acceptable option for dis-
abled children whose misbehavior is unrelated to their disability. See id. The Malone court,
however, expressly declined to address the question of whether a "cessation of all educa-
tional services" is appropriate for such students. See id.
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The Ninth Circuit, in Doe v. Maher,49 disagreed with the Kaelin
court's distinction between expulsion and complete cessation of edu-
cational services.5" After holding that a school can suspend a disabled
student for more than ten days without providing a due process hear-
ing,"' the Ninth Circuit stated, in dicta, that "when a handicapped
child is properly expelled [for misbehavior unrelated to disability],
the school district may cease providing all educational services-just
as it could in any other case."5 In Maher, the relation between disabil-
ity and misconduct was not raised in the parties' petition for review to
the Supreme Court.53 As a result, when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case (renamed Honig v. Doe),' it did not consider
whether the IDEA requires states to provide educational services for a
disabled student whose misbehavior was unrelated to her disability.
55
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Riley, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the Secretary of Education's
interpretation of the IDEA.56 The court vacated the Fourth Circuit
panel decision that supported Secretary Riley's interpretation of the
IDEA and adopted the opinion of the panel dissent.57 A plurality of
the en banc court adopted Judge Luttig's entire dissenting panel
opinion, thereby permitting Virginia to receive its sixty million dollars
49. 793 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986), affd and modified sub nom. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S.
305 (1988).
50. Id. at 1482.
51. See id. at 1485 (stating that a suspension of ten school days does not trigger due
process protection because "[slerious though it may be... [such a suspension] is not...
so substantial as to constitute a 'change in placement' or a loss of a 'free appropriate
public education' within the meaning of the [IDEA]").
52. Id. at 1482.
53. See Brief of Petitioner at 25 n. 18, Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337 (4th
Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2627).
54. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
55. In June 1997, Congress passed the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA. See Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37.
These Amendments speak directly to the issue of disciplining disabled children who misbe-
have for reasons unrelated to their disabilities. See id. at 95. The Amendments state that if,
as a result of a hearing officer's review, it is determined that "the behavior of the child with
a disability was not a manifestation of the child's disability, the relevant disciplinary proce-
dures applicable to children without disabilities may be applied to the child in the same
manner in which they would be applied to children without disabilities." Id. Therefore, as
of the June 4, 1997, effective date of the 1997 Amendments, the Secretary of Education's
position on disciplining disabled children is overturned by Congress itself. Nevertheless,
the Amendments are determinative of neither the Riley case nor any other case arising
before the Amendments were enacted.
56. Riey, 106 F.3d at 562-63.
57. Id.
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in IDEA funds.5" Six judges wrote separate concurrences, supporting
only part of Judge Luttig's panel dissent.59 Judge Murnaghan, who
wrote the Fourth Circuit panel majority opinion, and Judge Hall
dissented.60
In his now-vindicated Fourth Circuit panel dissent, Judge Luttig
first discussed the substance of the rights that Congress granted to
disabled children under the IDEA.6" Section IA of the opinion, which
received the support of a majority of the en banc court,62 noted that
the IDEA requires merely that states "'ha[ve] in place a policy that
assures all children with disabilities the right to a free appropriate pub-
lic education.' 63 Nothing in the language of the IDEA indicates that
Congress intended to confer an absolute right to education upon chil-
dren with disabilities. Judge Luttig reasoned that a child with a disa-
bility forfeits her right to an education under the IDEA if she engages
in "conduct antithetical to the right," just as she forfeits any other
right if abused.64 The court held that "[a] state ... no more fails to
satisfy the statute [ ] ... when it refuses to continue educational serv-
ices to a student who has forfeited his right to such services, than
when it does not provide an education to a student who chooses not
to avail himself of the opportunity at all."65
Judge Luttig supported his reading of the IDEA by citing to Con-
gress's intent in enacting the statute. 66 Without the incentive of fed-
eral funds, many states would continue to exclude disabled children
from schools because of their disabilities. Congress sought to create
equal access to public education for disabled children when it enacted
the IDEA. 67 Judge Luttig claimed, however, that this purpose is ac-
complished without requiring states to continue educational services
for disabled students expelled for conduct unrelated to their disabili-
ties.68 Accordingly, the en banc Riley court held that the Secretary of
Education erred in withholding Virginia's sixty million dollars be-
58. Id. at 560-72.
59. Id. at 561.
60. Id. at 572-82.
61. Id. at 562.
62. Along with the sixjudge plurality, Judges Niemeyer, Hamilton, and Michael sup-
ported part IA ofJudge Luttig's opinion. Id. at 572.
63. Id. at 563 (emphasis added) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1994)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id at 566.
67. Id. at 565.
68. Id at 563.
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cause Virginia acted in complete compliance with the aims of the
IDEA.
69
A majority of the en banc Riey court also supported Judge Lut-
fig's contention that Congress failed to clearly condition Virginia's re-
ceipt of IDEA funds on its acceptance of Secretary Riley's disciplinary
policy.7" According to the court, the Fourth Circuit panel decision
violated the principles set forth in South Dakota v. Dole7 t and Pennhurst
v. Haldernan,72 in which the Supreme Court required Congress's con-
ditional spending statutes to be clear and unambiguous.7" The en
banc Riley court noted that "It]he [Riley panel] majority is unable to
cite to a single word from the statute or from the legislative history of
IDEA evidencing that Congress even considered such a condition...
and its implications for the sovereignty of the States, and determined
to condition the States' funds in this manner."74 Congress had not
conditioned, in "unmistakable terms," states' receipt of IDEA funds
on states' provision of educational services for disabled children
whose misbehavior is unrelated to their disabilities.75
In Section II of his Riley opinion, Judge Luttig opined that the
Secretary of Education's decision violated the Tenth Amendment to
the Constitution.76 This part of his opinion, which received only the
support of the six judge Riley plurality, explained how Secretary Riley's
decision to withhold Virginia's IDEA funds usurped the state's power
to govern local educational affairs-matters traditionally reserved to
state sovereignty.77 The Tenth Amendment places substantive limits
on the extent to which the federal government can use federal funds
to coerce states into accepting its policies on local matters. 78 Accord-
69. Id. at 561.
70. This was not the same majority that supported section 1A of Judge Luttig's Fourth
Circuit panel dissent. This majority included the sixjudge plurality, Judges Niemeyer,
Hamilton, and Motz. Id. at 572.
71. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
72. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
73. See Riley, 106 F.3d at 566. Judge Luttig wrote:
Applying the clear statement rule [established in Dole and Pennhurst] .... it is
apparent that Congress has not spoken through the IDEA with anywhere near the
clarity and degree of specificity required for us to conclude that the States' re-
ceipt of special education funds is conditioned upon their continued provision of
education to handicapped students expelled for criminal activity or other miscon-
duct unrelated to their disabilities.
Id.
74. Id. at 567.
75. Id.
76. 1& at 566.
77. Id. at 572.
78. Id. at 561.
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ingly, such Supreme Court decisions as South Dakota v. Dole79 reify the
Tenth Amendment's bite, providing states with tools for attacking the
constitutionality of overly intrusive federal legislation."0
Ultimately, if the [Supreme] Court meant what it said in
Dole, then.., a Tenth Amendment claim of the highest or-
der lies where, as here, the Federal Government (accepting
the majority's interpretation of the statute) withholds the en-
tirety of a substantial federal grant on the ground that the
States refuse to fulfill their federal obligation in some insub-
stantial respect rather than submit to the policy dictates of
Washington in a matter peculiarly within their powers as sov-
ereign States.8
Following Judge Luttig's panel dissent, the en banc Riey plurality was
"[u]nwilling to acquiesce in such a pretentious arrogation of
power." 2
4. Analysis.-The en banc Riley court correctly rejected the Sec-
retary of Education's interpretation of the IDEA and recognized Con-
gress's true intent. When it enacted the IDEA, Congress intended to
provide disabled children with access to education equal to that of
nondisabled children.8 3 Secretary Riley's interpretation of the IDEA
violated this legislative intent by extending more rights to disabled
children than those enjoyed by their nondisabled counterparts.8 4 Sec-
tion 4.a of this Note will argue that the Fourth Circuit corrected Secre-
tary Riley's erroneous interpretation. Section 4.b will demonstrate
that the undesirable consequences flowing from the Secretary of Edu-
cation's interpretation weigh heavily in favor of the Riley decision.'
a. Furthering Congress's Intent.-The equal access policy un-
derlying the IDEA is evident in both the statute's legislative history
and Congress's express legislative intent. Congress enacted the IDEA,
79. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
80. Riey, 106 F.3d at 570.
81. 1&
82. Id at 572. The breadth of a Tenth Amendment argument deserves the treatment
of an entire Note. The subject will not be analyzed further in this Note in order to focus
on issues less developed in academic literature. For a review of the limits that the Tenth
Amendment places on Congress's power to enact conditional spending statutes see
Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Hos 1989
Sup. C. REv. 85, 117-25.
83. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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in part, as a response to Mills v. Board of Education,86 a United States
district court decision directing a school system to provide disabled
children with publicly financed education. The Mills court held that
states must provide equal protection to children with disabilities by
providing them with equal access to education.87 Congress invoked
the Mills court's rationale in the "'Congressional statements and decla-
rations" section of the IDEA, demonstrating that Congress's intent was
limited to providing disabled children with equal access to
education. 8
The Riley court correctly rejected the Secretary of Education's in-
terpretation of the IDEA because that interpretation failed to reflect
Congress's equal access rationale. Secretary Riley argued that his in-
terpretation of the IDEA was consistent with the statute, considered in
its entirety, because the IDEA "provides various benefits and proce-
dural protections to children with disabilities without regard to
whether similar benefits and protections are provided to nondisabled
children." 9 Therefore, he concluded that the legislative intent of the
statute was not strict equal protection.90
The "special rights" identified by Secretary Riley, however, are
more rightly understood as procedural safeguards that protect dis-
abled children from inappropriate placements. For example, dis-
abled children, under the IDEA, enjoy rights to annual evaluations of
their educational placements, while nondisabled children enjoy no
such rights.9 ' These special rights merely ensure that disabled chil-
dren's educations meet the minimum standard of "meaningfulness"
dictated by the IDEA.92 Such safeguards do not require states to pro-
vide any level of substantive educational services, nor do the safe-
guards provide disabled students with an education when nondisabled
children would be turned away, unlike the Secretary of Education's
disciplinary policy. As the Riley court correctly acknowledged, Con-
gress left such substantive standards to the discretion of states.9
86. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); see supra note 26.
87. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994); see supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
89. Brief for Respondents at 40, Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir.
1996) (No. 95-2627).
90. See supra note 5.
91. See supra note 30.
92. Cf Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982) (stating that, in enacting the
IDEA, "Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational stan-
dard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful").
93. See Riley, 106 F.3d at 571.
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Contrary to Congress's intent, the special rights for disabled chil-
dren approved by the Secretary of Education promoted inequality of
opportunity.94 Disabled children would remain in school despite will-
ful misbehavior.95 These superior rights are antithetical to the goal of
equal protection because nondisabled children do not enjoy educa-
tional opportunities when they willfully misbehave.96 Therefore, the
Secretary of Education's policy on disciplining disabled children con-
flicted with Congress's stated legislative purpose in enacting the IDEA.
Thus, the Riley court correctly overturned Secretary Riley's decision.
b. Avoiding Undesirable Consequences.-The Riley decision
avoided several undesirable consequences that would have resulted
from the Secretary of Education's interpretation of the IDEA. First,
Secretary Riley's decision left educators without the ability to maintain
discipline in schools. The IDEA, as interpreted by Secretary Riley,
gave disabled students a license to misbehave without fear of losing
their educational services. In addressing the issue, scholar Omyra
Ramsingh wrote that such a policy "inadvertently creates a loophole
whereby the Act can be manipulated by students to undermine a
school's ability to discipline them."9 7 Secretary Riley's decision re-
moved the deterrent effect of a school's threat to terminate a disabled
child's education.
Second, the Secretary of Education's decision requires states to
spend funds on students who willfully misbehave if the states wish to
receive federal funding.98 As Judge Luttig persuasively argued, the
federal government should not induce states to send private tutors to
94. Cf Erica Bell, Disciplinary Exclusion of Handicapped Students: An Examination of the
Limitations Imposed by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 51 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 168, 180 (1982) (stating that disparate disciplinary treatment of nondisabled children
and disabled children who misbehave for reasons unrelated to their disabilities "potentially
conflicts with the constitutional principle of equal protection"); Omyra M. Ramsingh,
Comment, Disciplining Children with Disabilities Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 12J. CONTrEMP. H.ALTH L. & POL'Y 155, 172 (1995) (arguing that when a court de-
mands that disabled students remain in school after the students misbehave willfully, the
court creates "a dual system of disciplinary procedures, whereby disabled students are not
subject to the same consequences for their misconduct as nondisabled students").
95. Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337, 1344 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 106 F.3d
559 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (en banc).
96. The Virginia Department of Education permits schools to expel unruly nondis-
abled students from school after providing children with fair notice, an opportunity to be
heard, and a right to appeal. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277 (Michie 1993). In this context,
expulsion means terminating a student's educational services. See Brief of Petitioner at 8,
Riley (No. 95-2627).
97. Ramsingh, supra note 94, at 173.
98. Riley, 106 F.3d at 563.
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jails and to children's homes when children choose to misbehave.99
These extra expenditures drain the resources available to responsible
disabled students. As a result of the depleted resources, those dis-
abled students that Congress intended to help-disabled students that
behave and disabled students whose misconduct is fairly attributable
to their disabilities-may enjoy lesser educational opportunities than
their nondisabled counterparts.
5. Conclusion.-The Fourth Circuit correctly overturned the
Secretary of Education's decision to withhold Virginia's sixty million
dollars in IDEA funds. Secretary Riley failed to view the IDEA's assur-
ance of a right to public education for "all children with disabilities"
in light of the statute's principle goal: assuring equal access to education
for all disabled children.' By overturning the Secretary of Educa-
tion's decision, the Riley court saved schools from a likely increase in
misbehavior among disabled students and from a decrease in the edu-
cational opportunities enjoyed by deserving children with disabili-
ties.' 1 In so doing, the Fourth Circuit set the IDEA back on the path
Congress paved towards justice for children with disabilities.
RicHARD N. GOLDBERG
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
1102 [VOL. 56:1044
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
IV. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. A Strict Construction and Application of Title VII to Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment
In McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a divided panel,
held that a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment cannot
lie under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)2 if the
victim and alleged harassers are heterosexuals of the same sex.' In
dicta, however, the Fourth Circuit left the door open for considera-
tion of sexual harassment claims involving parties of the same sex
when the alleged harasser makes homosexual advances.4 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit diverged from one other federal appellate court deci-
sion that directly addresses the subject of same-sex sexual harassment,
Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America.5 In Garcia, the Fifth Circuit held
that, because Title VII addresses gender discrimination, harassment
by a male employer against a male employee was not actionable under
Title VII, regardless of the sexual overtones of the harassment.6 In
contrast, the Fourth Circuit's decision in McWilliams appears to turn
on the sexual orientation of the parties. In deciding the actionability
of same-sex sexual harassment cases, "courts have relied on their inter-
pretation of the intent of Title VII, on the [Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission] guidelines, and on case law."7 Consequently,
courts have not been uniform in their rulings or their approaches to
the problem.' Rather, courts have used three separate approaches in
deciding same-sex sexual harassment cases.9 This Note explores those
approaches critically and argues that, in light of the Supreme Court's
1. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(1) (1994).
3. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195.
4. See id. at 1195 n.4.
5. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that harassment by a male supervisor against a
male subordinate did not state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment had
sexual overtones).
6. Id. at 451-52. In reaching its holding, the Fifth Circuit cited Goluszek v. H.P. Smith,
697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988), which found that the plaintiff did not show that he
worked in an atmosphere that treated males in a hostile, oppressive, or aggressive manner.
See id. at 1456; Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52.
7. Delaney J. Kirk & Maria M. Clapham, "Bagging" or "Goosing". How the Courts Are
Ruling in Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims, 160 LABOR L.J. 403, 405 (1996) (demonstrating
the division between various district and circuit court decisions on the topic of same-sex
sexual harassment).
8. See id.
9. The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have expressed these varying views. See infra
notes 74, 99 and accompanying text.
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rulings in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson1° and Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.," the Fourth Circuit's refusal to impose liability when
both the victim and the harasser are heterosexual men disregards the
fundamental goals of Title VII.
1. The Case.-In 1987, Mark McWilliams (McWilliams) began
working as an automotive mechanic at the Newington Facility of the
Fairfax County Equipment Management Transportation Agency
(EMTA), located in Fairfax County, Virginia. 2 McWilliams was learn-
ing disabled, and his coworkers subjected him to unwelcome sexually
offensive conduct.13 McWilliams worked at an all-male workplace,
and the general environment there was "heavily focused on sex."' 4
For example, McWilliams's coworkers circulated centerfold pictures
and off-color cartoons during work hours on a regular basis.' 5 Begin-
ning in 1989, several coworkers began teasing McWilliams, exposing
themselves to him and asking him about his sexual activities. 6 The
harassment grew progressively worse over time.'7 Eventually, McWil-
liams's co-workers subjected him to offensive physical abuse:
On at least three occasions, coworkers tied McWilliams'
hands together, blindfolded him, and forced him to his
knees. On one of these occasions, a coworker placed his fin-
ger in McWilliams' mouth to simulate an oral sexual act.
During another of these incidents, a coworker, Doug
Witsman, and another placed a broomstick to McWilliams'
anus while a third exposed his genitals to McWilliams. On
yet another occasion, Witsman entered the bus on which Mc-
Williams was working and fondled him.'"
McWilliams complained several times to his supervisors about the
conduct of his coworkers. 9 In 1991, McWilliams told his supervisor
that a coworker had placed a condom in his food."° In 1992, McWil-
liams informed a subsequent supervisor that a coworker had offered
10. 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see infra notes 41-46, 52 and accompanying text.
11. 510 U.S. 17 (1993); see infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.







19. Id. None of the complained incidents, however, involved incidents of physical
abuse. Id.
20. Id. This coworker sometimes took on a supervisory role at EMTA. Id.
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him money for sex.2 1 Each time that McWilliams complained, his su-
pervisors launched informal investigations into the allegations.22 In
October 1992, when McWilliams finally informed a supervisor of the
physical assaults,23 Fairfax County initiated a formal investigation of
McWilliams's allegations, and the Fairfax County Police Department
launched a criminal investigation against one of the most abusive of
McWilliams's coworkers.24
InJanuary 1993, McWilliams filed a charge with the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),25 which issued
a right-to-sue letter on July 14, 1993.26 On October 13, 1993, McWil-
liams filed an action in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia against Fairfax County,27 claiming that he had
been a victim of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.28 In addi-
tion to his Title VII claim, McWilliams alleged that his supervisors'
actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.29 McWilliams also asserted several
state tort claims against many of his supervisors and coworkers.3"
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on both the Title VII and the section 1983 claims.31 In so
ruling, the district court concluded that none of the defendants had
actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged harassing conduct.3 2
McWilliams appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit found that the case could be de-
cided on more "fundamental" grounds-whether hostile environment
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII when both
parties are heterosexual and of the same sex.3 3
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1193-94. The supervisors held meetings with McWilliams's coworkers and
questioned them about their alleged participation in the teasing and harassment. Id. Mc-
Williams's assistant supervisors assisted in the investigation, and the day and night foremen
were informed of the situation. Id.
23. Id. at 1194.
24. Id.
25. The EEOC is charged with enforcement of Tide VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1994).




30. Id. The court noted that McWilliams did not plead a Title VII claim against his
supervisors and that McWilliams re-filed his state law claims in state court. Id. at 1194 n.3.
31. Id. at 1194.
32. Id.




a. Legislative Intent of Title VJI.-In 1964, Congress enacted
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ....'
Since the enactment of Title VII, courts have struggled to define the
contours of sex discrimination in employment. No legislative history
exists regarding the meaning of the term "sex" within Title VII's origi-
nal prohibitions. A southern congressman had introduced the term
by amendment in an attempt to defeat the bill altogether.3 5 The con-
gressman introduced the term "sex" as a floor amendment at the elev-
enth hour, without prior hearings or debates. 6 The plan failed and
the bill passed with the added provision.
The Supreme Court has interpreted Tide VII to prohibit discrimi-
nation "because of sex" regardless of whether the discrimination is
directed against women or men. In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC,"7 for example, the Court interpreted Title VII to
protect male employees from a sexually discriminatory employer-
sponsored medical plan that limited the availability of pregnancy-re-
lated coverage to the spouses of male employees but did not limit
such coverage to female employees.3 " Further, lower federal courts
have held that both women and men can state claims for sexual har-
assment under Title VII.39 One distinction that federal courts have
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
35. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964) (statement of Rep. Thompson). Representative
Thompson stated:
As much as I hope the day will come when discrimination will be ended against
women, I really and sincerely hope that this amendment will not be added to this
bill. It will clutter up the bill and it may later-very well-be used to help destroy
this section of the bill by some of the very people who today support it.
Id.
36. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (noting the lack of
legislative history on sex discrimination).
37. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
38. Id. at 683.
39. See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 90 (E.D. Mich., Oct. 19,
1990) (acknowledging that the sex of the victim is immaterial when deciding sexual harass-
ment cases), affd, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992).
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made, however, is that the term "sex" applies solely to gender 4° and
does not allow for Title VII claims based on sexual orientation.
b. Sexual Harassment Under Title VII.-The Supreme Court
did not recognize sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination
under Title VII until its 1986 decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson.41 The Meritor Court relied on the EEOC's definition of sexual
harassment to hold that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title
VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile
or abusive work environment."42 The Court stated that the EEOC had
relied on "a substantial body of judicial decisions and EEOC prece-
dent holding that Title VII affords employees the right to work in an
environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and in-
sult."4" Although the Court limited its holding in Meritor to sexual
harassment between members of the opposite sex, the general effect
of the Court's holding was to strengthen the language of Title VII in
combatting sexual harassment in the workplace.44
Two forms of sexual harassment are actionable under Tide VII:
"quid pro quo harassment" and "hostile environment harassment."45
Quid pro quo harassment occurs when "'submission to or rejection of
[unwelcome sexual] conduct by an individual is used as a basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual. '"' The Supreme
Court has defined "hostile environment harassment" as discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, or insult that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive
'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an
abusive working environment."'4 7 In order to state a claim of hostile
work environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the subject conduct was unwelcome;
(2) it was based on the sex of the plaintiff;
40. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-41 (1989) (stating there is no
need to distinguish between the terms "sex" and "gender").
41. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Prior to Meritor, federal courts routinely dismissed Title VII
claims based on sexual harassment. See Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D.
Ariz. 1975), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
42. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
43. Id. at 65.
44. See id. at 72 (holding that a claim of hostile environment sex discrimination is ac-
tionable under Title VII).
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1993)).
47. Mentor, 477 U.S. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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(3) it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plain-
tiffs conditions of employment and to create an abusive
work environment;
(4) it was imputable on some factual basis to the employer.4
c. The Supreme Court's Influence on Lower Federal Court Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment Decisions.-The Supreme Court has yet to directly
address the issue of same-sex sexual harassment,49 and various federal
district courts and circuit courts of appeals have interpreted the Mer-
itor holding differently. Some courts have adopted the Court's reason-
ing in Meritor as evidence that the Supreme Court would not
recognize same-sex sexual harassment claims,5" while other courts
have permitted broad application of the standards set out in Meritor to
hold that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.51
In Meritor, the Court explained that "when a supervisor sexually ha-
rasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate [s]' on the basis of sex."52
In 1993, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in Meitor, in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc." In Harris, the Court rejected the em-
ployer's argument that hostile environment harassment must seriously
affect an employee's well-being to be actionable under Title VII. 5
4
Rather, the Court held that Title VII is violated whenever "the work-
place is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and in-
sult' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.'""' The Court emphasized that, in enacting Title VII, Congress
48. Spicer v. Virginia, 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995).
49. OnJune 9, 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a same-sex sexual harass-
ment case. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 65 U.S.L.W. 3432 (U.S.June 9,
1997) (No. 96-568), granting cert. to 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
50. See, e.g., Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 492 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (stat-
ing Meritor stands for the proposition that "sexual harassment constitutes sexual discrimina-
tion"); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D.S.C. 1995) (relying on Meritors
interpretation of Title VII).
51, See, e.g., Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 338 (E.D. Va. 1995) (relying
on the Court's use of gender-neutral language in Meritor); McCoy v. Johnson Controls
World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) ("Indeed, while Vinson did not
directly address homosexual harassment, nothing in the Court's reasoning suggests that
Title VII is limited to heterosexual harassment.").
52. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (alteration in original).
53. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
54. Id. at 22.
55. Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67) (citation omitted).
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intended "'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women' in employment."56
The EEOC has taken the position that Title VII may protect em-
ployees from same-sex sexual harassment. EEOC guidelines state:
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the
harasser. Since sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimi-
nation, the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a
member or members of one sex differently from members of
the other sex. The victim and the harasser may be of the
same sex where, for instance, the sexual harassment is based
on the victim's sex (not on the victim's sexual preference)
and the harasser does not treat the employees of the oppo-
site sex the same way.57
d. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: The Dilemma in the Fed-
eral Courts.-
(i) The Evolution of "But For" Causation Analysis.--One of the
earliest cases to address the issue of same-sex sexual harassment was
Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc.,5' decided in 1981. In Wright, a
male plaintiff brought an action against a homosexual supervisor al-
leging that he was terminated from his job because he rejected his
supervisor's sexual advances.59 A federal district court in Illinois
found that the supervisor's conduct was actionable under Tide VII
because, "but for" the employee's sex, the employee would not have
been the object of harassment.60 Two years later, in Joyner v. AAA
Cooper Transportation,6' a federal district court in Alabama also found
that same-sex homosexual advances could form the basis of a quid pro
quo sexual harassment claim under Title VII.6 2 The court held that
the harassment was based on the plaintiffs sex because employees of
the opposite gender had not been subject to similar advances.65
Each of these cases involved a factual scenario in which an em-
ployee rejected the homosexual advances of his same-sex supervisor,
and each brought a quid pro quo claim of sexual harassment, rather
56. Id. (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64).
57. EEOC Comp. Man. (CCH) § 615.2(h) (3) (1991).
58. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
59. I& at 308.
60. Id. at 310.
61. 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd, 749 F.2d 732 (lth Cir. 1984).
62. See id. at 541 (holding that a clear connection existed between the company's fail-
ure to rehire the plaintiff and the plaintiff's prior refusal to respond to the manager's
sexual demands).
63. Id. at 542.
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than a claim of hostile work environment. These two early cases were
grounded in the concept that same-sex harassment was "based on sex"
because employees of the opposite gender would not have inspired
the same treatment. In reaching their conclusions, the courts in
Wright and Joyner focused on the sexual preference of the harasser.64
(ii) The Intervention of Goluszek and Garcia: The Anti-Male
Environment Requirement.-After Wright and Joyner, a number of courts
deciding the issue of same-sex sexual harassment abandoned the "but
for" analysis. The second distinct analysis used by federal courts to
decide same-sex sexual harassment cases requires a male plaintiff to
show the existence of an anti-male work environment or, in the case
of a female plaintiff, an anti-female environment in order to satisfy the
"but for" causation test. In 1988, the case of Goluszek v. H.P. Smith65
emerged as the precedent-setting ruling on this approach to deciding
same-sex sexual harassment cases. The male plaintiff in Goluszek al-
leged that a number of his male coworkers had sexually harassed
him.66 The Goluszek court began its analysis by applying the "but for"
standard of causation.67 The court held that Goluszek needed to
prove that but for the fact that he was male he would not have been
harassed.68 The court concluded that Goluszek may have been
harassed on the basis of his sex, but nevertheless granted summary
judgment for the defendant on the ground that Goluszek failed to
show that he worked in an atmosphere that treated males in a hostile,
oppressive, or aggressive manner.69 The court reasoned that Title VII
was designed to protect powerless groups from dominant groups.7 °
The court distinguished between the appropriate use of Tide VII
to protect less powerful groups and the unwarranted extension of the
statute as a remedy for all workplace conduct of a sexual nature.7"
The court found no evidence that males were treated inferior to fe-
males in Goluszek's workplace and held, therefore, that Goluszek's
64. See id.; Wright 511 F. Supp. at 310.
65. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. IlI. 1988).
66. Id. at 1454. The plaintiff's coworkers poked him in the buttocks with a stick, asked
him if he had intercourse with a woman, accused him of being gay, and made other sexu-
ally explicit comments. Id. at 1453-54.
67. Id. at 1456.
68. Id.
69. Id. The court ruled that Goluszek "may have been harassed 'because' he is a male,
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allegations fell outside the purview of Title VII. 7 2 Several federal dis-
trict courts have relied on Goluszek in their refusal to extend Title VII
coverage to same-sex sexual harassment.
73
The Fifth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to rule on
the issue of same-sex harassment. In Garcia v. Elf Atochem North
America,'4 the plaintiff claimed that his male foreman sexually
harassed him by frequently touching and grabbing him in a sexual
manner.75 The court summarily dismissed the plaintiffs claim on the
ground that "'[h]arassment by a male supervisor against a male
subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the
harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender discrimi-
nation. '"76 Although, beyond this, the Fifth Circuit offered no ration-
ale for its position, it cited Goluszek as in "accord" with its ruling.7 7
Because Garcia was the first same-sex sexual harassment decision from
a federal appellate court, its ruling has guided many lower federal
courts applying Title VII to same-sex sexual harassment claims.7 8
One of the first cases to follow Garcia was Vandeventer v. Wabash
National Corp.79 The Vandeventer court agreed with both Goluszek and
Garcia that Congress enacted Title VII to eliminate "an atmosphere of
oppression by a 'dominant' gender."80 Further, the court found that
the male plaintiff had not reached the threshold requirement of prov-
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 (S.D. Iowa 1995)
("[M]ale employees are afforded Tide VII protection if they can show they are members of
a disadvantaged or vulnerable group (i.e., if they are working in an anti-male environment
or predominantly female environment)."), rev'd, 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996)
("[The] proper inquiry for determining whether discrimination was based on sex is
whether 'members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of em-
ployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.'" (quoting Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993))); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 526 (D.S.C.
1995) (relying on Goluszek to argue that Congress never intended Title VII to remedy same-
sex sexual harassment claims); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796
(N.D. Ind. 1994) ("This court agrees with the Goluszek analysis that Tide VII is aimed at a
gender-biased atmosphere; an atmosphere of oppression by a 'dominant' gender."), modi-
fied, 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (holding that "it would be going too far to
state that there is never any possible basis of relief" under the Goluszek standard).
74. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
75. Id. at 448.
76. Id. at 451-52 (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., 12 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpub-
lished opinion)).
77. Id. at 452.
78. See, e.g., Benekritis, 882 F. Supp. at 525 ("Since Garcia, most reported opinions ap-
pear to be following its finding."); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D.
Tex. 1995) ("[T]he Fifth Circuit has clearly and succinctly stated that Title VII addresses
gender discrimination and does not allow a claim for same-gender discrimination.").
79. 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994), modfied, 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
80. Id. at 796.
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ing the existence of an anti-male environment.81 The court stated
that the evidence showed only that the plaintiff had been harassed,
not that he had been harassed because he was male."2 The decision
suggested that same-sex sexual harassment was never actionable under
Title VII. s" That court later modified its decision, however, to ac-
knowledge that "a man can state a claim under Title VII for sexual
harassment by another man [but] only if he is being harassed because
he is a man." The court made clear that "it would be going too far" to
say that same-sex sexual harassment is never actionable.84 Thus, even
in the wake of the Garcia holding, the Vandeventer court did not hold
that same-gender sexual harassment is never actionable under Title
VII.
(iii) Application of the But For Causation Test.-A number of
courts, however, have focused their analysis on the but for causation
test to hold heterosexual as well as homosexual same-sex sexual har-
assment actionable under Title VII. In Prescott v. Independent Life &
Accident Insurance Co., 5 for instance, a federal court in Alabama
squarely rejected the Garcia rule.8 6 In Prescott, the plaintiff alleged
quid pro quo sexual harassment by his homosexual supervisor who
demanded sexual favors in return forjob benefits.8 7 The court in Pres-
cott did not agree that Title VII only protected a powerless group
against a dominant group.88 Applying the but for causation test, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs homosexual supervisor would not
have similarly harassed a female, 9 and thus homosexual sexual harass-
ment was actionable under Title VII.9° The Prescott opinion reasoned
that had Congress intended to prohibit only heterosexual sexual har-
assment, it could have used the term "member of the opposite sex"
81. Id.
82. Id. ("[The plaintiff] was 'razzed' in a way designed to be the most annoying to him
personally-he was called a homosexual. The record does not support a reasonable infer-
ence that [a crew leader] 'harassed' [the plaintiff] because he was a man. This was not
actionable sexual harassment.").
83. See id. at 796 ("Same-sex harassment is not actionable under Title VII.").
84. Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
85. 878 F. Supp. 1545 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
86. Id. at 1550.
87. Id. at 1547-48.
88. Id. at 1550.
89. Id. at 1550-51.
90. Id. at 1551. AccordJoyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala.
1983), affd, 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. I11. 1981).
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rather.than the gender neutral term "sex" within the language of Title
VII.
91
In Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co.,92 a federal district
court in Louisiana took a similar position. The Pritchett case involved a
female employee who alleged that her former female supervisor had
sexually harassed her.93 The court held that same-sex sexual harass-
ment constituted a form of sex discrimination under Title VII because
a ruling to the contrary would exempt homosexuals from Title VII
anti-discrimination provisions.94
The case of Raney v. District of Columbia95 provided a unique twist
to the same-sex sexual harassment controversy. Raney involved the
harassment of a male employee by his bisexual supervisors.96 The
plaintiff claimed that he had been denied a promotion because he
refused to provide sexual favors to his supervisors.97 The Raney court
held that harassment by a bisexual was actionable except in the rare
case in which a bisexual harasses both sexes equally.98
The most recent appellate decision to hold same-sex sexual har-
assment actionable under Title VII is Quick v. Donaldson Co. 9 The
facts in Quick closely resemble those in McWilliams. The plaintiff, Don-
ald Quick, worked in a predominantly male workplace, and Quick's
claim included allegations of both physical assault and verbal taunt-
ing.100 The Eighth Circuit applied the traditional elements of hostile
environment sexual harassment to the facts of the case and reversed
the district court decision, which had required the plaintiff to show
evidence of a predominantly female work environment. 1' The court
held that a plaintiff states an actionable claim of same-sex sexual har-
assment so as long as the plaintiff can show evidence that "'members
of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of em-
91. Prescott, 878 F. Supp. at 1550.
92. 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1377 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995).
93. Id. at 1377.
94. Id. at 1379. The court noted that when a homosexual man propositions male but
not female subordinates, he singles out male subordinates because of their gender. Id.
95. 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1995).
96. Id. at 286.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 288. See generally, Sandra Levitsky, Note, Footnote 55: Closing the "Bisexual De-
fense"Loophole in Title VII Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MwN. L. REv. 1013 (1996) (illustrating
the inadequacies of current sexual harassment standards under Title VII's "because of sex"
requirement).
99. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
100. Id. at 1374.
101. Id. at 1378.
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ployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."" 2 As
a result of the Quick decision, district courts within the Eighth Circuit
now examine the facts of same-sex sexual harassment cases on a case-
by-case basis."' 3 To date, only the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits
have directly addressed the issue of same-sex sexual harassment.104
Other circuits, however, have suggested in dicta that they might recog-
nize a same-sex sexual harassment claim.' 0 5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Fourth Circuit's approach to
same-sex harassment turns on the sexual orientation of the alleged
harasser. The McWilliams decision precludes same-sex sexual harass-
ment claims in which both parties are heterosexuals of the same
sex.' O6 In so ruling, the court reasoned that harassment of a hetero-
sexual man by another heterosexual man could never be "because of'
the victim's sex, as required by Title VII. 107 The McWilliams court re-
served in dicta, however, the question of whether a same-sex claim
would be actionable if the plaintiff alleges that the harasser is homo-
sexual or bisexual.10
8
The court first set forth the pertinent sections of Title VII and the
elements that a plaintiff must prove to establish a claim of hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment.'09 The court then declined to rule on
the issue of whether the defendant had received actual or constructive
notice of the harassment-the basis of the district court's dismissal-
on the ground that such a ruling would be necessary only if the unwel-
come conduct fell within the purview of Title VII." °
102. Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring)). The court found that a fact finder could have reasonably concluded that there
was disparate treatment between men and women at the plaintiff's place of employment.
See id. at 1379.
103. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996); Grillo v.
John Alden Life Ins. Co., 939 F. Supp. 685, 687-88 (D. Minn. 1996).
104. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Quick, 90 F.3d
at 1372; Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
70 (1996); McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1191; Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir.
1994).
105. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Sexual
harassment of women by men is the most common kind, but we do not mean to exclude
the possibility that sexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or women
by other women would not also be actionable in appropriate cases.").
106. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1195 nn.4-5.
109. Id. at 1194-95.
110. Id. at 1195.
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The court strictly construed the language of Title VII in reaching
its result. In particular, the court held that heterosexual male-on-male
harassment can never occur "because of the [claimant's] sex" as re-
quired by Title VII. 111 The court acknowledged that such conduct
constituted inappropriate workplace behavior. 1 ' According to the
court, however, Title VII does not proscribe all inappropriate behav-
ior."' The court determined that the alleged harassment did not oc-
cur "because of' the victim's sex. Rather, the court opined, the
behavior very likely occurred because of other vulnerabilities of Mc-
Williams or the propensities of his alleged harassers." 4 The court
stated:
[W] e do not believe that in common understanding the kind
of shameful heterosexual-male-on-heterosexual-male con-
duct alleged here ... is considered to be "because of [McWil-
liams's] 'sex.'" Perhaps "because of" the victim's known or
believed prudery, or shyness, or other form of vulnerability
to sexually-focussed speech or conduct. Perhaps "because
of' the perpetrator's own sexual perversion, or obsession, or
insecurity. Certainly, "because of' their vulgarity and insensi-
tivity and meanness of spirit. But not specifically "because
of' the victim's sex."'
The court grounded its reasoning in administrative concerns and
its interpretation of the intent of Congress.1 16 The court conceded
that the conduct alleged by McWilliams was reprehensible and per-
haps should be redressable through other remedies." 7 The court re-
fused, however, to expand the coverage of Title VII to include all
behavior that might fall within a broad range of activities character-
ized by a sexual nature."18 To do so, the court concluded, would over-
whelm the courts with cases that Congress never envisioned Title VII
should address." 9 To extend Title VII, the court concluded, would
give "unmanageably broad protection of the sensibilities of workers
simply 'in matters of sex."' 20
111. Id. at 1195-96.
112. Id. at 1196.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1195-96.
116. Id. at 1196-97.
117. Id. at 1196. The court stated that "there perhaps ought to be a law against such
puerile and repulsive workplace behavior." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
118. Id. The court distinguished between "because of the worker's sex" and "in matters





The court expressly limited its holding to hostile environment
harassment cases involving heterosexuals of the same sex."' The
court clearly stated that its decision in McWilliams did not reach situa-
tions in which one of the parties is homosexual or bisexual.122 Fur-
ther, the court stated that its holding did not "purport to rule out
claims of discrimination by adverse employment decisions (hiring, fir-
ing, etc.) involving only same-sex heterosexual actors." '2 3 The court
stated that all future same-sex cases should be determined on a case-
by-case basis. 124
In his dissent, Judge Michael disagreed with the majority's analy-
sis. 1 25 Judge Michael argued that there should be a cause of action
under Title VII for same-sex sexual harassment and that a material
issue of fact remained as to whether McWilliams had been discrimi-
nated against "because of' his sex. 12 6 Judge Michael raised serious
concerns regarding the majority's focus on the sexual preferences of
the parties.1 27 He opined that to make the harasser's sexual orienta-
tion an element of a Title VII claim would drastically impair the effec-
tiveness, practicality, and availability of a remedy.1 21 Judge Michael
stated that requiring a plaintiff to show that his harasser was homosex-
ual "puts too fine a point on the 'discriminat[ion] . . . because of [his]
sex' issue. I would simply hold that Title VII is implicated whenever a
person physically abuses a co-worker for sexual satisfaction or proposi-
tions or pressures a co-worker out of sexual interest or desire."1 29 The
plaintiff should be able to establish such facts, Judge Michael argued,
"by an account of what the harasser did or said to the victim" and not
the harasser's sexual orientation."' ° FurtherJudge Michael suggested
that, in the McWilliams case, "[t] he acts of assault and harassment are
sufficiently direct and suggestive by themselves to raise the question
whether they were done 'because of [McWilliams's] . . . sex."'1 3
In addition, Judge Michael, addressing the majority's concerns
over the administration of a broader application of Title VII, vigor-
ously disagreed with the majority's view that no clear line could be








129. Id. (alteration in original).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1199. Judge Michael noted that courts should be able to properly infer sex-
ual orientation from the conduct of the harasser. Id.
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drawn between discrimination "because of sex" and objectionable
conduct in "matters of sex."13 2 Judge Michael analogized to a long
line of case law from both the federal district courts and circuit courts
of appeals that had successfully distinguished between "actionable
hostility" and "non-actionable horseplay" in matters of sexual harass-
ment and discrimination.1 33
The Fourth Circuit has affirmed its position, also in dicta, in sub-
sequent rulings. Two months after the decision in McWilliams, the
Fourth Circuit again addressed the issue of same-sex harassment in
Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.'34 The court held that the al-
leged harassment was not severe or pervasive enough to create a hos-
tile work environment and dismissed the case on those grounds.'
The court stated in dicta, however, that it did not find persuasive the
Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Garcia and indicated that some same-sex
sexual harassment claims may be actionable under Tide VII. 136 Spe-
cifically, the court noted that "when someone sexually harasses an in-
dividual of the opposite gender, a presumption arises that the
harassment is 'because of' the victim's gender."'37 When the victim
and harasser are of the same gender, however, the sexually suggestive
conduct may also be, and is more likely to be, "because of" many other
variables.' 38
In Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 39 the Fourth Circuit fi-
nally recognized a Tide VII claim for same-sex sexual harassment in
which the harasser was homosexual."4 The facts in McWilliams and
Wrightson were strikingly similar, 1 ' but the crucial difference between
the two cases was the sexual orientation of the alleged harasser.
Therefore, Wrightson addressed head-on the issue left open in McWil-
liams and affirmed the distinction between harassment committed by
homosexual defendants upon heterosexual employees of the same sex
and harassment committed by heterosexual defendants upon hetero-
sexual employees of the same sex. These cases illustrate that,
although the harassment may be exactly the same, a Tide VII remedy
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996).
135. Id. at 747.
136. Id. at 751.
137. Id. at 752.
138. Id.
139. 99 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
140. Id. at 143.
141. In Wrightson, the harasser pressured the plaintiff for sex, made numerous graphic




exists in the Fourth Circuit only if the plaintiff proves the homosexual-
ity of the harasser.
4. Analysis.-In McWilliams, the Fourth Circuit held that the
gender and sexual orientation of McWilliams's harassers precluded
McWilliams from establishing a cognizable same-sex hostile environ-
ment claim under Title VII. 42 By focusing on the gender and sexual
orientation of the alleged harassers, rather than proof of discrimina-
tory intent, the Fourth Circuit departs from settled Title VII doctrine.
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's strict interpretation of Title VII's lan-
guage is misplaced, and the consequences are troubling. The McWil-
liams decision essentially creates difficult obstacles for victims of same-
sex sexual harassment by requiring proof of homosexual conduct by
their harassers. The decision also builds a framework that will inevita-
bly lead to the inconsistent treatment of victims of same-sex harass-
ment and underestimates the ability of federal courts to distinguish
between behavior that constitutes discrimination and behavior that
constitutes mere horseplay.
a. Title VII's Legislative and Jurisprudential History Does Not Pre-
clude Same-Sex Claims.--The ruling in McWilliams turned, in large part,
on the court's reading of the language of Title VII. The court's nar-
row interpretation of the "because of sex" language in Title VII is
flawed in many respects. First, because there is no clear legislative
history surrounding the inclusion of the term "sex" in Title VII, it is
difficult to discern Congress's true intent.14 Although the McWilliams
court tried to uncover what Congress's actual intent may have been,
the sheer absence of guidance from Congress poses an obstacle to this
interpretive strategy.144
One role of the court is to adapt enactments of the legislature to
modern situations. 45 This role is particularly important in the con-
text of anti-discrimination law. Significantly, the Supreme Court has
recognized reverse race discrimination claims under Title VII, thus
142. McWiUiams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96.
143. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
144. In fact, the term "sexual harassment" was not even used until the late 1970s and,
thus, was not in Congress's vocabulary when it passed Title VII in 1964. See CATHERINE A.
MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION
17 (1979).
145. See generaUy Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 9-25 (tracing the history of the chang-
ing conception of the courts in regard to gender and sex).
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evidencing an intent to construe Tide VII broadly.1" One federal
court in Tennessee observed:147 "[I]t would be untenable to allow
reverse discrimination cases but not same-sex sexual harassment cases
to proceed under Tide VII." 14s Similarly, in Prescott, the court cor-
recdy concluded that the term "sex" should be awarded the same sta-
tus of neutrality that has been given to the term "race."' 4 9 The
Supreme Court's opinion in Meritor set forth a gender neutral and
race neutral policy on sexual harassment when it stated, "'Sexual har-
assment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members
of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality."" 5 Therefore,
courts that have read Tide VII broadly to prohibit all forms of sex
discrimination have properly done so. The McWilliams court, in its
rigid interpretation of Tide VII, failed to allow the flexibility that has
been used to interpret the term "because of race" within the meaning
of Tide VII. If the term "because of race" can be read expansively,
then it would logically follow that Congress would also allow the term
"because of sex" to be read inclusively rather than exclusively.
Second, there is no indication within the legislative history of Ti-
de VII that harassment "because of one's sex" requires harassment by
a member of the opposite sex or by someone who is seeking sexual
favors. Instead, the Supreme Court has stated that the language of
the statute provides a "broad rule of workplace equality."' 5 ' In fact,
the Supreme Court's decision in Meritorimplicidy adopts the view that
Tide VII's anti-sex discrimination provision should be construed
broadly to permit sexual harassment claims by both men and wo-
men.152 The Court stated: "'Surely, a requirement that a man or wo-
man run a gaundet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being
146. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976) (stating
that Title VII coverage extends to discrimination of members of any race, including
whites).
147. EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
148. Id. at 1103.
149. See Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 (M.D.
Ala. 1995).
150. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dun-
dee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
151. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). One district court in California
explained that "no language in the Supreme Court's MAeritor Savings Bank or Haris opin-
ions could be interpreted as justifying an absolute bar of same-gender sexual harassment
claims." Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1379 (C.D. Cal. 1995); see
also Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and FeministJurisprudee, 105 YALE LJ. 1, 9-11 (1995) (discussing the rele-
vancy of gender differences).
152. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
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allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and discon-
certing as the harshest of racial epithets.""53 Thus, the court in Me-
Williams stands on weak ground when it suggests that Title VII was not
intended to reach non-traditional situations of harassment."' The
Court in Meritor never suggested that Title VII requires courts to iden-
tify the sexual orientation of the parties in deciding sexual harassment
cases. Rather, Meritods inquiry is whether men and women were
treated differently and whether the harassment was "sufficiently severe
or pervasive to 'alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and
create an abusive working environment."'155 Thus, the Fourth Circuit
did not rely on the Supreme Court's analysis in Meritor and Harris, but
instead placed an incorrect emphasis on Title VII's legislative history
to conclude that the statute does not protect heterosexual employees
from harassment by other heterosexuals of the same sex. 15 6
b. Problems with Proof and Invasions of Privacy.-Judge
Michael, in his dissent, aptly explained that the majority's decision to
require a plaintiff to prove the sexual orientation of the harasser is not
only unfounded in prior case law, but also poses serious issues of
proof and privacy.15 7 By changing the elements of proof in a sexual
harassment case, the majority in McWilliams shifted the focus of Title
VII. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the basis of a hos-
tile environment claim is that "members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which mem-
bers of the other sex are not exposed."' 58 The necessary element is
that a person be subjected to disparate treatment "because of" his or
her sex.'5 9 The gender or sexual orientation of the harasser is not
determinative of this element.
Despite precedent to the contrary, the court in McWilliams re-
quired a higher standard of proof in Title VII claims of same-sex sex-
ual harassment than in other discrimination contexts.' 60 In cases in
which the alleged harassment involves a male harasser and a female
victim, courts usually do not ask the victim to prove that the harass-
153. Id. (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
154. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196.
155. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904); see
also Harris, 510 U.S. at 17 (further developing the fact-specific test laid out in Meritor).
156. McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96.
157. See id. at 1198 (Michael, J., dissenting).
158. Hams, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 22.
160. Se McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96.
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ment was based on sex. 61 This fact is usually presumed from the fact
that the harassment involved a victim and harasser of the opposite sex.
Moreover, in cases involving a harasser and victim of the opposite sex,
courts do not require the victim to show that the harasser is heterosex-
ual. Such disparate treatment is simply unfair. It is also unnecessary.
The Fourth Circuit imposed higher standards of proof because it
could not envision a scenario in which a heterosexual employee could
harass another heterosexual employee "because of the victim's sex."162
The idea that heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment can never oc-
cur because of the victim's sex is wrong. As feminist commentators
have pointed out, men who exhibit characteristics traditionally de-
fined as "feminine" are often harassed or discriminated against pre-
cisely because they are men who are exhibiting these characteristics. 63
Further, as Judge Michael suggested, the very nature of the
harassing conduct in McWilliams may alone be sufficient to raise the
question of whether the conduct occurred "because of' the victim's
sex.' 6 4 This is particularly true in light of the specific facts found in
McWilliams. 65 Allowing plaintiffs to infer sex-based harassment from
the nature of the conduct would prevent plaintiffs in same-sex harass-
ment cases from having to launch a separate investigation into the
sexual orientation of the alleged harasser. Judge Michael noted the
difficulty inherent in having to prove an individual's sexual orienta-
tion."6 Determining the "true" sexual orientation of the alleged har-
asser, Judge Michael observed, would "surely ... be complicated, far-
ranging and elusive."' 67
The majority in McWilliams made a valid point that the plaintiff in
a same-sex case must be able to demonstrate that the harassment oc-
curred "because of" the plaintiffs sex.' 68 The court deviated from a
fair and equitable ruling, however, because the but for demonstration
should not hinge on the sexual orientation of the alleged harasser.
Sexual harassment should be defined as discrimination based on sex,
regardless of the harasser's sexual orientation. According to the
161. See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir.), cert. denied
117 S. CL 70 (1996).
162. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195.
163. See Franke, supra note 145, at 75-80.
164. See McWliams, 72 F.3d at 1199 (Michael, J., dissenting) ("The facts, construed in
McWilliams' favor, are sufficient to show that he was subject to a hostile work environment
because of his sex.").
165. See id. at 1198-99. For example, one of McWilliams's coworkers told McWilliams
that he loved him and asked McWilliams for sex. Id.
166. Id. at 1198.
167. Id.
168. McWiUiams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96.
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Supreme Court, the question that the trial court must ask is whether
the plaintiff would have been treated differently if the plaintiff was a
member of the opposite sex. 169
In Quick v. Donaldson Co.,"10 the Eighth Circuit provided an inter-
pretation of the "because of sex" requirement that does not turn on
the sexual orientation of the alleged harasser. That interpretation re-
quires the plaintiff to prove that he has been treated differently than
members of the opposite sex in order to state an actionable same-sex
claim. 7' In Quick, the court first analyzed the presence of disparate
treatment using the but for standard and then proceeded to evaluate
the severity of the conduct." 2 Under the Quick analysis, a determina-
tion of a hostile environment "entails consideration of the entire rec-
ord and all the circumstances." 173 Unlike McWilliams, no single factor
has the potential to dictate a motion to dismiss, nor does the Eighth
Circuit's multifactor approach implicate the proof and privacy con-
cerns brought about by the Fourth Circuit's position.
c. Drawing the Line Between Harassment and Horseplay.-The
majority in McWilliams raised the concern that courts are ill-equipped
to make the distinction between intentional discrimination "because
of' a worker's sex and workplace sexual harassment. 74 In his dissent,
Judge Michael aptly argued that similar distinctions between actiona-
ble and non-actionable conduct have been made and continue to be
made by courts in sexual harassment cases involving parties of the op-
posite gender, as well as parties of the same gender. 175 The court in
McWilliams could have ruled that same-sex heterosexual harassment
was actionable under Title VII and still have ruled in favor of the de-
fendant. By allowing courts to consider the nature of the conduct on
a case-by-case basis, future plaintiffs will have a greater opportunity to
defeat a motion to dismiss, thus permitting a jury to decide whether
the alleged conduct would constitute a hostile working environment.
Several courts have begun to emphasize the actual hostile envi-
ronment as opposed to the parties' sexual preferences. For example,
in Gerd v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,"76 a federal district court in Colo-
169. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
170. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
171. Id. at 1378 ("Evidence that members of one sex were the primary targets of the
harassment is sufficient to show that the conduct was gender based. ..
172. See id. at 1379.
173. Id.
174. McWliams, 72 F.3d at 1196.
175. Id. at 1199 (Michael, J, dissenting).
176. 934 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1996).
1122 [VOL. 56:1044
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALs11
rado rejected the reasoning of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits and rec-
ognized same-sex claims under Title VII when the harassment is based
on the plaintiffs gender. 77 The court followed the reasoning of
Quick in holding that the target's sexual preference is not determina-
tive.' 78 The court also cited to the reasoning of Tanner v. Prima Donna
Resorts, Inc.179 in holding that the plaintiff is not required to prove that
the work environment was hostile to all employees of the plaintiffs
sex. 1 0 The court in Gerd noted that same-sex harassment tends to be
fact-specific and should not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.'
The Supreme Court has articulated a demanding standard of
proof in adjudicating claims of sexual harassment: "Conduct that is
not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abu-
sive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview."182 This
standard challenges several of the administrative concerns that the
majority in McWilliams raised. First, the established standard of care is
that of a reasonable person.18 3  Therefore, courts would decide
whether a reasonable person would find the alleged conduct to be
abusive, as opposed to merely locker room antics, joking, or horse-
play;' 84 thus, the particular sensitivities of the plaintiff would not be
relevant. For example, in Goluszek, the plaintiff lived with his mother,
blushed easily, and lived an "isolated existence" with "little or no sex-
ual experience."18 5 Under the reasonable person standard, conduct
directed at this plaintiff would not be judged by what he subjectively
believed created a hostile environment. Rather, the standard would
be an objective one, and the jury orjudge would be required to deter-
mine whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe to violate
Title VII.
The Supreme Court in Harris v. For*lift Systems, Inc.18 6 directed
lower courts to look at the totality of the circumstances in deciding
whether an environment was hostile or abusive.'8 7 The lower courts
177. Id. at 360.
178. Id.
179. 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 1996).
180. Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 360-61.
181. Id. at 361.
182. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
183. See id.
184. See Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501 (E.D. Va.
1996).
185. Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1453 (N.D. Il1. 1988).
186. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
187. Id. at 23 (explaining that the court should examine the frequency of the discrimi-
natory conduct; the severity of the conduct; whether the conduct is physically threatening
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have successfully applied this test in deciding both same-sex and oppo-
site-sex sexual harassment cases. For example, in Easton v. Crossland
Mortgage Corp., ' the court held that although same-sex claims are ac-
tionable under Title VII, the plaintiff's claim failed because the al-
leged conduct was not sufficiently severe.189 Specifically, the court
found the plaintiff's failure to complain to upper management to be
highly probative evidence that the harassing conduct was not suffi-
ciently severe.' 90 The court granted summary judgment for the de-
fendant.'91 In Taylor v. National Group of Companies, Inc.,9 ' the court
held that the fact that the plaintiff was struck on the buttocks with a
board by the president of the company, rather than merely a co-
worker, increased the severity of the harassment. 9 ' It is this type of
careful fact-specific inquiry that has enabled courts to distinguish be-
tween actionable and non-actionable harassment-a distinction that
the McWilliams court incorrectly concluded was virtually impossible. 194
A fairer way to decide same-sex hostile environment cases would
be to rule on a case-by-case basis with attention to the individual fac-
tual situations. The court in McWilliams had a valid point in wanting
to ensure that the offensive behavior is based on an employee's sex,
rather than mere horseplay or joking. l'9 This, however, can be ac-
complished if the courts carefully scrutinize the facts and apply the
objective reasonable person standard to determine whether the un-
welcome conduct is sufficiently severe to violate Title VII.
5. Conclusion.-In McWilliams, the Fourth Circuit unnecessarily
limited the protections afforded to victims of sexual harassment in a
hostile workplace environment. The court narrowly interpreted the
meaning of the phrase "because of sex" to turn on the sexual orienta-
tion of the alleged harasser, rather than on the central question of
whether men and women were treated differently. Although the
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether the conduct unreasonably in-
terferes with an employee's work performance).
188. 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The facts in Easton involved a female supervi-
sor who called her employees "bitch, slut, and whore"; exposed herself to her employees;
subjected employees to unwanted touching; and continuously questioned her employees
about their sex lives. Id. at 1380-81.
189. Id. at 1383-84.
190. See id. at 1381.
191. Id. at 1381-82.
192. 872 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
193. Id. at 464.
194. The purpose of these examples is to show that the "totality of the circumstances"
test is applicable in situations of same-sex harassment as well as traditional opposite-sex
harassment.
195. See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
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Fourth Circuit in McWilliams tried to protect the core of Title VII from
overuse and dilution, the court's decision essentially minimized the
importance of protecting the workplace from harassment and discrim-
ination. It is true that not every instance of unwelcome conduct con-
stitutes hostile environment harassment, but an all-encompassing ban
on harassment claims between heterosexuals of the same sex goes too
far. If a plaintiff can establish that he or she was the victim of abusive
or offensive conduct to which members of the opposite sex were not
subjected, then that plaintiff should have a viable hostile environment
claim. In McWilliams, however, the Fourth Circuit inappropriately
closed the door to certain employees in the workplace, who by virtue
of the sex and sexual orientation of their harassers are now left with-




A. EMTALA: The Fourth Circuit's Backdoor Effort to Reconcile the Spirit
with the Letter of the Law
Historically, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has liberally construed the language of the Emergency Medi-
cal Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),' despite Congress's
narrow intent that this statute serve to enhance the availability of
emergency medical care for indigent and uninsured patients.2 The
court's broad interpretation of EMTALA's language has evoked criti-
cism that the Fourth Circuit invites overuse and misuse of this federal
cause of action.' Yet in Vickers v. Nash General -lospital, Inc.,4 the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an EMTALA complaint
brought against a hospital and physician.5 The court avoided the ne-
cessity of explicitly reaffirming or reversing its prior construction of
EMTALA's language by failing to interpret Vickers's complaint in the
light most favorable to him and by requiring that he allege specific
facts in his complaint to support allegations that the hospital em-
ployed disparate medical screening and failed to stabilize an emer-
gency medical condition.6 These types of facts are unlikely to be
available to an EMTALA plaintiff prior to discovery. In an apparent
effort to place limits on the number of EMTALA claims resulting from
the court's literal interpretation of the statute's overly broad lan-
guage, the Fourth Circuit required that Vickers's EMTALA claim meet
an inappropriately high standard of factual specificity in order to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss on the pleadings.
1. The Case.--On June 20, 1992, Martin Vickers arrived at the
emergency room of Nash General Hospital.' Vickers had apparently
hit his head during an altercation earlier that evening and sustained a
laceration of his scalp.8 Dr. James R. Hughes examined Vickers and
arrived at a medical diagnosis of "laceration and contusions and multi-
ple substance abuse."9 Dr. Hughes also ordered cervical spine x-rays,
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994).
2. See infra notes 58-62, 78-91 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 92-93, 139-140 and accompanying text.
4. 78 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1996).
5. Id. at 145.
6. Id. at 143-45.
7. Brief of Appellant at 7, Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139 (4th Cir.
1996) (No. 95-1391).
8. Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 313, 315 (E.D.N.C. 1995), aff'd, 78
F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1996).
9. Vwkers, 78 F.3d at 141.
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which revealed no spinal damage.1" He did not order x-rays or other
diagnostic tests to rule out intracranial injury. 1 After Vickers's scalp
laceration was repaired with staple sutures, the hospital discharged
him with instructions to return in ten days for suture removal.1 2 Dis-
charge recommendations also included follow-up with the mental
health department the following Monday, two days after the injury. 3
Four days after Vickers's discharge from the hospital, paramedics
responded to an emergency call. 4 They discovered Vickers without a
pulse and not breathing. 5 The paramedics transported Vickers to
Nash General Hospital's emergency room, where efforts to resuscitate
him were unsuccessful. 6 Vickers was pronounced dead, and an au-
topsy was subsequently performed. The autopsy report identified
Vickers's cause of death as cerebral herniation resulting from a left
epidural hematoma, produced by a left parietal skull fracture."
Franklin Vickers, executor of Martin Vickers's estate, brought suit
against the hospital and Dr. Hughes in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.' 9 Vickers's com-
plaint alleged that the hospital had failed to provide the decedent
with an appropriate medical screening examination during his first
emergency room visit on June 20, and had failed to stabilize Vickers's
emergency medical condition before discharging him on that date.20
The plaintiff alleged that these actions, on the part of both Dr.
Hughes and the hospital,2 ' constituted violations of EMTALA.22
10. Id.
11. Brief of Appellant at 7, Vikers (No. 95-1391).
12. Id. at 7-8.
13. Id.





19. Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 313 (E.D.N.C. 1995), afftd, 78 F.3d
139 (4th Cir. 1996).
20. Id. at 315.
21. Id. at 315-16.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994). The legislature enacted EMTALA as part of the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). Pub. L. No. 99-272,
100 Stat. 82 (1986). EMTALA provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Medical screening requirement
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individ-
ual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to the
emergency department and a request is made on the individual's behalf for ex-
amination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an
appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital's
emergency department, including ancillary services routinely available to the
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Specifically, the complaint alleged that Martin Vickers "'received
less screening, both in quantity and quality, than required under the
Act, and less than those other patients presenting in this same medical
condition received.' 23 The complaint further asserted that Vickers
arrived at the hospital in an "emergency medical condition,"2 4 as de-
fined by EMTALA, 5 and that "upon determining Martin's emergency
medical condition, the Hospital had a duty to provide stabilizing treat-
ment and it failed to do so before discharging Martin."26 Vickers also
brought medical malpractice claims against Dr. Hughes and against
the hospital on the theory of respondeat superior and asked the dis-
trict court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 27 over these state law
claims.28
emergency department, to determine whether or not an emergency medical con-
dition... exists.
(b) Necessary stabilizing treatment for emergency medical conditions and labor.
(1) In general
If any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter)
comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the individual has an
emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide either-
(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such fur-
ther medical examination and such treatment as may be required to
stabilize the medical condition, or
(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accord-
ance with subsection (c) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
23. Brief of Appellant at 8, Vickers (No. 95-1391) (quoting Complaint 26, App. at 8).
24. Id. (citing Complaint 28-29, App. at 9).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1). The Act defines "emergency medical condition" as:
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity
(including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention
could reasonably be expected to result in-
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant wo-
man, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant women [sic] who is having contractions-
(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital
before delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or
the unborn child.
Id.
26. Brief of Appellant at 8-9, Vickers (No. 95-1391).
27. Supplemental jurisdiction permits a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over state
claims arising from cases over which the court already has jurisdiction, provided that the
state claims are "so related ... that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994).
28. Brief of Appellees at 1, Vickers (No. 95-1391).
1128 [VOL. 56:1044
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Before filing answers to the complaint, the hospital and Dr.
Hughes moved to dismiss the EMTALA claim 29 pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."° The defendants
contended that Vickers's complaint failed to state an EMTALA claim
because it set forth no factual allegations to support the assertion that
Martin Vickers had received "disparate treatment."" l The district
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, reasoning that Vick-
ers's "speculative assertion" regarding disparate treatment was insuffi-
cient to state a claim under EMTALA.12 The court noted that Vickers
had presented no "evidence" of disparate treatment.33 However, the
court rejected the defendant's argument that EMTALA requires an
allegation of disparate treatment motivated by consideration of "low
economic status."
3 4
Having dismissed the federal cause of action, the district court
declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state medi-
cal malpractice claims and dismissed them without prejudice for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 5 Vickers appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
36
2. Legal Background.--Congress enacted EMTALA in 1986 in re-
sponse to concern over the widespread practice in American hospitals
of "patient dumping."3 7 Patient dumping occurs when a hospital
emergency room refuses to admit an indigent or uninsured patient
with an emergency medical condition or when a hospital inappropri-
ately transfers such a patient to another facility before the individual's
condition has been stabilized.3 8 The federal circuit courts have uni-
formly recognized that, in enacting EMTALA, Congress intended to
29. Brief of Appellant at 9, Vickers (No. 95-1391).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). Rule 12 provides that certain enumerated defenses may
be made by motion, including "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
Id.
31. Brief of Appellees at 5-6, ickers (No. 95-1391).
32. Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 313, 317 (E.D.N.C. 1995), affd, 78
F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1996).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 316 (citingJones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.N.C.
1991)).
35. Id. at 317.
36. Vckers, 78 F.3d at 142.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 241 at 27, reprinted in 3 U.S.C.CAN. 579, 605 (1986) (docu-
menting congressional concern "about the increasing number of reports that hospital
emergency rooms are refusing to accept or treat patients with emergency conditions if the
patient does not have medical insurance").
38. See Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's
Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1186-87 (1986) (describing "patient dumping" as the phe-
nomenon that occurs "when a hospital that is capable of providing the needed medical
1997] 1129
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
enhance access to emergency medical care for the indigent and unin-
sured. 9 The judiciary has been less consistent, however, in its con-
struction of EMTALA's language when applying the statute to specific
cases and controversies. Two key phrases in the statute's operative
language have sparked disagreement.
a. What Is an "Appropriate Medical Screening Examination"?-
The first source of confusion has been the Act's requirement that "the
hospital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examina-
tion within the capability of the hospital's emergency department. " '
The Sixth Circuit accentuated the ambiguity of the word "appropri-
ate" in the context of an EMTALA claim when the court described the
word as "one of the most wonderful weasel words in the dictionary."4 1
In the absence of a statutory definition of an "appropriate medical
screening examination,"42 federal courts have interpreted this term at
least two ways.43
One school of thought suggests that each hospital emergency
room is held to its own internal set of standards in determining what
care (the transferring hospital) sends a patient to another facility (the receiving hospital)
or simply turns the patient away because the patient is unable to pay").
39. See, e.g., Correa v. Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1189 (1st Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that Congress enacted EMTALA to allay concerns about increasing reports that hospi-
tals were refusing to provide emergency medical treatment to the uninsured), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1423 (1996); Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994)
(stating that "Congress enacted EMTAIA to address a growing concern with preventing
'patient dumping,' the practice of refusing to provide emergency medical treatment to
patients unable to pay, or transferring them before emergency conditions were stabi-
lized"); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116,117 n.2 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that EMTALA
was enacted to prevent patient dumping); Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387, 391 n.5 (10th
Cir. 1993) (noting that Congress designed EMTALA to end patient dumping); Brooker v.
Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging that EMTALA's
legislative history indicates a congressional intent to prevent hospitals from dumping unin-
sured patients); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (stating that EMTALA was enacted by Congress to address the problem of hospitals
"dumping" uninsured patients in need of emergency care); Cleland v. Bronson Health
Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that "there is nothing in the
legislative history showing that Congress had any concern about the treatment accorded
any patients other than the indigent and uninsured").
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
41. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e) (providing statutory definitions for the terms "emer-
gency medical condition," "participating hospital," "to stabilize," "stabilized," "transfer,"
and "hospital," but not for the term "appropriate medical screening examination").
43. See Lawrence E. Singer, Look What They've Done to My Law, Ma: COBRA's Implosion,
33 Hous. L. REv. 113, 143-46 (1996) (discussing a third judicial interpretation of "appro-
priate medical screening examination" that requires a finding of a "bad motive" as a pre-
requisite to a deficient emergency medical screening); see infra notes 134-135 and
accompanying text.
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constitutes an appropriate medical screening examination. The D.C.
Circuit introduced this subjective standard for "appropriateness" in
Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp.44 In Gatewood, the plaintiff al-
leged that the misdiagnosis of her husband's impending heart attack
by a member of the hospital emergency room staff constituted inap-
propriate medical screening under EMTALA.4" Noting that "allega-
tions of misdiagnosis, without more, are simply not cognizable under
[EMTALA]," the court held that "a hospital fulfills the 'appropriate
medical screening' requirement when it conforms in its treatment of a
particular patient to its standard screening procedures. By the same
token, any departure from standard screening procedures constitutes
inappropriate screening in violation of [EMTALA]."46 Anticipating
concerns that such a subjective standard may encourage hospitals to
establish artificially low internal standards to insulate themselves from
EMTAI-A liability, the D.C. Circuit reasoned:
We recognize... that there may be some instances in which
a hospital's normal screening procedure will fall below the
standard of care established by local negligence or malprac-
tice law. Nevertheless, we decline the appellant's invitation
to incorporate a malpractice or negligence standard into
subsection 1395dd (a). The federal Emergency Act is not in-
tended to duplicate preexisting legal protections, but rather
to create a new cause of action.., for what amounts to fail-
ure to treat.
47
Thus, according to this first view, the key to "appropriate" screen-
ing procedures is that hospitals "apply their standard screening proce-
dure for identification of an emergency medical condition uniformly
to all patients." ' Community standards of what constitutes an accept-
able medical screening, although appropriately considered in a state
malpractice or negligence claim, are irrelevant for the purpose of an
EMTAIA analysis using this subjective test.49
Though agreeing with the D.C. Circuit that EMTAIA does not
create a federal negligence or malpractice cause of action, some fed-
44. 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
45. Id. at 1039.
46. Id. at 1041.
47. Id.; see also Barry R. Furrow, An Overview and Analysis of the Impact of the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 16 J. LEcAL MED. 325, 332 (reviewing the concern
expressed by several courts that "cases might arise where the examination of the patient
was so cursory or inadequate that the court could find that no examination has been given
at all under the EMTALA requirements").
48. Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 878 (4th Cir. 1992).
49. See id. at 879-80.
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eral courts have nonetheless suggested a second, more objective stan-
dard for assessing the appropriateness of a medical screening
examination. In Ruiz v. Kepler ° the federal district court for New
Mexico considered a fact pattern closely analogous to that in Vickers.51
In determining whether the plaintiff had a viable EMTALA claim, the
district court examined the meaning of an "appropriate screening ex-
amination."52 Although it acknowledged that the standard for "appro-
priateness" must be "individualized for each hospital,""3 and is
"[u]nlike malpractice law in which the standard of care required is
based on the objective, reasonable person standard,"'M the court rea-
soned that use of a subjective test "does not mean that the Court
should ignore evidence of accepted medical practice from which sub-
jective standards can be inferred."" The court held that an expert
witness's assertion of the parameters of "an appropriate medical
screening examination within the capability of an emergency depart-
ment anywhere in New Mexico in 1991" was properly considered in
determining whether the hospital in question had provided an appro-
priate screening. 6 In so holding, the court opened the door for the
application of external community standards in determining what
constitutes an appropriate screening examination for EMTALA
purposes. 7
The following year, the Fourth Circuit applied a similar test for
appropriateness in Power v. Arlington Hospital Ass'In.5s In a case involv-
ing circumstances that have been described as "every emergency
room's-and every patient's-worst nightmare,"59 a patient brought
an EMTALA action against a hospital, claiming, in part, that the hos-
pital emergency department failed to provide an appropriate medical
50. 832 F. Supp. 1444 (D.N.M. 1993).
51. See id. at 1444. The case involved an emergency room patient presenting with head
wounds sustained in a fight. Id. at 1445-46. An emergency room nurse took a medical
history and checked the patient's vital signs, and the physician on call cleaned and sutured
the patient's head and ordered skull x-rays. Id. at 1446. In examining the x-rays, the physi-
cian failed to detect a skull fracture, which allegedly resulted in irreparable brain damage.
Id.
52. Id. at 1447-48.




57. See Singer, supra note 43, at 150-52.
58. 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1994).
59. Robin E. Margolis, Split Developing Among Federal Circuits on Disparate Treatment
Claims, HEALTHSPAN, Jan. 1995, at 19, 19.
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screening.6" The Fourth Circuit announced a standard for determin-
ing the appropriateness of a medical screening examination that
involved:
allow[ing] a hospital, after a plaintiff makes a threshold
showing of differential treatment, to offer evidence rebutting
that showing either by demonstrating that the patient was ac-
corded the same level of treatment that all other patients re-
ceive, or that a test or procedure was not given because the
physician did not believe that the test was reasonable or nec-
essary under the particular circumstances of that patient.
If a hospital offers such rebuttal evidence, fairness dic-
tates that the plaintiff should be allowed to challenge the
medical judgment of the physicians involved through her
own expert medical testimony.61
The court determined that the allowance of expert testimony regard-
ing community standards of care was particularly necessary when the
defendant hospital asserted that it had no standard emergency room
screening procedures, and thus could not have deviated from its pro-
cedures in the plaintiffs case.6
2
b. Who Qualifies As "Any Individual"?-Unlike the ambigu-
ous term "appropriate medical screening examination," the meaning
of the second controversial phrase in EMTALA's language appears all
too clear. The statute requires that hospital emergency departments
provide an appropriate medical screening examination for "any indi-
vidual" who comes to the emergency department for examination or
treatment 63 and that the hospital stabilize the condition of "any indi-
60. Power, 42 F.3d at 853-54. Power had presented to the hospital emergency room
complaining of "pain in her left hip, her lower left abdomen, and in her back running
down her leg, and reporting that she was unable to walk, was shaking, and had severe
chills." Id. at 853. After being seen by two physicians and two nurses, Power was dis-
charged and given a prescription for pain medication, the name of an orthopedist, and
instructions to return to the hospital if her condition worsened. See id. The next day,
Power returned to the emergency room and was diagnosed with septic shock. See id. She
was subsequently hospitalized "in intensive care for over four months during which time
she was on life support equipment, had both legs amputated below the knee, lost sight in
one eye, and experienced severe and permanent lung damage." Id.
61. Id. at 858.
62. Id.; see also Correa v. Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1995) ("A
hospital fulfills its statutory duty to screen patients in its emergency room if it provides for
a screening examination reasonably calculated to identify critical medical conditions.., and
provides that level of screening uniformly to all those who present substantially similar
complaints." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1423 (1996).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
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vidual" with an identified emergency medical condition.' Despite
the facially clear meaning of the phrase "any individual," early judicial
interpretations of its meaning reflected an effort to incorporate what
the courts uniformly understood to be Congress's clear intent when it
enacted the statute.65
Thus, early cases required proof of an underlying economic mo-
tive for failure to appropriately screen for or stabilize an emergency
medical condition in order to sustain a cause of action under EM-
TALA. In Nichols v. Estabrook,66 the federal district court for New
Hampshire dismissed an EMTALA claim arising from an emergency
room physician's failure to detect and stabilize an ultimately fatal con-
dition in the plaintiffs' infant son before sending him to another hos-
pital.67 The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim
under EMTALA because they did "not allege that their financial con-
dition or lack of health insurance contributed to Dr. Estabrook's deci-
sion not to treat their son."68 The court reasoned: "The interest
which Congress sought to protect by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd was
not invaded by the defendant's conduct as ... alleged."69
Similarly, in Evitt v. University Heights Hospital,7" a federal district
court in the Southern District of Indiana held that an emergency
room patient who was examined and discharged with chest pain that
later proved to be symptomatic of a heart attack could not sustain an
EMTALA cause of action.7 1 The plaintiffs failure to allege that she
had been turned away from the hospital for economic reasons led the
court to dismiss her EMTALA claim.72 The court reasoned that al-
lowing the federal cause of action without allegation of an improper
economic motive would "lead to the result that any patient dissatisfied
with an emergency room diagnosis and release could sue the hospital
under the anti-dumping provision .... [The plaintiff's] complaint
that the original diagnosis was incorrect obviously states a mere mal-
practice claim which should be resolved in state court."73
64. See id. § 1395dd(b).
65. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
66. 741 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.H. 1989).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 330.
69. Id.
70. 727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
71. Id. at 497-98.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 434-36 (D. Kan. 1990) (reviewing
EMTALA's legislative history and holding that there was no EMTALA claim when it was
"uncontroverted that [the patient] was never denied treatment or discharged... due to a
lack of insurance").
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This line of reasoning was first explicitly rejected in DeBerry v.
Sherman Hospital Ass'n.74 In DeBeny, the district court held that an EM-
TALA claim does not require an allegation of disparate treatment
based on inability to pay. 5 Legislative intent notwithstanding, the
court noted that "the language of the statute quite plainly goes further
[I]t nowhere mentions either indigency, an inability to pay, or
the hospital's motive as a prerequisite to statutory coverage."76 The
court reasoned:
While one may disagree with the efficacy of § 1395dd's
breadth or its necessity, it is not this court's place to rewrite
the language enacted by our duly elected officials. If Con-
gress went too far in § 1395dd, then the statute must either
be attacked constitutionally... or through the same political
processes which caused its enactment. Amendment by the
judiciary, however, is never proper. 77
All of the federal circuit courts that have addressed the meaning
of "any individual" within the context of EMTALA have adopted the
DeBetiy court's plain language approach to statutory construction.78
Like the First, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, 79 the
Fourth Circuit has taken Congress's term "any individual" literally. In
Power v. Arlington Hospital Ass'n,8° the court considered the issue of
whether an "improper motive" for deviation from standard screening
74. 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Il. 1990).
75. Id. at 1307.
76. Id. at 1306.
77. Id. at 1307.
78. See, e.g., Correa v. Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1194 (1st Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that "EMTALA, by its terms, covers all patients who come to a hospital's emergency
department... regardless of insurance status or ability to pay"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1423
(1996); Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The fact that Con-
gress, or some of its members, viewed COBRA as a so-called 'anti-dumping' bill, i.e., a bill
designed to prohibit hospitals from 'dumping' poor or uninsured patients in need of
emergency care, does not subtract from its use of the broad term 'any individual.'");
Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding "Congress to its
words... that the Act applies to any and all patients, not just to patients with insufficient
resources"); Burditt v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 1362, 1373
(5th Cir. 1991) (refusing to "invent a requirement found nowhere in the statute that an
improper, or nonmedical, motive for transfer must be proved as an element of all EM-
TAILA transfer violations"); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037,
1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting that "the Act's plain language unambiguously extends its
protections to 'any individual' who seeks emergency room assistance"); Cleland v. Bronson
HealthCare Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268-71 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plain words
of the statute extend EMTALA protection to "any individual," but interpreting the require-
ment of an "appropriate medical screening exam" to refer to the motives-in terms of
characteristics of the individual patient-with which the hospital acts).
79. See supra note 78 and cases cited therein.
80. 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1994).
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procedures is required to assert an EMTALA claim and concluded
that it is not."1 The court reasoned there is "nothing in the statute
itself that requires proof of indigence, inability to pay, or any other
improper motive on the part of a hospital as a prerequisite to recov-
ery. The language of subsection 1395dd(a) simply refers to 'any indi-
vidual' who presents to the emergency room."82
The Fourth Circuit also adopted the plain meaning of Congress's
term "any individual" in its 1994 opinion in In re Baby K 8 In that
case, a Virginia hospital sought a declaratory order that it was not
obliged under EMTALA to provide mechanical respiratory assistance
to an anencephalic infant 4 who was repeatedly brought to its emer-
gency room in respiratory distress.85 The hospital argued, inter alia,
that "in prohibiting disparate emergency medical treatment Congress
did not intend to require physicians to provide treatment outside the
prevailing standard of medical care" and that "an interpretation of
EMTALA that requires a hospital or physician to provide respiratory
support to an anencephalic infant fails to recognize a physician's abil-
ity, under Virginia law, to refuse to provide medical treatment that the
physician considers medically or ethically inappropriate."86 Nonethe-
less, the Fourth Circuit held that the plain language of the statute
obligated the hospital to provide mechanical ventilation for Baby K
"when she arrives at the emergency department of the Hospital in re-
spiratory distress and treatment is requested on her behalf.""
In a dissenting opinion, Senior Circuit Judge Sprouse raised a
legislative intent argument 88 reminiscent of the reasoning that the dis-
trict courts applied in early EMTALA cases.89 He noted that "the stat-
ute was designed narrowly to correct a specific abuse: hospital
'dumping' of indigent or uninsured emergency patients,"90 and went
on to suggest:
81. Id. at 857-58; see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
82. Power, 42 F.3d at 857.
83. 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
84. Anencephaly is:
a congenital malformation in which a major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp
are missing. While the presence of a brain stem does support ... autonomic
functions and reflex actions, because [an anencephalic infant] lacks a cerebrum,
she is permanently unconscious. Thus, she has no cognitive abilities or aware-
ness. She cannot see, hear, or otherwise interact with her environment.
Id. at 592.
85. See id. at 592-93.
86. Id. at 595.
87. Id. at 594-95.
88. See id. at 598-99 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
89. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
90. Baby X 16 F.3d at 598 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
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There is no indication in the legislative history of EMTALA
that Congress meant to extend the statute's reach to hospi-
tal-patient relationships that do not involve "dumping."
Clearly, there is no suggestion of patient "dumping" in this
case. . . . In light of the purposes of the statute and this
child's unique circumstances, I would find this case to be
outside the scope of EMTALA's anti-dumping provisions.
I also submit that EMTALA's language concerning the
type and extent of emergency treatment to be extended to
all patients was not intended to cover the continued emer-
gencies that typically attend patients like Baby K.9"
The Fourth Circuit's Baby K decision engendered disapproval in
scholarly commentary as well. Criticisms included the decision's es-
tablishment of "a troubling precedent" of using EMTALA to deter-
mine specific treatment issues such as those in Baby K 92  One
physician commentator, noting the court's refusal to permit excep-
tions to EMTALA that would allow physicians to withhold treatment in
cases they considered "hopeless," suggested that the application of
EMTALA's plain language is "unrealistic because it separates the pa-
tient's emergency event from the entire context of the patient's
illness.""3
3. The Court's Reasoning. -In Vickers, the Fourth Circuit began its
analysis by recognizing that Congress's intent in enacting EMTALA
was to prevent hospitals from engaging in the practice of patient
dumping based on a person's inability to pay.9 4 Writing for the court,
in an opinion joined by judge Hall, ChiefJudge Wilkinson noted that
EMTALA imposes only a "'limited duty on hospitals with emergency
rooms to provide ... care to all individuals who come there,"'95 and
he underscored that EMTALA was not intended to create a federal
cause of action for negligence or medical malpractice.9 6
91. Id. at 598-99.
92. Scott B. Smith, Note, The Critical Condition of the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act: A Proposed Amendment to the Act After In the Matter of Baby K, 48 VAND. L.
REv. 1491, 1493-94 (1995) (noting that the Fourth Circuit's "broad application of the Act's
current language controls medical treatment decisions beyond the Act's antidumping pur-
pose," and urging Congressional amendment of EMTAIA to protect only indigent and
uninsured individuals).
93. David Z. Myerberg, The Fourth Circuit's Baby K Decision: "Plain Language" Does Not
Make Good Law, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 397, 423 (1995).
94. Vickers, 78 F.3d at 142.





The court next examined the plaintiffs complaint, which in-
cluded allegations of failure to provide an appropriate screening ex-
amination as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a), and failure to
stabilize Vickers's medical condition before discharging him as re-
quired by 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b). Addressing the first allegation,
the court stated that the standard for "appropriateness" of a medical
screening examination is the application of "'uniform screening pro-
cedures to all individuals coming to the emergency room."'98 Citing
the plaintiff's contention that Vickers "received less screening, both in
quantity and quality, than required under the Act, and less than those
other patients presenting in this same medical condition received,"
the majority acknowledged that "[o]n the surface, this allegation may
seem to state a claim under EMTALA's screening provision."9" How-
ever, the court reasoned that the plaintiff had confused EMTALA's
requirement of an initial screening examination with an obligation
that the treatment following that screening examination be correct.1"'
According to the majority, this confusion reflected a "failure to take
the actual diagnosis as a given."' Vickers had received a screening
examination in the emergency room, and Dr. Hughes's diagnosis
based on that screening examination was "laceration and contusions
and multiple substance abuse."102 That this diagnosis ultimately
proved to be incomplete is a question for state medical malpractice
law, according to the majority, but does not state a cause of action
under EMTALA."'0 The majority noted that "mechanical invocation
of the phrase 'disparate treatment' does not convert [Vickers's] alle-
gations of misdiagnosis into a valid claim under EMTALA."' °
The majority's analysis relied heavily upon the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning in Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America.'05 In Baber, a patient
with a history of psychosis and alcohol abuse was treated at a hospital
emergency room for nausea and agitation.0 6 While there, the patient
experienced a seizure and fell, striking her head and lacerating her
scalp. 10 7 The emergency room physician re-examined her and su-
97. Id. at 143.
98. Id. (quoting In re Baby K 16 F.3d 590, 595 (4th Cir. 1994)).
99. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 144.
102. Id. at 141 (internal quotations omitted).
103. Id. at 144-45.
104. Id. at 144 n.3.
105. 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
106. Id. at 875.
107. Id.
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tured her head wound, but ordered no x-rays of her scalp. 1 8 The
patient was subsequently transferred to another hospital, in part be-
cause the facility owned sophisticated equipment that the treating
physician believed would be of assistance in identifying the cause of
the patient's seizure.1"9 The patient later died from a subdural hema-
toma and skull fracture, which might have been identified by x-rays of
her skull." 0 Her brother brought an EMTALA action against both
hospitals. 1 ' The Baber court affirmed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of the hospitals."12 The Fourth Circuit held that
the plaintiff had not produced evidence that either hospital failed to
treat Ms. Baber and that this was sufficient to defeat an EMTALA
claim on a motion for summary judgment. 13
Likewise, in Vickers, the majority reasoned that Dr. Hughes had
treated the patient for what he "perceived to be" the patient's medical
condition." 4 The court commented that "none of the evidence dem-
onstrates an attempt.., to 'dump' [the patient]"1 15 and noted that
"[iln light of the substantial medical attention paid to Vickers, the
circumstances are far afield from those that concerned Congress in
enacting EMTALA." 116 After making this distinction between Vick-
ers's situation and those situations the legislature intended to address
with EMTALA, the court turned to the plaintiffs complaint and con-
cluded that it did not state a cause of action under EMTALA's appro-
priate screening requirement "[b]ecause [the plaintiff] does not
allege that Vickers received different treatment than other
patients."117
The majority also affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs second
EMTALA claim-that the hospital failed to stabilize Vickers before
discharging him.' Again, harkening back to congressional intent,
the Fourth Circuit emphasized that EMTALA's purpose was limited to
establishing a duty of hospital emergency rooms to stabilize emer-
gency medical conditions they identify, reserving the establishment of
malpractice liability to state law." 9 The court reasoned that EM-
108. Id.
109. Id. at 876.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 873.
112. Id. at 885.
113. Id.
114. Vckers, 78 F.3d at 144 (internal quotations omitted).
115. Id. at 145 (alteration in original) (quoting Baber, 977 F.2d at 885).
116. Id. at 144.
117. Id. at 144-45.




TALA's stabilization requirement "takes the actual diagnosis as a
given, only obligating hospitals to stabilize conditions that they actu-
ally detect."1 20 The majority concluded that the emergency medical
condition identified by Dr. Hughes was Vickers's scalp laceration, and
that the plaintiff had not alleged that Dr. Hughes had actually per-
ceived the intracranial injury but nonetheless failed to stabilize it.12 1
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Ervin chastised the majority for
finding Vickers's allegations insufficient to state an EMTALA claim.
He opined: "The majority's real problem is not with what Vickers al-
leged, but with the statutory language, which allows an EMTALA viola-
tion to be proven even when the failure to screen or stabilize is not
shown to have been based on an economic motive. "122 Judge Ervin
noted that, under the notice pleading system established by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, "[c]omplaints should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted only when, con-
struing all allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is
clear that no set of facts could be proven under which the plaintiff
would be entitled to relief."1
23
In Judge Ervin's view, the allegations upon which Vickers based
his EMTALA claims were adequate to put Nash General Hospital on
notice regarding the nature of the claims against it. 1 24 The dissent
maintained that Vickers's allegations were sufficient to allow him to
withstand dismissal and undertake discovery and that the majority
erred in upholding the district court's dismissal under Rule
12(b) (6).125 Judge Ervin found the majority's reliance on Baber to be
unavailing because that case was decided on summary judgment, after
the plaintiff had an opportunity to engage in discovery and present
evidence of disparate treatment. 126
4. Analysis.-
a. Reconciling Narrow Congressional Intent with Broad Statutory
Language.-Early Supreme Courtjurisprudence suggested that, in the
interest of preserving the spirit of the law, the letter of the law need
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 146 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
124. Id.
125. Id.; see supra note 30 and accompanying text regarding FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6).
126. Vickers, 78 F.3d at 146 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
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not necessarily be taken literally.12 7 However, contemporary Supreme
Court statutory construction affords much greater deference to the
statutory language itself. In a frequently cited example of the Court's
position on interpretation of unambiguous statutory language, Justice
Black wrote that when statutory provisions "are clear and unequivocal
on their face, we find no need to resort to the legislative history of the
Act."1 21 Justice Black's opinion went on to note that legislators' com-
ments during congressional discussions about a bill's enactment "have
never been regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify deviation
from the plain language of a statute.' 29
In interpreting EMTALA's provisions, the federal circuit courts of
appeals have expressed the belief that they are bound by the plain
language of the statute's term "any individual."13 0 Despite unanimous
recognition that EMTALA's purpose was to prevent hospital emer-
gency rooms from dumping indigent or uninsured patients," l the
federal circuit courts of appeals have declined to interpret "any indi-
vidual" as meaning "any indigent or uninsured individual."' 3 2
The ambiguous phrase "appropriate screening examination" has
afforded the courts more "wiggle room" within which to engage in
statutory interpretation."' In fact, the Sixth Circuit seized the oppor-
tunity this ambiguity afforded to incorporate the legislative purpose of
preventing patient dumping into the meaning of the phrase. In Cle-
land v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc.,"3 4 the Sixth Circuit held that
"appropriate medical screening" means "a screening that the hospital
would have offered to any paying patient" and that "emergency medi-
cal condition" means a "condition within the actual knowledge of the
doctors on duty or those doctors that would have been provided to
127. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("It is
a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because [it is] not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.").
128. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The
[EMTALA] ... is not ambiguous as to the type of individuals covered. If a statute is clear
and unequivocal on its face we need not resort to the statute's legislative history."); Gate-
wood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[T]he Act's
plain language unambiguously extends its protections to 'any individual' who seeks emer-
gency room assistance. We conclude that we are bound by statutory language this clear, at
least where, as here, it is not manifestly inconsistent with legislative intent." (citations
omitted)).
131. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 40-62 and accompanying text.
134. 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990).
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any paying patient."135 To date, no other circuit has followed the Sixth
Circuit's lead in this regard.
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit adopted the broader of the two
more commonly recognized interpretations of "appropriate medical
screening," allowing objective evidence of community standards of
care to be considered in determining whether an emergency room
medical screening was appropriate. 3 6 This liberal interpretation of
the statutory language, combined with a nearly total disregard of legis-
lative intent, culminated in the controversial outcome of In re Baby
K 137 Among other criticisms of the Baby Kdecision, 138 commentators
have expressed concern that giving literal effect to EMTALA's broad
language invites plaintiffs to overuse this federal cause of action.13 9
Others have remarked that EMTALA's language, as interpreted by the
Fourth Circuit in Baby K, may "force physicians to act against their
moral, ethical and professional standards," and may impermissibly in-
trude upon state law governing standards of medical care. 14 °
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Vickers appears to be an attempt
to extricate the court from the dilemma it has faced as the result of its
history of broadly interpreting EMTALA's language and straying too
far from the statute's purpose. In its five-page opinion, the majority
referred to Congress's intention in enacting EMTALA on five separate
occasions. 1 4 ' However, the court avoided the need to address the wis-
dom of Congress's imprecise drafting or of its own broad interpreta-
135. Id. at 268-69 (emphasis added).
136. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 43, at 119-21 (noting the risk that overuse of EMTAIA
by plaintiffs will flood the federal docket with what amounts to state malpractice and negli-
gence claims, and will increase damage awards with the availability of both state and fed-
eral theories of recovery for the same injury).
140. Myerberg, supra note 93, at 422, 431-32.
141. See Vickers, 78 F.3d at 141 ("Under [Vickers's] reasoning, every claim of misdiagno-
sis could be recast as an EMTAIA claim, contravening Congress' intention and this cir-
cuit's repeated admonition that EMTAILA not be used as a surrogate for traditional state
claims of medical malpractice."); id. at 142 ("Congress enacted EMTAIA in 1986 'to ad-
dress a growing concern with preventing "patient dumping," the practice of refusing to
provide emergency medical treatment to patients unable to pay, or transferring them
before emergency conditions were stabilized.'" (quoting Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n,
42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994))); id. at 144 (expressing concern about "subvert[ing]
Congress' intent that EMTALA remain distinct from state malpractice law"); id. at 145 ("'It
is enough for purposes of EMTALA that none of the evidence demonstrates an attempt...
to "dump" [the patient].'" (alteration in original) (quoting Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am.,
977 F.2d 872, 885 (4th Cir. 1992))); id. ("'Congress deliberately left the establishment of
malpractice liability to state law.'" (quoting Brooks v. Maryland Gen. Hosp., Inc., 996 F.2d
708, 711 (4th Cir. 1993))).
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tion of EMTALA by instead affirming the district court's dismissal of
Vickers's EMTALA claim on a 12(b) (6) motion. 14 2
b. Dismissal of Vickers's EMTALA Cause of Action on the Plead-
ings.-Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that,
under the federal notice pleading system, "a pleading•., shall contain
... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief." 43 Rule 12(b) (6) provides for a pre-answer mo-
tion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted."1" The Supreme Court addressed the circumstances in
which a motion to dismiss on the pleadings should be granted in Con-
ley v. Gibson.'45 In Conley, the defendants moved for a 12(b) (6) dismis-
sal based upon the plaintiff's failure to set forth specific facts in the
complaint to support his general allegations.' 46 The Supreme Court
held:
The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the
Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim"
that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. ... Such sim-
plified "notice pleading" is made possible by the liberal op-
portunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures
established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis
of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the
disputed facts and issues .... The Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one mis-
step by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept
the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a
proper decision on the merits.147
The Supreme Court has also held that when considering a defend-
ant's motion to dismiss the court must view the complaint's allega-
tions in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.148
Several federal courts have applied the principals set forth in Con-
ley and Scheuer to determine whether an EMTALA claim can withstand
142. See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
144. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
145. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
146. Id. at 47.
147. Id. at 47-48 (foomotes omitted).
148. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
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a 12(b) (6) motion. In Ruiz v. Kepler,149 the court held that the plain-
tiff had satisfied the pleading requirements for stating an EMTALA
cause of action "by alleging he (1) went to defendant's emergency
room (2) with an emergency medical condition, and defendant hospi-
tal either (3) did not adequately screen him to determine whether he
had an emergency medical condition, or (4) discharged him before
the emergency condition was stabilized."" 0 In dicta, the Ruiz court
opined that an EMTALA plaintiffs burden of proving unequal treat-
ment is an onerous one:
The hospital possesses records of similarly situated patients
and plaintiffs access to those records would most likely be
strongly opposed because of patient confidentiality. Thus, a
hospital is in a more favorable position to show it did not
treat the plaintiff differentially than is the plaintiff to show
differential treatment.1 51
In Jones v. Wake County Hospital System, Inc., 5' the same federal
district court that dismissed Vickers's EMTAIA cause of action consid-
ered a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss a case with analogous facts and a
complaint facially similar to that in Vickers.15 3 In Jones, an emergency
room physician failed to identify a burn patient's sepsis154 during an
initial examination. 155 The patient was treated for his burns and re-
leased. 56 Shortly thereafter, the patient developed septic shock, re-
spiratory arrest, and renal failure, and died from cardiac arrest.157
The patient's administratrix filed an EMTALA claim and pendent
state medical malpractice and negligence claims in federal district
court against the hospital and two of its emergency room physi-
cians.1 58 The complaint alleged that the hospital's physicians had
failed to provide "an appropriate medical screening" and failed to
"stabilize" the patient's "emergency medical condition." 59 In Jones,
the plaintiffs EMTALA cause of action survived the defendants' mo-
149. 832 F. Supp. 1444 (D.N.M. 1993).
150. Id. at 1447; see also DeBerry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (holding that an EMTALA plaintiff's complaint containing these same elements
was sufficient to state a claim on which relief could be granted).
151. Ruiz, 832 F. Supp. at 1447 n.4.
152. 786 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
153. Id.
154. Sepsis is "the presence in the blood or other tissues of pathogenic microorganisms
or their toxins." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1400 (25th ed. 1974).
155. Jones, 786 F. Supp. at 541.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 540-41.
159. Id. at 543.
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tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim."60 The district court rea-
soned that the "plaintiff has alleged thatJones was not given the same
medical screening examination that would be given to every other pa-
tient at Wake Medical Center. Thus, .... she must be given an oppor-
tunity to prove that Wake Medical Center deviated from its customary
standard of care when it treated Jones."' 6 '
In the instant case, Vickers alleged that the decedent received
"less screening ... than those other patients presenting in this same
medical condition received."' 62 Taken in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, this first cause of action alleges that the medical screen-
ing provided to Martin Vickers was less than that provided to other
patients with a "severe scalp laceration."16 The Fourth Circuit
wrongly assumed that the "same medical condition" to which the dis-
parate screening claim referred was the patient's intracranial injury
rather than his severe scalp laceration and faulted the plaintiff for
"failure to take the actual diagnosis as a given." '64
Without an opportunity to engage in discovery, Franklin Vickers
was unlikely to have access to the specific facts that may have sup-
ported his allegation of disparate screening, such as the standard
screening procedures that Nash General Hospital used with other pa-
tients presenting to the emergency room with severe scalp lacerations,
and precisely how the hospital failed to uniformly apply that standard
in Martin Vickers's case. Under a notice pleading system, he should
not be required to state his complaint with such a high degree of
particularity.
As to Vickers's second allegation, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that EMTALA imposed no duty to stabilize the intracranial injury
prior to discharge because Vickers's claim did not allege that Dr.
Hughes had actually detected the intracranial injury. 65 Taken in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, Vickers's second EMTALA com-
plaint is an alternative allegation that if Dr. Hughes did not provide
Martin Vickers with less screening than that provided to other patients
with severe scalp lacerations, then he had determined that Martin
Vickers had an emergency medical condition but failed to stabilize
160. Id. at 544.
161. Id.
162. Brief of Appellant at 8, Viwkers (No. 95-1391).
163. See Brief of Appellees at 3, Vwkers (No. 95-1391); Reply Brief of Appellant at 4,
Vickers (No. 95-1391) (both defining the emergency medical condition for which the dece-
dent allegedly received disparate screening as the "severe scalp laceration").
164. Viwkers, 78 F.3d at 144.
165. Id. at 145.
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that condition before discharging Vickers. 166 Although this alterna-
tive allegation may have been inartfully pleaded, this misstep should
not be decisive in defeating Vickers's claim before he had an opportu-
nity, through discovery, to determine which of the two claims was best
supported by the facts.
5. Conclusion.-The federal courts have struggled for a decade
to reconcile the narrow purpose for which EMTALA was enacted with
the statute's overly broad and ambiguous language. 6 ' The Fourth
Circuit's approach has been characterized by broad, literal construc-
tion of EMTALA's language and a relative disregard of Congress's in-
tent in enacting the statute.1 6' This course has resulted in decisions
that have been criticized for encouraging overuse and misuse of a fed-
eral cause of action to bring what often amounts to a state malpractice
claim. 69 In Vickers, the Fourth Circuit cut EMTALA plaintiffs off at
the knees, not by altering the court's statutory interpretation, but by
requiring an inappropriately high degree of factual specificity in an
EMTALA plaintiffs complaint in order to state a claim upon which
relief under EMTALA can be granted.
THERESE M. GOLDSMITH
166. See Brief of Appellant at 12, Vickers (No. 95-1391); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (stat-
ing that "[r]elief in the alternative... may be demanded").
167. See supra notes 37-91 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 58-62, 80-91 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 92-93, 139-140 and accompanying text.
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VI. PROCEDURE
A. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Holds Occasional Interstate
Telephone Calls Insufficient to Sustain Personal Jurisdiction by a
Maryland Court
In Stover v. O'Connell Associates,' the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that an out-of-state telephonic reten-
tion of a Maryland firm to conduct a criminal background check on a
Maryland resident was an insufficient basis to sustain personal jurisdic-
tion by a Maryland court.2 Concluding that the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland did not have personal jurisdiction
over the out-of-state defendant, the Fourth Circuit assumed that Mary-
land's long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction to the limits
allowed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.' The Fourth Circuit held that sub-
jecting O'Connell Associates-a New York firm-to suit in Maryland
based on its occasional telephonic retention of Maryland firms over
several years would contravene the Due Process Clause.4 This Note
will argue that the Fourth Circuit properly affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the suit, but in reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit
assumed an interpretation of Maryland's long-arm statute that is in-
consistent with the plain language of the law.
1. The Case.-In September 1992, Richard Stover (Stover), a
Maryland resident, discovered that O'Connell Associates, Inc.
(O'Connell), a New York private investigation firm, had requested
and received information about his consumer credit history from
Equifax Corporation, a consumer credit reporting agency.5 Stover
suspected that O'Connell sought this information because of Stover's
work on Ross Perot's 1992 presidential campaign.6
1. 84 F.3d 132 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 437 (1996).
2. Id. at 137.
3. 1&L at 135-36. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Stover, 84 F.3d at 137.
5. Id. at 134.
6. I In April 1992, Stover began volunteering in the Frederick County, Maryland
office of the Perot campaign. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5, Stover v. O'Connell As-
socs., 84 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-1309). Lawrence Way served as the volunteer
coordinator in the Frederick office of the Perot campaign. Id. at 4. Mark Blahnik, Man-
ager of Field Operators for the National Perot Petition Committee in Texas, contacted the
Callahan & Gibbons Group (Callahan) in late April 1992, after other Perot campaign vol-
unteers working at the Frederick office expressed concerns about racist statements alleg-
edly made by Lawrence Way. Id. The volunteers told Blahnik that they felt threatened by
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O'Connell alleged that the Callahan & Gibbons Group (Calla-
han), a private investigation firm located in California, retained
O'Connell to obtain the public information about Stover.' In re-
sponse to Callahan's request, O'Connell used a computer in its New
York office to obtain Stover's name, address, birthdate, social security
number, and place of employment from Equifax.8 O'Connell also
placed a telephone call to Montgomery Investigative Services, Ltd.
(Montgomery), a private investigation firm in Rockville, Maryland,9 to
request Stover's criminal record."0 In addition, O'Connell asked
Montgomery to ascertain whether Stover had connections with the Ku
Klux Klan or any other known white supremacist group.11 O'Connell
then provided the information it obtained from Equifax and Mont-
gomery to Callahan, O'Connell's California client. 2
Stover filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland alleging that "because consumer credit reports may be
furnished only for limited purposes," O'Connell had violated the fed-
eral Fair Credit Reporting Act, i" the Maryland statute regulating con-
sumer credit reporting agencies, 14 and Stover's common law right to
privacy. 5 Stover asked for compensatory damages in the amount of
$50,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.16
Way's statements and that they believed Way was affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan. Id.
Blahnik asked Callahan to investigate the matter, which may have prompted Callahan to
also conduct an investigation on Stover. Id.
7. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5, Stover (No. 94-1309).
8. Stover, 84 F.3d at 134.
9. The exact location of Montgomery Investigative Services is unclear. The United
States District Court for the District of Maryland, which originally heard the case, identi-
fied Silver Spring, Maryland, as the company's location. Stover v. O'Connell Assocs., Civ.
A. No. HAR93-1936, 1994 WiL 146794, at *1 (D. Md. 1994), affd, 84 F.3d 132 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 437 (1996).
10. Stover, 84 F.3d at 134. O'Connell asserted that Montgomery limited its criminal
background check to public court records in Maryland. Id.; see also Stover, 1994 WL 146794,
at *3 (citing Montgomery's affidavit, which alleged that the criminal background check of
Stover was limited to public court records in Maryland).
11. Stover, 84 F.3d at 134.
12. Id.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1693 (1994). Under federal law, consumer credit reports may
not be issued to a third party unless in response to a court order or to a person who
intends to use the information for the following purposes: extending credit, employment
decisions, underwriting insurance, eligibility for a license or government benefit, or other
legitimate business reason. Id. § 1681(b). Maryland's consumer credit reporting law is
identical to the federal law in this respect. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 14-1202(a)
(1996).
14. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II §§ 14-1201 to -1218.
15. Stover, 1994 WL 146794, at *I; see also Stover, 84 F.3d at 134.
16. Stover, 84 F.3d at 134.
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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (2),17
O'Connell filed a motion in the district court to dismiss the com-
plaint, asserting that the firm was not subject to personal jurisdiction
in Maryland. 8 At the outset, the district court noted that it could not
assert in personam jurisdiction' 9 over O'Connell unless the firm had
certain "minimum contacts" with Maryland "such that 'the mainte-
nance of the suit [did] not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. '"20
The district court took note, however, of the "dearth of contacts"
O'Connell had with the State of Maryland. 21 The district court found
that O'Connell, incorporated in New York, also maintained its pri-
mary place of business in New York.2 Further, O'Connell was not a
licensed business in Maryland, had no agent for service of process in
Maryland, and maintained no "bank accounts, telephone listings, of-
fice space, agents, employees or corporate officers in Maryland."2 ' Fi-
nally, the district court noted that O'Connell did not advertise, solicit,
promote business, provide services, or derive revenue from
Maryland.24
Following O'Connell's challenge to the court's jurisdiction, the
district court held that the burden shifted to Stover to establish a fac-
tual basis to support the exercise of in personamjurisdiction. 25 Stover
offered two theories: general and specific jurisdiction.26 In urging
17. Federal Rule 12 sets out procedural defenses and objections that a defendant may
raise. Rule 12(b)(2) provides the defense of "lack ofjurisdiction over the person." FED. R.
Crv. P. 12(b)(2).
18. Stover, 84 F.3d at 134.
19. In personam jurisdiction allows a court to "enter ajudgment imposing obligations
on persons." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958). In personam jurisdiction is
distinguished from quasi in rem jurisdiction, which concerns a court's power over a per-
son's interest in property, and in rem jurisdiction, which pertains to a court's power over
the property itself. See generally BLAcvK's LAw DIcrIoNARY 791 (6th ed. 1990).
20. Stover, 1994 WL 146794, at *1 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326





25. Id. at *2.
26. Id. The court noted that "[g] eneral jurisdiction applies to situations in which there
is no relationship between the defendant's contacts with the forum and the facts underly-
ing the cause of action. In such instances, courts may exercise jurisdiction over the defend-
ant if its contacts are 'extensive, continuous and systematic.'" Id. (citing Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Ruby, 312 Md. 413, 422-23, 540 A.2d 482, 486 (1988)). By contrast, specific jurisdiction is
applicable when the cause of action arises out of or is related to the defendant's contacts
with the forum, and "[e]ven a single contact may be sufficient to permit the exercise of
specificjurisdiction when the cause of action arises out of that single contact, provided that
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the district court to assert general jurisdiction over O'Connell, Stover
pointed to O'Connell's ongoing "relationship" with Montgomery, em-
ploying Montgomery to obtain investigative reports on various persons
over the last several years.27 The district court rejected this argument,
however, holding that O'Connell's past dealings with Maryland inves-
tigative firms were "not so extensive, continuous and systematic as to
sustain this Court's general jurisdiction."2" Therefore, the district
court determined, Stover's claim must rest on specific jurisdiction to
survive the motion to dismiss. 9
To persuade the district court that an exercise of specific jurisdic-
tion was appropriate, Stover argued that an agency relationship ex-
isted between O'Connell and Montgomery, whereby Montgomery's
actions, performed under the direction of O'Connell, "formed the ba-
sis for the violations which necessitated the institution of the present
action."" ° The district court rejected this argument as inconsistent
with the factual record of the case."l The district court held that "the
undisputed record indicate [d] that [O'Connell had not hired] Mont-
gomery [to] seek information about Stover's credit history from
Equifax."3 2 Rather, evidence suggested that O'Connell had obtained
the information itself in New York, via computer. Thus, the district
court held that Stover's fair credit and related claims did not arise
from Montgomery's conduct in Maryland, but instead, from
"O'Connell's conduct in New York,""3 and granted O'Connell's mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 4
The Fourth Circuit agreed to review the district court's ruling as
to whether Maryland courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
the principle of 'fair play and substantial justice' is observed." Id. (citing Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414 &
n.9).
27. Id. John O'Connell, President of O'Connell Associates, admitted that his company
had, over the last several years, "engaged Maryland investigations agencies to review public




31. Id. at *3.
32. Id. In his affidavit, John O'Connell asserted that O'Connell, itself, had made the
request to Equifax by means of a computer located in its New York offices-not through
Montgomery. Id. Lending support toJohn O'Connell's statement, Daniel Frishkorn, pres-
ident of Montgomery Investigative Services, stated in his affidavit that the assignment sheet
accompanying O'Connell's inquiry for information on Stover did not include a request for
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New York company whose only connection with Maryland was its occa-
sional telephonic retention of Maryland investigation companies to
provide information on Maryland residents. 3
5
2. Legal Background. -
a. Maryland's Long-Arm Statute and Previous Interpretations.-
Federal and Maryland courts have disagreed over whether Maryland's
long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36 In Beaty
v. M.S. Steel Co., 37 the Fourth Circuit held that a Maryland court may
not exert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant unless
the state's long-arm statute permits it to do so.3" In Beaty, the appel-
lants had argued that personal jurisdiction need only satisfy the re-
quirements of the Due Process Clause before a court may establish
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.39 The Fourth Circuit rejected
this argument, holding that due process issues do not arise "unless a
federal statute or a state statute or rule of court authorizes an asser-
tion ofjurisdiction over [an] out-of-state defendant."4 °
Further, the Fourth Circuit held that Maryland's long-arm statute
did not authorize personal jurisdiction in the situation contested in
the suit.4" Of particular significance was the Fourth Circuit's interpre-
35. Stover, 84 F.3d at 134.
36. Maryland's long-arm statute states, in pertinent part:
(a) Condition.-Ifjurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, he
may be sued only on a cause of action arising from any act enumerated in this
section.
(b) In generaL-A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
directly or by an agent:
(3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the State;
(4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or
omission outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in
any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial reve-
nue from goods, food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed
in the State ....
MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JuD. PROC. § 6-103 (1995).
37. 401 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1968). Beaty involved a suit brought by a group of Maryland
iron workers who were injured by collapsed prefabricated bar joists. Id. The workers
brought suit against the Alabama manufacturer of those joists. Id.
38. Id. at 161.





tation of section 6-103(b)(4) of Maryland's long-arm statute.42 The
appellants in Beaty argued that the court could exercise personal juris-
diction over any out-of-state defendant that caused a tortious injury in
the state.43 In support of this proposition, the appellants relied on
case law interpreting the Illinois long-arm statute.44 The Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected the appellant's argument, interpreting Maryland's long-
arm statute as "requiring ... some other reasonable connection be-
tween the state and the defendant besides the single out-of-state
act."45 The Fourth Circuit interpreted the Maryland statute's addi-
tional requirements of regular business activity or other persistent
conduct in Maryland as requiring more forum-related activity than is
necessary under the Due Process Clause.' Although not holding so
directly, the Beaty court implied that Maryland's long-arm statute did
not extend personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47
In Craig v. General Finance Corp.,4s the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland stated that the interpretation of Mary-
land's long-arm statute was governed by the decisions of the Maryland
Court of Appeals. 49 The district court, however, expressly stated that
Maryland's long-arm statute was more limited than the Due Process
Clause allows.5 ° In particular, the court said that sections 6-103(b) (3)
and (b) (4) of the long-arm statute were not "coterminous with due
process. 51
The conclusions about the proper interpretation of the statute
reached in Beaty and Craig, however, are contradicted by a line of
Maryland cases. In Geelhoed v. Jensen,52 which was decided between
Beaty and Craig, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that Maryland's
"long arm statute represents an effort by the Legislature to expand the
42. See supra note 36. Although Beaty was decided in 1968, the wording of section 6-
103(b) (4) of the long-arm statute has remained essentially the same. See Beaty, 401 F.2d at
159.
43. Beaty, 401 F.2d at 159.
44. Id.
45. Id. In addition to requiring a tortious injury in the state or outside of the state by
an act or omission outside of the state, the statute requires the defendant to engage "in any
other persistent course of conduct in the State." MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 6-
103(b) (4).
46. See Beaty, 401 F.2d at 159 & n.3.
47. See id. at 160 (stating that the statute requires an independent connection with the
state before jurisdiction can be asserted).
48. 504 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1980).
49. Id. at 1036.
50. Id,
51. Id.
52. 277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d 818 (1976).
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boundaries of permissible in personam jurisdiction to the limits per-
mitted by the Federal Constitution.""3 In Mohamed v. Michael,54 the
Maryland Court of Appeals reaffirmed the Geelhoed decision.55 The
Fourth Circuit finally adopted this interpretation of the long-arm stat-
ute in 1993.56 In Ellicott Machine Corp. v. John Holland Party Ltd., the
Fourth Circuit held that the two-step inquiry of first determining
whether jurisdiction is authorized by statute and then determining if
jurisdiction comports with due process "merges into one."57 The
Fourth Circuit, in Stover, took notice of the conflicting interpretations
of the state's long-arm statute, but proceeded under the assumption
that Maryland law authorizes personal jurisdiction to the extent al-
lowed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
b. Constitutional Due Process Limitations of Personal Jurisdic-
tion.-Supreme Court jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction is rooted
in the seminal case of Pennoyer v. Neff.59 According to the Pennoyer
Court, "the authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established."60 Therefore,
the Court laid down the principles that "every State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its terri-
tory" and, conversely, that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction
and authority over persons and property without its territory."61 The
central holding of the case, however, was that a court violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it overreaches its ju-
risdictional authority.6"
53. Id. at 224, 352 A.2d at 821.
54. 279 Md. 653, 370 A.2d 551 (1977).
55. Id. at 657, 370 A.2d at 553; see also Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 307 Md. 270,
274, 513 A.2d 874, 876 (1986) (noting that when enacting the long-arm statute, the legisla-
ture intended to expand personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed by the Due Process
Clause).
56. See Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland Party Ltd., 995 F.2d 474, 477 (4th Cir.
1993) (concluding that "the Maryland legislature designed its long-arm statute to extend
personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed by federal due process"); see also Lesnick v. Hol-
lingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 940 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that Maryland authorizes
long-arm jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the Due Process Clause).
57. EUicott Mach. Corp., 995 F.2d at 477.
58. Stover, 84 F.3d at 135 n.* ("Were we to read Maryland's long-arm statute naturally,
we might question the Maryland courts' interpretation, at least with respect to the constitu-
tional limits of specific jurisdiction.... In any event, we shall assume that Maryland's long-
arm statute reaches the limits of due process." (citations omitted)).
59. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
60. Id. at 720.
61. Id. at 722.
62. Id. at 733.
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The Court substantially modified the rule laid down in Pennoyer-
requiring the physical presence of the defendant in the forum state
before a court could exercise personal jurisdiction-in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.63 According to the International Shoe Court, if a
person or corporation was not physically present in the state, jurisdic-
tion over the person or corporation could still be achieved so long as
there were "certain minimum contacts" between the defendant and
the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 64 Explaining
the test set forth in its decision, the Court noted that "the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corpora-
tion to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or
quantitative." 65 In determining whether the Due Process Clause is sat-
isfied, a court should examine "the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was
the purpose of the due process clause to insure." The Court held
that the Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may
make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corpo-
rate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations."67
The "minimum contacts" test formulated in International Shoe re-
ceived a resounding endorsement in McGee v. International Life Insur-
ance Co.68 In that case, the Court noted that the minimum contacts
test of International Shoe was proper since the nation's economic trans-
formation allowed business transactions to be conducted across state
lines with relative ease.69
The Court further refined the minimum contacts test in Hanson
v. Denckla.7° The Hanson case concerned the appointees' and benefi-
ciaries' rights to the proceeds of a trust established in Delaware by a
settlor who resided in Pennsylvania at the time the trust was created
63. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
64. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
65. Id. at 319.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
69. Id. at 222-23. Taking note of the fact that the insurance contract at issue in McGee
was delivered to the plaintiff in California, that the premiums were mailed from California
to the insurance company in Texas, and that the plaintiff's beneficiary was a resident of
California, the Court held that "[i]t is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit
was based on a contract which had substantial connection with [California]." Id. at 223.
Under these circumstances, the Court reasoned that the insurance company "had no
vested right not to be sued in California." Id. at 224.
70. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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but later became domiciled in Florida.7' When the settlor died, one
group of claimants maintained that the trust proceeds passed under
the residuary clause of the settlor's will, which was admitted to probate
in Florida.72 These claimants brought suit in a Florida chancery court
for a declaratory judgment concerning what property had passed
under the residuary clause of the settlor's will. 73 The Florida court
held that the trust proceeds had passed under the residuary clause of
the will.74 The second group of claimants, however, contended that
the trust proceeds passed pursuant to the settlor's exercise of a power
of appointment created in the deed of trust.75 This group of claim-
ants brought suit in Delaware for a declaratory judgment to determine
who was entitled to participate in the trust assets. 76 The Delaware
court refused to give full faith and credit to the Florida court decision
on the ground that Florida had no personal jurisdiction over the Dela-
ware trust companies, which were acting as trustees for the trust.
77
In deciding the case, the Court noted that the first relationship
Florida had to the contested trust agreement executed in Delaware
was established when the settlor voluntarily moved from Pennsylvania
to Florida.78 The Court held that "[t]he unilateral activity of those
who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot sat-
isfy the requirement of contact with the forum State;" rather, "it is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." 79
The Court next addressed the law of personal jurisdiction in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. ° In that case, the owners of
an automobile brought a products liability suit in Oklahoma after they
became involved in an accident in Oklahoma that caused severe inju-
ries to several passengers.8 ' The plaintiffs named as defendants the
automobile's manufacturer, importer, regional distributor, and retail
71. Id. at 238-39.
72. Id. at 240.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 242-43.
75. Id. at 242.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 243.
78. See id. at 252.
79. Id. at 253. Therefore, because it was the settlor who initiated the contact with Flor-
ida by voluntarily moving there, and not the Delaware trust companies, the Court held that
Florida could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the trust companies. Id. at 255.
80. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
81. Id. at 288.
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dealer.82 The regional distributor, incorporated in New York, distrib-
uted vehicles to retail dealers in New York, NewJersey, and Connecti-
cut." The retail dealer was incorporated and conducted business in
New York.8 4 Applying the relevant precedent, the Court found "a to-
tal absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary pred-
icate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction."85 The Court listed
five factors that it would consider when deciding whether a court rea-
sonably asserted personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. 86
These five factors were: (1) "the burden on the defendant"; (2) "the
forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute"; (3) "the plaintiff s
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief"; (4) "the inter-
state judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolu-
tion of controversies"; and (5) "the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."87
Rejecting the plaintiffs arguments based on the foreseeability of
the product entering the forum state, the Court held that personal
jurisdiction is appropriate when "the defendant's conduct and con-
nection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably antic-
ipate being haled into court there."88 In support of its holding, the
Court noted that the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Due
Process Clause should allow "a degree of predictability to the legal
system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary con-
duct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and
will not render them liable to suit."89
In Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall,9 ° the Court clarified
the concepts of specific and general jurisdiction.9" When a state as-
serts personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a cause of action arising
out of, or related to, the defendant's forum state contacts, the state is
exercising specific jurisdiction over the defendant.92 If the state at-
82. Id.
83. Id. at 288-89.
84. Id. at 289.
85. Id. at 295. The Court noted that the regional and retail dealers conducted no
business in Oklahoma, stating: "They close no sales and perform no services there. They
avail themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no
business there either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to
reach the State." Id.
86. Id. at 292.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 297.
89. Id.
90. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
91. Id. at 414.
92. Id. at 414 n.8.
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tempts to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant in a cause
of action unrelated to the defendant's forum state contacts, the state
is exercising general jurisdiction." The distinction is crucial because
the assertion of general jurisdiction requires substantial contacts by
the defendant to the forum state, whereas specific jurisdiction may be
sustained even if the contacts between the defendant and the forum
state were sporadic.94
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,95 the Court identified several
factors a court should take into account when determining if personal
jurisdiction can be asserted. The case involved a suit filed in Florida
by Burger King, a Florida company, against one of its franchisees, a
Michigan resident, for breach of the franchise agreement.9 6 The con-
tract establishing the franchise relationship was established in Florida,
with provisions stating that Florida law would control future disputes
and directives for the franchisee to forward required fees and relevant
notices to Burger King's Miami headquarters.97 Taking note of the
franchise agreement, the Florida choice-of-law provision contained in
the agreement, and the requirement to send all payments and notices
to Burger King's Florida headquarters, the Court determined that
Florida could exercise personal jurisdiction over Rudzewicz.98 Ac-
cording to the Court, Rudzewicz could be held liable to suit in Florida
because he "established a substantial and continuing relationship with
Burger King's Miami headquarters, received fair notice from the con-
tract documents and the course of dealing that he might be subject to
suit in Florida, and has failed to demonstrate how jurisdiction in that
forum would otherwise be fundamentally unfair."99
Finally, in Calder v. Jones,1"' the Court considered whether actress
Shirley Jones could bring suit in California against the National En-
quirer, and a reporter and an editor of the newspaper, for libel and
defamation.10 Both the reporter and editor challenged the suit,
claiming that California did not have personal jurisdiction over them
because both resided in Florida and had researched and written the
93. Id. at 414 n.9.
94. SeeJACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CWIL PROCEDURE § 3.10, at 124 (2d ed. 1993); see
also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952) (holding that forum
state contacts must be sufficiently substantial in order to permit personal jurisdiction when
the cause of action is unrelated to the defendant's activities in the state).
95. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
96. Id. at 464-68.
97. Id. at 463-64.
98. Id. at 478-82.
99. Id. at 487.
100. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
101. Id. at 784-86.
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article primarily in Florida."°2 In deciding the issue, the Court noted
that more copies of the National Enquirer were sold in California than
in any other state. ' Because the article was intentionally written to
impugn the reputation of "an entertainer whose television career was
centered in California," the Court held that the defendants targeted
their intentional acts toward California and knew the article's impact
would fall disproportionately on that state.10 4 As such, the Court held
that 'jurisdiction over petitioners in California is proper because of
their intentional conduct in Florida calculated to cause injury to re-
spondent in California." ' 5
It is against this legal background that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered Stover v. O'Connell Associates.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In affirming the district court's deci-
sion, the Fourth Circuit declared that a challenge to personal jurisdic-
tion requires a court, first, to consider whether the long-arm statute of
the state authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over the defending
party and, if so, to then determine whether the exercise of personal
jurisdiction satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1 0 6 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit began its analysis by exam-
ining whether Maryland's long-arm statute authorized jurisdiction
over O'Connell.
10 7
In support of his argument that the district court could assert
personal jurisdiction over O'Connell, Stover relied on two sections of
Maryland's long-arm statute. 08 The Fourth Circuit rejected Stover's
argument that the long-arm statute allowed personal jurisdiction be-
cause O'Connell caused injury in Maryland by an act that occurred in
the state. 0 9 The court conceded that O'Connell may have caused
Stover injury in Maryland, but agreed with the district court's determi-
102. Id.
103. Id. at 783.
104. Id. at 788-90.
105. Id. at 791.
106. Stover, 84 F.3d at 134.
107. Id. at 135.
108. Id. Stover relied on sections 6-103(b) (3) and (b) (4) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code. Section 6-103(b) (3) allows a Maryland court to
exercise jurisdiction over a person, who directly or by agent "[clauses tortious injury in the
State by an act or omission in the State." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 6-103(b) (3)
(1995). Section 6-103(b) (4) allows a Maryland court to exercise jurisdiction over a person,
who directly or by agent "[c]auses tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an
act or omission outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, [or] engages in
any other persistent course of conduct in the State .... " Id. § 6-103(b)(4).
109. Stover, 84 F.3d at 135.
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nation that the injury-causing acts occurred outside of the state."1
According to the Fourth Circuit, O'Connell's conduct-obtaining in-
formation about Stover from Equifax and placing a telephone call to a
Maryland investigation firm to request a survey of Stover's criminal
background-occurred "entirely in New York state.""' Relying on
Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, 1 2 the court refused to allow Stover to
attribute the activities of Montgomery to O'Connell pursuant to
agency theory because O'Connell did not exercise control over Mont-
gomery's business practices.11 3
After rejecting Stover's first argument, the Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed Stover's contention that Maryland's long-arm statute author-
ized personal jurisdiction because, although O'Connell caused injury
in Maryland by an act outside of the state, O'Connell engaged in a
"persistent course of conduct in the State."" 4 Noting that Maryland's
long-arm statute was "coterminous with the limits of the Due Process
Clause,"115 the court initiated a constitutional inquiry. 6
Addressing the constitutional issue, the Fourth Circuit proceeded
with a summary of relevant Supreme Court precedent on the due pro-
cess requirements for personal jurisdiction. 7 Relying primarily on
International Shoe,"' Hanson,"9 Helicapteros Nacionales,t2 ° and Burger
King,12 1  the court concluded that asserting jurisdiction over
O'Connell would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 22
According to the Fourth Circuit, O'Connell's request to Equifax
did not create a connection with Maryland because it was unclear
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 2 F.3d 56 (4th Cir. 1993). In Mylan Laboratories, the Fourth Circuit developed an
agency test for personal jurisdiction purposes. See id. at 61. Under the test, actions of a
subsidiary corporation could be attributed to a foreign parent corporation "only if the
parent exerts considerable control over the activities of the subsidiary." Id.
113. Stover, 84 F.3d at 135.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 135-36.
116. Id. at 136.
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
120. 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984) ("[Plurchases and related trips, standing alone, are not a
sufficient basis for a State's assertion ofjurisdiction."); see supra notes 90-93 and accompa-
nying text.
121. 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) ("Jurisdiction is proper . .. where the contacts proxi-
mately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection'
with the forum State." (quoting McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957))); see supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
122. Stover, 84 F.3d at 137.
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from the record "where Equifax stored that information or where
Equifax is located."12 O'Connell's telephone call to Montgomery re-
questing a criminal check also did not create a sufficient connection
because "[o]rdering a product or service by telephone from a com-
pany in a different state does not subject the customer to that state's
jurisdiction. " 114 While conceding that a telephone call does transport
the caller into the state of the person being called, the court held,
nonetheless, that a phone call does not establish a caller's " 'presence '
in that jurisdiction."125 Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejected Stover's
argument based on Calder v. Jones,'26 describing the conduct of the
Calder defendants as completely different in "magnitude."1 27 Charac-
terizing O'Connell's conduct as "occasional telephonic requests for
information from Maryland-based investigation services over a period
of years," the Fourth Circuit held that the firm could not have ex-
pected to defend its actions in the State of Maryland.1 28
4. Analysis.-
a. Misreading Maryland's Long-Arm Statute.-In Stover, the
Fourth Circuit assumed that Maryland's long-arm statute authorizes
personal jurisdiction to the limits allowed under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 In so assuming, the Fourth
Circuit based its holding on a dubious interpretation of Maryland's
long-arm statute. Section 6-103(b)(4) of the statute allows personal
jurisdiction if an out-of-state defendant causes a tortious injury in the
state, but only if the defendant also "regularly does or solicits business,
[or] engages in any other persistent course of conduct" in Mary-
land.'3 The Supreme Court has held that a tortious act is sufficient
under due process to allow for an exercise of personal jurisdiction if
the cause of action arises out of, or is related to, contacts with the
forum-state.' 31 A plain reading of this section of the statute, however,
clearly indicates that greater contacts than the tortious act itself are
123. Id. at 136.
124. Id. at 137.
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
127. Stover, 84 F.3d at 137.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
130. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 6-103(b)(4) (1995); see supra note 36.
131. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984);
see also FRiEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 94, at 123 (stating that a single act may be sufficient
provided that the cause of action arises out of that act).
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required before the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the
out-of-state defendant.
In Beaty v. M.S. Steel Co., the Fourth Circuit noted that Maryland's
long-arm statute was patterned after the Uniform Interstate and Inter-
national Procedure Act.1 3 2 In a footnote, the Beaty Court included a
quotation from one of the drafters of Wisconsin's long-arm statute,
which was also patterned after the Uniform Interstate and Interna-
tional Procedure Act.13 3 According to the drafter, language was delib-
erately included in the statute to make clear that it did not approach
the "'outer limits permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment."" 4
Although, in Stover, the Fourth Circuit took note of this alternative
interpretation of the long-arm statute, the court proceeded under the
assumption that the statute authorized jurisdiction to the extent al-
lowed by the Due Process Clause. 13' This assumption contradicts
Beaty, conflicts with the plain language of the statute, and allows Mary-
land courts to bypass the inquiry of whether Maryland's long-arm stat-
ute permits personal jurisdiction and to proceed directly to the due
process inquiry.
Any difference in the plain language of a statute and the judicial
interpretation of that statute creates uncertainty for those seeking to
order their affairs in Maryland. As the Supreme Court emphasized in
World-Wide Volkswagen, due process considerations require that there
exist "predictability" in a state's legal system so that potential defend-
ants can "structure their primary conduct with some minimum assur-
ance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit.""3 6 This degree of predictability is lacking under the current
state of the law in Maryland. In this world of ever-growing intercon-
nectedness, the Maryland General Assembly should clarify the reach
of the state's long-arm statute.
b. Court Made Proper Decision Using Due Process Analysis.-
Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit's questionable use of a straight
due process analysis, the court correctly analyzed the facts of Stover
under the Due Process Clause for several reasons. A Maryland court
could not, consistent with the Due Process Clause, exercise specific
132. See 401 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1968).
133. Id. at 159 n.3.
134. Id. (quoting Foster, Judicial Economy: Fairness and Convenience of Place of Trial:
Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, An Address to the Thirty-eighth Judicial Confer-
ence of the Fourth Circuit, 1968).
135. Stover, 84 F.3d at 135 n.* (noting that the plain language of section 6-103(b) (4)
seems "to require greater contacts than the specific jurisdiction jurisprudence requires").
136. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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jurisdiction over O'Connell. As noted earlier, specific jurisdiction is
proper if the cause of action arises out of the defendant's contacts
with the forum state."l 7 In Stover, O'Connell's contact with Maryland
consisted of a single telephone call to Montgomery requesting a crimi-
nal background check."' 8 Stover sued O'Connell, however, for viola-
tions of federal and state credit reporting laws.13 9 Stover also sued
O'Connell for a violation of his common law right to privacy." Yet
the district court, in dismissing Stover's complaint for want of specific
jurisdiction, found that Stover's privacy complaint was based on
O'Connell's alleged credit reporting violations, not on its retention of
Montgomery to perform a criminal background check from public
court records in Maryland."' It is clear, therefore, that specific juris-
diction was inappropriate because Stover's causes of action did not
derive from, or arise out of, O'Connell's contact with Maryland.
The Fourth Circuit was also correct in holding that general juris-
diction over O'Connell was improper. To reach its holding, the
Fourth Circuit correctly interpreted and applied Supreme Court pre-
cedent. Under International Shoe, O'Connell, as an out-of-state defend-
ant, would be subject to suit in Maryland only if the firm had "certain
minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' 142 Under Hanson, Stover needed to show that O'Connell
"purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws." 143 Further, under World-Wide Volkswagen, O'Connell's activi-
ties and contacts with Maryland needed to be of the variety that the
firm "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."144
Even though the Supreme Court lowered the personal jurisdiction
threshold in International Shoe because of the increasing demands of
interstate commerce and the multi-state activities of corporations, the
Fourth Circuit was correct in noting that the post-Pennoyer tests for
establishing presence in a state were "never intended to reorder the
137. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
138. Stover, 84 F.3d at 134.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Stover v. O'Connell Assocs., Civ. A. No. HAR93-1936, 1994 WL 146794, at *2-3 (D.
Md. 1994), affd, 84 F.3d 142 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct 437 (1996).
142. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
143. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
144. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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concepts of state sovereignty which form the basis of the Constitu-
tion's due process guarantee." 4 5
Given these jurisdictional hurdles, O'Connell's one telephone
call to Montgomery to request a criminal background check was
clearly insufficient to sustain personal jurisdiction. If a telephone call
from one state to another were sufficient to sustain personal jurisdic-
tion in the state where the call was received, the concept of sover-
eignty inherent in personal jurisdiction would be a nullity. If a
telephone call were sufficient to establish adequate contacts for juris-
dictional purposes, any person who called another state would, in ef-
fect, be appointing her telephone as her agent for service of process
and her amenability to suit would travel wherever she placed a call.
Such a concept could not be in accord with the requirements of the
Due Process Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
146
Finally, the Fourth Circuit correctly refused to apply Calder v.
Jones147 to Stover's claim. As the court noted, Calder can be distin-
guished from Stover by the magnitude of the contacts involved.1 41 In
Calder, the National Enquirer printed a defamatory article knowing it
would be read by 600,000 California residents and would result in sub-
stantial harm to the plaintiff in California.141 In Stover, the public
records concerning Stover's criminal background were to be disclosed
to one entity-O'Connell's California client that requested the infor-
mation. 150 To compare the harm suffered by the plaintiff in Calder to
the harm allegedly suffered by Stover is implausible.
Although the Fourth Circuit did not address this matter, Calder
and Stover can also be distinguished based on the intent of the defend-
ants. In Calder, the Court grounded its holding, in part, on the de-
fendant's intentional conduct and its harm to the plaintiff.' In Stover,
it was not alleged that the information O'Connell obtained about Sto-
ver (all of it public information) was sought with the intent of harm-
ing Stover.
145. Stover, 84 F.3d at 136.
146. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 ("[W]e have never accepted the proposi-
tion that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain
faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution.").
147. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
148. Stover, 84 F.3d at 137 (noting the differences in the facts and the magnitude of the
harm of the two cases).
149. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785-89 (1984).
150. Stover, 84 F.3d at 134.
151. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
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5. Conclusion.-In affirming the district court's dismissal of Sto-
ver's suit against O'Connell for lack of personal jurisdiction, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accepted a ques-
tionable interpretation of Maryland's long-arm statute, but reached
the correct decision based on a due process analysis consistent with
Supreme Court precedent. Subjecting O'Connell to suit in Maryland
based on its telephonic contact with the state would have rendered
meaningless the sovereignty component of personal jurisdiction that
the Supreme Court has consistently maintained is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
STEPHEN E. JONES
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
VII. TORTS
A. Extending a New Form of Absolute Immunity from Tort Liability to
Government Contractors
In Mangold v. Analytic Services, Inc.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit created a new form of federal absolute
immunity.' The court held that a government contractor and its em-
ployees were "absolutely immune from state tort liability based on any
statements made and information given in response to queries made
in the course of [an] Air Force[ ] investigation."3 With this ruling, the
court effectively bridged the gap between two similar but separate im-
munities that support each form of absolute privilege based on solid
policy foundations.
1. The Case.-In the summer of 1993, the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations and the Inspector General launched an official
investigation into the activities of Colonel Sanford D. Mangold, head
of the Air Force's Resource Allocation team at the Pentagon.4 The
investigation, led by Air Force Brigadier General Raymond Huot, fo-
cused on allegations that Colonel Mangold "improperly exerted his
influence to pressure a government contractor ... to hire a Mangold
family friend," Betsy Worrell, to provide consulting services to the Air
Force's Resource Allocation team.'
As part of the investigation, General Huot and his staff ques-
tioned executive officers of the contractor, Analytic Services, Inc. (AN-
SER).6 Three of ANSER's executives responded to the questions and
"presented cassette tapes of telephone messages left by Colonel Man-
gold on ANSER's telephone answering machine in November and De-
cember 1992."' ANSER's Chief Executive Officer, Dr. John M.
Fabian, told General Huot that Colonel Mangold requested the use of
ANSER's consulting services in the fall of 1992 and that "Mangold sug-
gested that ANSER hire Mrs. Worrell to provide those services."8 Dr.
Fabian told Colonel Mangold that Worrell did not meet the minimum
1. 77 F.3d 1442 (4th Cir. 1996).
2. See id. at 1449-50.
3. Id. at 1450.
4. Id. at 1444.
5. Id.
6. Id. ANSER is a private company that contracts with the U.S. government to provide





requirements for the job.9 However, Colonel Mangold implied that
whether or not his team used ANSER's services hinged directly on
ANSER's decision to employ Worrell."° Paul Adler, ANSER's vice
president, confirmed Dr. Fabian's testimony, and the transcripts of
Colonel Mangold's telephone messages corroborated the statements
of both men. i" When ANSER refused to hire Worrell, "[Colonel]
Mangold canceled the Air Force's request for contract support from
ANSER." 12
Colonel Mangold's immediate subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel
James Rooney, reported the Colonel's actions to superior officers,
prompting the internal Air Force investigation of the Colonel's deal-
ings with ANSER.11 The Air Force subsequently transferred Colonel
Mangold "from his position as head of the Resource Allocation
team."
14
Colonel Mangold and his wife later filed a complaint against AN-
SER, its executives, and Lieutenant Colonel Rooney in state court in
Virginia.15 Lieutenant Colonel Rooney removed the case to federal
court, and "the United States substituted itself for Lt. Col. Rooney as
the party defendant."16 The United States moved for summaryjudg-
9. Id. at 1444-45. To provide the services requested by Colonel Mangold, ANSER re-
quired that the candidate possess a college degree-a qualification that Mrs. Worrell did
not possess. Id. at 1445.
10. Id. at 1444.




15. Id. The Mangolds filed the complaint in Arlington County Circuit Court for the
Commonwealth of Virginia. See Mangold v. ANSER Corp., 842 F. Supp. 202, 203 (E.D. Va.
1994), rev'd sub nom. Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442 (4th Cir. 1996). In the
seven-count complaint, the plaintiffs alleged "defamation (counts I and II), civil conspiracy
to damage plaintiff Colonel Mangold's career (count III), tortious interference with an
employment contract (count IV), intentional infliction of emotional distress (counts V and
VI), and an encompassing allegation that [the foregoing conduct] was done willfully, wan-
tonly, and maliciously (count VII)." Id.
16. Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1446. Removal was effected under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2)
(1994). Id. The statute provides in pertinent part:
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was act-
ing within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of
which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such
claim in a State court shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by
the Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place in which the action or proceeding is pending. Such
action or proceeding shall be deemed to be an action or proceeding brought
against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references
thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant.
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (2). Though the United States apparently could have substituted itself
for Lieutenant Colonel Rooney under section 2679(d)(2), which encompasses both re-
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ment, alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 17 In
response, the Mangolds voluntarily dismissed all claims against the
United States.18
ANSER and its employees filed a summary judgment motion
claiming absolute immunity from state tort liability arising out of their
answers to questions posed to them during the official federal investi-
gation into their contractual dealings with the Air Force.' 9 ANSER
alternatively claimed that the information provided to Air Force inves-
tigators was "privileged as statements spoken during a judicial
proceeding."20
The district court held that it retained jurisdiction "solely for the
purpose of deciding whether defendants' actions [were] entitled to an
absolute immunity because the allegedly defamatory statements were
made within the context of an Air Force investigation." 2' Relying pri-
marily on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Becker v. Philco Corp.,22 the
district court decided that there was "no contractual provision" be-
tween ANSER and the federal government requiring ANSER to dis-
close information and that, in the absence of such a provision, ANSER
could not "clothe" its discretionary responses in absolute immunity.23
After denying ANSER's absolute immunity defense, the district court
decided to remand the action to the Virginia state court under 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c)2 4 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 25
moval and substitution, the substitution was effected under section 2679(d) (1). Mangol4
77 F.3d at 1446.
17. Mangold 77 F.3d at 1446 n.2 ("The United States contended that Col. and Mrs.
Mangold failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing an administrative claim
with the Air Force; that the United States had not waived its immunity from the torts al-
leged in the complaint; and that the Mangolds' claims were barred by the [Supreme
Court's] decision in Feres v. United States...." (citation omitted)).
18. Id. at 1446.
19. Id.
20. Mangold v. ANSER Corp., 842 F. Supp. 202, 204 (E.D. Va. 1994), rev'd sub nom.
Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442 (4th Cir. 1996).
21. Id. at 203.
22. 372 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1967). In Becker, the Fourth Circuit found that the terms of
the contract required a report made by a government contractor. Id. at 772-74. Absolute
immunity, therefore, exempted the contractor from liability. Id. at 776. Nevertheless, the
court posed the question of the necessity of the contractual provision to its extension of
federal absolute immunity to a government contractor, but refused to resolve this issue
because no doubts existed as to the right of the contractor to make the communications.
Id. at 774.
23. Mangold, 842 F. Supp. at 203-04.
24. See infra note 27.
25. Mangold, 842 F. Supp. at 204. After dismissal of the federal defendant, diversity of
citizenship no longer existed between the remaining parties. Id. at 203.
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In reviewing the decision of the district court, the Fourth Circuit
considered both its ability to review remand decisions invoking sec-




a. Review of Remand Decisions Under Section 1447(c).-A fed-
eral district court has two bases for remand to a state court according
to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c): (1) a defect in removal procedure and (2) a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time before a final judgment
in federal court.27 Section 1447(d) provides, in part, however, that
"[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise."28 The term
"otherwise" prohibits higher court review by mandamus. 9 Therefore,
this section appears to serve as a general ban on reconsideration of
federal district court remand decisions.
Nevertheless, in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,° the
Supreme Court found that a remand order, not explicitly issued pur-
suant to section 1447(c), is not barred from review by section
1447(d). " The Court also found, however, that section 1447(d) "pro-
hibits review of all remand orders issued pursuant to § 1447(c)
whether erroneous or not and whether review is sought by appeal or
by extraordinary writ. "32
Subsequent federal circuit court decisions have qualified the
seemingly broad language of Thermtron, which bars any review of fed-
eral district court remand decisions issued pursuant to section
1447(c)."3 These courts based their decisions on the Supreme Court's
26. Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1450.
27. The relevant text of section 1447(c) provides:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure
must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal .... If at
any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1994).
28. Id. § 1447(d).
29. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 343-45. This is commonly known as the "Thermtron exception." See infra notes
78-89 and accompanying text.
32. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 343.
33. See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 779 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding remand itself ineffective due to erroneous pronouncement of substantive law);
Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir. 1984)
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reasoning in City of Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.3 4 that
no appeal lies from the order of remand, but if in logic and in fact the
substantive decree precedes that of remand, the order may be the sub-
ject of an appeal.35
Additionally, courts have apparently differed over whether the
mere citation of section 1447(c) operates as "magic words," preclud-
ing review of the remand order itself by appeal or mandamus, or
whether appellate courts may look behind the face of the remand or-
der to ensure that it is motivated by one of the permitted bases for
remand.36 In Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,37 the Supreme
Court distinguished the Thermtron formula conceived in the preceding
year.38 The Court determined that section 1447(c) remand orders
are not reviewable when a district court "determines that 'the case was
removed improvidently and without jurisdiction.' 39 Although the
Supreme Court refused to review the remand order, it did not indi-
cate that a bare citation to section 1447(c) would be dispositive. In
fact, the Court's own inquiry into the reason behind the district
court's remand order served as a model for deeper inquiry in future
cases. For example, in Kunzi v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 40 the
Ninth Circuit stated: "Remand orders issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) and based on the grounds specified therein, i.e. that removal was
improvident and without jurisdiction, are immune from appellate re-
view."4" This two-part test, framed in the conjunctive, left open the
possibility of review of district court remand decisions invoking sec-
tion 1447(c), that were not actually based on the grounds specified
therein.
(holding federal district court's substantive decision on the merits, separate from the juris-
dictional issue, was appealable despite remand under section 1447(c)).
34. 293 U.S. 140 (1934).
35. Id. at 143.
36. Compare Kunzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 833 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1987)
(involving appeals court inquiry into actual grounds for remand despite district court's
invocation of section 1447(c)), with Volvo of Am. Corp. v. Schwarzer, 429 U.S. 1331, 1332
(Rehnquist, CircuitJustice 1976) ("[W]hile the District Court may have been wrong in its
Uurisdictional] analysis, it clearly stated, citing to § 1447(c), that it considered itself with-
out jurisdiction. The District Court therefore thought it was acting in accordance with
§ 1447(c) .... Review of this order, therefore, is presumptively barred . ..
37. 430 U.S. 723 (1977) (per curiam).
38. Id. at 724 (citing Thermtron as being not to the contrary, because it was based "'on
grounds wholly different from those upon which § 1447(c) permits remand'" (quoting
Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976))).
39. Id. at 723 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
40. 833 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1987).
41. Id. at 1293 (emphasis added).
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b. The Growth of Absolute Immunity and Its Extension to Govern-
ment Contractors.-In Barr v. Matteo,42 the Supreme Court upheld a
government official's defense of absolute immunity to an action for
libel based on the release of an allegedly damaging public state-
ment.4" A plurality of the Court applied a balancing test,4 4 conclud-
ing that although there may be "occasional instances of actual
injustice which will go unredressed,"45 government officials should be
free to carry out their duties without fear of state damage suits arising
from acts done "in the course of those duties."' In discussing what
would be within a government official's course of duty such that the
immunity defense would apply, the plurality referred to an "outer pe-
rimeter" of the petitioner's duty.4 7 As a result of its balancing test, the
Court found that the petitioner's actions were within the outer perim-
eter,' without attempting to define the "perimeter," or systematize
this determination for future cases.4 9
The Supreme Court moved closer to a systematic process for ad-
judicating claims of absolute immunity in Westfall v. Erwin.5" As in
Bar,, the Court recognized the need for lower courts to strike a bal-
ance between the national interest in "effective government" and a
private citizen's interest in bringing a cause of action against a govern-
ment official under state tort law.51 In conducting this balancing test,
the Westfall Court admonished lower courts to "consider whether the
contribution to effective government in particular contexts outweighs
the potential harm to individual citizens."52 The Court added, how-
ever, that "absolute immunity from state-law tort actions should be
available only when the conduct of federal officials is within the scope
of their official duties and the conduct is discretionary in nature."5 3
More recently, the Supreme Court extended a form of federal
immunity to private companies contracting with the government. In
42. 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (plurality opinion).
43. Id. at 574. The statement, issued by William G. Barr, acting director of the Office
of Rent Stabilization, publicly announced that two members of the agency would be sus-
pended. Id. at 567 n.5.
44. See id. at 564-65.
45. Id. at 576.
46. Id. at 571.
47. Id. at 575.
48. Id.
49. In fact, Justice Stewart, dissenting in Barr, disagreed with the determination of the
plurality that the actions of the public official in question were within the "outer perime-
ter" of his duty. Id. at 592 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
51. Id. at 299.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 297-98.
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Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,54 the Court compared the alleged lia-
bility of the outside contractor in question with the analogous liability
of government employees performing the same function.55 The
Court found: "The present case involves an independent contractor
performing its obligation under a procurement contract, rather than
an official performing his duty as a federal employee, but there is obvi-
ously implicated the same interest in getting the Government's work
done."5 6 The Court ultimately found the contractor immune from
state tort liability based on its actions on behalf of the federal govern-
ment.57 The Court justified the immunity, however, by finding a su-
perseding federal interest in direct conflict with a state interest, not by
explicitly extending federal absolute immunity from state tort liability
to a government contractor.5' Furthermore, to the extent that the
Boyle majority altered existing law, it did so sparingly, drawing only
narrow conclusions of law. 9
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Mangold, the Fourth Circuit justi-
fied its power to review the district court's remand order before reach-
ing the merits of the defendants' absolute immunity defense.6" The
majority examined the remand order to ensure that one of the two
grounds under section 1447(c) served as "the actual basis being in-
voked as authority for remand."'" Citing Kunzi for support,62 the ma-
jority reviewed the district court proceedings and order, concluding
that "the district court remanded in the end not on the assumption
that there was a 'lack ofjurisdiction' so that remand was compelled, but
that though there was jurisdiction, there was discretion to remand."6"
54. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
55. Id. at 505.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 514.
58. Id. at 505 n.1.
59. The Court set three conditions for the displacement of state tort law in similar
cases:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to
state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier
warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States.
Id. at 512.
60. Mangold 77 F.3d at 1446. Judge Niemeyer delivered the opinion of the court with
respect to parts I, III, and IV, and Judge Niemeyer joined Senior Circuit Judge Phillips's
concurring opinion on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1444.
61. Id. at 1450.
62. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
63. Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1451. The majority relied, in part, on the district court's query
while discussing jurisdiction: "But it's purely discretionary with the Court whether to hold
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Viewed as a discretionary order, the majority found the district
court's exercise of discretion "sufficiently egregious in error," that it
would be proper to treat the defendants' notice of appeal as a petition
for a writ of mandamus. 64 The majority then determined that the dis-
trict court's discretionary remand was not permitted.65 Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit's grant of mandamus, and vacatur of the remand or-
der, would render the district court's immunity ruling sufficiently fi-
nal to be reviewable by the appellate court as a collateral order
denying absolute immunity.'
Having thus reached the merits of the defendants' absolute im-
munity defense, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the development of fed-
eral absolute immunity from state tort liability.67 Reasoning that the
scope of federal absolute immunity is defined by the nature of the
function being performed, the Fourth Circuit concluded: "Extending
such immunity to the private sector, in the narrow circumstances
where the public interest in efficient government outweighs the costs
of granting such immunity, comports with the principles underlying
the immunity recognized in Barr and Westfall."68 As support for this
extension of federal absolute immunity to government contractors,
the majority cited Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.6 9 and Yearsley v.
W.A. Ross Construction Co.7" However, the validity of these cases as pre-
cedent for the extension of absolute immunity to contractors has been
on to the case in the posture that it presently is in. P]." Id. (alteration in original) (inter-
nal quotations omitted).
64. Id. at 1453. The court cited Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 234 (4th Cir. 1994), to
support its decision to treat ANSER's notice of appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus.
Mangold 77 F.3d at 1453. In Jamison, the court wrote, "We will therefore treat [the appel-
lant's] effort to take a direct appeal from the order of remand as a petition for a writ of
mandamus, which we may entertain subject to the normal limitations on mandamus re-
lief." Jamison, 14 F.3d at 234.
65. Id.
66. Id. Under the "Cohen doctrine," interlocutory orders are immediately appealable if
they reflect "a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of
action and does not require consideration with it." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
67. Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1446-47.
68. Id. at 1447. The majority relied heavily on the following language in Bar.
"'[T]here must of necessity be a delegation and redelegation of authority as to many func-
tions, and we cannot say that these functions become less important simply because they
are exercised by officers of lower rank in the executive hierarchy.'" Id. (quoting Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1959) (plurality opinion)).
69. 487 U.S. 500 (1988); see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
70. 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (holding that the remedy for taking of private property by a
government contractor in the course of work for the government lies directly against the
federal government under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not against
contractor).
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disputed. 71 Ultimately, with the "interest in efficient government" in
mind, the Fourth Circuit found that the government must be allowed
to investigate thoroughly its contracts with private companies to dis-
cover "fraud, waste, and mismanagement. "72
The majority quickly recognized, however, that this legal founda-
tion did not resolve the issue of whether persons cooperating with
official investigations would be protected from state tort liability.73
Consequently, the appellate court turned to the common law privi-
lege to testify with absolute immunity in courts of law for a second
"root" justification for extending absolute immunity to persons in-
clined to cooperate with official investigations.7 ' According to the
majority, this form of absolute immunity would be applied "only inso-
far as necessary to shield statements and information, whether truth-
ful or not, given by a government contractor and its employees in
response to queries by government investigators engaged in an official
investigation."
75
4. Analysis.-In Mangold, the Fourth Circuit created an unprec-
edented hybrid variety of absolute immunity from two familiar forms:
(1) federal absolute immunity from state tort liability and (2) the
common law privilege to testify with immunity in courts of law. 76 To
exercise the power to review the decision of the district court, the
Fourth Circuit had to align itself with the disputed position that re-
mand orders under section 1447(c) may be reviewed to determine the
"actual" basis for remand.77 In both extending immunity and exercis-
ing review, the positions taken by the Mangold majority are properly
justified by policy considerations.
a. Remand Orders Invoking Section 144 7(c). -A key dispute be-
tween the majority and dissent in Mangold centers on the interpreta-
tion of the Thermtron exception to nonreviewability of remand orders
71. For a discussion of Boyle as an extension of immunity to government contractors,
see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. In his dissent in Boy/e, Justice Brennan ques-
tioned the applicability of Yearsley as an extension of federal absolute immunity to govern-
ment contractors. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 524 (1988) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting). He wrote that it was unlikely the Yearsley Court intended that its extension of
immunity to a government contractor apply outside the context of the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 525.
72. Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1448.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 1448-49.
75. Id. at 1449.
76. See id. at 1450.
77. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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pursuant to section 1447(c). 7' The dissent interprets Thermtron as a
prohibition against all efforts to look behind the face of a remand
order merely citing the title of section 1447(c). 79 Such a rigid rule
would purportedly "avoid long, technical disputes about whether cases
should be heard in state or federal court."80
There are, however, several reasons to broadly construe the
Thermtron exception and to permit appellate review of remand orders.
In City of Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co.,8 1 the Supreme
Court upheld the petitioner's right to appeal a determination of sub-
stantive law that preceded a remand order "in logic and in fact."82
Technically, the remand order itself was not the subject of review;
rather, the Court reviewed the substantive law determination that pre-
ceded the remand order.8" Since City of Waco, however, even this
rule-that a substantive law determination must precede the remand
order-has eroded to some extent, due to the desire of some circuit
courts to review and correct potential errors of substantive law that
exist in actions remanded to state court.84
In fact, the Mangold exception to nonreviewability of remand or-
ders is the latest step in the steady erosion of Thermtron. First, Gravitt
focused the determination of reviewability on the language of section
1447(c), instead of on the mere invocation of the statute.85 Then,
Kunzi interpreted the language in Gravitt to allow a determination of
whether or not the decision to remand was actually "based on the
grounds" of section 1447(c).86 Finally, citing Kunzi, the Mangold ma-
jority confidently writes:
[I] t must be the case, as some courts have had the occasion
to recognize, that neither the citation of § 1447(c) nor the
failure to cite it as presumed authority for a remand is con-
clusive of the real question: whether one of its two grounds is
the actual basis being invoked as authority for remand.87
78. See Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1455 (Michael, J., dissenting) ("The scope of the Thermtron
exception is extremely narrow.").
79. See id. at 1458.
80. Id. at 1455.
81. 293 U.S. 140 (1934).
82. Id. at 143.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
86. Kunzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 833 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1987).
87. Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1450.
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The entirely valid principle behind this trend is that restrictions on a
litigant's right to appeal and restrictions on a circuit court's right to
review substantive determinations of law should be drawn narrowly.
Furthermore, the Thermtron holding was based on a remand or-
der that was not issued, either actually or purportedly, under section
1447(c). aa Therefore, "any language [in Thermtron] about a situation
where a remand order purports to be issued under § 1447(c) but is
not actually based on a ground specified therein is dictum." 9 In this
light, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mangold is consistent with the
holding of Thermtron.
Finally, the formidable problem to be avoided by a mechanical
remand statute is an unnecessary and costly shifting of cases between
state and federal courts. In this respect, it makes more sense to read
section 1447(d), prohibiting review of remand orders under section
1447(c), as an attempt to quickly and easily decide jurisdictional issues
before contentious substantive issues arise.9" The Mangold decision is
precisely the sort of complex substantive review that, whatever the out-
come, should not be precluded by an artificially mechanical remand
statute.
b. Extension of Absolute Immunity to Contractors. -Despite the
Fourth Circuit's characterization of its extension of immunity to the
ANSER defendants as a "small step,""' it is a step supported primarily
by policy, not precedent. Neither of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Yearsley and Boyle can be read to cover even a simple extension of fed-
eral absolute immunity to government contractors.92 In fact, aside
from these two cases, the majority in Mangold cites no prior example
of an extension of federal absolute immunity to government contrac-
tors.93 Additionally, responding to the questions of investigators is
clearly not within the "scope" of ANSER's duties. Yet the existence of
discretionary action within the scope of official duties is an element of
the Westfall formulation of federal absolute immunity.94 Similarly, the
majority's citations to common law extensions of testimonial immu-
88. Thermtron Prods. Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343-44 (1976).
89. Mark Herrmann, Thermtron Revisited: Wien and How Federal Trial Court Remand
Orders Are Reviewable, 19 ARiz. ST. LJ. 395, 407 n.67 (1987).
90. See id. at 414-15.
91. Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1448.
92. The Court in Boyle explicitly declined to pass on the question of an extension of
immunity to federal contractors. Boyle, 487 U.S. 500, 505 n.1 (1988).
93. See Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1442.
94. See Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 297-98 (1988).
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nity in judicial contexts do not support such immunity in quasi-judi-
cial contexts.95
Despite this lack of direct precedent, Supreme Court decisions
on absolute immunity increasingly emphasize a balancing test of pol-
icy considerations.9 6 This may reflect an increasing societal concern
with efficient government. This balancing of interests in Mangold sup-
ports the extension of absolute immunity. Chief Justice Warren, dis-
senting in Barr v. Matteo, opined that "[r]eleases to the public from
the executive branch of government imply far greater dangers to the
individual claiming to have been defamed than do internal libels."97
In the case of internal investigations, as in Mangold, the internal na-
ture of the communication is less likely to do harm than a "public"
release. Furthermore, statements volunteered in this type of investiga-
tion can be weighed accordingly, and if discredited by other facts, the
statements would remain clothed in confidentiality and have no repu-
tation-damaging impact.
Similarly, the same policy considerations that support absolute
immunity for testimony in a judicial setting support the extension of
absolute immunity in a quasi-judicial internal investigation.9" Without
absolute tort protection, witnesses in official investigations might
either decline to testify or alter their testimony to avoid perceived lia-
bility.99 Also, as in the instant case, the general shroud of confidenti-
ality that covers many governmental activities may produce fewer
people who are able or willing to testify. Therefore, those in a posi-
tion to cooperate with internal investigations must be encouraged to
volunteer testimony. Additionally, contractors that depend to a large
extent on continued employment with the government may view co-
operation in an official investigation as a duty, whether contractually
required or not, thereby creating an expectation of immunity from
suit and naturally encouraging truthful responses.
Absolute immunity cases, however, do not lend themselves to
bright line rules. Therefore, the Mangold majority properly created a
narrow holding that applies only to federal contractors' responsive
95. See MangoId 77 F.3d at 1448.
96. In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court's
balancing test of federal and private interests was implicit only. However, in Westfa//, the
Court more explicitly weighed the interests at stake: "Courts should.., consider whether
the contribution to effective government in particular contexts outweighs the potential
harm to individual citizens." Westfall, 484 U.S. at 299.
97. Barr, 360 U.S. at 583 (Warren, CJ., dissenting).
98. The majority, in discussing immunity for testimony, emphasized the underlying
policy considerations. See Mangold, 77 F.3d at 1449.
99. See id.
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statements made in the course of official internal governmental inves-
tigations.1"' Absolute immunity cases can be adjudicated fairly only by
applying balancing tests to the particular factual contexts in question.
5. Conclusion.-The Mangold decision represents a circuitous
path toward a more efficient federal government. It first stretches the
Thermtron exception to nonreviewability of cases remanded to state
court purportedly under section 1447(c), thus ensuring important
substantive issues a second hearing on appeal. It then construes the
policy behind existing case law on federal employee absolute immu-
nity as authorizing the extension of absolute immunity to contractors.
Finally, it uses the long-recognized privilege of absolute immunity for
witnesses testifying in judicial settings as a mandate for the similar pro-
tection of statements made to governmental investigators by govern-
ment contractors in the course of official investigations. The result is
an unprecedented leap toward a new brand of absolute immunity for
government contractors.
SEAN L. BROHAWN




A. Providing Title VII Protections to Former Employees
In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a former employee could
not bring a claim of retaliation against his employer, pursuant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),2 for retaliatory actions
that took place after his termination from employment.3 The Fourth
Circuit's decision to interpret the term "employee," as used in Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision, to mean current employees4 consti-
tuted a departure from the trend among other Federal Circuit Courts
of Appeals to read the provision more broadly to include former em-
ployees. Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous
decision, reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Robinson.5 Apply-
ing well-established canons of statutory interpretation, the Supreme
Court found the language of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision am-
biguous and, taking into consideration the important overall remedial
goals of Title VII, appropriately rejected the Fourth Circuit's narrow
interpretation.6
1. The Case.-Shell Oil Company (Shell) terminated Charles
Robinson (Robinson) from his position as a territory sales representa-
tive on October 13, 1991.' Immediately following his termination,
Robinson filed a charge of discrimination with the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),8 alleging that
1. 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). Section 704(a) provides, in pertinent part: "It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees or applicants for employment ... because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing [regard-
ing a Title VII discrimination charge]." Id.
3. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 327.
4. Id.
5. 117 S. Ct. 843, 849 (1997).
6. Id. at 848.
7. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-1562, 1995 WL 25831, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 18,
1995).




Shell had fired him because of his race, in violation of Title VII.9
While that charge was pending, Robinson applied for a position with
the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan)." ° Metro-
politan had indicated that it would hire Robinson for the position,
contingent upon a favorable employment reference from Shell."
Shell, using Metropolitan's reference form, rated Robinson as "poor"
in all areas. 2
Robinson subsequently filed suit against Shell, alleging that Shell
gave the negative reference in retaliation for his having filed an EEOC
charge, thereby violating section 704(a) of Title VII.1' Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6), 1" Shell moved to have
Robinson's retaliation claim dismissed,' 5 arguing that Robinson, as a
former employee, was not protected by Title VII's anti-retaliation pro-
vision. 6 The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
granted Shell's motion and dismissed Robinson's complaint.17 Robin-
son appealed to the Fourth Circuit, where a divided panel reversed
the district court's dismissal.' The Fourth Circuit subsequently va-
cated the panel decision, however, and after a rehearing en banc af-
firmed the district court's action.19 The Supreme Court unanimously
reversed, holding that former employees may state a cognizable Title
VII claim for post-employment retaliation.2 °
2. Legal Background.-
a. Anti-retaliation Statutes.--Congress has enacted several
statutes designed to eradicate employer retaliation against employees
who attempt to assert their rights under federal labor statutes. Title
VII prohibits discrimination against an employee who "has opposed
... an unlawful employment practice ... or because he has made a
9. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 327.
10. Robinson, No. 93-1562, 1995 WL 25831 at *1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 327. Robinson's race discrimination charge was resolved in
favor of Shell in a separate proceeding. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 95-1376, 1996
WL 341308, at *3 n.1 (1996). Thus, the only question before the court was whether Robin-
son, as a former employee, qualified for protection under Title VII.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (providing for dismissal of plaintiff's claim for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
15. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 327.
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
17. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 327.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 328.
20. Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846.
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charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investi-
gation, proceeding, or hearing."2' Similarly, the Fair Labor Standards
Act 2 (FLSA) makes it unlawful "to discharge or . ..discriminate
against any employee because such employee has filed [a] complaint
or instituted... [a] proceeding under [the FLSA] or has testified...
in any such proceeding."23 In addition, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) 4 makes it "unlawful for an employer to dis-
criminate against any of his employees... because such individual...
has opposed any practice made unlawful" under the Act or because
the individual has filed an ADEA charge or has "testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litiga-
tion" under the ADEA. 5
Several cases pre-dating Robinson indicate that the Supreme Court
favors interpreting anti-retaliation provisions broadly, thereby effectu-
ating Congress's intent that employees report suspected violations of
federal labor statutes. 6 For example, in Mitchell v. Robert DeMarioJew-
elty, Inc., 7 the Supreme Court held that, under the FLSA, courts may
properly order employers to reinstate and "reimburse employees, un-
lawfully discharged or otherwise discriminated against, for wages lost
because of that discharge or discrimination."28 The Court noted that
"[b]y the proscription of retaliatory acts set forth in [the FLSA], and
its enforcement in equity .... Congress sought to foster a climate in
which compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be
enhanced."29 Therefore, the Court concluded, it could not "read the
Act as presenting those it sought to protect with what is little more
than a Hobson's choice."30  Similarly, in NLRB v. Scrivener, the
Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)32
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a) (3) (1994). Generally, the FLSA establishes minimum standards
"necessary for health, efficiency, and general well being of workers." Id. § 202(a).
23. Id. § 215(a) (3).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1994). The ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age
(forty-years-old and older) in employment. Id.
25. Id.
26. See NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1972) (holding that discharging em-
ployees suspected of providing statements to an NLRB investigator violated the NLRA);
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292-93 (1960) (holding that an
employer that discharged an employee for filing a FLSA complaint violated the FLSA).
27. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
28. Id. at 296.
29. Id. at 292.
30. Id. at 293.
31. 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-185 (1994) (prohibiting employers from considering a person's
union involvement when making employment decisions).
[VOL. 56:11781180
U.S. SUPREME COURT
should be interpreted broadly to protect an employee who gives a
sworn affidavit to federal investigators during an investigation of un-
fair labor practices and not just "to protect an employee against an
employer's reprisal only for filing an unfair labor practice charge or
for giving testimony at a formal hearing.""3 In so ruling, the Court rea-
soned that to construe the NLRA's anti-retaliation provision "to pro-
tect the employee during the investigative stages, as well as in
connection with the filing of a formal charge or the giving of formal
testimony, comports with the objective of that section." 4 Further, the
Court noted prior cases in which it had firmly held: "'Congress has
made it clear that it wishes all persons with information about such
practices to be completely free from coercion against reporting them
to the Board."'' 5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Robinson to resolve a
split among the Circuit Courts of Appeals as to whether a former em-
ployee may bring a Title VII retaliation claim for retaliatory acts taken
by an employer after the employment relationship has ended. 6 Prior
to the Fourth Circuit's decision, six Circuit Courts of Appeals had
held that Title VII plaintiffs were protected from post-employment re-
taliation. 7 In Bailey v. USX Corp., 8 the Eleventh Circuit concluded
33. Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 121.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 121 (quoting Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 238 (1967)).
36. Robinson, 117 S. CL at 846.
37. See Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198-200 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
that a former employee may file a Title VII claim for former employer's retaliatory conduct
that occurred after the employment relationship ended); EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d
541, 543 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a former employee may state a Title VII retaliation
claim when a co-employee is dismissed for engaging in protected activity on the former
employee's behalf); Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding
that former employees may sue under Title VII for retaliatory conduct by a former em-
ployer); O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that former
employees who alleged that former employer refused to rehire them and gave them bad
recommendations because they filed EEOC charges stated cognizable Title VII retaliation
claims), ovemded on other grounds, Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1481-
82 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir.
1978) (per curiam) (holding that Title VII's prohibition against retaliation for filing an
EEOC charge applies to former employees); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce,
565 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that a former employee is protected under
Title VII from retaliatory actions and that informing a former employee's prospective em-
ployer about a filing with EEOC constituted retaliatory conduct).
Several Circuit Courts of Appeals have similarly interpreted the anti-retaliation provi-
sions of other labor and employment statutes broadly. See, e.g., Passer v. American Chem.
Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the anti-retaliation provision in the
ADEA includes former employees so long as the retaliation arises from the employment
relationship); EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
former employee was protected under the ADEA's provision prohibiting retaliation against
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that a former employee did state a cognizable claim under section
704(a), and the court reasoned that "a strict and narrow interpreta-
tion of the word 'employee' to exclude former employees would un-
dercut the obvious remedial purposes of Title VII."'  Similarly, in
Rutheford v. American Bank of Commerce,' the Tenth Circuit held that a
former employee stated a cognizable claim because "[a] statute which
is remedial in nature should be liberally construed."4" The Tenth Cir-
cuit also noted that the problem of retaliation against former employ-
ees is very real because everyone needs to provide references to secure
new employment.42
Further, in EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co.,43 the Sixth Circuit held that a
former employee stated a cognizable claim under section 704(a) be-
cause courts should interpret retaliation provisions in employment
statutes "consistent with the objective of the Act which is to prohibit
retaliation against protected activity."'
In Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co.,45 the Second Circuit held that for-
mer employees state cognizable section 704(a) claims because a literal
reading of the statute would not give effect to Tite VII's remedial
goals.' Commenting on Congress's explicit inclusion of "applicants
for employment" in Title VII but omission of "former employees," the
Second Circuit stated: "An applicant for employment, unlike a for-
mer employee, may not be described as an 'employee' . .. [but] once
an employment relationship has been created, use of the term 'em-
ployee' in referring to a former employee, while colloquial, is not
inappropriate."47
Recognizing that its decision in Robinson ran contrary to the view
of several other circuits, the Fourth Circuit attempted to garner sup-
port from the Seventh Circuit's decision in Reed v. Shepard.4" In Reed,
"employees or applicants for employment"); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139,
142 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that a former employee was protected by the FLSA's anti-
retaliation provision).
38. 850 F.2d 1506 (lth Cir. 1988).
39. Id. at 1509.
40. 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
41. Id. at 1165.
42. Id. at 1166.
43. 7 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 1993).
44. Id. at 545; see also Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198-200 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding that a former employee may file a Title VII claim for former employer's
retaliatory conduct that occurred after the employment relationship ended).
45. 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
46. Id. at 1055.
47. Id.
48. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
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a former employee of a county correctional facility sued her former
employer for violations of Title VII, alleging that she was fired because
she had complained of gender discrimination.49 The former em-
ployee identified the post-employment retaliatory actions taken
against her as "a mysterious attack on her person by a disguised assail-
ant urging her to drop her case," "disturbing late-night phone calls
threatening her with reprisals for her lawsuit," and "shooting at her
car with a gun while she was driving."10 The Seventh Circuit held that
Reed had not been retaliated against under section 704(a) because
"the alleged retaliatory activities took place after the termination of
Reed's employment.""' In Robinson, the Fourth Circuit interpreted
this holding to mean that section 704(a) does not cover former em-
ployees.52 The Seventh Circuit, however, later repudiated the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of Reed in Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc.,53 stat-
ing that "Reed contains an important qualification... [that] excludes
from the realm of actionable retaliation only those post-termination
acts which are unrelated to the plaintiffs employment."54 Thus, the
Seventh Circuit explained, it had dismissed the former employee's re-
taliation claim in Reed because the acts of retaliation alleged were not
related to employment, not because she was a former employee. 55
b. Interpreting the Term "Employee".-In enacting Title VII,
Congress attempted to address workplace discrimination in a compre-
hensive manner. Therefore, courts often rely on the interpretations
of other federal labor law statutes, such as the FLSA, the NLRA, and
the ADEA, to interpret Title VII. 56 Courts have frequently interpreted
49. Id. at 485-86.
50. Id. at 492.
51. Id.
52. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 331.
53. 87 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VII anti-retaliation claims by
former employees are cognizable so long as they relate to the employment relationship).
Limiting the scope of former employees' Title VII protections to prohibitions on retalia-
tory acts that arise out of the employment relationship has been a subject of debate among
commentators. See Patricia A. Moore, Parting Is Such Sweet Sorrow: The Application of Title VI
to Post-Employment Retaliation, 62 FoRDHAM L REv. 205, 219 (1993) (arguing that Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision should only apply to post-employment retaliatory actions related
to employment). But see Sandra Tafuri, Note, Title V's Antiretaliation Provision: Are Employ-
ees Protected After the Employment Relationship Has Ended , 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 797, 800 (1996)
(arguing that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision must be interpreted broadly to achieve
Title VI's basic purpose-the elimination of employment discrimination).
54. Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 888 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 886.
56. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723-24 (1947) (stating
that statutes enacted as "part of... social legislation ... of the same general character" are
persuasive when interpreting any of the statutes individually).
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the term "employee" to include former employees under these stat-
utes. For example, the term "employee" in the anti-retaliation provi-
sion of the FLSA has been interpreted to include former employees
who have alleged post-employment retaliation.57 Additionally, the
Fifth and D.C. Circuits have interpreted the term "employee" in the
anti-retaliation provision of the ADEA to extend to former employ-
ees.5" The language of Title VII's section 704(a) is almost identical to
the ADEA's anti-retaliation provision.59
Significantly, prior to its decision in Robinson, the Supreme Court
also interpreted the term "employee" in one federal labor statute
broadly and in a manner consistent with its purpose. In NLRB v. Town
& Country Electric, Inc.,6" a case brought under the NLRA, the Court
granted certiorari to decide whether a worker can be "a company's
'employee' within the terms of the [NLRA] if, at the same time, a
union pays that worker to help the union organize the company."6
The plaintiff alleged that an employer's refusal to hire workers who
were also paid union organizers violated the NLRA.62 The Eighth Cir-
cuit had held that the term "employee" did "not cover (and therefore
the Act does not protect from antiunion discrimination) those who
work for a company while a union simultaneously pays them to organ-
ize that company."6 Also like Robinson, the Court used Town & Coun-
try Electric to resolve a disagreement among the circuits regarding the
interpretation of the term "employees."'
57. See Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 147 (6th Cir. 1977) (stating that a
former employee who had "voluntarily separated from his employer is protected from dis-
crimination by his former employer" under the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision).
58. In EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987), in which the Fifth Circuit
held that while the ADEA's anti-retaliation provision applies to "employees or applicants
for employment," former employees are included in this category because "[t] he term 'em-
ployee'. . . is interpreted broadly: it includes a former employee as long as the alleged
discrimination is related to or arises out of the employment relationship." Id at 1088.
Similarly, in Passer v. American Chemical Society, 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the D.C.
Circuit held that section 623 (d) of the ADEA prohibited retaliation against former employ-
ees because "[t]o read the statute otherwise would be to deny protection to any person
who has suffered discharge or termination due to unlawful discrimination. Obviously,
Congress could not have intended such an absurd result." Id. at 331.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1994).
60. 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995).
61. Id. at 452 (citation omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Town & Country Elec. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1994), vacated, 116 S.
Ct. 450 (1995). The Eighth Circuit had concluded that the NLRA did not protect employ-
ees who received money from a union for organizing on the union's behalf in addition to
their regular pay. Id.; see also H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 75 (4th Cir. 1989)
(same). The D.C. and Second Circuits, however, had reached the opposite conclusion in
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In Town & Country Electric, the Court established valuable guide-
lines for evaluating the proper scope of interpretation of labor stat-
utes: (1) the term "employee," as used in federal labor statutes that
provide workers with protections from discrimination and unfair la-
bor practices, should be broadly construed;65 and (2) the agency re-
sponsible for enforcing the statute's provisions receives deference in
defining the scope of employees entitled to protection. 66
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In reversing the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion to exclude former employees from Title VII's protection,67 the
Supreme Court first rejected the Fourth Circuit's finding that the
meaning of the term "employee" was clear on its face.6" Looking to
the "language [of the statute itself], the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole,"6 9
the Court found the meaning of the term "employee" ambiguous,
thus requiring inquiry beyond the plain language of the statute."°
The Court offered three justifications for its finding that the term
"employee," as used in Title VII, was ambiguous. First, the Court held,
section 704(a) contains no "temporal qualifier" that clearly restricts
that section's protections to only those individuals currently employed
at the time the alleged retaliation took place.71 The Court rejected
the argument that, because Congress could have used the phrase "for-
mer employees" in section 704(a), but chose not to, former employees
were excluded from section 704(a) protections.7' The Court noted
that the reverse argument could be made: that Congress could have
used the phrase "current employees" in section 704(a) and other pro-
visions of Title VII, but did not.73 The Court maintained that Con-
gress's occasional, specific use of the term "employee" means only that
Congress can use employees as an unqualified term, not that Congress
did so in Title VII. 7 4 The Court also distinguished its holding in Wal-
Wilmar Electric Sewice, Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 909 (1992) and NLRB v. Henlopen Manufacturing Co., 599 F.2d 26, 30 (2nd Cir.
1979).
65. Town & County Elec., 116 S. Ct. at 454.
66. Id. at 455. As it did in Robinson, the Supreme Court gave deference to the position
of the agency charged with enforcing the provisions of the Act. See infra notes 118-122 and
accompanying text.
67. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 327.
68. Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846.








ters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc.,75 in which the Court in-
terpreted the term "employee," as used in section 701 (b) of the Act,
to refer only to current employees.76 Section 701(b) sets out the
number of individuals an employer must employ before it will be sub-
ject to the provisions of Title VII. 7 7 The Court concluded that be-
cause Title VII liability attaches only when an employer employs
fifteen or more individuals, the most fair and accurate way to assess
the number of employees an employer has is to count only those em-
ployees currently on the payroll. 78 Because section 701 (b) contains
two temporal qualifiers, the Court concluded that only current em-
ployees should be counted for purposes of exposure to Title VII. 79 By
contrast, the Court noted, section 704(a) lacks any such temporal
qualifier.80
Second, the Court held that Title VII's definitional section, sec-
tion 701 (f), which defines the term "employee" for the purpose of
reading Title VII, also lacks a temporal qualifier.8 ' The Court stated
that section 701 (f)'s definition of employee-"an individual employed
by an employer"S2-could be read to mean either "is employed" or
"was employed."8" Thus, Title VII can properly be read to apply to
both current and former employees. In addition, the Court rejected
the argument that the common meaning of the term "employed"-
"[p] erforming work under an employer-employee relationship"8 4-is
the intended meaning of Title VII's definitional section.85 The Court
concluded that relying on the common definition merely "begs the
question by implicitly reading the word 'employed' to mean 'is em-
ployed."'86 Instead, the Court maintained, the term "employed"
"could just as easily be read to mean 'was employed.' 87
Third, the Court held that several Title VII provisions "use the
term 'employees' to mean something more inclusive or different than
75. 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997).
76. Id. at 664 (holding that for the purposes of section 701(b), "employees" refers only
to persons who have an existing relationship with the employer).
77. Id. at 662-63. Section 701(b) states that Title VII applies to employers "who ha[ve]
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year." Id. at 663.
78. Id.
79. Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 846 n.2.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 846.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).
83. Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 847.
84. BiACI's LAw DICTIONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990).





'current employees. ' " " The Court cited, for example, several sections
of Title VII in which the term "employee" can only be read as refer-
ring to former employees.89 For instance, the Court observed:
Section 717(b) requires federal departments and agencies to
have equal employment opportunity policies and rules,
"which shall include a provision that an employee or appli-
cant for employment shall be notified of any final action
taken on any complaint of discrimination filed by him there-
under." If the complaint involves discriminatory discharge,
as it often does, the "employee" who must be notified is nec-
essarily a former employee.9"
Likewise, the Court also cited to several Title VII provisions in which
the term "employee" clearly refers only to current employees. 91
The Court stated that these instances only prove that "the term
'employees' may have a plain meaning in the context of a particular
section-not that the term has the same meaning in all other sections
and in all other contexts."92 Thus, the Court concluded, "the term
standing alone is necessarily ambiguous."9 3 The Court determined
that, because of these varying meanings of the term "employee,"
courts must individually scrutinize each section of Title VII to deter-
mine whether its context limits the scope of the term "employee."94
The Court specifically rejected the Fourth Circuit's position that
if Congress intended to protect former employees, it would have done
so expressly just as it had specifically protected "applicants" for em-
88. Id.
89. The Court also pointed to section 706(g) (1), which authorizes a court to order
"affirmative remedial action," including the "'reinstatement ... of employees,'" if it finds
that an employer intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice. Id. (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1) (1994)). Clearly, because an employer cannot be ordered to
reinstate an individual whom it has never employed, this section necessarily refers to former
employees. Similarly, section 717(b) authorizes the EEOC to order reinstatement as a rem-
edy when a federal agency is the employer. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (1994)).
90. Id. (citation omitted).
91. Id. For example, the Court pointed to section 703(h), which states that merely
varying compensation standards for "'employees who work in different locations,'" will not
be a prohibited employment practice under Title VII, and section 717(b), which instructs
federal agency and department heads to formulate training plans designed "to provide a
maximum opportunity for employees to advance so as to perform at their highest poten-
tial." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(h), 2000e-16(b)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Court also rejected the argument that the use of the term "his" employees
restricts the scope of protection offered by section 704(a). The Court stated that "his"
provides no guidance as to the time frame in which the employment relationship must
exist in order for an employee to be protected by section 704(a). Id. at 847-48.
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ployment under section 704(a). 9 The Court found this reasoning
flawed because it improperly equates the term "applicants" for em-
ployment with "future employees."96 The Court observed that "the
term 'applicants' would seem to cover many persons who will not be-
come employees [including] [u]nsuccessful applicants or those who
turn down ajob offer"9 7 and that "the term fails to cover certain fu-
ture employees who may be offered and will accept jobs without hav-
ing to apply for [them]."8 Thus, because the term "applicants" can
be construed to include individuals other than employees, the Court
held that "there is no basis for engaging in the further (and questiona-
ble) negative inference that inclusion of the term 'applicants' demon-
strates intentional exclusion of former employees. "9
Having concluded that the term "employees" in section 704(a) is
ambiguous, the Court next examined the context of the statute as a
whole in order to determine the scope of the term "employee."1"'
The Court reasoned that resolving the ambiguity to include, rather
than exclude, former employees is more consistent with the overall
purposes of the Act.1" 1 For example, the Court found that because
section 703(a) prohibits discriminatory discharge, only a former em-
ployee could file for an alleged violation of section 703(a).1°2 Fur-
ther, because section 704(a) "expressly protects employees from
retaliation for filing a 'charge' under Title VII," the Court concluded
that "it is far more consistent to include former employees within the
scope of 'employees' protected by § 704(a).'q The Court also found
persuasive the EEOC's position that, if courts interpret the term "em-
ployees" to exclude former employees, much of the protection section
704(a) offers would be effectively eliminated. 10 4 Specifically, the
Court adopted the EEOC's argument that denying Title VII's protec-
95. Id. at 848.
96. Id. at 846-47. The Court found that "the use of the term 'individual' in § 704(a), as
well as in § 703(a) ... provides no meaningful assistance in resolving this case." Id. at 848
(citation omitted). The Court reasoned that "'individual' is a broader term than 'em-
ployee' and would facially seem to cover a former employee... [and] would also encom-
pass a present employee as well as other persons who have never had an employment
relationship with the employer at issue." Id. For these reasons, the Court concluded that
the term "individual" "provides no insight into whether the term 'employees' is limited
only to current employees." Id.










tions to former employees "would provide a perverse incentive for em-
ployers to fire employees who might bring Title VII claims." 105
Moreover, the Court found that because the general purpose of anti-
retaliation provisions in statutes is to maintain "unfettered" access to
"statutory remedial mechanisms, " "' it would be illogical and inconsis-
tent to deny a remedy to former employees who experienced retalia-
tion after the employment relationship had ended.10 7
4. Analysis.-In Robinson, the Supreme Court correctly con-
cluded that the Fourth Circuit ignored the proper rules of statutory
interpretation." 8 In light of the Fourth Circuit's heavy reliance on
the rules of statutory interpretation in deciding the issue,10 9 the
Supreme Court likewise devoted most of its opinion to demonstrating
how the Fourth Circuit had co-opted the rules of statutory interpreta-
tion. Consequently, the Supreme Court failed to squarely address the
important policy considerations that make the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion untenable.
Specifically, in Robinson, the Fourth Circuit stated that it inter-
preted section 704 by looking only at the plain meaning of the statu-
tory language." 0 Nevertheless, had the Fourth Circuit actually
heeded the rule pronounced by the Supreme Court in Estate of Cowart
v. Nicklos Drilling Co.,"' it could not have concluded that the term
"employee" was unambiguous. Proper adherence to the rules of statu-
tory interpretation would have forced the Fourth Circuit to examine
the term "employee" in the broader context of Title VII, which implic-
itly includes both current and former employees and applicants for
employment. 
1 2
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that "[a]lthough the
rules of statutory construction do not require us to proceed further,
several other important considerations support our interpretation of
the anti-retaliation provision.""s Thus, the Fourth Circuit not only
105. Id. (citing Brief for United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18-21, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S.
Ct. 843 (1997) (No. 95-1376)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
109. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 332.
110. Id. at 330.
111. 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992) (stating that when the language of a statute is clear, judi-
cial inquiry into the meaning of the statute ceases).
112. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g)(1), 2000e-16(b) (providing for relief which in-
cludes reinstatement or hiring of employees).
113. Robinson, 70 F.3d at 330.
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recognized that the broader context and purpose of a statute inform
the court's interpretation of that statute-as the Court indicated in
Cowart-but also that the Fourth Circuit's view that "employees" is an
unambiguous term was tenuous at best, intellectually dishonest at
worst.
Circuits that allow former employees to state cognizable claims
under Tide VII are merely allowing employees a forum in which to
bring their concerns. Because such an approach is consistent with
congressional intent, the Supreme Court correctly required the
Fourth Circuit to conform to the guidelines1 1 4 for interpreting stat-
utes generally, and labor statutes particularly.
a. Ignoring the Message of Town & Country Electric.-The
Fourth Circuit erred not only in ignoring the decisions of its sister
circuits, but the message sent by the Supreme Court as well. The
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted remedial statutes in a
manner consistent with their purpose.115 Although Town & Country
Electric is distinguishable from Robinson,"6 the Town & Country Electric
Court sent clear signals to the lower courts that labor statutes afford-
ing protection to employees against retaliation should be broadly con-
strued, a point patently disregarded by the Fourth Circuit." 7
b. EEOC Amicus Brief- -The Supreme Court largely adopted
the arguments put forth by the EEOC in its Amicus Brief."' The
EEOC argued that the language of section 704(a) was ambiguous,
"[a] nd in construing a statute, the Court should adopt that sense of its
words which best promotes the policy and objectives of the legisla-
ture.""' 9 The EEOC emphasized the varying meanings of the term
"employee" within the context of Title VII and the need to interpret
the term "with reference to the particular context in which it ap-
114. See supra notes 68-70.
115. See NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) (holding that employer that dis-
charged employees based on a belief that they gave sworn statements to NLRB investigator
violated the NLRA); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)
(holding that an employer may be ordered to reimburse former employees for lost wages
when they were discharged for alleging that their employer violated the FLSA).
116. In Town & Country Electric, the plaintiff-employee was still actively working for the
defendant-employer at the time the suit was filed. Town & Country Electric, 116 S. Ct. at
452.
117. See Robinson, 70 F.3d 325, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 843
(1997).
118. See Amicus Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16-25, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117
S. Ct. 843 (1997) (No. 95-1376).
119. Id. at 16.
1190 [VOL. 56:1178
U.S. SUPREME COURT
pears."1"' The EEOC argued that the "[u]se of the word 'employee'
to refer to a former employee is consistent with the common use of
the term." 1 ' The EEOC also noted the circularity in the definition of
"employee" provided in Title VII's definitional section. 122
c. Policy Considerations.--At oral argument, an ongoing col-
loquy took place over the problems inherent in giving references re-
garding former and current employees to prospective employers.
1 2 3
Counsel for Shell acknowledged that because many employers provide
references for current employees when contacted by a prospective em-
ployer, the problems presented by allowing the issuance of a negative
reference to constitute retaliation was not squarely before the Court
in this case. 24 Moreover, Shell's counsel conceded that many state
legislatures are currently addressing the issue of liability for employers
that provide negative references.125 Twenty-five states have enacted
legislation to protect employers from the threat of having to defend a
defamation action brought by an employee who disagrees with the
reference provided.126 For example, in Maryland, employers are im-
120. Id. at 11.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Id. at 14.
123. See Transcript at 39-53, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997) (No. 95-
1376), available in 1996 WL 656475.
124. Id. at 40.
125. Id.
126. In 1994, the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) in Washington,
D.C., which represents 77,000 mid- to large-size employers, began a nationwide effort to
urge states to pass legislation that would grant immunity to employers that provide good
faith employment references. SeeJulie Forster, 25 States Adopt 'Good Faith'Job Reference Laws
to Shield Businesses from Liability, WEsr's LEGAL NEWS, July 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL
363324. As a result, in 1995 and 1996, half of the states enacted statutes granting employ-
ers job-reference immunity. Id. See, e.g., CAL. Cw. CODE § 47 (West 1996) (stating that
under California's "common interest" privilege, a party is immune for statements made to
another regarding a person of common interest to both parties); Quality in Hiring Act,
1996 Del. Laws ch. 367 (1996) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 708) (granting
civil immunity to an employer that, in good faith, discloses information about a current or
former employee's job performance or work-related characteristics, actions which consti-
tute a violation of law, and evaluations of ability to perform job duties that may include
comparisons with other employees); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West Supp. 1997) (provid-
ing qualified civil immunity for an employer's good faith disclosures about a former em-
ployee's job performance made at the request of the former employee or the former
employee's prospective employer); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1996) (providing civil
immunity to employers that make good faith disclosures about the job performance, un-
lawful conduct, or job-related capabilities of a current or former employee upon request of
that employee or that employee's prospective employer); 1996 La. Sess. Law Serv. 632
(West) (to be codified at L& REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:291) (granting civil immunity for an
employer's good faith disclosure about a current or former employee's job performance
made at the request of the employee); Mic-. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.452 (West 1996)
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mune from suit for their good faith disclosures about the job perform-
ance of a current or former employee or the reason for terminating a
former employee.1 2 7 With the rest of the nation following suit, the
argument that allowing former employees to bring a retaliatory action
claim under Title VII destroys the vital exchange of honest informa-
tion about employees is practically rendered moot. The important
policy question that emerges from Robinson is how soon after the em-
ployment relationship has ended must an alleged act of retaliation
occur in order to be actionable under Title VII? Moreover, will the
Court read Title VII to include protection from non-employment re-
lated forms of retaliation such as harassment, bodily harm, or prop-
erty damage?
5. Conclusion.-The Supreme Court correctly held-consistent
with the rules of statutory interpretation and broad policy considera-
tions-that former employees may bring claims of retaliation against
their former employers under Title VII. The Fourth Circuit's holding
to the contrary represented an attempt to co-opt the rules of statutory
interpretation in order to limit employee access to the courts, contra-
vening congressional intent. Although the Supreme Court appropri-
ately reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision, significant policy issues
remain.
TRAcE" H. COHEN
(granting qualified civil immunity to employers that in good faith disclose job perform-
ance-related information contained in personnel files); 1996 Ohio Legis. Bull. 134 (Ander-
son) (to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.71) (providing qualified civil
immunity to employers that disclose job-related information about current or former em-
ployees); 1996 R.I. Pub. Laws 96-195 (to be codified at R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6.4-1) (granting
civil immunity to employers that, while acting in good faith and at the request of a current
or former employee or that employee's prospective employer, disclose fair, unbiased infor-
mation about that employee); 1996 S.C. Acts 281 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-
65) (granting employers civil immunity for disclosure of dates of employment, pay level,
and wage history to a prospective employer and for written responses to a prospective
employer's request for written evaluations, official notices indicating the reason for separa-
tion, and information about the employee's job performance and reason for separation, so
long as the employee has access to such information); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (1995)
(providing civil immunity for employers that disclose performance-related information to a
prospective employer). According to SHRM surveys, "the fear actually outweighs the
number of lawsuits that have been filed against employers." Forster, supra. Even in states
that have enacted employer-immunity statutes, some businesses continue to refuse to give
references for fear of being sued. See id. SHRM predicts that, as companies become more
aware of the protections these laws offer, the anxiety level about providing references will
lessen, and information between employers will more freely be exchanged. See id.
127. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-399.7 (1996).
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